FROM: FEDERAL DEPOSIT INSURANCE CORPORATION
January 14, 2014
Agencies Approve Interim Final Rule Authorizing Retention of Interests in and Sponsorship of Collateralized Debt Obligations Backed Primarily by Bank-Issued Trust Preferred Securities
Five federal agencies on Tuesday approved an interim final rule to permit banking entities to retain interests in certain collateralized debt obligations backed primarily by trust preferred securities (TruPS CDOs) from the investment prohibitions of section 619 of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, known as the Volcker rule.
Under the interim final rule, the agencies permit the retention of an interest in or sponsorship of covered funds by banking entities if the following qualifications are met:
the TruPS CDO was established, and the interest was issued, before May 19, 2010;
the banking entity reasonably believes that the offering proceeds received by the TruPS CDO were invested primarily in Qualifying TruPS Collateral; and
the banking entity’s interest in the TruPS CDO was acquired on or before December 10, 2013, the date the agencies issued final rules implementing section 619 of the Dodd-Frank Act.
The federal banking agencies on Tuesday also released a non-exclusive list of issuers that meet the requirements of the interim final rule.
The interim final rule defines Qualifying TruPS Collateral as any trust preferred security or subordinated debt instrument that was:
issued prior to May 19, 2010, by a depository institution holding company that as of the end of any reporting period within 12 months immediately preceding the issuance of such trust preferred security or subordinated debt instrument had total consolidated assets of less than $15 billion; or
issued prior to May 19, 2010, by a mutual holding company.
Section 171 of the Dodd-Frank Act provides for the grandfathering of trust preferred securities issued before May 19, 2010, by certain depository institution holding companies with total assets of less than $15 billion as of December 31, 2009, and by mutual holding companies established as of May 19, 2010. The TruPS CDO structure was the vehicle that gave effect to the use of trust preferred securities as a regulatory capital instrument prior to May 19, 2010, and was part of the status quo that Congress preserved with the grandfathering provision of section 171.
The interim final rule also provides clarification that the relief relating to these TruPS CDOs extends to activities of the banking entity as a sponsor or trustee for these securitizations and that banking entities may continue to act as market makers in TruPS CDOs.
The interim final rule was approved by the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, the Commodity Futures Trading Commission, and the Securities and Exchange Commission, the same agencies that issued final rules to implement section 619. The agencies will accept comment on the interim final rule for 30 days following publication of the interim final rule in the Federal Register.
Showing posts with label CDO. Show all posts
Showing posts with label CDO. Show all posts
Sunday, January 19, 2014
Tuesday, December 18, 2012
CDOs AND MISREPRESENTATION
FROM: U.S. SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION
Washington, D.C., Dec. 17, 2012 — The Securities and Exchange Commission today charged a Connecticut-based investment adviser with falsely stating to clients that it was co-investing alongside them in two collateralized debt obligations (CDO).
The SEC’s investigation found that Aladdin Capital Management’s co-investment representation was a key feature and selling point for its Multiple Asset Securitized Tranche (MAST) advisory program involving CDOs and collateralized loan obligations (CLOs). For example, Aladdin Capital Management asked in one marketing piece, "Why is an investor better off just investing in Aladdin sponsored CLOs and CDOs?" It then emphasized that the "most powerful response I can give to your question is that Aladdin co-invests alongside MAST investors in every program. Putting meaningful ‘skin in the game’ as we do means our financial interests are aligned with those of our MAST investors." Aladdin Capital Management in fact made no such investments in either CDO, and its affiliated broker-dealer Aladdin Capital collected placement fees from the CDO underwriters.
Aladdin Capital Management and Aladdin Capital agreed to pay more than $1.6 million combined to settle the SEC’s charges. One of the firms’ former executives Joseph Schlim agreed to pay a $50,000 penalty to settle charges against him for his role in the misrepresentations.
"If you sell an investment with the pitch that you are co-investing and have ‘skin in the game,’ then you better actually have ‘skin in the game,’" said Robert Khuzami, Director of the SEC’s Enforcement Division. "Such a representation by an investment adviser or broker-dealer is an important consideration to investors in complex products."
Kenneth Lench, Chief of the SEC Enforcement Division’s Structured and New Products Unit, added, "Aladdin marketed these CDOs via the co-investment representation, but then did not take steps to ensure that the representation was accurate. This action demonstrates our continuing commitment to holding market participants, including individuals, responsible for their misconduct leading up to the financial crisis."
According to the SEC’s orders instituting settled administrative proceedings, Aladdin Capital Management’s clients committed to investing in upcoming CDO deals that would be managed by the firm. Aladdin Capital Management inaccurately informed a municipal retirement plan, a pension plan, and an individual entrepreneur that it would co-invest alongside them. After those three clients invested in the two CDOs, Aladdin Management erroneously continued to inform clients from 2007 to 2010 that the firm had skin in the game.
According to the SEC’s order against Schlim, he was significantly involved in the MAST program on a day-to-day basis. He made sales calls to potential clients and negotiated with CDO and CLO underwriters about the amount of equity in those securities that Aladdin Capital could place with customers or purchase for itself. Schlim also negotiated the placement fees to be received by Aladdin Capital for securing MAST investments in equity tranches of each CDO or CLO.
The SEC found that Schlim knew that Aladdin used the co-investment representation as a significant marketing feature in its pitches to clients, but he failed to take any action to ensure that such representations were accurate when they were made. As the CFO of Aladdin, Schlim was responsible for reserving funds for Aladdin to co-invest alongside its MAST clients, yet he failed to ensure that funds were reserved or allocated for any co-investments alongside clients in either CDO.
Aladdin Capital Management and Schlim agreed to cease-and-desist orders without admitting or denying the SEC’s allegations. The Aladdin entities agreed to jointly pay $900,000 in disgorgement, $268,831 in prejudgment interest, and a $450,000 penalty. Schlim agreed to pay a $50,000 penalty.
The SEC’s investigation was conducted by James Goldman, Neil Smith, Kathleen Shields, and Kenneth Leung in the SEC’s Boston Regional Office. Mr. Goldman is a member of the Structured and New Products Unit. Mr. Leung participated in a related SEC examination of Aladdin Capital Management.
Washington, D.C., Dec. 17, 2012 — The Securities and Exchange Commission today charged a Connecticut-based investment adviser with falsely stating to clients that it was co-investing alongside them in two collateralized debt obligations (CDO).
The SEC’s investigation found that Aladdin Capital Management’s co-investment representation was a key feature and selling point for its Multiple Asset Securitized Tranche (MAST) advisory program involving CDOs and collateralized loan obligations (CLOs). For example, Aladdin Capital Management asked in one marketing piece, "Why is an investor better off just investing in Aladdin sponsored CLOs and CDOs?" It then emphasized that the "most powerful response I can give to your question is that Aladdin co-invests alongside MAST investors in every program. Putting meaningful ‘skin in the game’ as we do means our financial interests are aligned with those of our MAST investors." Aladdin Capital Management in fact made no such investments in either CDO, and its affiliated broker-dealer Aladdin Capital collected placement fees from the CDO underwriters.
Aladdin Capital Management and Aladdin Capital agreed to pay more than $1.6 million combined to settle the SEC’s charges. One of the firms’ former executives Joseph Schlim agreed to pay a $50,000 penalty to settle charges against him for his role in the misrepresentations.
"If you sell an investment with the pitch that you are co-investing and have ‘skin in the game,’ then you better actually have ‘skin in the game,’" said Robert Khuzami, Director of the SEC’s Enforcement Division. "Such a representation by an investment adviser or broker-dealer is an important consideration to investors in complex products."
Kenneth Lench, Chief of the SEC Enforcement Division’s Structured and New Products Unit, added, "Aladdin marketed these CDOs via the co-investment representation, but then did not take steps to ensure that the representation was accurate. This action demonstrates our continuing commitment to holding market participants, including individuals, responsible for their misconduct leading up to the financial crisis."
According to the SEC’s orders instituting settled administrative proceedings, Aladdin Capital Management’s clients committed to investing in upcoming CDO deals that would be managed by the firm. Aladdin Capital Management inaccurately informed a municipal retirement plan, a pension plan, and an individual entrepreneur that it would co-invest alongside them. After those three clients invested in the two CDOs, Aladdin Management erroneously continued to inform clients from 2007 to 2010 that the firm had skin in the game.
According to the SEC’s order against Schlim, he was significantly involved in the MAST program on a day-to-day basis. He made sales calls to potential clients and negotiated with CDO and CLO underwriters about the amount of equity in those securities that Aladdin Capital could place with customers or purchase for itself. Schlim also negotiated the placement fees to be received by Aladdin Capital for securing MAST investments in equity tranches of each CDO or CLO.
The SEC found that Schlim knew that Aladdin used the co-investment representation as a significant marketing feature in its pitches to clients, but he failed to take any action to ensure that such representations were accurate when they were made. As the CFO of Aladdin, Schlim was responsible for reserving funds for Aladdin to co-invest alongside its MAST clients, yet he failed to ensure that funds were reserved or allocated for any co-investments alongside clients in either CDO.
Aladdin Capital Management and Schlim agreed to cease-and-desist orders without admitting or denying the SEC’s allegations. The Aladdin entities agreed to jointly pay $900,000 in disgorgement, $268,831 in prejudgment interest, and a $450,000 penalty. Schlim agreed to pay a $50,000 penalty.
The SEC’s investigation was conducted by James Goldman, Neil Smith, Kathleen Shields, and Kenneth Leung in the SEC’s Boston Regional Office. Mr. Goldman is a member of the Structured and New Products Unit. Mr. Leung participated in a related SEC examination of Aladdin Capital Management.
Sunday, November 11, 2012
SEC CHARGES HEDGE FUND MAMAGER IN BATON ROUGE, LA., WITH DEFRAUDING INVESTORS
FROM: SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION
Washington, D.C., Nov. 8, 2012 — The Securities and Exchange Commission today charged a hedge fund manager in Baton Rouge, La., with defrauding investors by hiding millions of dollars in losses suffered during the financial crisis from investments tied to residential mortgage-backed securities (RMBS).
The SEC alleges that Walter A. Morales and his firm Commonwealth Advisors Inc. caused the hedge funds they managed to buy the lowest and riskiest tranches of a collateralized debt obligation (CDO) called Collybus. They sold mortgage-backed securities into the CDO at prices they had obtained four months earlier while knowing that the RMBS market had declined precipitously in the meantime. As the CDO investments continued to perform poorly, Morales instructed Commonwealth employees to conduct a series of manipulative trades between the hedge funds they advised (called cross-trades) in order to conceal a $32 million loss experienced by one of the funds in its Collybus investment. Morales and Commonwealth lied to investors about the amount and value of mortgage-backed assets held in the hedge funds, and they created phony internal documents to justify their false valuations.
"Morales and Commonwealth Advisors concealed significant hedge fund losses from investors, including pension fund investors, instead of owning up to them and facing the consequences," said Robert Khuzami, Director of the SEC’s Division of Enforcement. "Investors put their fundamental trust in the hands of their investment adviser, and they deserve better than being manipulated and lied to through deceptive trades and phony documents."
According to the SEC’s complaint filed in U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Louisiana, Commonwealth’s hedge fund clients included pension funds and individual investors. Morales and Commonwealth invested a significant portion of hedge fund assets in RMBS. When the mortgage markets began to decline dramatically in 2007, bond rating agencies began to aggressively downgrade subprime RMBS. Therefore, Commonwealth clients were sustaining heavy investment losses and Morales knew those losses would probably continue.
The SEC alleges that rather than come clean with investors, Morales directed Commonwealth to execute more than 150 deceptive cross-trades from two hedge funds they advised to another one of their hedge funds in June 2008 at prices below Commonwealth’s own valuation for those securities. After the trades, Morales directed a Commonwealth employee to mark the securities at fair market value, which created a fraudulent $19 million gain for the acquiring hedge fund at the expense of the funds that sold. Morales ordered the cross-trades even though Commonwealth had represented in forms filed with the SEC that it would not execute such trades between these hedge fund clients. Moreover, when the trades raised concern from the prime broker, Morales falsely represented that the transactions were for a legitimate business purpose and at prevailing market prices.
The SEC further alleges that Morales deceived Commonwealth’s largest investor about its exposure to the CDO. Morales agreed to limit the investor’s exposure to Collybus through its investment in a particular Commonwealth hedge fund to 10 percent of that hedge fund’s equity. Morales, however, abided by this agreement only temporarily, and the investor’s exposure to Collybus more than doubled by mid-2008. After the large investor learned that Commonwealth was not following its stated valuation procedures, the investor requested valuation committee meeting minutes to review. Morales prepared false minutes that were delivered to the investor purporting to describe meetings that never occurred.
The SEC’s complaint charges Morales and Commonwealth with violations of Section 17(a) of the Securities Act of 1933, Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and Rule 10b-5, and Sections 206(1), 206(2), and 206(4) of the Investment Advisers Act of 1940 and Rule 206(4)-8. The SEC also alleges that Commonwealth violated Sections 204, 206(4), and 207 of the Advisers Act and Rules 204-2, 206(4)-2, and 206(4)-7, and that Morales aided and abetted Commonwealth’s violations of Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act, Rule 10b-5, and Sections 204, 206(1), 206(2), 206(4), and 207 of the Advisers Act and Rules 204-2, 206(4)-2, 206(4)-7, and 206(4)-8. Morales was a controlling person of Commonwealth pursuant to Section 20(a) of the Exchange Act, and is therefore liable as a control person for Commonwealth’s violations of the Exchange Act.
The SEC’s investigation, which is continuing, has been conducted by Gary M. Zinkgraf, Carol E. Schultze, Jacob D. Krawitz, and Paul Gunson in coordination with members of the SEC Enforcement Division’s Structured and New Products Unit and Asset Management Unit. Matthew Rossi and Jan Folena will handle the SEC’s litigation.
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| Credit: Wikimedia Commons |
Washington, D.C., Nov. 8, 2012 — The Securities and Exchange Commission today charged a hedge fund manager in Baton Rouge, La., with defrauding investors by hiding millions of dollars in losses suffered during the financial crisis from investments tied to residential mortgage-backed securities (RMBS).
The SEC alleges that Walter A. Morales and his firm Commonwealth Advisors Inc. caused the hedge funds they managed to buy the lowest and riskiest tranches of a collateralized debt obligation (CDO) called Collybus. They sold mortgage-backed securities into the CDO at prices they had obtained four months earlier while knowing that the RMBS market had declined precipitously in the meantime. As the CDO investments continued to perform poorly, Morales instructed Commonwealth employees to conduct a series of manipulative trades between the hedge funds they advised (called cross-trades) in order to conceal a $32 million loss experienced by one of the funds in its Collybus investment. Morales and Commonwealth lied to investors about the amount and value of mortgage-backed assets held in the hedge funds, and they created phony internal documents to justify their false valuations.
"Morales and Commonwealth Advisors concealed significant hedge fund losses from investors, including pension fund investors, instead of owning up to them and facing the consequences," said Robert Khuzami, Director of the SEC’s Division of Enforcement. "Investors put their fundamental trust in the hands of their investment adviser, and they deserve better than being manipulated and lied to through deceptive trades and phony documents."
According to the SEC’s complaint filed in U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Louisiana, Commonwealth’s hedge fund clients included pension funds and individual investors. Morales and Commonwealth invested a significant portion of hedge fund assets in RMBS. When the mortgage markets began to decline dramatically in 2007, bond rating agencies began to aggressively downgrade subprime RMBS. Therefore, Commonwealth clients were sustaining heavy investment losses and Morales knew those losses would probably continue.
The SEC alleges that rather than come clean with investors, Morales directed Commonwealth to execute more than 150 deceptive cross-trades from two hedge funds they advised to another one of their hedge funds in June 2008 at prices below Commonwealth’s own valuation for those securities. After the trades, Morales directed a Commonwealth employee to mark the securities at fair market value, which created a fraudulent $19 million gain for the acquiring hedge fund at the expense of the funds that sold. Morales ordered the cross-trades even though Commonwealth had represented in forms filed with the SEC that it would not execute such trades between these hedge fund clients. Moreover, when the trades raised concern from the prime broker, Morales falsely represented that the transactions were for a legitimate business purpose and at prevailing market prices.
The SEC further alleges that Morales deceived Commonwealth’s largest investor about its exposure to the CDO. Morales agreed to limit the investor’s exposure to Collybus through its investment in a particular Commonwealth hedge fund to 10 percent of that hedge fund’s equity. Morales, however, abided by this agreement only temporarily, and the investor’s exposure to Collybus more than doubled by mid-2008. After the large investor learned that Commonwealth was not following its stated valuation procedures, the investor requested valuation committee meeting minutes to review. Morales prepared false minutes that were delivered to the investor purporting to describe meetings that never occurred.
The SEC’s complaint charges Morales and Commonwealth with violations of Section 17(a) of the Securities Act of 1933, Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and Rule 10b-5, and Sections 206(1), 206(2), and 206(4) of the Investment Advisers Act of 1940 and Rule 206(4)-8. The SEC also alleges that Commonwealth violated Sections 204, 206(4), and 207 of the Advisers Act and Rules 204-2, 206(4)-2, and 206(4)-7, and that Morales aided and abetted Commonwealth’s violations of Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act, Rule 10b-5, and Sections 204, 206(1), 206(2), 206(4), and 207 of the Advisers Act and Rules 204-2, 206(4)-2, 206(4)-7, and 206(4)-8. Morales was a controlling person of Commonwealth pursuant to Section 20(a) of the Exchange Act, and is therefore liable as a control person for Commonwealth’s violations of the Exchange Act.
The SEC’s investigation, which is continuing, has been conducted by Gary M. Zinkgraf, Carol E. Schultze, Jacob D. Krawitz, and Paul Gunson in coordination with members of the SEC Enforcement Division’s Structured and New Products Unit and Asset Management Unit. Matthew Rossi and Jan Folena will handle the SEC’s litigation.
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