COUNTERTERRORISM AND THE 'SMALL-FOOTPRINT' APPROACH

FROM: U.S. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

'Small-footprint' Operations Effective, Official Says

By Karen Parrish
American Forces Press Service

WASHINGTON, Jan. 31, 2013 - Counterterrorism operations in Somalia and Yemen demonstrate the value of "small-footprint" approaches and building partner capacity, the Pentagon's special operations chief said yesterday.

Michael A. Sheehan, assistant secretary of defense for special operations and low-intensity conflict, spoke here about the threat of terror in those and other countries during remarks at the National Defense Industrial Association's 24th Annual Special Operations and Low-intensity Conflict Symposium, which ended yesterday.

Sheehan pointed out the defense strategy released in January 2012 called for "innovative, low-cost approaches" in widely distributed counterterrorism efforts. In the year since that guidance was issued, such approaches have brought good results, he added.

"A year ago in Yemen, al-Qaida had taken over vast swaths of territory ... and was really threatening the state in Yemen, and also threatening to re-establish some capabilities that were very problematic," he said. "Over the past year, we've made great progress in Yemen."

With the support of U.S. special operations forces, he said, counterterror efforts there have "turned the corner."

Somalia also shows progress over the past year, he said, with al-Shabaab, a terrorist group that controlled large parts of the country, pushed out of the major cities.

"They haven't gone away," he added. "They're a persistent group. ... [But] you can see in our strategies, our policies and programs in Yemen and Somalia, some of the components of how our strategy might look in the months and years ahead."

Sheehan said while terror groups are known to spread and metastasize, the three traditional areas where al-Qaida is an entrenched threat are the mountainous area between Pakistan and Afghanistan, in Yemen, and in East Africa.

"Those three traditional areas ... have been and will continue to be areas of al-Qaida persistence," he said. "Fortunately for us, we've been able to batter them in all of those three areas over the last 10 or 11 years with a great deal of success."

The measure of success against terror groups is their inability to mount strategic attacks, Sheehan said. He credits constant pressure on al-Qaida with diminishing that organization's ability to train and equip terrorists.

"Some people say we've been a little bit lucky, with the underwear bomber and other incidents that haven't quite gone right for al-Qaida, but I'd say it's more than luck," he said. "Because we put more pressure on them around the world, because it's more difficult for them to train and deploy operatives, they make more mistakes."

Sheehan said the failed May 1 bombing in New York's Times Square demonstrated his point. Faizal Shazad, an American citizen later sentenced to life in prison for the bombing attempt, failed, Sheehan said, because "he was trained by the Pakistan Taliban. He couldn't get to al-Qaida."

The bomb Shazad created didn't work, and he had no network to support him, Sheehan said. "He also wasn't a suicide bomber," the special operations chief noted. "Why? Because he wasn't in those camps long enough to be indoctrinated."

The factors that caused the attack to fail weren't just luck, Sheehan said, but "the result of enormous pressure put on the organization, that prevents them from planning, training and launching skilled operatives."

Maintaining that pressure against al-Qaida and similar groups is a task U.S. special operations forces and partner militaries are focused on around the world, he said. If such groups find sanctuary and a place where they can act with impunity, he warned, they can rebuild their strategic capability.

New and evolving terrorist threats are emerging in Syria and North Africa, Sheehan noted.

In Syria, where Bashar Assad's government forces and the people have battled for two years, Sheehan said, the al-Nusra Front is "very closely associated with al-Qaida ... and we believe they are trying to hijack [the] struggles of the Syrian people ... and perhaps put their own agenda on a post-Assad Syria."

In Africa, the Maghreb region along the Mediterranean Sea and the Saharan area of the Sahel "are of major concern to us," he said.

Libya, he added, is "awash with weapons," while Mali was the scene of a Tuareg tribal rebellion that was hijacked by al-Qaida and other affiliates, who gained control of an area about the size of Texas in the country's north.

The French have had great initial success in pushing back al-Qaida advances in Mali, Sheehan noted, but the whole northern part of the continent is seeing increased terrorist presence and involvement.

"All these groups share a similar al-Qaida narrative. ... In many ways, al-Qaida is seeking to rebrand itself and diversify into Africa, because they're able to find, in those ungoverned spaces, the sanctuary they need ... to become strategic," he said.

Northern Africa has the four elements al-Qaida needs to do just that, Sheehan said: ungoverned space, terrorist groups, weapons and funding. Countering al-Qaida requires both direct action and security force assistance, Sheehan said.

"In the long term, we recognize that we can't solely rely on precision strikes to defeat enemy networks and foster the kind of stability we need in these regions," he said. Such stability can best be established by aiding friends, partners and allies, he added.

Special operations forces play a major role in security force assistance as well as in direct action, Sheehan noted. Security force assistance takes two approaches, he explained: training local forces to control border areas and deny space and sanctuary to terrorists, and training specialized counterterror forces.

U.S. special operations forces have, throughout their history, focused largely on training host-nation militaries, Sheehan said.

In Somalia, he noted, "the African Union and a multinational force led by the Ugandans ... did a darn good job, and we helped them. Their job was to control space ... and push al-Shabaab off." Meanwhile, he added, other units focused on high-value targets and other leaders of the organization.

"Coupled together, we had a strategy that worked," Sheehan said.

Sheehan acknowledged that a partnered strategy holds risks. Other countries may embarrass the United States, or U.S. forces could get pulled into other conflicts, he said. But the risk of inaction is greater, he added, as it holds the danger of al-Qaida or other groups developing a strategic attack capability.

Special operations troops understand those risks and have the experience and maturity to manage them, Sheehan said. He noted security force assistance is a "classic" role for special operations forces.

They can deploy to far-flung places in small numbers to protect U.S. national interests and to work with partners "to continue to crush al-Qaida," he said.

NATO FLAGSHIP ATTACKED BY PIRATES, PIRATE VESSEL DESTROYED

Map: Somalia. Credit: CIA World Factbook.

FROM: U.S. DEFENSE DEPARTMENT
Counterpiracy Flagship Comes Under Fire Off Somalia's Coast

From a Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe News Release

MONS, Belgium, Oct. 25, 2012 - The flagship for NATO's Ocean Shield counterpiracy mission came under sustained fire from suspected pirates off Somalia's coast yesterday, Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe officials reported today.

The Dutch warship HNMLS Rotterdam was attacked while conducting routine surveillance, officials said.

A boarding team from Rotterdam was approaching a suspect dhow near the coast when they came under fire from ashore and from the dhow itself. When Rotterdam returned fire in accordance with rules of engagement, officials said, the dhow ignited and crew members were seen leaping into the water. One dhow crew member was killed in this action, and 25 people were subsequently rescued from the water by Rotterdam crew members, officials said.

Commodore Ben Bekkering of the Dutch navy, commander of the NATO Task Force, said that the Rotterdam and her boats remained under sustained fire from the shore throughout the incident, even while attempting to rescue the crew of the stricken dhow. One of Rotterdam's rigid inflatable boats was damaged, he said.

Those rescued were transferred to the NATO flagship, where those who required it were given prompt medical attention. No Rotterdam crew members were injured.

"We know that pirates are increasingly using larger dhows as mother ships," Bekkering said. "Therefore, we routinely inspect them. In this instance, the pirates openly choose confrontation. This does not happen often, and it indicates that we are, indeed, impeding their operations and in doing so, pushing them to take more extreme options."

Bekkering praised the "calm professionalism" of the Rotterdam crew and said this incident, together with Rotterdam's successful Oct. 11 interdiction of seven pirates, made two things very clear.

"Firstly, it is obvious that the scourge of piracy has not gone away, and we need to maintain our vigilance," he said. "Secondly, the risks to the pirates themselves are becoming much greater, and while we regret any loss of life, we will deal with any threat we encounter in a firm, robust, but always proportionate, manner."

U.S.-SLOVENIA RELATIONS

Map Credit:  U.S State Department.
FROM:  U.S. STATE DEPARTMENT
The United States established diplomatic relations with Slovenia in 1992 following its independence from Yugoslavia. The United States and Slovenia work together actively on a number of fronts and have developed strong, cooperative relations on a broad range of bilateral, regional, and global issues. Slovenia is an important partner in advancing the shared goal of regional political and economic stability. The United States supported Slovenia's entrance into the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and other Euro-Atlantic agreements and institutions.

The two countries worked closely to resolve succession issues stemming from the breakup of Yugoslavia. Slovenia provided invaluable assistance to the United States and NATO by facilitating the deployment of peacekeeping forces to Bosnia after the conclusion of the 1995 Dayton accords. With strong U.S. support, Slovenia has developed the International Trust Fund as the demining instrument of choice in the Balkans and has expanded operations to include other areas.

The United States works with the Slovenian military to promote greater cooperation and interoperability with NATO forces. Slovenia’s military personnel work alongside U.S. and international forces on stabilization and reconstruction efforts around the globe. Slovenia has deployed troops in Afghanistan, Kosovo, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Lebanon, and Somalia. Slovenia’s peacekeeping troops and contributions to international security operations help bolster stability specifically in the Western Balkans, but also strengthen common defense against transnational terrorism more broadly.

U.S. Assistance to Slovenia

U.S. security assistance seeks to help Slovenia maintain its position as a positive and stabilizing influence in southeastern Europe, and to help its forces to further modernize as Slovenia qualitatively increases its participation in NATO missions further abroad. Earlier assistance to promote the development of democratic institutions and a market economy was phased out as Slovenia achieved its EU status.

Bilateral Economic Relations

Slovenia is a member of the European Union (EU). The United States has worked to develop bilateral trade and investment with Slovenia, although U.S. investments in Slovenia have been modest. U.S. companies looking to do business in Slovenia face a challenging environment, particularly if they are interested in selling goods and services to the government. The public procurement process, although compliant with most EU regulations and international treaties, has been the focus of bilateral efforts to improve transparency and establish stronger regulations. The United States and Slovenia have signed a reciprocal taxation treaty. Slovenia participates in the Visa Waiver Program, which allows nationals of participating countries to travel to the United States for certain business or tourism purposes for stays of 90 days or less without obtaining a visa.

Slovenia's Membership in International Organizations

Slovenia and the United States belong to a number of the same international organizations, including the United Nations, North Atlantic Treaty Organization, Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council, Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, International Monetary Fund, World Bank, and World Trade Organization. Slovenia also is an observer to the Organization of American States.

GENERAL HAM'S AFRICA REPORT

FROM: U.S. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

Ham Reports Progress Against al-Shabab in AfricaBy Donna Miles
American Forces Press Service

THEBEPHATSHWA AIR BASE, Aug. 22, 2012 - Calling the elimination of safe havens and support for terrorist groups in Africa his top priority, the commander of U.S. Africa Command reported that U.S. support for Somalia's military has had a direct impact in degrading the al-Shabab terror organization there.

"The performance of African militaries in Somalia ... has been extraordinary," Army Gen. Carter F. Ham told Soldiers Radio and Television Service reporter Gail McCabe during closing ceremonies for exercise Southern Accord here.

Ham noted the U.S. government role in training and equipping these forces and the impact it has had in increasing the African partners' counterterrorism capabilities.

"They really have degraded the capability of al-Shabab, an al-Qaida affiliate operating in Somalia, where most of Somali territory is no longer receptive to al-Shabab," he said. "They certainly still have some strong points, but are [al-Shabab is] greatly diminished over the last year, because of the role of Africans."

While holding up Somalia as a positive trend on the continent, Ham acknowledged progress elsewhere remains mixed. He noted Mali, where about two-thirds of the country "is essentially outside the control of the interim government ... and is largely controlled by transnational terrorist organizations."

Ham called the terrorist threat his most pressing challenge. "In fact, I would say it is my highest priority, as the geographic combatant commander, ... to protect America, Americans and American interests from threats that emerge from the continent of Africa," he said. "And at present, the most dangerous of those threats are transnational terrorists."

Countering this threat is the common denominator that drives Ham's theater engagement strategy and its broad array of operations, exercises and security cooperation programs. This includes teaching partner nations how to improve their border security, intelligence and tactical capabilities and equipping African nations so they can operate more effectively.

It's an effort Ham said involves the entire U.S. interagency – the departments of State, Commerce, Treasury and Justice, the U.S. Agency for International Development and other organizations – as they coordinate efforts to help address the underlying causes that create an environment where terrorists can operate.

The president's recently released policy directive for sub-Saharan Africa recognizes the importance of security in advancing economic development that lays the foundation for democracy, Ham noted.

"The two are interrelated," he said. "You can't really have good, strong economic development if there is not security and stability."

So Africom focuses on helping African partners promote security and stability. "We think it is important that we help African nations develop their own capabilities to provide their own security and also to begin the capability to contribute more expansively to regional security," Ham said.

U.S. engagements in Africa, such as Southern Accord, are tailored to help partners build capacity and to respect the rule of law, the general said. "What we are really trying to do is help you build security forces that are not only tactically capable, but forces that are genuinely responsive to legitimate civilian control – that operate according to the rule of law and see themselves as servants of that nation,'" he explained. "And we are seeing that over and over again, and we certainly see that here in Botswana."

Promoting that kind of engagement requires close relationships that are built over time. "It is all about relationships," Ham said. "It is the ability to talk to a chief of defense or minister of defense and in some cases, heads of state to convey to them what it is that we are trying to do, and make sure they understand that we ... don't want to do anything that they don't want us to do."

A true partnership benefits all the participants, Ham said, recognizing the gains both U.S. service members and Botswana Defense Force members received as they worked together during Southern Accord.

Ham said he's sometimes asked why what the United States needs a combatant command focused on Africa and why what happens in Africa matters to the United States. "I could easily say there are a billion reasons," he said, recognizing the African continent's population.

But also citing global economies and the global nature of security challenges, Ham emphasized that "what happens in Africa affects us in the United States."

"So I think there is a whole host of reasons why America and Americans should care about advancing our interests in Africa," he said. "And security is one component of an overall U.S. approach."

U.S. AFRICA COMMANDER UNDERSTANDS HUMANITARIAN SITUATION

Photo:  Gen. Carter F. Ham.  Credit:  U.S. DOD. 
FROM:  AMERICAN FORCES PRESS SERVICE
Africom Promotes Humanitarian Response Readiness in Africa
By Donna Miles
STUTTGART, Germany, July 5, 2012 - As the worst drought in six decades grips the Horn of Africa, displacing millions of people and creating a severe humanitarian crisis, the United States has stepped up its emergency assistance.

An additional $120 million in emergency aid announced in April brings to $1.1 billion the U.S. contribution in drought and famine relief since the crisis began last year, White House officials said, with funding provided by the U.S. Agency for International Development and the State Department.

Army Gen. Carter F. Ham, commander of U.S. Africa Command, understands all too well the security implications of a fragile humanitarian situation that has left millions of people in Somalia, Ethiopia and Kenya in need of urgent assistance.

"The linkage between security and humanitarian efforts in Africa is very clear to me," he told the House Armed Services Committee in February.

Ham expressed concern that looming budget cuts, particularly at the State Department and U.S. Agency for International Development, could affect the United States' ability to assist during this and other humanitarian crises on the continent.

"I do worry overall that if there is a significant decline in the State Department's security assistance or in USAID's ability to provide developmental or humanitarian assistance, those will have security consequences," he said.

Since its inception five years ago, Africom has stood ready to support U.S. government humanitarian and disaster relief operations, said Michael Casciaro, the command's division chief for security cooperation programs.

"The military brings unique capabilities that are used for humanitarian assistance," he said. "And that ranges from developing long-range projects like ... building clinics and schools and providing furniture and equipment for them."

It also includes helping African partners to build capability -- from training them how to conduct humanitarian response operations, to helping them promote HIV/AIDS prevention programs -- so they can conduct these missions themselves.
Africom also works with partner nations to help them develop national humanitarian response plans that include their militaries, Casciaro said. "We then focus on those tasks that were assigned to the military, and help them understand what capabilities are required to be able to do that, and how they need to train to do that," he said.

In support of this effort, Africom is emphasizing disaster response as well as traditional military skills through its robust exercise program on the continent. This year alone, the command and its service components are conducting 16 exercises involving about 30 African nations, all to include a component related to environmental disaster, Ham told the Senate Armed Services Committee in March. The scenarios will run the gamut, he said, but most will involve floods or drought.

These exercises help partner nations formulate and practice plans for responding to natural as well as manmade disasters within their borders, explained Marine Corps Lt. Col. Sam Cook, Africom's joint combined exercise branch chief. "It increases their ability and capability and capacity to conduct these operations themselves," he said.
Ham said African nations are "very accepting" of this training, and understand the security effects of humanitarian assistance and disaster response preparedness. He expressed concern, however, that Africom is finding "less traction on the preventive steps than we are on responses."

The general credited the interagency makeup of Africom, which includes about 30 representatives from more than a dozen U.S. agencies and departments, which he said gives it the capabilities needed to help address challenges requiring "nothing short of a whole-of-government approach."

"No one element of the government has all the resources, authorities or capabilities to address the impacts on security of environmental change," Ham said.
That, he said, demands that Africom work closely with chiefs of mission in Africa who have the responsibility to pull together that whole-of-government approach, as well as with various bureaus in the State Department and the U.S. Agency for International Development to coordinate and synchronize efforts.

That, Ham said, will help achieve the desired end state: "assisting the African countries deal with an increasingly serious security matter that ultimately contributes to our security by them being more secure."

PIRATES

FROM:  U.S. STATE DEPARTMENT
Piracy: Where We Are Today
Remarks Thomas P. Kelly
Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary, Bureau of Political-Military Affairs The American Petroleum Institute, Biennial Tanker Conference
Orlando, FL
May 21, 2012
Scott, thanks for that introduction, and for inviting me here today. I want to thank API for the work that it does promoting U.S. business and commerce, and for organizing this important event. It is my pleasure to be here and to speak to an audience with so much experience and expertise. I look forward to hearing from you following my remarks.

Piracy off the coast of Somalia is a critical issue for the United States, the international community, and the global economy. Since 2008, Somali pirates have hijacked 175 vessels and attacked at least 445 others. They have kidnapped 3,000 crewmembers from over 40 countries, and are still holding 241 hostages today. They hijacked 27 ships last year and six already this year. There are ten ships currently being held by Somali pirates. Three are tankers.

While piracy at sea is certainly not a new problem, its modern reincarnation has new impacts. Piracy off the coast of Somalia threatens one of the principal foundations of today’s modern interconnected global economic system -- the freedom of navigation. In a globalized world, the impact of piracy in one area of the world can cause a ripple effect across the globe. People in countries around the world depend on secure and reliable shipping lanes for their food, their medicine, their energy, and consumer goods brought by cargo ships and tankers. By preying on commercial ships in one of the world’s busiest shipping lanes, pirates off the Horn of Africa threaten more than just individual ships. They threaten a central artery of the global economy -- and that means that they threaten global security.

In 2007 and 2008, pirate attacks began to escalate dramatically. A vicious and reinforcing cycle was forming. Motivated by escalating ransom payments – which grew into the millions of dollars – and a lack of other opportunities to make money quickly, more and more Somali men took to the sea. Piracy, as a result, went from a fairly ad hoc, disorganized endeavor to a highly developed transnational criminal enterprise. Flush with money, pirates were also able to improve their capabilities and expand their operations further and further from shore.

To make matters worse, Somalia offered pirates near ideal conditions. Piracy is a prime example of the dangers and problems that can arise from the presence of ungoverned spaces in our globalized world. In places off the coast of Somalia where pirates operate – throughout the coastal areas in Puntland and parts of central Somalia – the lack of governance and weak institutions provide them with safe haven. With more than two thousand miles of coast line and with the Gulf of Aden to its north, Somalia sits along one of the world’s busiest shipping lanes. This high volume of trade means that there is virtually an endless variety and supply of ships for Somali pirates to target. Over time, tankers and other high-value ships became prized targets for potential high ransoms that raised the bar on the amounts demanded by and paid to pirates for individual ships and crews. The fact that many tankers are ‘low and slow’ makes them particularly attractive targets.

Piracy emanating from Somalia represented a perfect storm for the international community – a weak state in a strategically essential location that harbors a rapidly growing transnational criminal enterprise and which threatens a vital artery of the global economy.

The U.S. government has made it clear that it will take all appropriate measures to protect our citizens, safely recover hostages, and bring hostage takers to justice. Just months into office in 2009, the Obama administration was confronted with the hostage taking of the American captain of the MAERSK Alabama, a U.S.-flagged ship carrying a cargo of food aid. The President authorized the use of force to rescue the captured captain, and after a tense standoff, U.S. Navy Seals successfully freed the captain. And just hours before the State of the Union address last January, President Obama ordered U.S. Special Forces to rescue an American and a Danish aid worker being held hostage on the ground in Somalia. The health of the American hostage Jessica Buchanan was deemed to be in jeopardy and the President ordered U.S. forces to rescue her. This dangerous but ultimately successful mission demonstrated our resolve.

In the past, there seemed to be no limit to the growth of piracy. Today, through the collective efforts of the international community and the private sector, we are now seeing signs of clear progress. In 2011, the number of successful pirate attacks fell by nearly half. There has been a significant drop in the numbers of ships and crew held hostage. In January 2011, pirates held 31 ships and 710 hostages. In early May of 2012, pirates hold ten ships and 241 hostages – a roughly 70 percent decline. This is still an unacceptable number, but clearly we are making progress. This morning, I’d like to talk to you about the U.S. response to Somali piracy and why I think our efforts, in conjunction with the efforts of the international community and the private sector, are having an impact.

In combating piracy, the United States has pursued an integrated multi-dimensional approach toward combating piracy that focuses on:

diplomatic engagement to spur collective international action;
expanding security at sea through the use of naval assets to defend private vessels and to disrupt pirate attacks;

preventing attacks by encouraging industry to take steps to protect itself;
deterring piracy through effective legal prosecution and incarceration; and
disrupting the piracy enterprise ashore, including the financial flows that make it possible.
From the beginning, the United States has led and adopted a multilateral approach focused on addressing piracy as a shared challenge most effectively addressed through broad, coordinated, and comprehensive international efforts. In January 2009, the United States helped establish the Contact Group on Piracy off the Coast of Somalia to both prompt action and coordinate efforts to suppress Somali piracy. It has grown from 29 initial participants to nearly 70 nations and international organizations today. It also includes international and maritime industry organizations.

The Contact Group’s meetings enable interaction between states, regional and international organizations, and industry. A number of specialized working groups were established within the Contact Group to address a variety of subjects, including naval coordination at sea; judicial and legal issues concerning captured pirates; liaison with industry; public diplomacy programs in Somalia to discourage piracy; and most recently, a working group to focus on and coordinate efforts to disrupt the pirate enterprise ashore. Many of you may be familiar with Working Group 3, until recently co-chaired by the U.S. Maritime Adminstration and U.S. Coast Guard, which was very effective in communicating industry views and concerns to government and intergovernmental policy makers. The Republic of Korea recently assumed the chairmanship of Working Group 3 from the United States. We’re looking forward to continuing to support this very important forum for liaison with the maritime industry.

Through its five working groups, the Contact Group draws in international expertise and adopts a problem-solving approach toward addressing piracy. This coordinated international engagement has spawned significant and effective action.

In this regard, the Contact Group helps to synchronize the many efforts underway to utilize resources effectively, prevent duplication, and maximize the impact of national international efforts. Private sector contributions to these efforts would be welcome. One activity that your firms may wish to consider would be contributions -- in cash or expertise -- to the Trust Fund to Support Initiatives of States Countering Piracy off the Coast of Somalia. General or designated donations for particular projects are possible. For example, Shell, Maersk, BP, and Japan Shipping recently announced a combined donation to economic capacity-building projects in Somalia. We would welcome similar donations by U.S. industry.

There’s another interesting international effort currently underway. RAPPICC stands for the Regional Anti-Piracy Prosecutions Intelligence Coordination Centre in the Seychelles. Early this year, the UK and the Seychelles decided to move forward on RAPPICC, which will be located on an old Seychellois Coast Guard base. The RAPPICC will be an information fusion center that facilitates the capture and prosecution of the financiers, investors and ringleaders of Somali piracy. It will be part of a larger “Crime Campus” with a 20-person holding facility for use in conducting interviews.
The UK allocated over one million dollars in initial funding and proposed that RAPPICC be initially led by the British Serious Organized Crime Agency. The Seychelles agreed. The U.S. is now examining possible support to and participation in RAPPICC.

The issue of armed robbery and piracy has also become a significant component of our bilateral diplomatic engagements with other countries. When we engage in diplomatic talks with countries as varied as India, Indonesia, Nigeria, and Brazil, this issue is on the agenda. It is a shared challenge that many countries have an interest in seeing addressed.
In West Africa and the Gulf of Guinea, we are working with our partners on a related but different problem. Their situation varies from Somali piracy; we shouldn’t conflate the two. Piracy and armed robbery in the Gulf of Guinea is not systematic hostage taking for ransom. Instead, it is often illegal oil bunkering abetted by corrupt regional actors. Recent UN Security Council Resolutions encourage States of the Gulf of Guinea region to develop “a regional framework to counter piracy and armed robbery at sea, including information-sharing and operational coordination mechanisms in the region.” Towards that end, the United States, led by the U.S. Africa Command, has supported regional organizations in their efforts to address the problem.

Another way that government can help is by increasing security at sea. As you know, as pirate attacks increased, the United States, NATO, the EU, and many other national navies responded.

The United States established Combined Task Force 151 – a multinational task force charged with conducting counter-piracy naval patrols in the region. It operates in the Gulf of Aden and off the eastern coast of Somalia, covering an area of over one million square miles. In addition, there are a number of coordinated multinational naval patrols off the Horn of Africa. NATO is engaging with Operation Ocean Shield, the European Union has Operation ATALANTA, and other national navies in the area conduct counter-piracy patrols and escort operations as well.

On any given day, up to 30 vessels from as many as 20 nations are engaged in counter-piracy operations in the region. This force includes countries new to this kind of effort, like China, India, and Japan. U.S. and international naval forces have thwarted pirate attacks in progress, engaged pirate skiffs, and successfully taken back hijacked ships during opposed boardings. We have also sought to create a safe transit corridor for commercial shipping vessels. U.S. Naval Forces Central Command has worked with partners to set up a nearly 500-mile long transit corridor through the Gulf of Aden. This transit zone is heavily patrolled by naval forces and used by some countries for convoy operations. The corridor has helped reduce the number of attacks within the transit zone, but it also has had the side effect of pushing pirate activities further out to sea.

The pirates’ expansion of their area of operations demonstrates how they adapt their tactics in response to international efforts. The expanded use of mother-ships has made pirates more difficult to interdict and more effective at operating during the monsoon seasons, which previously restricted their activities. Mother-ships have extended the pirates’ reach far beyond the Somali Basin, all the way to the west coast of India. Somali pirates now operate in a total sea space of approximately 2.5 million square nautical miles – an area equivalent to the size of the continental United States. This makes it difficult for naval or law enforcement ships and other assets to reach the scene of a pirate attack quickly enough to disrupt an ongoing attack. There is just too much water to patrol.

Private Sector
Navies can’t be everywhere. That’s why we need the maritime industry’s ships themselves to become tougher for pirates to seize. Indeed, the best defense against piracy is often simply vigilance on the part of the maritime industry. The private sector is now playing a major role in deterring and preventing pirate attacks.

In response to the growing threat, we’ve worked with the shipping industry to develop and implement “best management practices” to prevent pirate boardings before they take place. These include practical measures, such as:
proceeding at full speed through high risk areas;
employing physical barriers such as razor wire;
posting additional look-outs;
reporting positions to military authorities; and
mustering the crew inside a “citadel” or safe-room in the vessel when under attack.
These steps, when properly implemented, remain some of the most effective measures to protect against pirate attacks. Recognizing the value of these measures, the U.S. government has required U.S.-flagged vessels sailing in designated high-risk waters to take additional security measures. Nevertheless, we remain troubled that there are still commercial ships travelling through pirate-infested waters that have yet to implement appropriate security measures. Approximately 20 percent of all ships off the Horn of Africa are not taking proper security precautions. Unsurprisingly, these account for the overwhelming number of successfully pirated ships. Take the case of the Smyrni, a tanker that was taken by Somali pirates earlier this month. The Smyrni was transporting a valuable cargo of oil that was loaded in Turkey and was destined for Indonesia. What is noteworthy and unfortunate about the Smyrni hijacking is that it was avoidable. The ship had no embarked security team on board and took a dangerous course. It was easy pickings for the pirates.

However, we must also recognize that even when fully implemented, best management practices do not guarantee security from pirates. As a result, we have also supported the maritime industry’s use of additional measures to enhance their security – such as embarking armed security teams. To date, not a single ship with Privately Contracted Armed Security Personnel aboard has been pirated.

These teams serve as a potential game-changer in the effort to counter-piracy. The IMO is examining the issue of internationally recognized standards for the use of Privately Contracted Armed Security Personnel. In most engagements, the situation ends as soon as pirates are aware an armed security team is on board. Pirates often break off the attack and turn their skiffs around and wait for another less protected ship to come by. These teams therefore have served as an effective deterrent.

Best Management Practices and Privately Contracted Armed Security Personnel are not an either/or choice. They should be used together and tailored to the specific needs of particular ships and transit plans.

When a vessel is successfully hijacked, our foremost concern is always about the safety of the crew, regardless of nationality. The U.S. government is acutely aware of the dilemma that shipowners face when ships and sailors are taken hostage. While the safety of the crew is critical, it’s also a fact that submitting to pirate ransom demands ensures that future crews will be taken hostage. The United States has a long tradition of opposing the payment of ransom, and we have worked diligently to discourage or minimize ransom payments. While some may consider this the cost of doing business, every ransom paid further institutionalizes the practice of hostage-taking for profit and promotes its expansion as a criminal enterprise. We strongly encourage flag States, shipowners, and private parties involved in hostage crises to seek assistance from appropriate U.S. government sources in their crisis management procedures.. The average ransom is now at $4.5 million per incident; one ransom totaled $12 million. And as I’m sure you know, tankers command the highest ransoms. Total ransom payments paid to Somali pirates increased from approximately $80 million in 2010 to $140 million in 2011. The average ransom demanded has soared from roughly $150,000 in 2005 to $4.6 million in 2011. In light of the pirates’ growing difficulties at sea, we have seen pirates shift to targeting hostages on land, such as with captured aid workers or tourists at beach resorts. Pirates’ ability to adapt means that the maritime industry and the international community must be constantly vigilant in assessing the effectiveness of self-protection measures.

The United Kingdom’s February conference on Somalia explored a wide range of global initiatives to speed assistance to Somalia, promote a credible political transition, sever the terrorist group al-Shabaab’s financial lifelines, and counter piracy and kidnapping operations. The United States welcomed the United Kingdom’s initiative to create an international task force to discourage the payment of ransoms to pirates, terrorists, and other groups, as well as prevent the illicit flow of money and its corrosive effects. We are participating in this task force and doing everything in our power to make it more effective.

Prosecution, Incarceration, and Pirate Networks
Now let me turn to another aspect of our response – our efforts to deter piracy through effective apprehension, prosecution and incarceration of pirates and their supporters and financiers. Today, over 1,100 pirates are in custody in 20 countries around the world. Most are or are expected to be convicted and sentenced to lengthy prison terms.
An important element of our counter-piracy approach involves renewed emphasis on enhancing the capacity of states – particularly those in the region – to prosecute and incarcerate suspected pirates. The United States is currently supporting efforts to:
increase prison capacity in Somalia;
develop a framework for prisoner transfers so convicted pirates serve their sentence back in their home country of Somalia; and
to establish a specialized piracy chamber in the national courts of regional states.
We are moving in the right direction in this area. Last year, a new maximum security prison opened in northern Somalia to hold general convicts and convicted pirates. Nevertheless, the capacity and willingness to prosecute and incarcerate pirates is limited. Countries in the region that might be able and otherwise willing to prosecute Somali pirates in their national courts often decline to do so because they do not want to squeeze more pirates into their already overburdened prison systems. In this regard, we are in some ways a victim of our own success. We are apprehending more pirates at sea, leading to more crowded prisons. Expanding the capacity to prosecute and incarcerate pirates is a real challenge and is one that the international community, including the governments of flag states and ship owners, will have to work hard to address. Your industry can also support this important effort by contributing to the Trust Fund. I encourage all of you to do that.

As piracy has evolved into an organized transnational criminal enterprise, it is increasingly clear that the arrest and prosecution of pirates captured at sea is insufficient on its own to meet our longer term counter-piracy goals. Most pirates captured at sea are often low-level operatives. The sad fact is that prosecution is often a limited deterrent for men lacking employment opportunities onshore and who are willing to venture hundreds of miles out to sea in nothing more than a small boat. An untold number of pirates are lost at sea every year. Part of what makes piracy seem so intractable is that despite these dangers, the lack of other economic opportunities in coastal communities means there is no shortage of willing recruits for pirate organizers to choose from.

After an intensive review of our strategy last year, Secretary Clinton approved a series of recommendations which constitute a new strategic approach. A focus on pirate networks is now at the heart of our strategy. We are using all of the tools at our disposal in order to disrupt pirate networks and their financial flows. We are focused on identifying and apprehending the criminal conspirators who lead, manage, and finance the pirate enterprise, with the objective of bringing them to trial and disrupting pirate business processes. Often, the best way to attack organized crime is to follow the money. That’s how the U.S. put some nefarious criminals behind bars. Pirate organizers receive income both from investors and ransom payments, and disburse a portion of the proceeds of ransoms back to these investors. Already, the United States has convicted one Somali pirate negotiator.

The Contact Group recently endorsed this approach and formed a new working group, under Italy’s leadership, to assist in multilateral coordination to disrupt the pirate enterprise ashore. We are working to connect law enforcement communities, intelligence agencies, financial experts, and our international partners to promote information sharing and develop actionable information against pirate conspirators. This effort will include tracking pirate sources of financing and supplies, such as fuel, outboard motors, and weapons.

Situation on the Ground in Somalia
All of the policies I’ve described help us to combat piracy. But the only long-term solution to piracy is the re-establishment of stability, responsive law enforcement, and adequate governance in Somalia. This will require concentrated and coordinated assistance to states in the region and credible governing authorities in Somalia to build their capacity to deal with the social, legal, economic and operational challenges to governance, effective law enforcement and economic development. To that end, the United States continues to support the Djibouti Peace Process, the Transitional Federal Government (TFG), and other regional authorities working toward these same goals. In February, Secretary Clinton attended the London Conference on Somalia, which the United Kingdom convened to galvanize high-level international support for Somalia’s political transition.

However, acknowledging the difficult situation on shore doesn’t preclude progress at sea. While there is no simple solution to modern-day piracy, we are having a positive effect on what was seemingly an intractable transnational problem.
The U.S. response to piracy also shows how we as a government can address new and emergent transnational challenges. Addressing these threats requires us to be flexible and innovative in how we respond. It also requires agencies across the U.S. government to work together so that we bring every tool that we have to bear – including our diplomatic, military, law enforcement, economic, and intelligence tools.

There isn’t just one single thing we can do, or just one policy we can implement, that will end piracy. Reducing and mitigating the threat posed by piracy will be long, hard work. But it is clear that the multifaceted nature of our response is having an impact. As pirates continue to adapt, we need to stay vigilant and continue our efforts. The security of your ships, the region, and the global economy depend on it.

Finally, we come to the question of what you can do to insure the safety of your crews and vessels. They key actions should be:
Maintain, and where necessary increase, situational awareness.
Employ Best Management Practices on your ships.
Employ embarked security teams where circumstances necessitate their use.
Train your crews on the piracy threat.
Train your crews in the methods of preserving evidence when ships are attacked or taken.
Provide personnel for participation in investigations and trials, including giving testimony.
Make contributions for general or particular projects to the Trust Fund.
And finally, stay in touch with the personnel, military units, and governments involved in fighting piracy.
With that, I thank you for your attention, and will be glad to take your questions.

U.S. DROUGHT FUNDING INCREASED TO HORN OF AFRICA

FROM U.S. STATE DEPARTMENT
Increase in U.S. Funding to Drought Relief in the Horn of Africa
Media Note Office of the Spokesperson Washington, DC
April 5, 2012
The United States continues to be deeply concerned by the humanitarian emergency in the Horn of Africa, and particularly the hard-hit Somali population. Despite the end of famine conditions in February, nearly 10 million people in the region still require humanitarian assistance. For this reason, the United States Government is providing an additional nearly $50 million in aid for refugees and drought-affected communities in Somalia, Ethiopia, and Kenya in addition to what we have already provided. As Secretary Clinton announced April 3rd, since early in 2011 "the United States has provided almost $1 billion in humanitarian assistance that has saved countless lives from malnutrition, starvation, and disease. And our sustained commitment has demonstrated the best of America, helping to undermine the extremist narrative of terrorist groups like al-Shabaab in Somalia."

The Famine Early Warning System Network (FEWS NET) stated April 3, 2012 that the March-May rains in the eastern Horn of Africa will not be adequate. Poor rains would likely negatively affect food security in a region still recovering from a devastating drought and famine in 2011. The United States remains committed to breaking the cycle of hunger and famine in the Horn of Africa and to this end will continue to provide humanitarian assistance to those in need and call on others to join it in supporting the UN's $1.5 billion 2012 Consolidated Appeal for Somalia. This appeal is currently funded at only $179 million. We encourage all donors to take additional steps to tackle both immediate assistance needs and strengthen capacity in the region to mitigate future crises.

In addition to our emergency assistance, the United States is leading efforts to address the root causes of hunger and food insecurity by improving agricultural systems in the Horn of Africa under the Feed the Future initiative. As part of these efforts, yesterday in Nairobi, Kenya USAID Administrator Dr. Rajiv Shah participated in a high-level forum on strengthening the resilience of vulnerable communities to drought in the Horn of Africa. The forum brings together African and international development leaders who are committed to working together in new ways to prevent future humanitarian crises related to drought.

STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL ON PIRACY OFF THE HORN OF AFRICA

The following excerpt is from a Department of State e-mail:
Piracy Off the Horn of Africa
Remarks Andrew J. Shapiro
Assistant Secretary, Bureau of Political-Military Affairs Remarks to the Center for American Progress
Washington, DC
March 27, 2012
Thank you for inviting me here today. I want to thank the Center for American Progress [CAP] for having me here to speak on the important subject of piracy off the Horn of Africa. CAP is a tremendous leader in developing new ideas and in approaching issues in new ways. I come here before you today to talk about an issue that the Obama administration has also had to approach in new and innovative ways.

Despite the romantic notions surrounding piracy of previous centuries, modern day piracy represents a new and complex threat to the international community. While piracy at sea is certainly not a new problem, its modern re-incarnation has an impact of a different magnitude. Piracy off the coast of Somalia threatens one of the principal foundations of today’s modern interconnected global economic system – and that is freedom of navigation on the high seas. In a globalized world, the impact of piracy in one area of the world can cause a ripple effect greater in magnitude than ever before. We live in an era of complex, integrated, and on-demand global supply chains. People in countries around the world depend on secure and reliable shipping lanes for their food, their medicine, their energy, and consumer goods. By preying on commercial ships in one of the world’s most traversed shipping lanes, pirates off the Horn of Africa threaten more than just individual ships. They threaten a central artery of the global economy, and therefore global security and stability.

When the Obama administration came to office the problem of piracy off the coast of Somalia was snowballing out of control. In 2007 and 2008 pirate attacks began to escalate dramatically. A vicious and reinforcing cycle was forming. Motivated by escalating ransom payments – which grew into the millions of dollars – and a lack of other employment opportunities, more and more Somali men took to the waters. Piracy, as a result, went from a fairly ad hoc, disorganized endeavor to a highly developed transnational criminal enterprise. Flush with money, pirates were also able to improve their capabilities and expand their operations further and further away from shore.

To make matters worse, Somalia offered pirates near ideal conditions. Piracy is a prime example of the dangers and problems that can arise from the presence of ungoverned spaces in our globalized world. In places where pirates operate – through the coastal areas in Puntland and parts of central Somalia – the lack of governance and weak institutions provide them with a safe haven. Additionally, with more than two thousand miles of coast line and with the Gulf of Aden to its north, Somalia sits along one of the busiest shipping lanes in the world. International seaborne trade traversing through the Suez Canal to get from the United States or Europe to Asia must also travel through the Gulf of Aden and therefore along Somalia’s coast. This high volume of trade means that there is virtually an endless supply of ships for Somali pirates to target.

Piracy emanating from Somalia therefore represented a perfect storm for the international community – a weak state in a strategically essential location that harbors a rapidly growing transnational criminal enterprise and which threatens a vital artery of the global economy. Action had to be taken.

While there seemed to be no limit to the growth of piracy, through the collective effort of the United States, the international community, and the private sector, we are now seeing signs of clear progress. The numbers clearly demonstrate this. In 2011, the number of successful pirate attacks fell by nearly half. As a result, there has been a significant drop in the numbers of ships and crew held hostage. In January 2011, pirates held 31 ships and 710 hostages. In early March of 2012 pirates held eight ships and 213 hostages – a roughly 70 percent decline. This is still way too many, but it is clear advances are being made.

Today, I want to talk to you about the U.S. response to Somali piracy and why I think our efforts, and the efforts of the international community and the private sector are having an impact. In combating piracy, the Obama administration has pursued a strategy that seeks to leverage all elements of U.S. power. We have developed and pursued an integrated multi-dimensional approach toward combating piracy that focuses on:
diplomatic engagement to spur collective international action;
expanding security on the high seas through the use of naval assets to defend private vessels and to disrupt pirate attacks;
preventing attacks by encouraging industry to take steps to protect itself;
deterring piracy through effective legal prosecution and incarceration;
and finally debilitating the networks that support piracy operations.
Let me now turn to talk about our diplomatic response. The international community has adopted innovative steps to address the problem of piracy. For our part, the United States has helped lead the international response and galvanize international action. As the State Department’s Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review concluded, “solving foreign policy problems today requires us to… bring countries and peoples together as only America can.” This is exactly what the United States has done when addressing the problem of piracy.

From the beginning, the United States has adopted a multilateral approach focused on addressing this issue as a shared challenge. Piracy affects the international community as a whole and can only be effectively addressed through broad, coordinated, and comprehensive international efforts. In January 2009, the United States helped establish the Contact Group on Piracy off the Coast of Somalia to both prompt action and coordinate the efforts to suppress Somali piracy. The Contact Group is based on a voluntary membership and was established concurrent with the UN Security Council’s passage of Resolution 1851. It now includes over 70 nations as well as international and maritime industry organizations, to help coordinate national and international counter-piracy policies and actions.

The Contact Group serves as an essential forum for interaction between states and regional and international organizations. A number of specialized working groups were established within the Contact Group to address a variety of subjects, including, naval coordination at sea, judicial and legal issues concerning captured pirates; and public diplomacy programs in Somalia to discourage piracy. Through these working groups, the Contact Group adopts a problem solving approach toward addressing piracy. While we don’t always agree on everything, we agree on a lot and this coordinated international engagement has spawned action. In this regard, the Contact Group helps synchronize the international efforts underway to prevent duplication and to maximize the impact of international efforts.

The issue of piracy has also become a significant component of our diplomatic engagement with countries. This is something we see at the State Department in our dealings with countries across the globe. When I engage in diplomatic talks with countries as varied as Indonesia and Brazil, piracy is on the agenda. It is a shared challenge that many countries have an interest in seeing addressed. The issue of piracy therefore has an ancillary diplomatic benefit, as it often proves to be a useful subject for us to discuss with countries with which we are looking to expand our security relationship.
Our response to piracy is an example of how we are seeking to lead in new ways, by reaching out to new actors, building new kinds of partnerships and coalitions. American diplomatic engagement and leadership on piracy has helped catalyze the action of others so that the burden of maintaining global stability is shared.

Now let me turn to talk about how we are increasing security at sea. As pirate attacks increased, the United States, NATO, the EU, and many other national navies took action.

The United States established Combined Task Force 151 – a multinational task force charged with conducting counter-piracy naval patrols in the region. It operates in the Gulf of Aden and off the eastern coast of Somalia, covering an area of over one million square miles. In addition, there are a number of coordinated multinational naval patrols off the Horn of Africa. NATO is engaging in Operation Ocean Shield, the European Union has Operation ATALANTA, and other national navies in the area conduct counter-piracy patrols as well. On any given day up to 30 vessels from as many as 20 nations are engaged in counter-piracy operations in the region, including countries new to these kinds of effort like China, India, and Japan. U.S. and international naval forces have thwarted pirate attacks in progress, engaged pirate skiffs, and successfully taken back hijacked ships during opposed boardings.

We have also sought to create a safe transit corridor for commercial shipping vessels. U.S. Naval Forces Central Command or NAVCENT has worked with partners to set up a nearly 500-mile long transit corridor through the Gulf of Aden. This transit zone is heavily patrolled by naval forces and used by some countries for convoy operations. The corridor has helped reduce the number of attacks within the transit zone but it also has had the unfortunate side effect of pushing pirate activities further out to sea.

This demonstrates how pirates are constantly adapting their tactics in response to international efforts. One example of this is their expanded use of mother-ships – which are themselves pirated ships with hostage crews aboard. These ships launch and re-supply groups of pirates who use smaller, faster boats for attacks. They can carry dozens of pirates and tow many skiffs for multiple simultaneous attacks. This has made pirates more difficult to interdict and more effective at operating during monsoon season, which previously restricted their activities. Mother-ships have extended the pirates’ reach far beyond the Somali Basin. Somali pirates now operate in a total sea space of approximately 2.5 million square nautical miles – an area equivalent to the size of the continental United States. Pirate activity has even extended as far as the waters off the coast of India. This increase makes it difficult for naval or law enforcement ships and other assets to reach the scene of a pirate attack quickly enough to disrupt an ongoing attack. There is just too much water to patrol.
But in the cat and mouse game that is modern day piracy, we have responded as well. Since discovering the use of mother-ships, international navies now seek to identify and interdict mother-ships when possible. These are very delicate engagements however. With hostages on board and with mother-ships sometimes capable of traveling thousands of miles, interdictions and contested boardings of mother-ships by international navies are at times not possible. Yet we are making progress in isolating these vessels when discovered and boarding when necessary.

An example of this occurred in January of this year, when the U.S. Navy rescued an Iranian fishing vessel that had been hijacked and was being used as a mother-ship. The mother-ship was discovered when its skiffs launched an attack on another commercial vessel travelling nearby. Under attack, the commercial vessel contacted the US Navy, which was able to respond in time, forcing the pirates to break off their attack and head back to their mother-ship. While the pirates thought that was the end of the engagement, U.S. forces were on their tail and tracked the pirate skiffs undetected back to the Iranian vessel. When U.S. warships approached, all 15 pirates surrendered and the Iranian crew held hostage aboard was freed. The pirates were arrested by U.S. forces and were transported to the Seychelles for prosecution. This case demonstrated our principled commitment to freedom of navigation no matter the country impacted.

The American public should also know that this administration will do everything it can to ensure the safety and security of American citizens threatened by pirates. The Obama administration has made clear that it will act aggressively to rescue and protect American citizens threatened by piracy and that it will act diligently against those who perpetuate these crimes. Just months into office, President Obama was confronted with the hostage taking of the American captain of the MAERSK Alabama. The President authorized the use of force to rescue the captured captain and after a long standoff, U.S. Navy Seals successfully freed the captain by force. And this year, just hours before the State of the Union address, President Obama ordered U.S. special forces to rescue an American and a Danish aid worker being held hostage on the ground in Somalia. The health of the American hostage Jessica Buchanan was deemed to be in jeopardy and President Obama ordered U.S. forces to attempt a rescue mission. This dangerous mission clearly demonstrated our resolve. If you attack or capture an American citizen, we will act vigilantly and aggressively to make sure you face justice.

Private Sector
Another integral part of the response to piracy has been the critical role played by the private sector in taking measures to prevent and deter attacks. Perhaps the most significant factor in the decline of successful pirate attacks has been the steps taken by commercial vessels to prevent and deter attacks from happening in the first place. We have found that the best defense against piracy is often simply vigilance on the part of the maritime industry.

In response to the growing threat, we worked with the shipping industry to expand and develop its implementation of industry-developed “best management practices” to prevent pirate boardings before they take place. These include practical measures, such as:
proceeding at full speed through high risk areas;
employing physical barriers such as razor wire;
posting additional look-out;
reporting positions to military authorities; and
mustering the crew inside a “citadel” or safe-room in the vessel when under attack.
These steps, when properly implemented, remain some of the most effective measures to protect against, and repel, pirate attacks. Recognizing the value of these measures, the U.S. government has required U.S.-flagged vessels sailing in designated high-risk waters to take additional security measures. Nevertheless, we remain troubled that there are still commercial ships travelling through pirate-infested waters that have yet to implement proper security measures. Approximately 20 percent of all ships off the Horn of Africa are not taking proper security precautions. Unsurprisingly, these account for the overwhelming number of successfully pirated ships.

However, we must also recognize that even when fully implemented best management practices do not guarantee security from pirates. As a result, we have also supported the maritime industry’s use of additional measures to enhance their security – such as having armed security teams on board. To date, not a single ship with Privately Contracted Armed Security Personnel aboard has been pirated. Not one.

These teams serve as a potential game-changer in the effort to counter-piracy. While many expected these teams to be made up of undisciplined “cowboys” that would cause an increase in the violence at sea, from what we have seen so far this has not been the case. We have not seen cases of pitched battles at sea between pirates and armed security personnel. In fact, in most engagements, the situation ends as soon as pirates are aware an armed security team is on board. In most cases, as pirates approach a ship the armed security teams will use flares or loudspeakers to warn the pirates. If the pirates keep coming, they will fire warning shots. That is usually when the interaction ends. Pirates break off the attack and turn their skiffs around and wait for another less protected ship to come by. These teams therefore have served as an effective deterrent.

However, when a vessel is successfully hijacked our foremost concern is always about the safety of the crew, regardless of nationality. The U.S. government is acutely aware of the dilemma that ship owners face when ships and sailors are taken hostage. While the safety of the crew is critical, we must all acknowledge that submitting to pirate ransom demands only ensures that future crews will be taken hostage. The United States has a long tradition of opposing the payment of ransom, and we have worked diligently to discourage or minimize ransom payments. While some may consider this the cost of doing business, every ransom paid further institutionalizes the practice of hostage-taking for profit and promotes its expansion as a criminal enterprise. We strongly encourage flag States, shipowners and private parties involved in hostage crises to seek assistance from appropriate U.S. government sources in their crisis management procedures.

The enormous ransoms that are paid out make the kidnapping-for-ransom industry incredibly lucrative. The average ransom is now at $4.5 million per incident and has reached as much as $12 million. We also know that lucrative industries fight hard to stay in business. Indeed, despite the decline in successful attacks, the overall number of attempted attacks actually increased slightly in 2011 compared to 2010. In light of the pirates growing difficulties at sea, we have seen pirates shift to targeting hostages on land, such as with the captured American and Danish aid workers. Pirates’ ability to adapt means that the maritime industry and the international community must be constantly vigilant in assessing the effectiveness of self-protection measures.

Prosecution, Incarceration, and Pirate Networks
Now let me turn to another aspect of our response – our efforts to deter piracy through effective apprehension, prosecution and incarceration of pirates and their supporters and financiers. Today, over 1,000 pirates are in custody in 20 countries around the world, most are or will be convicted and sentenced to lengthy prison terms.
An important element of our counter-piracy approach involves renewed emphasis on enhancing the capacity of states – particularly those in the region – to prosecute and incarcerate suspected pirates. The United States is currently supporting efforts to:
increase prison capacity in Somalia;
develop a framework for prisoner transfers so convicted pirates serve their sentence back in their home country of Somalia;
and to establish a specialized piracy chamber in the national courts of one or more regional states.

We are seeing progress in this area. Last year a new maximum security prison opened in northern Somalia to hold convicted pirates. And just this past month the government of the Seychelles once again demonstrated its tremendous commitment to combating piracy by accepting the 15 pirates captured from the Iranian fishing vessel for prosecution.
Nevertheless, the capacity and willingness to prosecute and incarcerate pirates is limited. Countries in the region that might be able and otherwise willing to prosecute Somali pirates in their national courts often decline to do so because they do not want to take dozens of Somali pirates into their already overburdened prison systems. In this regard, we are in some ways a victim of our own success. We are apprehending more pirates at sea, leading to more crowded prisons. Expanding the capacity to prosecute and incarcerate pirates is a real challenge and is one that the international community, including the governments of flag states and ship owners, will have to work hard to address.

As piracy has evolved into an organized transnational criminal enterprise, it is increasingly clear that the arrest and prosecution of pirates captured at sea is insufficient on its own to meet our longer term counter-piracy goals. Most pirates captured at sea are often low-level operatives. The sad fact is that prosecution is often a limited deterrent for men lacking employment opportunities onshore and who are willing to embark hundreds of miles out to sea in nothing more than a small boat – exposed to the elements and often with limited fuel. Sometimes pirates fail to carry enough fuel to get back from a voyage, which forces them to take remarkable risks in attempting to hijack vessels. An untold number of pirates are lost at sea every year. Part of what makes piracy seem so intractable is that despite these dangers, the lack of other economic opportunities in coastal communities means there is no shortage of willing recruits for pirate organizers to choose from.

After an intensive review of our strategy last year, Secretary Clinton approved a series of recommendations which, taken together, constitute a new strategic approach. A focus on pirate networks is now at the heart of our strategy.

We are using all of the tools at our disposal in order to disrupt pirate networks and their financial flows. We are focused on identifying and apprehending the criminal conspirators who lead, manage, and finance the pirate enterprise, with the objective of bringing them to trial and disrupting pirate business processes. Often, the best way to attack organized crime is to follow the money. Pirate organizers receive income both from investors and ransom payments, and disburse a portion of the proceeds of ransoms back to these investors. Already, the United States has indicted and is prosecuting two alleged Somali pirate negotiators.

The Contact Group recently validated the importance of this approach and formed a new working group to assist in multilateral coordination to disrupt the pirate enterprise ashore. We are working to connect law enforcement communities, intelligence agencies, financial experts, and our international partners to promote information sharing and develop actionable information against pirate conspirators. This effort will include tracking pirate sources of financing and supplies, such as fuel, outboard motors, and weapons.

Situation on the Ground in Somalia
Lastly, the only long-term solution to piracy is the re-establishment of stability, responsive law enforcement, and adequate governance in Somalia. This will require concentrated and coordinated assistance to states in the region – including those parts of Somali society with which we can work – to build their capacity to deal with the social, legal, economic and operational challenges to governance, effective law enforcement and economic development. To that end, the United States continues to support the Djibouti Peace Process, the Transitional Federal Government (TFG), and other regional authorities working toward these same goals. Last month Secretary Clinton attended the London Conference on Somalia, which the United Kingdom convened to galvanize high-level international support for Somalia’s political transition.

As the Secretary noted, Somalia is at a critical juncture, with less than five months left to complete the Roadmap to End the Transition. The United States and its partners are working to help the TFG and other Somali leaders seize this opportunity to make progress toward greater security and political stability. We also welcome the expansion of the troop level, mandate, and logistical support package for the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM). AMISOM has made impressive security gains over the past several months, and we believe this positive trend will continue and will provide additional space for political progress and humanitarian access.

However, acknowledging the difficult situation on shore does not preclude progress at sea. While there is no simple solution to modern-day piracy, we are making advances to address what was seemingly an intractable transnational problem. The effective and coordinated international response to piracy also provides an example of how – with U.S. leadership – the international community can respond to other transnational threats and challenges that emerge. The U.S. response to piracy is also a prime example of how we as a government can address new and emergent transnational challenges. Addressing these threats requires us to be flexible and innovative in how we respond. It also requires agencies across the U.S. government to work together so that we bring every tool that we have to bear – including our diplomatic, military, law enforcement, economic, and intelligence tools. There isn’t just one thing we can do, or just one policy we can implement, that will simply solve piracy. Reducing and mitigating the threat posed by piracy will be long, hard work. But it is clear that the multi-faceted nature of our response is having an impact. While pirates will continue to adapt and evolve, it is vital that we stay vigilant and continue our efforts – the security of the region and the global economy depend on it.
With that I will be glad to take your questions.

U.S. STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL SPEAKS ON SOMALI PIRACY

The following excerpt is from a U.S. State Department e-mail:
Somali Piracy
Remarks Andrew J. Shapiro
Assistant Secretary, Bureau of Political-Military Affairs Remarks to the U.S. Chamber of Commerce
Washington, DC
March 13, 2012
As prepared
Thank you Al for that introduction and for inviting me here today. I also want to thank the U.S. Chamber of Commerce for the exceptional work that it does promoting U.S. business and for organizing this event on counter-piracy. This is an incredibly important issue to the United States, the international community, and to the global economy.

We live in an era of complex, integrated, and on-demand global supply chains. People in countries around the world depend on secure and reliable shipping lanes for their medicine, their food, their energy, and consumer goods. By preying on commercial ships in one of the world’s busiest shipping lanes, piracy off the Horn of Africa threatens more than just individual ships. Piracy threatens the life blood of the global economy, and therefore global security and stability.

Piracy is an issue in which the private sector, and the maritime industry in particular, are on the front lines. Commercial shipping vessels provide a constant stream of targets for Somali pirates. Over the years, thousands of crew members have been taken hostage and many in the maritime industry have lost their lives as a result of piracy. I have heard directly from the captains and crews of commercial ships about the harrowing situations they encounter as they transport the goods and merchandise that make the global economy function.

The challenge posed by piracy off the coast of Somalia is immense and represents a major threat to regional security and the global economy. As international action has been taken to address the challenge, the pirates have adapted. Flush from the money made from ransom payments, pirate operations have become more sophisticated. For instance, the use of so-called “mother-ships” has expanded greatly. Mother-ships are themselves pirated ships with hostage crews on board, making attacking or liberating these ships a significant challenge. Mother-ships launch and re-supply groups of pirates who use smaller, faster boats for attacks. They can carry dozens of pirates and tow many skiffs for multiple simultaneous attacks. This has made pirates more effective at operating in seasonal monsoons that previously restricted their activities. This has also extended the pirates’ reach far beyond the Somali Basin. Somali pirates now operate in a total sea space of approximately 2.5 million square nautical miles. To put that in context that’s roughly the size of the continental United States.

Piracy is a threat that this Administration has been working hard to address. In response, we have pursued a multilateral and multi-dimensional approach that focuses on security, deterrence, diplomacy, and prevention.

Security has increased through U.S. and multi-national naval escorts and patrols, which continue to escort convoys of commercial ships and patrol high risk waters. On any given day, up to 30 vessels from as many as 20 nations conduct counter-piracy operations in the Gulf of Aden and beyond. U.S. and international naval forces have thwarted pirate attacks in progress, engaged pirate skiffs and mother-ships, and successfully taken back hijacked ships during opposed boardings.

We have sought to deter piracy, through effective apprehension, prosecution and incarceration of pirates and their supporters and financiers. Today, over 1,000 pirates are in custody in some 20 countries around the world, many of whom have been convicted and sentenced to lengthy prison terms. Just last week the government of Seychelles accepted the handover from U.S. custody of 15 suspected Somali pirates for prosecution. These alleged-pirates were captured in early January when the U.S. Navy boarded an Iranian fishing vessel and rescued 13 Iranian mariners who were being held hostage. This ship was being used as a mother-ship from which to launch attacks on other vessels. Seychelles’ willingness to accept these pirates for prosecution demonstrates their strong commitment to combating piracy. They recognize the corrosive effect that pirates are having on the region and they are certainly punching far above their weight in the effort to address the problem. This case demonstrates the impact the United States and the international community is making in combating piracy.

But it is not just countries in the region that recognize the problem. We have also sought to rally the wider international community to address the problem posed by piracy. In January 2009, the United States helped establish the Contact Group on Piracy off the Coast of Somalia, which now includes nearly 70 nations, international organizations, and maritime trade associations, including INTERTANKO, BIMCO, and the International Chamber of Shipping. The Contact Group has helped galvanize action and coordinate counter-piracy policy among its participants.

We are seeing signs that all of these efforts are having a positive effect. The numbers demonstrate this. In 2011, even though the number of pirate attacks off the coast of Somalia increased slightly over 2010, the number of successful pirate attacks fell by nearly half. There has also been a significant drop in the numbers of ships and crew held hostage. In January 2011, pirates held 31 ships and 710 hostages. In early March of 2012 pirates held 8 ships and 213 hostages. This is still too many, but it is clear that progress is being made.

The role of the private sector has been critical. Perhaps the most significant factor in the decline of successful pirate attacks has been the steps taken by commercial vessels to prevent and deter attacks from happening in the first place. We have found that the best defense against piracy is vigilance on the part of the maritime industry. In the last few years, we have worked with industry in developing and implementing a variety of measures that are having a tremendous impact.

In response to the threat, the shipping industry has expanded its implementation of industry-developed “best management practices” to prevent pirate boardings before they take place. These guidelines were developed to identify self-protection measures that have proven successful in preventing boarding and seizure and enabling rescues by naval forces when boarded. They include practical measures, such as:

proceeding at full speed through high risk areas,
placing additional lookouts on watches,
using closed circuit television to monitor vulnerable areas,
employing physical barriers such as razor wire,
reporting positions to military authorities, and
mustering the crew inside a “citadel” or safe-room in the vessel.
These practices, when properly implemented, remain some of the most effective measures to protect against pirate attacks. Taken together these steps make a pirates job much harder and often give international naval vessels in the area time to respond. For instance, should a ship come under attack, razor wire can hinder pirates getting on deck. This gives a crew more time to get to a citadel inside the vessel and to notify international navies of an attack. A citadel is essentially a hardened room within the ship that is usually equipped with food and water, communications equipment, and an emergency capability to shut down the ship’s engine. It is designed and constructed to be incredibly difficult for a pirate to break into. Additionally, once the entire crew is secure inside the citadel, the captain can notify international navies that all crew are accounted for. This is invaluable information for a potential rescue mission. Properly employed best management practices are therefore making the work of pirates even harder and as a result are contributing to a declining rate in successful attacks.

Recognizing the value of these measures, the U.S. government has required U.S.-flagged vessels sailing in designated high-risk waters to take additional security measures. This includes having extra lookouts and extra communications equipment, as well as being prepared at all times to evade or resist pirate boarding. Nevertheless, we are troubled by the fact that there are commercial ships travelling in pirate-infested areas that have still not implemented these recommended security measures. Some in the shipping industry have been unwilling make basic investments that would render their crews and cargoes less vulnerable to attack. Approximately 20 percent of all ships off the Horn of Africa are not employing best management practices or taking proper security precautions. Unsurprisingly, these 20 percent account for the overwhelming number of successfully pirated ships. We have intensified our efforts to encourage commercial vessels to adopt best management practices. And I encourage anyone in industry to take proper precautions to protect their crews and their cargoes by implementing these practices.

Yet we must also recognize that best management practices do not guarantee security from pirates. Pirates operate in too large of an area for naval forces to respond quickly. The reality is that international naval forces simply might not be there to respond. The problem of piracy is one that can’t simply be solved by national governments. Therefore, we have also supported industry’s use of additional measures to ensure their security – such as the employment of armed security teams. To date, not a single ship with Privately Contracted Armed Security Personnel aboard has been pirated.Not a single one.

These teams serve as a potential game-changer in the effort to counter-piracy. This is because – and as anyone in the Navy or Marines can tell you – one of the most difficult combat maneuvers to undertake is to board a ship when coming under fire. While many expected these teams to be made up of undisciplined “cowboys” that would increase the violence at sea, from what we have gathered and observed the opposite has happened. We have not seen cases of pitched battles at sea between armed security teams and pirates attempting to board under fire. In fact, in most engagements between armed security teams and pirates, the situation ends as soon as pirates are aware these teams are on board. We have found these teams to be highly professional. In most cases, as pirates approach a ship the armed security teams will use flares or loudspeakers to warn the pirates. If the pirates keep coming, they will fire warning shots. That is usually when the interaction ends. Pirates break off the attack and turn their skiffs around and wait for another less protected target.

At the State Department, we have encouraged countries to permit commercial vessels to carry armed teams. However, we do note that this is a new area, in which some practices, procedures, and regulations are still being developed. We are working through the Contact Group and the International Maritime Organization or IMO on these issues. For instance, we have advised that armed security teams be placed under the full command of the captain of the ship. The captain then is in control of the situation and is the one to authorize the use of any force. Last September, we were encouraged to see language adopted by the IMO that revised the guidance to both flag States and ship operators and owners to establish the ship’s master as being in command of these teams.

There have been some logistical and technical issues that have arisen with armed security teams – particularly relating to weapons licensing and the transit of these teams through third countries. The United States regularly works with other governments to help resolve questions on weapons licensing to facilitate compliance with the laws of individual port States as related to firearms transfer. We engage through the Contact Group and the IMO to encourage all port and coastal States to adopt legislation that is conducive to smooth, facilitated movements of security team firearms and equipment. Currently, some States present challenges in this regard by requiring transfer to a third party while a vessel is moored in a port. Others impose fee schedules that directly charge against the presence of these weapons. In response, we have demarched port and coastal States and let them know that U.S. vessels may have firearms onboard and we request that these teams and their firearms be facilitated under applicable laws. We have also worked with the Coast Guard and Department of Transportation at the IMO and through the Contact Group to further encourage port and coastal States to develop regulations that facilitate the use of these teams aboard commercial vessels. We are working hand in glove with industry in all these endeavors to ensure these teams are both properly regulated and properly equipped.

While we are seeing progress, hijackings are still taking place. When a vessel is successfully hijacked, our foremost concern is always the safety of the crew, regardless of nationality. The U.S. government is acutely aware of the dilemma that ship owners face when ships and sailors are taken hostage. While the safety of the crew is critical, industry must face the fact that submitting to pirate ransom demands only ensures that future crews will be taken hostage. A vicious cycle has formed where ever-rising ransom payments have not just spurred additional pirate activity, but have also enabled pirates to increase their operational capabilities and sophistication. The average ransom is now at $4 million per incident and has reached as much as $12 million. Ransoms paid in 2011 totaled $135 million. Piracy, as a result, has gone from a fairly ad hoc disorganized criminal endeavor to a highly developed transnational criminal enterprise. In short, they have developed a successful business model that is hard to break.

The United States has a long tradition of opposing the payment of ransom, and we have worked diligently to discourage or minimize ransoms. But many governments and private entities are paying, often too quickly, serving to reinforce this cycle and incentivizing future hostage-taking. While some may consider this the cost of doing business, every ransom paid further institutionalizes the practice of hostage-taking for profit and promotes its expansion as a criminal enterprise both at sea and on land.

The issue of ransoms is no doubt an emotional one for all involved – especially the families and friends of those who are hijacked. And we recognize the unease within industry that believes government involvement will only prolong the hostage situation and increase the cost of the hijacking. Nevertheless, we strongly encourage flag states, shipowners and private parties involved in hostage crises to seek assistance from appropriate U.S. government sources in their crisis management procedures. Continued cooperation between industry and government and, most importantly, the mutual exchange of information is critical.

The American maritime industry should also know that this Administration will do everything it can to ensure the safety and security of American citizens threatened by pirates. This Administration has taken bold aggressive action when necessary, such as the rescue of the captain of the MAERSK ALABAMA in 2009 and the rescue of an American hostage and a Danish hostage in January of this year. The United States has also actively prosecuted pirates involved in attacks on U.S. vessels. To date, that totals 28 persons involved in several attacks.

Our approach to combating piracy has also taken on new dimensions. In the effort to combat piracy, we are now targeting pirate ringleaders and their networks. While expanding security and prosecuting and incarcerating pirates captured at sea is essential, we also recognize that the pirates captured at sea are often low-level operatives. Their leaders and facilitators are ashore in Somalia and elsewhere relatively unaffected. After an intensive review of our strategy, Secretary Clinton last year approved a series of recommendations which, taken together, constitute a new strategic approach. A focus on pirate networks is at the heart of our strategy.

Pirate organizers receive income both from investors and ransom payments, and disburse a portion of the proceeds of ransoms back to these investors as well as to the pirates who actually hijack the ships and hold the crews hostage. We intend to use all of the tools at our disposal in order to disrupt piracy financial flows and to identify and apprehend those who lead the pirate enterprise. We are seeking to make the business model of pirate leaders and facilitators untenable. We are making progress, as the United States has indicted and is prosecuting in the United States two alleged Somali pirate negotiators.
But it’s not just governments that need to work together to target pirate networks. This effort also depends on effective cooperation with the private sector. The United States is working to enhance cooperation between law enforcement and the maritime industry. When a hostage-taking occurs, industry can share information relating to the pirate negotiators and their negotiation tactics. This can help intelligence and law enforcement officials expand their understanding of how the pirate networks operate, which can help them in their efforts to indict and prosecute these criminals.

Progress is being made here as well. A sub-group of officials from the Contact Group recently met with shippers, insurers, and lawyers in London this past January to encourage them to regularly share information about piracy collected during hijackings. The United States also participated in a follow-on meeting with industry representatives earlier this month at the Italian Embassy here in Washington. The meeting helped demonstrate to industry the value of INTERPOL’s piracy database, which is collecting information relating to piracy suspects and attacks hijackings. This database enables law enforcement agencies worldwide to share information and is facilitating piracy investigations, resulting in an increase in piracy-related prosecutions worldwide. Additionally, the Department of the Treasury will provide industry with an overview of the enforcement process for Executive Order 13536, which targets the property of persons contributing to conflict in Somalia, and will help answer questions that industry has about this order.

In closing, while we are making important gains in combating piracy, this does not diminish the number of challenges going forward. Pirates may be having less success at sea, but this is unlikely to sap their motivation to continue seeking out new hostages for ransom. The enormous ransoms that are paid out make the kidnapping-for-ransom industry incredibly lucrative – and lucrative industries fight hard to stay in business. Indeed, the number of attempted attacks has actually risen over the last year, despite the declining number of successful attacks. Additionally, the capacity and willingness to prosecute and incarcerate pirates is limited. Our successes at sea are putting more strain on the prison systems in the region and prison capacity in the region is getting stretched. It is imperative that more nations step forward to prosecute and pirates who have been caught attacking vessels that are flagged, owned and crewed by citizens of their countries.

The greatest challenge however remains on land. The only long-term solution to piracy is the re-establishment of stability and adequate governance in Somalia. At the February 23 Somalia conference in London, Secretary Clinton once again declared the United States’ commitment to working with the international community in this effort.

But recognizing the challenges ashore does not exclude progress at sea. While there is no simple solution to modern-day piracy, we are making headway in mitigating the threats posed by piracy off the coast of Somalia. The progress that has been achieved is rooted in the close partnership that has been established between this Administration and the private sector in the counter-piracy effort. Piracy continues to pose a severe threat to the maritime industry, global trade and therefore the entire global economy. This means that governments and industry will need to continue to work hand-in-glove to address this problem. We look forward to working with you to make even more progress in the months and years ahead.

With that I will be glad to take your questions.