TERROISTS LIVING KENTUCKY SENTENCED

FROM: U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
Tuesday, January 29, 2013
Former Iraqi Terrorists Living in Kentucky Sentenced for Terrorist Activities

Defendants Attempted to Ship Weapons and Money from U.S. to Iraqi Insurgents Defendants Admitted to Extensive Terrorist Activities Against U.S. Soldiers in Iraq

Two Iraqi citizens living in Bowling Green, Ky., who admitted using improvised explosive devices (IEDs) against U.S. soldiers in Iraq and who attempted to send weapons and money to Al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) for the purpose of killing U.S. soldiers, were sentenced today to serve federal prison terms by Senior Judge Thomas B. Russell in U.S. District Court for the Western District of Kentucky.

The sentences was announced Lisa Monaco, Assistant Attorney General for National Security; David J. Hale, U.S. Attorney for the Western District of Kentucky; and Perrye K. Turner, Special Agent in Charge of the FBI Louisville Division.

Mohanad Shareef Hammadi, 25, a former resident of Iraq, was sentenced to life in federal prison, and Waad Ramadan Alwan, 31, a former resident of Iraq, was sentenced to 40 years in federal prison, followed by a life term of supervised release. Both defendants had pleaded guilty to federal terrorism charges.

"These two former Iraqi insurgents participated in terrorist activities overseas and attempted to continue providing material support to terrorists while they lived here in the United States. With today’s sentences, both men are being held accountable," said Assistant Attorney General Monaco. "I thank the dedicated professionals in the law enforcement and intelligence communities who were responsible for this successful outcome."

"These are experienced terrorists who willingly and enthusiastically participated in what they believed were insurgent support operations designed to harm American soldiers in Iraq," stated U.S. Attorney Hale. "The serious crimes of both men merit lengthy punishment, and only the value of Alwan’s immediate and extensive cooperation with law enforcement justifies our recommendation of a reduced sentence for him. Bringing these men to justice is the result of a comprehensive law enforcement effort. The FBI agents of the Louisville Division, along with the federal and local law enforcement members of the Joint Terrorism Task Forces here in Kentucky, including the Bowling Green Police Department, and our many other partners, are to be commended."

"Protecting the United States from terrorist attacks remains the FBI's top priority," said FBI Special Agent in Charge Turner. "Using our growing suite of investigative and intelligence capabilities, FBI agents and analysts assigned to our Bowling Green office were able to neutralize a potential threat. Our local Joint Terrorism Task Force, comprised of FBI Agents and other local, state and federal agencies from across the Commonwealth, remains committed to dismantling extremist networks and cutting off financing and other forms of support provided by terrorist sympathizers, whether they are operating in Kentucky or worldwide."

"Today, the sentencing of Alwan and Hammadi represents the culmination of the extensive, effective and focused efforts of the U.S. Attorney's Office and the Kentucky Division of the FBI for their roles in the investigation and prosecution of these would-be terrorists. I want to thank U.S. Attorney David Hale, the Kentucky Division of the FBI and the members of the FBI Bowling Green local office for their individual and collective efforts in bringing Alwan and Hammadi to justice for their crimes against the people of Kentucky and the United States," stated Chief Doug Hawkins, Bowling Green Police Department.

Alwan, whose fingerprints were found on an unexploded IED found in Iraq, pleaded guilty earlier in the case on Dec. 16, 2011, to all counts of a 23-count federal indictment. He pleaded guilty to conspiring to kill U.S. nationals abroad; conspiring to use a weapon of mass destruction (explosives) against U.S. nationals abroad; distributing information on the manufacture and use of IEDs; attempting to provide material support to terrorists and to AQI and conspiring to transfer, possess and export Stinger missiles.

Hammadi pleaded guilty on Aug. 21, 2012, to a 12-count superseding indictment. Charges against him included attempting to provide material support to terrorists and to AQI; conspiring to transfer, possess and export Stinger missiles; and making a false statement in an immigration application. At today’s sentencing, at the request of the United States, Alwan received a reduced sentence due to his cooperation with federal law enforcement. The United States asked for no reduction of Hammadi’s sentence.

According to information presented by the United States in connection with today’s sentencings, Hammadi and Alwan both admitted, in FBI interviews that followed waiver of their Miranda rights, to participation in the purported material support operations in Kentucky, and both provided the FBI details of their prior involvement in insurgent activities while living in Iraq. Both men believed their activities in Kentucky were supporting AQI. Alwan admitted participating in IED attacks against U.S. soldiers in Iraq, and Hammadi admitted to participating in 10 to 11 IED attacks as well as shooting at a U.S. soldier in an observation tower.

Court documents filed in this case reveal that the Bowling Green office of the FBI’s Louisville Division initiated an investigation of Alwan in which they used a confidential human source (CHS). The CHS met with Alwan and recorded their meetings and conversations beginning in August 2010. The CHS represented to Alwan that he was working with a group to ship money and weapons to Mujahadeen in Iraq. From September 2010 through May 2011, Alwan participated in ten separate operations to send weapons and money that he believed were destined for terrorists in Iraq. Between October 2010 and January 2011, Alwan drew diagrams of multiple types of IEDs and instructed the CHS how to make them. In January 2011, Alwan recruited Hammadi, a fellow Iraqi national living in Bowling Green, to assist in these material support operations. Beginning in January 2011 and continuing until his arrest in late May 2011, Hammadi participated with Alwan in helping load money and weapons that he believed were destined for terrorists in Iraq.

Documents filed by the United States describe in detail the material support activities of the men in Bowling Green. Without Hammadi present, Alwan loaded money and weapons he believed were being sent to Iraq on five occasions from September 2010 through February 2011, handling five rocket-propelled grenade launchers, five machine guns, two sniper rifles, two cases of C4 explosive and what he believed to be $375,000. After Hammadi joined Alwan in January 2011, the two men loaded money and weapons together on five occasions from January to May 2011. Together, on these five occasions, they loaded five rocket-propelled grenade launchers, five machine guns, five cases of C4 explosive, two sniper rifles, one box of 12 hand grenades, two Stinger surface-to-air missile launchers and what they believed to be a total of $565,000. Alwan and Hammadi were recorded by video during these operations.

In speaking with the CHS, Alwan spoke of his efforts to kill U.S. soldiers in Iraq, stating "lunch and dinner would be an American." Hammadi told the CHS that he had experience in Iraq with "Strelas" (a Russian made, portable, shoulder-fired surface-to-air missile launcher) and discussed shipping "Strelas" in future operations.

According to the charging documents, Hammadi entered the United States in July 2009, and, after first residing in Las Vegas, moved to Bowling Green. Hammadi and Alwan were arrested on May 25, 2011, in Bowling Green on criminal complaints. Both defendants were closely monitored by federal law enforcement authorities in the months leading up to their arrests. Neither was charged with plotting attacks within the United States. All of the weapons, including Stinger missiles, had been rendered inert before being handled by Hammadi and Alwan. The weapons and money handled by the men in the United States were never provided to AQI, but instead were carefully controlled by law enforcement as part of the undercover operation.

This case was investigated by the Louisville Division of the FBI. Assisting in the investigation were members of the Louisville and Lexington Joint Terrorism Task Forces, U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, U.S. Marshals Service, U.S. Department of Defense, U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services and the Bowling Green Police Department.

The prosecution was handled by Assistant U.S. Attorneys Michael Bennett and Bryan Calhoun from the U.S. Attorney’s Office for the Western District of Kentucky and Trial Attorney Larry Schneider from the Counterterrorism Section of the Justice Department’s National Security Division.

PRESIDENT OBAMA BLAMES TERRORISTS FOR DEATHS IN ALGERIA

FROM: U.S. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
Obama: Blame for Algeria Tragedy Rests With Terrorists
American Forces Press Service

WASHINGTON, Jan. 19, 2013 - The nation's thoughts and prayers are with the families of those killed and injured in the terrorist attack in Algeria, and the blame for the tragedy rests with the terrorists who carried it out, President Barack Obama said today.

In a statement, the president said the United States condemns the terrorists' actions "in the strongest possible terms."

"We have been in constant contact with Algerian officials and stand ready to provide whatever assistance they need in the aftermath of this attack," Obama said. "We also will continue to work closely with all of our partners to combat the scourge of terrorism in the region, which has claimed too many innocent lives."

The attack is another reminder of the threat posed by al-Qaeda and other violent extremist groups in North Africa, the president said.

"In the coming days, we will remain in close touch with the government of Algeria to gain a fuller understanding of what took place so that we can work together to prevent tragedies like this in the future," he added.

During a news conference in London today, Defense Secretary Leon E. Panetta and British Defense Secretary Philip Hammond said both of their governments remain in close contact with Algerian officials, and are working to establish firm details of the assault, kidnappings and murders that took place at a remote natural gas facility in Algeria.

Panetta confirmed Americans were among those held hostage, but he said the possible number of U.S. deaths remains unclear. He pledged continued close consultation with Algerian authorities, and emphasized the attackers bear full and sole responsibility for all loss of life.

"Just as we cannot accept terrorist attacks against our cities, we cannot accept attacks against our citizens and our interests abroad," he said. "Neither can we accept an al-Qaida safe haven anywhere in the world."

Since 9/11, Panetta said, "We've made very clear that nobody is going to attack the United States of America and get away with it." The nation and its allies and partners have fought terrorists in Afghanistan, Pakistan, Somalia and Yemen, and
will take the fight to North Africa as well, he said.

(Karen Parrish of American Forces Press Service, traveling with Panetta in London, contributed to this report.)

　

18 YEAR OLD PLEADS GUILTY TO CONSPIRACY TO AID TERRORISTS

FROM:  U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
Friday, May 4, 2012
Maryland Man Pleads Guilty to Conspiracy to Provide Material Support to Terrorists
WASHINGTON – Mohammad Hassan Khalid, 18, a Pakistani citizen and U.S. lawful permanent resident who resided in Maryland, pleaded guilty today to conspiracy to provide material support to terrorists, stemming from his participation in a scheme to support, recruit and coordinate members of a conspiracy in their plan to wage violent jihad in and around Europe.

The guilty plea before U.S. District Judge Petrese B. Tucker in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania was announced by Lisa Monaco, Assistant Attorney General for National Security; Zane David Memeger, U.S. Attorney for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania; and George C. Venizelos, Special Agent in Charge of the Philadelphia Division of the FBI.

Khalid, aka “Abdul Ba’aree ‘Abd Al-Rahman Al-Hassan Al-Afghani Al-Junoobi W’at-Emiratee,” was charged with one count of conspiracy to provide material support to terrorists in a superseding indictment returned on Oct. 20, 2011.  Khalid faces a potential sentence of 15 years in prison and a $250,000 fine at sentencing.

Khalid’s co-defendant, Ali Charaf Damache, aka “Theblackflag,” 46, an Algerian man who resided in Ireland, was charged with one count of conspiracy to provide material support to terrorists and one count of attempted identity theft to facilitate an act of international terrorism.  Damache is in custody in Ireland and is being prosecuted there on an unrelated criminal charge.

“Today’s plea, which involved a radicalized teen in Maryland who connected with like-minded individuals around the globe via the Internet, underscores the evolving nature of violent extremism today,” said Assistant Attorney General Monaco.  “I thank the many agents, analysts and prosecutors who helped bring about this case.”
“This case has demonstrated that age is not a limiter to threats to our nation’s security,” said U.S. Attorney Memeger.  “Regardless of a defendant's age or background, we are committed to keeping our communities and our country safe through the investigation and prosecution of violent extremist activity.”

“This investigation and the guilty plea announced today underscores the continuing threat we face from violent extremism and radicalism, both from within our country and from across the world,” said FBI Special Agent in Charge Venizelos.  “These threats can emerge from anywhere and from anyone, from individuals and groups in the farthest reaches of the globe or from those in the United States sitting in the perceived safety of their own homes.”

According to the plea memorandum, indictment and other court documents filed in the case, from about 2008 through July 2011, Khalid and Damache conspired with Colleen R. LaRose, Jamie Paulin Ramirez and others to provide material support and resources, including logistical support, recruitment services, financial support, identification documents and personnel, to a conspiracy to kill overseas.

LaRose, aka “Fatima LaRose,” aka “JihadJane,” pleaded guilty in February 2011 in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania to conspiracy to provide material support to terrorists, conspiracy to kill in a foreign country, false statements and attempted identity theft.  Ramirez pleaded guilty in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania in March 2011 to conspiracy to provide material support to terrorists.

Khalid, Damache and others devised and coordinated a violent jihad organization consisting of men and women from Europe and the United States divided into a planning team, a research team, an action team, a recruitment team and a finance team; some of whom would travel to South Asia for explosives training and return to Europe to wage violent jihad.

As part of the conspiracy, Khalid, Damache, LaRose and others recruited men online to wage violent jihad in South Asia and Europe.  In addition, Khalid, Damache, LaRose and others allegedly recruited women who had passports and the ability to travel to and around Europe in support of violent jihad.  LaRose, Paulin-Ramirez and others traveled to and around Europe to participate in and support violent jihad.  In addition, Khalid, LaRose and others also solicited funds online for terrorists.

For example, in July 2009, Khalid posted or caused to be posted an online solicitation for funds to support terrorism on behalf of LaRose and later sent electronic communications to multiple online forums requesting the deletion of all posts by LaRose after she was questioned by the FBI.  In August 2009, Khalid sent a questionnaire to LaRose in which he asked another potential female recruit about her beliefs and intentions with regard to violent jihad.  In addition, Khalid received from LaRose and concealed the location of a U.S. passport that she had stolen from another individual.

The Khalid case was investigated by the FBI Field Division in Baltimore, in conjunction with the FBI’s Joint Terrorism Task Force in Philadelphia and the FBI Field Divisions in New York and Washington, D.C.  Authorities in Ireland also provided assistance in this matter.

PROLIFERATION THREAT AND COUNTER-PROLIFERATION

FROM:  U.S. DEFENSE DEPARTMENT
The Proliferation Threat and Counter-proliferation: Why It Matters for the GCC
Remarks Vann Van Diepen
Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary, Bureau of International Security and Nonproliferation Key Note Address, U.S. Gulf Cooperation Council Workshop
Dubai, United Arab Emirates
April 12, 2012
Introduction
Good Morning, Dr. Saeed Al Shamsi, Consul General Siberell, Excellencies, ladies and gentlemen.
I would like to extend my thanks to the Government of the United Arab Emirates for co-hosting with the United States this Gulf Cooperation Council Counterproliferation Workshop. It is a pleasure for me to be back in Dubai.

I am particularly pleased to be here with all of you today, and gratified that we have representatives from all the GCC countries. I think that is an indication of the importance your governments have placed on countering the threat of proliferation -- as well as an indication of the value you have placed on working together on this issue, with each other, and with the United States.

I want to take a few minutes to set the stage for the conference by outlining in broad strategic terms the threat that proliferation poses to international peace and security, to the stability of this region, and to all of the countries gathered here.

I then want to briefly discuss why it is so important for GCC countries to work to counter this proliferation threat, not only nationally, but in cooperation with each other and in cooperation with other friendly countries such as the United States.

I will then briefly note how the rest of the workshop will focus in on the broad spectrum of interlocking measures that each of us can use to combat, impede, and ultimately thwart proliferation – and by so doing improve the national security and economic viability of all of our countries.

Proliferation: The Strategic Threat
The international community has long recognized the threat that weapons of mass destruction (WMD) – nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons – and their delivery systems pose to global and regional security. And all of us are fully aware of the fact that this threat is posed not only by countries of concern, but by terrorists.

The use of WMD – especially against cities -- would have horrendous physical, psychological, and economic consequences, and could even threaten the maintenance of civil order in the countries where it is used. Even the presence of WMD in countries of concern:
can lead those countries to threaten their neighbors in order to extract political and economic concessions;
it can embolden those countries to engage in conventional aggression or terrorism against their neighbors; and
it risks promoting arms races where neighboring states decide they must acquire WMD of their own, potentially resulting in an expanding spiral of insecurity and instability.
And you are all well aware this threat is not just theoretical. It exists in the real world, and it affects this region as well as others. For example...

Iran has been acquiring, developing, and deploying for over 20 years ballistic missiles that are inherently capable of delivering WMD, missiles with ranges that easily cover all the GCC countries and even southeastern Europe. It is actively pursuing yet longer-range systems that can cover Western Europe and beyond.
Iran is violating its United Nations (UN) and International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) obligations by continuing to enrich uranium, in the process clearly demonstrating the technical capability to produce highly enriched uranium for use in nuclear weapons.
The IAEA has formally reported that Iran has carried out activities relevant to the development of a nuclear explosive device, some of which may be ongoing, and that these past activities included some related to the development of a nuclear payload for a ballistic missile.
There is mounting evidence that Iran did not declare and has not destroyed all aspects of its offensive chemical weapons program under the Chemical Weapons Convention – which raises questions about it declarations concerning biological weapons (BW) as well.

North Korea openly admits to developing and having tested nuclear weapons. It deploys WMD-capable ballistic missiles able to threaten its neighbors, has tried to flight-test missiles able to reach the United States, and sells missiles and missile technology to any country willing to pay – including to countries in the Middle East. North Korea also is widely believed to have substantial CW and BW programs.

Syria, too, has a large CW program and ballistic missiles capable of targeting the entire region. It has been researching biological weapons, and attempted unsuccessfully to conceal construction of a nuclear reactor that had no logical purpose other than the production of plutonium for use in nuclear weapons.

Beyond these examples of nation-state proliferation, it is clear that Al-Qaida and other terrorist groups are interested in acquiring WMD. Terrorists – both groups and individuals – can operate in any country, and can engage in attacks against any country. CW and BW in particular can be developed using technology available worldwide. Terrorists actually have used sarin nerve gas and anthrax bioweapons.

Why Counterproliferation Matters
It is very clear from these examples that all of our countries face a direct security threat from the potential for countries of concern or terrorists to use WMD directly against us. We also face the threat of political and economic instability caused by the use of WMD against others, as well as from the mere possession of WMD by countries of concern and terrorists.

In addition, however, the national and economic security of all of our countries is undermined by proliferators’ efforts to acquire WMD and their delivery systems, and the ability to make them, by misusing the territories, economies, and institutions of our countries. Proliferators do so in four key ways.

First, proliferators seek to acquire items for their WMD and missile programs directly from our countries – not just the United States, but increasingly from the other countries in this room as your economies and technology levels develop.
Second, in order to disguise their actual intention to use the items in proliferation programs, proliferators pretend that reputable countries such as yours are the destination for items they buy in third countries. Proliferators do this by:
1. falsely listing countries such as yours as end-users in export paperwork;
2. by diverting to their countries items imported into y countries such as yours from elsewhere; and
3. by having brokers and front companies – often, small import/export companies -- based in countries such as yours purchase the goods from third countries on the proliferant country’s behalf.

For example, a multi-million dollar procurement network has been using a series of companies in a third country to procure steel and aluminum alloys for use in a proliferant ballistic missile program.

Third, proliferators seek to move through countries such as yours goods they have purchased elsewhere for use in their WMD and missile programs, by misusing the common commercial practices of transit and transshipment to camouflage illicit activities. Indeed, proliferators have singled out transshipment hubs such as those in this region as a critical part of their efforts to evade the global framework of trade controls.
For example, in 2009 a UN Member State inspecting a cargo ship passing through its busy transshipment port on the way elsewhere discovered anti-tank ammunition and other munitions. The ship's manifest revealed the weapons were actually on their way to another country in violation of UN Security Council Resolutions.
Nor are proliferant transits and transshipments only by sea. Last year, during a routine check, authorities in another UN Member State discovered weapons aboard a cargo aircraft traveling through its airspace from a neighboring country to a country of concern.
Just a few weeks ago, a UN Member State discovered two independent truck shipments, one with missile-related items and one with CW-related items, moving through its territory from one neighbor to a country of concern.
Fourth, proliferators seek to use banks or middlemen in countries such as yours to pay for the items they need for their WMD and missile programs.
For example, a Chinese citizen who procures items for proliferation programs in another country used front companies and false names to route payments through New York bank accounts to sell graphite to a proliferant ballistic missile program.
Increasingly, proliferators are applying several of these approaches simultaneously.
For example, a proliferator with Canadian citizenship imported from the United States pressure transducers, dual-use items that can be used in uranium enrichment.
Since enrichment is not something that happens in Canada, that part of the transfer did not raise suspicions, as the proliferator intended.
But the proliferator then exported the items from Canada to a proliferation program by falsifying the description and cost of the shipment, and routing it via a third country.

In all of these cases, proliferators are misusing our territories and economies against our will -- using stealth, lies, and manipulation to obtain support for WMD and missile programs that directly threaten our security. These same actions by proliferators also:
subvert legitimate trade,
call into question the good reputations of our companies and ports, and
thus undermine the confidence needed for legitimate trade to grow.
This directly inhibits our countries’ economic prosperity, not just our national security. And the proliferators are not standing still. They are increasingly adaptive and creative:
seeking alternative suppliers, such as overseas distributors;
using front companies, cut-outs, and brokers to facilitate and conceal diversion;
falsifying documentation, end-users, and end-uses; and
using circuitous shipping routes and multiple transshipment points to obscure the actual destination of their shipments.

In addition, proliferators are increasingly interested in procuring items not on multilateral control lists. Proliferators use these non-listed items, which also have legitimate commercial applications, to help produce WMD and missiles, either directly or to substitute for items on the multilateral lists.

Counterproliferation Cooperation is the Answer
I hope I have clearly demonstrated the importance of the issue to all of our countries, and the magnitude of the challenge we face. The threats posed by, and activities of, proliferators are global in scope – and they bear heavily on this region as well.
It is no surprise, therefore, that the answer to countering and reducing this threat also is global in scope, and requires work in this region as well. Fortunately, the international community has developed effective methods against the proliferation threat that our countries and other responsible countries can bring to bear. Analyzing and discussing these various methods, how they work, and how to implement them will be the focus of the bulk of this workshop.

Let me briefly outline the tools and solutions that we will be discussing together.
We will start at the global and multilateral level, briefly examining the international authorities and control regimes that provide foundational sources and legal bases for combating proliferation. We also look forward in that segment to hearing more about the GCC Customs Union.

We then will move to a discussion of national level solutions, where we want to analyze the core elements of strategic trade controls and share experiences.
I noted earlier the challenge of proliferators seeking items not on, or below the thresholds of, the multilateral regime control lists, and their misuse of transshipment – both techniques proliferators commonly use against this region. So the next segment in the workshop will focus on catch-all controls and transshipment best practices.
Then the session on combating proliferation financing will highlight tools to prevent proliferators from misusing your banking systems to facilitate illicit trade.

Finally, we want to make you aware of some of the resources that are available to you to help build capacity in your countries to fight proliferation, and to implement these various tools.

And at the end of our second day together, we will have a “table top” exercise that will give us an opportunity to interact, directly and dynamically, to see how all the tools we’ve been discussing fit together in the real world. I hope this will help us develop some new ideas about how to work together and assist each other.

In conclusion, let me suggest that a recurring theme of this workshop is that the central element of effectively countering proliferation is cooperation:
cooperation between different ministries within each country, and between government and industry;
cooperation between neighbors within a region; and
cooperation with friends and trading partners from outside the region and with the broad international community.

Just as proliferators use networks to procure goods and services, we need to be a network of nonproliferators, employing best practices, and creating a layered, mutually reinforcing defense strategy against proliferation and its associated procurement efforts. All of the countries here today have a key role to play in this network. And I am quite sure that our workshop will promote the cooperation and collaboration needed to combat the proliferation threat that endangers the security and prosperity of us all.
Thank you.

ALLEGED COLOMBIAN TERRORIST EXTRADITED TO U.S.

The following excerpt is from the Department of Justice website:
Monday, March 12, 2012
Accused Member of Foreign Terrorist Organization Extradited to United States on Hostage Taking Charges
WASHINGTON – Alexander Beltran Herrera, 35, aka Jhon Alexander Beltrain Herrera, aka Rodrigo Pirinolo, an accused member of the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), has been extradited from Colombia to face hostage taking and terrorism charges in the United States.

The extradition was announced by Lisa Monaco, Assistant Attorney General for National Security; Ronald C. Machen Jr., U.S. Attorney for the District of Columbia; and Dena Choucair, Acting Special Agent in Charge of the FBI’s Miami Division.

Beltran Herrera was extradited from Colombia to the United States over the weekend to face charges in an indictment returned in the District of Columbia on Feb. 22, 2011.   The indictment, which names as defendants 18 members of the FARC, charges Herrera specifically with one count of conspiracy to commit hostage taking; three counts of hostage taking; one count of using and carrying a firearm during a crime of violence; one count of conspiracy to provide material support to terrorists and one count of conspiracy to provide material support to a designated foreign terrorist organization.

Beltran Herrera is scheduled to be arraigned today at 11:15 a.m. before Judge Royce C. Lamberth in federal court in the District of Columbia.   If convicted of all the charges against him, he faces a maximum potential sentence of life in prison.

According to the indictment, the FARC is an armed, violent organization in Colombia, which since its inception in 1964, has engaged in an armed conflict to overthrow the Republic of Colombia, South America’s longest-standing democracy.  The FARC has consistently used hostage taking as a primary technique in extorting demands from the Republic of Colombia.  Hostage taking has been endorsed and commanded by FARC senior leadership.   The FARC has characterized American citizens as “military targets” and has engaged in violent acts against Americans in Colombia, including murders and hostage taking.   The FARC was designated as a foreign terrorist organization by the U.S. Secretary of State in 1997 and remains so designated.

The indictment alleges that Beltran Herrera was a member of the 27th Front in the FARC’s Southern Block.   Beltran Herrera was allegedly involved in the hostage taking of three U.S. citizens, Marc D. Gosalves, Thomas R. Howes and Keith Stansell.   These three individuals, along with Thomas Janis, a U.S. citizen, and Sergeant Luis Alcides Cruz, a Colombian citizen, were seized on Feb. 13, 2003, by the FARC after their single engine aircraft made a crash landing near Florencia, Colombia.   Janis and Cruz were murdered at the crash site by members of the FARC.

According to the indictment, Gonsalves, Howes and Stansell were held by the FARC at gunpoint and were advised by FARC leadership that they would be used as hostages to increase international pressure on the government of the Republic of Colombia to agree to the FARC’s demands.

The FARC at various times marched the hostages from one site to another, placing them in the actual custody of various FARC Fronts.   At the conclusion of one 40-day march, in or about November 2004, the hostages were delivered to members of the FARC’s 27th Front, commanded by Daniel Tamayo Sanchez, who was responsible for the hostages for nearly two years, after which they were delivered to the FARC’s 1st Front.   During part of this two year period with the 27th Front, Beltran Herrera was responsible for moving the hostages and keeping them imprisoned.

Throughout the captivity of these three hostages, FARC jailors and guards, including Beltran Herrera, used choke harnesses, chains, padlocks and wires to restrain the hostages, and used force and threats to continue their detention and prevent their escape.  The indictment also accuses Beltran Herrera of using and carrying a military-type machine gun during the hostage taking and providing material support and resources to aid in the hostage taking and to aid the FARC.

“Today’s extradition underscores our resolve to hold accountable all those responsible for this crime and we will not rest until every one of them is brought to justice,” said Assistant Attorney General Monaco.

“This extradition is another step toward justice on behalf of Americans taken hostage and held in chains by a Colombian terrorist organization,” said U.S. Attorney Machen. “We will not hesitate to bring to justice anyone who targets Americans around the world with violence to advance their political agendas.”

“This extradition further disrupts and dismantles the FARC, a foreign terrorist organization that has engaged in violent acts against American and Colombian citizens,” said FBI Acting Special Agent in Charge Choucair.  “The outstanding, long term cooperation between the Colombian National Police and U.S. law enforcement has struck another blow to international terrorism.”

This investigation is being led by the FBI’s Miami Field Division.   The prosecution is being handled by Assistant U.S. Attorneys Anthony Asuncion and Fernando Campoamar-Sanchez from the U.S. Attorney’s Office for the District of Columbia, and Trial Attorney David Cora from the Counterterrorism Section of the Justice Department’s National Security Division.

Substantial assistance in the case was provided by the Justice Department’s Office of International Affairs, the Department’s Judicial Attachés in Colombia, and the FBI’s Office of the Legal Attaché in Colombia. The Directorate of Intelligence (DIPOL) and the Anti-Kidnapping Unit (GAULA) of the Colombian National Police also provided substantial assistance.

The public is reminded that an indictment contains mere allegations and that defendants are presumed innocent unless and until proven guilty.