Showing posts with label WMD. Show all posts
Showing posts with label WMD. Show all posts

Monday, June 29, 2015

U.S. AND KAZAKHSTAN MAKE INITIAL SCIENCE & TECHNOLOGY CENTER AGREEMENT

FROM:  U.S. STATE DEPARTMENT
United States and Kazakhstan Initial New International Science and Technology Center Agreement
Bureau of International Security and Nonproliferation
June 24, 2015

UNITED STATES EMBASSY ASTANA

On June 22, in Astana, Kazakhstan, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Nonproliferation Programs Simon Limage initialed on behalf of the United States the Agreement Continuing the International Science and Technology Center (ISTC) along with the European Union, Georgia, Japan, the Kingdom of Norway, Kyrgyz Republic, the Republic of Armenia, the Republic of Kazakhstan, and the Republic of Korea.

The ISTC, with its new headquarters at Nazarbayev University in Astana, Kazakhstan, seeks to minimize incentives for scientists and engineers in states with technologies, expertise, and related materials applicable to WMD to engage in activities that could result in the proliferation of WMD or related materials by supporting and cooperating in research and development activities for peaceful purposes. The initialing of the agreement sets the stage for signing the agreement once all parties have completed their internal procedures.

Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Limage, as the US representative to the ISTC Governing Board, led a U.S. interagency delegation, which included technical experts from the Departments of State and Energy. In the course of the two day Governing Board meeting, significant decisions were made to streamline the ISTC, endorse plans to expand the organization to other regions, and enhance opportunities for scientific projects in new fields.

Saturday, April 11, 2015

SUSPECT ARRESTED FOR ATTEMPTING TO DETONATE CAR BOMB AT U.S. MILITARY BASE

FROM:  U.S. JUSTICE DEPARTMENT
Friday, April 10, 2015

Topeka, Kansas, Man Charged in Plot to Explode Car Bomb at Military Base
A Topeka, Kansas, man has been charged in federal court with attempting to detonate a vehicle bomb at Fort Riley military base near Manhattan, Kansas, announced Assistant Attorney General for National Security John P. Carlin, U.S. Attorney Barry Grissom of the District of Kansas and Special Agent in Charge Eric K. Jackson of the FBI’s Kansas City Division.  The defendant was arrested as part of an FBI investigation, and the device used by the defendant was, in fact, inert.        

John T. Booker Jr., 20, of Topeka, Kansas, was charged in a criminal complaint unsealed today with one count of attempting to use a weapon of mass destruction (explosives), one count of attempting to damage property by means of an explosive and one count of attempting to provide material support to the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL), a designated foreign terrorist organization. Booker is expected to make an initial appearance this afternoon before U.S. District Judge Daniel Crabtree of the District of Kansas in federal court in Topeka.

Booker was arrested this morning near Manhattan, as he completed his final preparations to detonate a vehicle bomb targeting U.S. military personnel.

“As alleged in the complaint, John Booker attempted to attack U.S. military personnel on U.S. soil purportedly in the name of ISIL,” said Assistant Attorney General Carlin.  “Thanks to the efforts of the law enforcement community, we were able to safely disrupt this threat to the brave men and women who serve our country.  Protecting American lives by identifying and bringing to justice those who wish to harm U.S. citizens remains the National Security Division’s number one priority.”

“We face a continued threat from individuals within our own borders who may be motivated by a variety of causes,” said U.S. Attorney Grissom.  “Anyone who seeks to harm this nation and its people will be brought to justice.”

“I want to assure the public there was never any breach of Fort Riley Military Base, nor was the safety or the security of the base or its personnel ever at risk,” said FBI Special Agent in Charge Jackson.  “Recently the Command Staff at Fort Riley has been working hand in hand with law enforcement to ensure the utmost security and protection for the men and women who serve our country, and the surrounding community that supports the base."

Booker is alleged to have spent months discussing multiple plans before deciding on a plan that involved the execution of a suicide bombing mission.

The complaint alleges Booker told another person “that detonating a suicide bomb is his number one aspiration because he couldn’t be captured, all evidence would be destroyed, and he would be guaranteed to hit his target.”  Booker identified Fort Riley as a good target, “because the post is famous and there are a lot of soldiers stationed there,” the complaint alleges.

It is alleged that since March 2015, Booker plotted to construct an explosive device for an attack on American soil.  It is alleged he repeatedly stated that he desired to engage in violent jihad on behalf of ISIL.  Over a period of months, he took a series of actions to advance his plot.  As alleged in the complaint, Booker assisted in acquiring components for a vehicle bomb, produced a propaganda video, rented a storage locker to store components for the explosive device, identified Fort Riley as the target and talked about his commitment to trigger the device himself and become a martyr.

FBI Evidence Response Teams are executing search warrants related to the case.

If convicted, Booker would face a maximum penalty of life in prison.

The investigation was conducted by the FBI Joint Terrorism Task Force, including members from the FBI’s Kansas City Division, the Topeka Police Department and the Kansas Highway Patrol.

The case is being prosecuted by Assistant U.S. Attorneys Tony Mattivi and David Smith of the District of Kansas, and Trial Attorneys Josh Parecki and Rebecca Magnone of the National Security Division’s Counterterrorism Section.

In all cases, defendants are presumed innocent until and unless proven guilty.  The charges merely contain allegations of criminal activity.

Friday, March 13, 2015

BROTHERS PLEAD GUILTY TO TERRORISM VIOLATIONS, ASSAULTING TWO U.S. MARSHALS

FROM:  U.S. JUSTICE DEPARTMENT
Thursday, March 12, 2015
Two Florida Brothers Plead Guilty to Terrorism Violations and Assault on Two Deputy U.S. Marshals
Younger Sibling Plotted to Attack New York City with a Weapon of Mass Destruction

Assistant Attorney General for National Security John Carlin, U.S. Attorney Wifredo A. Ferrer of the Southern District of Florida, Director Stacia A. Hylton of the U.S. Marshals Service, Special Agent in Charge George L. Piro of the FBI’s Miami Field Office and members of the South Florida Joint Terrorism Task Force (JTTF) announced today that Raees Alam Qazi and his brother, Sheheryar Alam Qazi, pleaded guilty to terrorism violations and to assaulting two Deputy U.S. Marshals while in custody.

During the hearing, the Qazi brothers acknowledged that Raees Alam Qazi, the younger brother, was going to initiate an attack using a weapon of mass destruction in New York City and that he had been financially and emotionally supported by his older brother, Sheheryar Alam Qazi, who encouraged him to launch the attack.

“With today’s guilty pleas, Raees Qazi and his brother Sheheryar Qazi are being held accountable for their roles in a plot to conduct a terrorist attack using a weapon of mass destruction in New York City and their assault on two federal officers during their pretrial detention,” said Assistant Attorney General Carlin.  “This case highlights our commitment to pursue any individuals who would seek to conduct an attack on U.S. soil or to injure law enforcement officials who risk their lives to protect us.  I want to thank the many agents, analysts, and prosecutors who are responsible for this successful result.”

“The plot by Raees Qazi to perform a terrorist attack in New York City – and his older brother’s financial support of that plot – was intended to further Al Qa’ida’s message in the United States,” said U.S. Attorney Ferrer.  “The Qazi brothers later attacked federal law enforcement agents.  As today’s guilty pleas demonstrate, we will respond by holding those who plan terrorist acts on American soil accountable.  This case serves as an example of our commitment to protecting civilians from violent jihadi attacks.”

“Any attempt on the life of a law enforcement official is heinous,” said Director Hylton.  “To attempt to murder two Deputy U.S. Marshals while in a federal cellblock is a total disregard for life and the entire judicial process.”

“The Qazi brothers are a great example why the FBI’s number one priority is counterterrorism,” said Special Agent in Charge Piro.  “We remain committed in our steadfast efforts to detect, deter and disrupt every threat to the United States.”

Raees Alam Qazi, 22, and his brother, Sheheryar Alam Qazi, 32, were living in Oakland Park, Florida, in November 2012 when they were arrested and charged with conspiracy to provide material support to terrorists and conspiracy to use a weapon of mass destruction (explosives).  In January 2015, a federal grand jury added additional terrorism charges and five counts of conspiracy, assault and attempted murder relating to an attack on two Deputy U.S. Marshals in April 2014 while the Qazis were in federal custody.

Raees Alam Qazi pleaded guilty to one count of conspiring to provide material support and resources to terrorists in preparation for the use of a weapon of mass destruction, one count of attempting to provide material support to a foreign terrorist organization and one count of conspiring to assault a federal employee.  Under the terms of the plea agreement, the parties jointly agreed to recommend a 32-year prison sentence for Raees Qazi.

Sherheyar Alam Qazi pleaded guilty to one count of conspiring to provide material support and resources to terrorists in preparation for the use of a weapon of mass destruction and one count of conspiring to assault a federal employee.  Under the terms of the plea agreement, the parties jointly agree to recommend a 17-year prison sentence for Sheryheyar.

The sentencing hearing for both brothers is currently set before U.S. District Judge Beth Bloom of the Southern District of Florida on June 5.

Raees Alam Qazi and Sheheryar Alam Qazi face a potential statutory maximum sentence of 35 years and 20 years, respectively.

The brothers are naturalized U.S. citizens from Pakistan.

Tuesday, January 20, 2015

MAN ARRESTED FOR TRYING TO ACQUIRE RICIN THROUGH THE "DARK WEB"

FROM:  U.S. JUSTICE DEPARTMENT 
Tuesday, January 20, 2015
New York Man Indicted For Attempting to Acquire Deadly Toxin, Ricin

Assistant Attorney General for National Security John P. Carlin, U.S. Attorney Preet Bharara for the Southern District of New York and Assistant Director-in-Charge George Venizelos of the FBI’s New York Office, announced today that a federal grand jury returned a two-count indictment against Cheng Le for attempting to acquire and distribute ricin and committing postal fraud.  Le was arrested on Dec. 23, 2014, by the FBI in Manhattan.  He was presented on a Complaint before the U.S. Magistrate Judge James C. Francis IV on Dec. 24, 2014, and has been detained since his arrest.  He is expected to be arraigned on Friday, January 23, 2015, before the United States District Judge Alison J. Nathan.

“As alleged, Cheng Le attempted to acquire ricin, a potentially lethal toxin, through the Dark Web so that it could be used for deadly purposes,” said U.S. Attorney Bharara.  “Thankfully, with the help of our law enforcement partners he was intercepted and must now answer for his alleged crimes.”

“In the shadows of the Dark Web, criminals hide behind a veil of anonymity, sniffing out hidden opportunities to buy and sell illegal and potentially dangerous merchandise,” said Assistant Director-in-Charge Venizelos.  “As alleged, in this case, activity carried out in the marketplace served as a conduit for Le to obtain ricin. In his desire to acquire this potentially deadly toxin, he picked his own poison and now faces the consequences of the justice system.”

According to the Complaint, which was unsealed today in Manhattan federal court, and the indictment:

Ricin is a highly potent and potentially fatal toxin with no known antidote.  In December 2014, an individual (the Ricin Buyer) contacted an FBI online covert employee (the OCE) on an online forum.  During Dec. 2014, the Ricin Buyer exchanged a series of messages with the OCE, during which the Ricin Buyer explored the possibility of the OCE supplying the Ricin Buyer with ricin, for the Ricin Buyer to resell to at least one secondary buyer.

On or about Dec. 18, 2014, the Ricin Buyer directed the OCE to send a quantity of ricin to a particular postal box in Manhattan (the Postal Box).  The FBI later determined that the Postal Box belonged to Cheng Le.  Later that same day, FBI agents observed Le wear latex gloves while retrieving a package from the Postal Box (the Package) and mailing it at a nearby post office (the Post Office).  Law enforcement officers examined the Package, confirmed that it did not contain any hazardous materials, and determined that Le had listed a fake name as the Package’s return address.  A postal employee (the Postal Employee) informed the FBI that the Postal Employee had seen Le at the Post Office on multiple prior occasions and that Le has worn blue latex gloves on at least some of those occasions.

The FBI prepared a package (the Sham Shipment) that was consistent with the Ricin Buyer’s request to the OCE, which was then delivered to the Postal Box.  On Dec. 23, 2014, Le, wearing latex gloves, retrieved the Sham Shipment, opened it, and took the contents to his apartment, whereupon he was arrested by FBI agents.

*                      *                      *

The indictment charges Le, 21, in two counts.  Count One charges Le with attempting to possess a biological toxin for use as a weapon, and carries a maximum sentence of life in prison.  Count Two charges Le with using a fictitious name in furtherance of unlawful business involving the mail, and carries a maximum sentence of five years’ imprisonment.  The maximum potential sentences in this case are prescribed by Congress and are provided here for informational purposes only, as any sentencing of the defendant will be determined by a judge.

Assistant Attorney General Carlin is grateful for the outstanding investigative efforts of the FBI, the New York City Police Department (NYPD) and the United States Postal Inspection Service (USPIS).  Le’s arrest is the result of the close cooperative efforts of the Justice Department’s National Security Division, U.S. Attorney’s Office for the Southern District of New York, the FBI’s Joint Terrorism Task Force—which consists of law enforcement officers of the FBI, NYPD, USPIS and other agencies.

The case is being prosecuted by the office’s Terrorism and International Narcotics Unit.  Assistant U.S. Attorneys Ilan Graff and Andrew D. Beaty are in charge of the prosecution, with assistance provided by Trial Attorney Joseph Kaster of the Justice Department’s Counterterrorism Section.

The charges contained in the indictment are merely accusations, and the defendant is presumed innocent unless and until proven guilty.

Monday, October 27, 2014

UNGA FIRST COMMITTEE THEMATIC DISCUSSION REGARDING WMD

FROM:  U.S. STATE DEPARTMENT 
Sixty-Ninth UNGA First Committee Thematic Discussion on Other Weapons of Mass Destruction
Remarks
Ambassador Robert A. Wood, Alternate Representative, Delegation of the United States of America
New York City
October 24, 2014

Mr. Chairman,

Last year the international community welcomed UN Security Council Resolution 2118 and the September 27th OPCW Executive Council decision that legally mandated the complete elimination of Syria’s chemical weapons program. These decisions were an historic and unprecedented achievement that allowed for the removal and verified destruction of Syria’s declared chemical weapons -- a significant step toward the complete dismantling of the Syrian chemical weapons program. This effort could not have been accomplished without the commitment and resolve of the international community. President Obama expressed his gratitude to the OPCW-UN Joint Mission and the entire international coalition for this extraordinary achievement. President Obama also made clear that the task of ensuring that Syria’s chemical weapons program has been entirely eliminated is far from over. Serious concerns remain; including Syria’s continued use of chemical weapons against the Syrian people in direct contravention of its obligations under Resolution 2118, the Chemical Weapons Convention and the decisions of the OPCW Executive Council.

Mr. Chairman, the OPCW Fact-Finding Mission, set up by the Director-General to establish the facts around allegations that chlorine has been used as a chemical weapon, has confirmed the use of such a chemical in its second report dated 10 September 2014. The United States commends the courage and dedication of the Mission and its professional and impartial efforts to ascertain the facts regarding chemical weapons use in Syria. We join the rest of the international community in strongly supporting the Director-General’s decision to have the Fact-Finding Mission continue its work.

This second report contains a compelling set of conclusions and evidentiary findings implicating the Syrian government in deadly chemical weapons attacks against three villages in northern Syria during April and May of 2014. The Fact-Finding Mission concluded that the testimony of primary witnesses and supporting documentation, including medical reports and other relevant information, constitutes a compelling confirmation with a high degree of confidence that chlorine was used as a weapon, systematically and repeatedly in the villages of Talmanes, Al Tamanah, and Kafr Zeta in northern Syria. The Fact-Finding Mission emphasized that “in describing the incidents involving the release of toxic chemicals, witnesses invariably connected the devices to helicopters flying overhead.” It is well known that the Syrian Government is the only party to the conflict in Syria possessing helicopters or any other aerial capability.

Mr. Chairman, the use of chlorine or any other toxic chemical as a weapon is a clear breach of the Chemical Weapons Convention and of Resolution 2118. Such a breach raises serious concerns about the willingness of Syria to comply with its fundamental treaty obligations not to possess or use chemical weapons.

We are also concerned about Syria’s declaration, as it contains gaps, discrepancies and inconsistencies which give rise to important questions and concerns about the declaration’s accuracy and completeness. We call on Syria to cooperate fully with the OPCW and promptly begin destruction of its remaining chemical weapon production facilities. The Syrian Arab Republic must provide the international community with credible evidence to support its assurances that it has fully abandoned its chemical weapons program. This cannot be achieved while use of chemical weapons continues and new allegations of such use continue to be made. Complete and accurate declarations must be provided, and destruction operations must be completed promptly and in full in order to prevent further use of chemical weapons against the Syrian people. The Syrian CW file remains open and will not be closed until all of these issues are addressed and Syria complies with its obligations under the CWC and UN Security Council Resolution 2118.

Mr. Chairman, on other CWC related matters, the United States looks forward to working closely with States Parties to meaningfully advance the work and recommendations of the Third Review Conference held in April 2013. While there is more work to be done in our efforts to further strengthen the implementation of the CWC, we remain encouraged by the progress made by the OPCW and its extraordinary efforts in working toward a world free of chemical weapons. The OPCW has accomplished a great deal and remains an indispensable multilateral body with a global responsibility.

For our part, the United States continues to act on opportunities to accelerate destruction and has safely destroyed almost 90 percent of our chemical weapons stockpile under OPCW verification. We continue our steadfast commitment to the CWC and will continue working in a transparent manner towards the complete destruction of our remaining chemical weapons.

The United States remains fully committed to the charge given in the preamble of the Chemical Weapons Convention, that all States Parties “determined for the sake of all mankind, to exclude completely the possibility of the use of chemical weapons, through the implementation of the provisions of this Convention….” We must stand together to make this goal a reality.

Mr. Chairman, as we pursue these important goals, we must not lose sight of the threat posed by biological weapons, whether in the hands of states or non-state actors. The Biological Weapons Convention bans the development, production, and stockpiling of such weapons. It embodies an aspiration as profound as that of the CWC: to completely exclude the possibility of biological agents and toxins being used as weapons. The United States strongly supports the BWC.

The 7th BWC Review Conference took steps to strengthen the Convention’s contribution to international security, establishing an ambitious agenda of important topics for ongoing work. But this agenda has not been matched by the resources or political will needed to deliver results. Even as we consolidate gains under the existing process, we must begin to look toward the 8th RevCon. What issues should we seek to address over the coming years, and how should we seek to address them?

Some will call – inevitably – for another effort to negotiate an all-encompassing supplementary treaty or protocol. We’ve been down that road. The problems are well known – and, despite the popular narrative, not limited to U.S. objections. Under this approach, nothing is agreed until everything is agreed. This is a formula for years of inaction. The BW threat won’t wait for us.

There is a better way. We can strengthen our intersessional process. We can – like so many other international entities – adopt decisions on the things we agree upon, while continuing to discuss those on which we do not. And there IS agreement on a great deal. We agree on the need to strengthen national implementation; on the importance of international cooperation, especially to build nations’ capacity to address challenges to health security posed by infectious disease and toxins; on the need to give practical effect to the mutual assistance provisions of Article VII. And – even if we do not agree on how to go about it – we agree on the need to find ways to strengthen confidence that Parties to the BWC are living up to their obligations.

Mr. Chairman, we HAVE a treaty. We don’t need to wait for some distant day when the stars align and another one emerges – and the threats we face will most certainly not wait. Let’s take the tools that we have, strengthen them where necessary, and put them to use.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Friday, July 11, 2014

U.S. STRATEGIC COMMANDER DISCUSSES CHALLENGES

FROM:  U.S. DEFENSE DEPARTMENT
Stratcom Chief Outlines Deterrence Challenges
By Terri Moon Cronk
DoD News, Defense Media Activity

WASHINGTON, July 11, 2014 – Strategic deterrence in the 21st century is complicated, challenging and vastly different from that of the Cold War, the commander of U.S. Strategic Command said yesterday.

Navy Adm. Cecil D. Haney said extremist organizations, significant regional unrest, protracted conflicts, budgetary stresses and competition for natural resources could have strategic implications for the United States and the world.
“While terrorism remains the most direct threat to our nation -- particularly weapons of mass destruction -- we are also dealing in advances in state and nonstate military capabilities across air, sea, land and space domains, and cyber security,” the admiral told an audience at the State Department’s George Marshall Conference Center.

Some nations continue to invest in long-term modernization with strategic capabilities, he added, some are replacing their older systems, while others are modernizing based on their perceived need in the geopolitical situation. He cited India, Pakistan, Russia, Iran, North Korea and China as examples of nations developing modern military capabilities.

When Russia recently invaded Ukraine and overtook Crimea, Haney said, Russian troops also exercised “their strategic ability, not just their conventional capabilities.” On May 8, he said, “Russia conducted a major strategic force exercise involving significant nuclear forces and associated command control six months from the last one. And I don’t mean just moving it around. I mean demonstrating firing each part of their associated arsenal.”

While adversarial threats grow against the United States, the nation still retains the strategic advantage, he said, although potential adversaries are moving quickly in their development of destructive capabilities.

“While we have improved and increased our cyberspace capabilities, the worldwide threat is growing in sophistication in a number of state and nonstate actors,” he said. “As we monitor developments, we must not lose sight of nation states and non-nation-state actors [that] continue to have goals of obtaining proliferation,” Haney said. “As long as these threats remain, so too does the value of our strategic capabilities to deter these threats.”

The Stratcom commander emphasized the importance of the U.S. nuclear triad.
“Each element of the nuclear triad has unique and complementary attributes in strategic deterrence,” Haney said. “As we look at ballistic missiles and air response capabilities to the survivable leg of our submarine capability to the heavy bombers, the real key is integration of all three that make a difference in the deterrence equation for any country that would want to take us on. And it works.”
Haney pointed out that while the United States has sought to have a world free of nuclear weapons, those weapons still have a role in strategic deterrence and in the foundational force, “until we can get rid of them.”

“We must continue to lean forward with arms-control agreements while continuing to provide assurance and deterrence,” he said. “As a nation, we must create strategies and policies to deal with this diverse, multidisciplinary-problem world we live in, because we have to deliver strategic stability and effective solutions in a conscious manner, given today’s fiscal environment.”

Haney urged students in the audience to challenge traditional thinking.

“Successful 21st-century strategic deterrence lies in our understanding that this is not about a Cold War approach,” he said. “It’s about understanding that deterrence is more than nuclear.”

And while U.S. nuclear weapons are just as salient today as in the past, Haney said, “it’s understanding that what our adversaries are willing to risk requires deep understanding.”

Thursday, June 12, 2014

U.S. FACT SHEET: G-7 DECLARATION ON NON-PROLIFERATION AND DISARMAMENT FOR 2014

FROM:  U.S. STATE DEPARTMENT 

G-7 Declaration on Non-Proliferation and Disarmament for 2014

Fact Sheet
Bureau of International Security and Nonproliferation
June 5, 2014


1. We are committed to seeking a safer world for all. Preventing the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and their means of delivery remains a top priority. Such proliferation poses a major threat to international peace and security as recognized in UN Security Council Resolutions (UNSCRs) 1540, 1673, 1810, 1887, and 1977. During this tenth anniversary year of UNSCR 1540, we reaffirm our commitment to working together towards full implementation of the resolution by 2021 and to strengthen our efforts to combat the proliferation of nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons and their means of delivery.

2. In seeking this safer world, we reiterate our commitment to create the conditions for a world without nuclear weapons, in accordance with the goals of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), in a way that promotes international stability, based on the principle of equal and undiminished security for all, and underlining the vital importance of non-proliferation for achieving this goal.

3. We reaffirm our unconditional support for all three pillars of the NPT, which remains the cornerstone of the nuclear non-proliferation regime and the essential foundation for the pursuit of disarmament and the peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

4. We call on all NPT Parties to fulfill their obligations under the Treaty and to preserve and strengthen the international nuclear non-proliferation regime. The 2015 NPT Review Conference presents a vital opportunity for all NPT Parties to further strengthen the Treaty in all its aspects. We recall the successful, consensus outcome of the 2010 NPT Review Conference, including its Action Plan. We remain fully committed to the Action Plan’s implementation, and call on all States Parties to implement its actions. In this regard, we welcome and encourage continued engagement of and among the NPT nuclear-weapon States on verification, transparency and confidence-building measures, with a view to strengthening implementation of all three pillars of the NPT. We welcome the April 2014 meeting of China, France, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom, and the United States (P5) in Beijing, the latest in this ongoing dialogue, and welcome the timely submission of the individual reports made to the third session of the NPT Preparatory Committee in New York in April, 2014, pursuant to Actions 5, 20, and 21 of the Action Plan. We encourage all States Parties, consistent with Action 20 of the Action Plan, to make similar reports.

5. The G7 partners continue to attach great importance to the development of internationally recognized nuclear weapon free zones, established on the basis of agreements freely arrived at among States of the regions concerned, in line with the principles set out by the UN Disarmament Commission in 1999 and recognize the legitimate interest of non-nuclear-weapon States in receiving security assurances from nuclear-weapon States in the framework of the relevant legally binding protocols of nuclear-weapon-free zone treaties. These protocols enhance regional and international security by helping to build confidence between nuclear and non-nuclear weapon states. We welcome the signature of the protocol to the Treaty on a Nuclear Weapon-Free-Zone in Central Asia. We also welcome the commitment of the P5 States to continue to consult with the States Parties to the Treaty on the Southeast Asia Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone.

6. We reaffirm the importance of commitments and assurances given by the NPT nuclear weapons States to the NPT non-nuclear weapon States. We deplore the recent and ongoing breaches of the commitments given to Ukraine by the Russian Federation in the Budapest Memorandum. In this Memorandum, the Russian Federation, United Kingdom and the United States reaffirmed their commitment to respect Ukraine’s independence and sovereignty and existing borders; reaffirmed their obligation to refrain from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of Ukraine and that none of their weapons will ever be used against Ukraine except in self-defense or otherwise in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, and reaffirmed their commitment to Ukraine to refrain from economic coercion. We consider that Ukraine’s historic decisions in 1994 were significant steps in promoting its own and wider regional and international security. We also welcome Ukraine’s statement at the 2014 Non-Proliferation Treaty Preparatory Committee that Ukraine remains committed to the provisions of the NPT.

7. The G-7 strongly support the goal of a zone free of nuclear weapons, as well as other weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery in the Middle East. Recalling the decision at the 2010 NPT Review Conference to hold a Conference on the establishment of such a zone, we strongly support Finnish Ambassador Laajava’s work as facilitator of the Conference, and welcome the continued commitment of the co-sponsors of the 1995 Resolution (the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom and the United States). We call upon the States of the region to continue their direct engagement with each other in order to finalize the preparation and convening of the Conference in the nearest future.

8. While acknowledging the right of withdrawal from the NPT contained in Article X.1, we consider that modalities and measures to address withdrawal from that Treaty are needed as demonstrated by North Korea’s announcement of withdrawal. We underscore the role of the UN Security Council in addressing announcements of withdrawal promptly and without delay, assessing the consequences of such withdrawal, including possible adoption of measures in this regard. We also emphasize that a State Party will remain responsible under international law for violations of the NPT committed prior to its withdrawal. We also underscore that nuclear transfers received prior to withdrawal should remain in peaceful uses and subject to IAEA safeguards. We welcome the growing recognition that this issue needs to be addressed urgently at the 2015 Review Conference and we support the adoption of appropriate recommendations on measures that address withdrawal in the Final Document.

Nuclear Proliferation Challenges

9. We underscore our support for E3+3 efforts led by High Representative Ashton to reach a long-term comprehensive solution to the Iranian nuclear issue that resolves fully the international community’s concerns regarding the exclusively peaceful nature of Iran’s nuclear program and ensures Iran does not acquire nuclear weapons. We welcome the implementation of the Joint Plan of Action (JPOA) between the E3+3 and Iran and the essential role played by the IAEA in verifying the nuclear-related measures. We commend those states which made financial contributions in this context for the monitoring work of the IAEA. We reaffirm our strong support for the IAEA’s ongoing efforts to verify the exclusively peaceful nature of Iran’s nuclear program and we call on Iran to cooperate fully with the IAEA to resolve all outstanding issues, particularly those which give rise to concerns about the possible military dimensions (PMD) of Iran’s nuclear program, the satisfactory resolution of which will be critical for a long-term comprehensive solution to the Iranian nuclear issue.

10. We call on Syria to remedy its noncompliance with its nuclear safeguards obligations, and to cooperate fully with the IAEA in resolving all outstanding questions regarding the nature of its nuclear program.

11. We will not accept North Korea as a nuclear armed state and urge North Korea to abandon all nuclear weapons and existing nuclear programs, and to return, at an early date, to the NPT and to IAEA safeguards and come into full compliance with its nonproliferation obligations. We condemn in the strongest possible terms North Korea’s continued development of its nuclear and ballistic missile programs in direct violation of UN Security Council Resolutions 1718, 1874, 2087 and 2094. In this regard, we condemn North Korea’s February and March 2014 ballistic missile launches in clear violation of its UNSCR obligations and call on North Korea to refrain from further provocations. We urge North Korea to halt any efforts to restart, readjust, and expand its nuclear facilities at Yongbyon, and cease immediately all nuclear activities including the ones related to its uranium enrichment and plutonium programs. We reaffirm our collective hope for lasting peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula and call on North Korea to refrain from any actions that escalate tensions in the region. We firmly support diplomatic efforts to implement the 2005 Joint Statement and to bring North Korea into compliance with its UN Security Council obligations, and call on North Korea to take concrete steps toward complete, verifiable and irreversible denuclearization. We commend the international community’s unified resolve in the face of North Korea’s defiance of it and urge continued vigilance by all states to curtail North Korea’s proliferation activities and impede the continued pursuit of its proscribed nuclear and ballistic missile programs.

Nuclear Disarmament

12. We encourage the P5 to continue their important dialogue, including on nuclear arms reductions and their work on confidence-building and transparency that represent major steps in accordance with Article VI of the NPT and the Action Plan adopted by the NPT Review Conference in May 2010. We welcome the continued implementation of the New START Treaty by the U.S. and Russia and the disarmament-related actions already made by France and the UK, as well as urge others that possess nuclear weapons but have not yet engaged in nuclear disarmament efforts to reduce their arsenals.

13. Early entry into force and universalization of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) is in the security interests of every nation. States that have yet to sign or ratify the Treaty should do so without waiting for others. For the Treaty to be an effective mechanism for nuclear disarmament and nonproliferation, we believe all States must maintain the political will and provide adequate resources to complete the Treaty’s verification regime and maximize the capabilities of the Provisional Technical Secretariat. We welcome the voluntary adherence to unilateral moratoria on nuclear explosive tests and call on all States to refrain from acts which would defeat the object and purpose of the Treaty. We also welcome the establishment of the Group of Eminent Persons and support its activities, which will inject new energy and dynamics into the push for entry into force.

14. The Conference on Disarmament (CD) and its predecessor bodies have a long history of delivering landmark agreements, but we share the growing impatience of many in the international community at the impasse at the CD. We believe the next logical step in multilateral negotiations to advance both nuclear nonproliferation and disarmament goals is the negotiation of a Treaty banning the production of fissile material for use in nuclear or other nuclear explosive devices (FMCT), on the basis of document CD/1299 and the mandate contained therein. While we welcome declared moratoria by some states on the production of fissile material for use in nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, a binding and verifiable ban on such production is a necessary step toward a world without nuclear weapons. We welcome the work of the UN Group of Governmental Experts (GGE), which will make recommendations on possible aspects that could contribute to a future Treaty, and can build momentum towards eventual negotiations in the CD.

Peaceful Use of Nuclear Energy

15. All States Parties to the NPT have an inalienable right to use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, in compliance with their international obligations. We reiterate our willingness to cooperate with States that meet their nuclear non-proliferation obligations and wish to develop a civil nuclear program in a manner that meets the highest standards of safety, security, non-proliferation, and respect for the environment.

16. We urge strong support for implementation of the IAEA’s Nuclear Safety Action Plan, including working towards establishing a global nuclear liability regime, and welcome the progress in enhancing the effectiveness of the Convention on Nuclear Safety. We emphasize the importance of the establishment, implementation and continuous improvement of national emergency preparedness and response measures.

17. Multilateral approaches to the nuclear fuel cycle contribute to nuclear energy programs. We support the IAEA’s work to establish a bank of Low Enriched Uranium in Kazakhstan and urge the conclusion of a Host State Agreement at an early date in order to allow for the beginning of operation of the bank.

IAEA Safeguards

18. We support the central role of the IAEA, and in particular its safeguards system, which remains essential for the effective implementation of the nuclear non-proliferation regime. The IAEA must continue to have the necessary resources and legal authorities to be able to carry out its mission in full, in accordance with its statutory mandate. We will continue to help promote an IAEA Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement together with an Additional Protocol as the universally accepted international verification standard, which should be a consideration in decisions on the supply of nuclear fuel, equipment, or technology. We call on all States which have not yet done so to sign and bring into force the Additional Protocol and apply its provisions as soon as possible.

Nuclear Security

19. We welcome the outcomes of the Nuclear Security Summit in The Hague on 24-25 March 2014 where 58 world leaders worked to further reduce the threat of nuclear terrorism by securing vulnerable nuclear and other radioactive material around the globe. The Hague Summit participants agreed to a Communique that reaffirms the fundamental responsibility of States, the need to further strengthen and coordinate international cooperation, and the need for a strengthened and comprehensive international security architecture. Many countries agreed to multilateral joint commitments intended to advance the goal of nuclear security. We highlight Belgian and Italian work to complete the removal of their excess supplies of highly enriched uranium and plutonium for elimination, and Japan for announcing that it will work with the United States to eliminate hundreds of kilograms of nuclear material from one of its experimental reactors. We call on others to take additional transparency measures. We also continue to encourage nations to join existing relevant international initiatives that support Summit goals.

20. We urge all States Parties to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material (CPPNM) to ratify, accept or approve the 2005 Amendment to the Convention as soon as possible. In addition to securing nuclear and radiological material at their source, we recognize the need to locate and secure material currently available on the illicit market and prosecute those involved in the trafficking of these materials.

21. We commend the work of the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism and other international efforts to counter nuclear smuggling and combat nuclear terrorism. The ongoing occurrence for more than 20 years of nuclear and radioactive trafficking highlights the threat that terrorists or other malicious actors can acquire these dangerous materials. The international community must be vigilant to prevent the world’s most dangerous materials from falling into the wrong hands.

The Nuclear Suppliers Group

22. We welcome the call by the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) on all states to exercise vigilance to ensure that the supply of nuclear related technologies and materials is for peaceful purposes and to make best efforts to ensure that none of their exports of goods and technologies contributes to the spread of nuclear weapons. In this regard, we recognize that the NSG Guidelines serve as the standard for nuclear and nuclear-related dual-use exports. We call on NSG Participating Governments to strictly observe the Guidelines and encourage nuclear supplier states that are not NSG participating governments to act in conformity with the Guidelines on a voluntary basis. We also support the discussion of the Additional Protocol as a condition of supply to enhance nuclear non-proliferation efforts. We welcome the progress that is being made by the Technical Experts Group to ensure that control lists remain current, and we welcome the Group’s outreach efforts to enhance non-proliferation. We welcome the membership of Mexico in 2012 and Serbia in 2013.

Chemical Weapons

23. We reaffirm our unconditional support for the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) and the functions of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW). We applaud the success of the Convention and the awarding of the Nobel Peace Prize to the OPCW for its ongoing work to eliminate an entire class of WMD and toward preventing the re-emergence of chemical weapons. We look forward to continuing the work set out in the final document of the 2013 Review Conference and support efforts to ensure the universalisation and effective implementation of the Convention, and we call on all states not party to the Convention to adhere to it now. Destroying chemical weapons remains a key objective of the Convention together with refraining from the development, production, acquisition, stockpiling, use and proliferation of chemical weapons. We welcome the progress being made by the possessor states as reported recently to the OPCW Executive Council (EC) and Conference of the States Parties. We encourage all possessor states to continue to take every necessary measure to complete their destruction processes as soon as possible in a transparent fashion, and within the framework of the existing verification regime. We reiterate the importance of an effective industry verification regime.

24. We share deep concern over the use of chemical weapons by the Assad regime against its citizens. We share further concern about the more recent allegations of use of a toxic chemical as a weapon in Syria and we support the OPCW fact-finding mission. We urge the regime to cooperate fully with the mission to ensure those who are responsible for such attacks are brought to account. The continued possession of chemical weapons material by the Assad regime represents a sustained danger to Syria’s population and all of its neighbors. We support the full implementation of the OPCW Executive Council Decision of September 27, 2013 and UN Security Council Resolution (2118), which resulted from the Russia U.S. Geneva framework to eliminate Syria’s chemical weapons program. We welcome the efforts of the Joint OPCW-UN Mission and the assistance provided by individual States and by the international community at large to support safe elimination of Syria’s chemical weapons program. Whilst efforts have been made, the removal process remains behind schedule. We call upon Syria to make sustained efforts in meeting its obligations under the CWC, OPCW EC decisions and UNSCR 2118. International confidence that the program has been completely eliminated requires further review of Syria’s declaration of its CW program. Syria must also take immediate steps to physically destroy the remaining 13 chemical production facilities in accordance with the CWC.

Biological Weapons

25. We welcome the work undertaken so far to implement the outcome of the Seventh Review Conference of the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC). We are committed to achieving real progress to promote national implementation, confidence-building measures, and cooperation and assistance, to reviewing developments in science and technology, and to strengthening the Convention’s Article VII on responding to use of biological or toxin weapons. We support further exploration or consideration of practical approaches to promote the exchange of best practices, enhance transparency, and build trust among states parties, such as peer review, voluntary transparency visits and briefings, and constructive approaches to raising and addressing concerns where they arise. Such approaches may play a role in strengthening implementation and enhancing assurance of compliance with BWC obligations. We reaffirm our commitment to promote universal membership of the BTWC, and we are determined to work with all the State Parties to reinforce its regime.

Addressing the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction

26. WMD and delivery means- related export controls by members of the international nonproliferation regimes (Australia Group, Missile Technology Control Regime, Nuclear Suppliers Group) and the Zangger Committee has significantly reduced the availability to proliferators of support from countries with the most advanced technology. These controls, and the information-sharing, best practices, and patterns of cooperation fostered by the regimes, have made it more difficult, time-consuming, and costly for proliferators to produce or acquire WMD and their delivery systems. We plan to continue to work through the regimes to reduce the global proliferation threat and urge all countries to unilaterally adopt and apply on a national basis the guidelines and standards of the regimes.

27. We fully support the key role played by the United Nations Security Council in addressing proliferation issues. We welcome the adoption by the Security Council of Resolution 1977, which renewed the mandate of the 1540 Committee for ten years and reaffirmed Resolution 1540’s obligations. We invite all States to nominate a national point of contact and to work toward full implementation of UNSCR 1540. We stand ready to provide assistance to States in this regard and we reiterate our support to the 1540 Committee in the discharge of its mandate.

28. We strongly believe that the proliferation of missiles, especially those capable of delivering weapons of mass destruction, continues to be a serious concern to us all and a threat to international peace and security, as reaffirmed in UN Security Council Resolutions 1540, 1887, and 1977. We believe that a multilateral response and international norms are the most adequate and effective way to address this issue. We strongly endorse the MTCR and the Hague Code of Conduct in that regard.

29. We affirm our commitment to the Global Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons and Material of Mass Destruction (Global Partnership) and this commitment remains unwavering. We therefore commend the Global Partnership on its efforts to coordinate and collaborate on programs and activities in the areas of nuclear and radiological security, biological security, chemical security, scientist engagement and countering knowledge proliferation, and in the implementation of UN Security Council Resolution 1540. The Global Partnership has continued its valuable work on engagement with centers of excellence and the expansion of its membership. Since 2013, the Global Partnership has welcomed the Philippines, Hungary and Spain as new members. Members of the Global Partnership also welcome the ongoing participation and closer cooperation of relevant international organizations and bodies in global efforts to improve information sharing and coordination of WMD threat reduction projects. The sub-groups that focused on each of the substantive areas of chemical, biological, nuclear and radiological security helped the Global Partnership improve information sharing, funding and project coordination. The Global Partnership has provided significant funding for the destruction of chemical weapons in Syria. In addition, strengthened matchmaking has begun to enable the Global Partnership to improve coordination of projects globally.

30. We continue to promote robust counter-proliferation tools. We support the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI). The list of endorsing nations continues to grow, with Vietnam recently being the 104th endorsing nation. We commit to undertake further measures to enhance the capabilities and authorities required to interdict shipments of weapons of mass destruction, their delivery systems, and related materials to and from states and non-state actors of proliferation concern. We promote outreach for enhanced participation in the PSI and continue to focus on legal and operational issues.

Conventional

31. Conventional arms play a legitimate role in enabling governments to defend their citizens, as enshrined in the UN Charter. However, in the wrong hands they pose a threat to global, regional and national security. Improperly controlled, they can fuel terrorism and threaten peace and stability. For this reason, we welcome the adoption of UNSCR 2117 and stress the need for full and effective implementation by States at the national, regional and international levels, of the UN Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons. In this context, we also reiterate our support for full implementation of UNSCR 2017 in order to stem arms proliferation from Libya. In addition, the Wassenaar Arrangement on Export Controls for Conventional Arms and Dual-use Goods and Technologies contributes to preventing de-stabilizing accumulations of these arms, goods and technologies. We urge those which currently sit outside the regime to make every effort to apply the Wassenaar Arrangement’s standards and control lists. Conventional arms agreements and commitments can also address specific regional security concerns. The Vienna Document and Open Skies Treaty have provided useful transparency about military activities in Ukraine and western Russia in recent months, reflecting the importance of continued implementation and modernization of these agreements and commitments.

32. We welcome the rapid progress that has been made towards entry into force of the Arms Trade Treaty since it was opened for signature on 3 June 2013. We call upon States who have not yet done so to join the Treaty as soon as possible. Effective implementation of the Treaty’s obligations will contribute to saving lives, reducing human suffering, protecting human rights, preventing the diversion of conventional arms to the illegal market and combating terrorism, while upholding the legitimate trade in arms, which is vital for national defense and security. We urge States in a position to do so to render assistance in capacity building to enable States Parties needing such assistance to fulfill and implement the Treaty’s obligations.

Outer Space

33. Outer space activities continue to play a significant role in the social, economic, scientific, and technological development of states, as well as in maintaining international peace and security. We acknowledge the need to take collaborative, timely, and pragmatic steps to enhance the long-term safety, security, sustainability, and stability of the space environment. In this context, the G-7 supports and encourages constructive discussion on the development and implementation of transparency and confidence building measures to enhance stability in space, taking into account the recommendations of the United Nations Group of Governmental Experts on Transparency and Confidence-Building Measures in Outer Space. The G7 continues to support ongoing efforts to develop a non-legally-binding International Code of Conduct for Outer Space Activities and strongly encourages completion of the Code in the near future or in the first half of 2015 at the latest. We also support the efforts to complete the United Nations Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space Guidelines on Long-Term Sustainability for Space Activities in 2015.

Friday, November 1, 2013

JOHN KERRY'S STATEMENT ON CHEMICAL WEAPONS ELIMINATION PROGRESS IN SYRIA

FROM:  U.S. STATE DEPARTMENT 
Progress Eliminating Syria's Chemical Weapons Program
Press Statement
John Kerry
Secretary of State
Washington, DC
October 31, 2013

International inspectors have worked with unprecedented speed to accomplish the first milestone in eliminating Syria’s chemical weapons and reducing the possibility that they will ever be used again. Now we must make sure the job is finished and that every one of these banned weapons is removed and destroyed. This is meaningful progress which many believed would be impossible. The progress must continue.

We must also be crystal clear that eliminating Syria’s chemical weapons is not a substitute for ending the civil war nor does it end the humanitarian catastrophe that continues to unfold. If weapons inspectors can carry out their critical mission, then I refuse to believe we can’t find a way for aid workers to carry out their equally critical mission delivering food and medical treatment to Syrians in need.

But where chemical weapons are concerned, we cannot lose sight of what has been accomplished thus far and what continues every day. Backed by the full weight of the United Nations and the international community, OPCW inspectors have responded to an unspeakable atrocity with unparalleled action. Nothing less would be acceptable after events that shocked the conscience of the world and left 1,400 innocent Syrians dead. Under the U.S.-Russia Framework, Syria must provide all UN and OPCW personnel unfettered access to any and all sites in order to fulfill their critical mission of verifying the full extent, and the eventual elimination, of Syria’s chemical weapons program. Syria’s obligations are clear, and it will need to fully comply with the requirements established by UNSCR 2118 and the OPCW Executive Council’s decision. To borrow from President Reagan’s maxim, where the Assad regime is concerned, there is no ‘trust,’ only ‘verify.’

To date, the United States has provided approximately $6 million in financial and in-kind assistance to support the efforts of the OPCW-UN Joint Mission to eliminate Syria’s chemical weapons program, including armored vehicles, training, protective equipment, and medical CW countermeasures for the inspection team. We intend to continue to provide available assistance to help the Joint Mission fulfill its mandate.

Wednesday, October 30, 2013

SECRETARY OF STATE KERRY'S REMARKS AT PLOUGHSHARES FUND GALA

FROM:  U.S. STATE DEPARTMENT 
Remarks at the Ploughshares Fund Gala
Remarks
John Kerry
Secretary of State
U.S. Institute of Peace
Washington, DC
October 28, 2013

Well, good evening, everybody. And Michael, thank you so much for a very, very generous introduction. I think everybody here wants to join me in thanking you for your remarkable efforts through all the years. You said a moment ago that you’ve been doing this for 40 years. You’ve really not only been involved in these humanitarian causes for a long time and the effort to make our world safer, but I think everybody here would agree that your groundbreaking film, China Syndrome, created a new consciousness about all of this, and you’ve been at it ever since. Thank you. God bless you for it. Appreciate it. (Applause.)

Doesn’t he look great? He looks absolutely spectacular. He is the comeback kid. And as everybody here knows, he has stashed away two Oscars. A month ago he added an Emmy to his mantle. And I’d asked him previously at another event we were at some time ago with friends here in Washington, I said, “What’s it like to win all these awards?” And he said, “You know, it was just an honor to be nominated.” And I said, “Yeah, that’s what they tried to tell me in 2004.” (Laughter.)

He has done amazingly, obviously, and we are really happy that you are gracing the screen, whether it’s television or the big screen, still with your talent.

Let me say how much I appreciate the leadership of Mary Estrin and Joe Cirincione. Thank you for all that you do. Thank you for your generous comments, Joe. And I want to thank everybody on the team of Ploughshares for your extraordinary work in pursuit of a difficult, obviously, reaching goal. But that’s what goals are supposed to be about, especially the big ones. Realizing a world that is free from the threat of weapons too terrible for any of us to comprehend is really hard for some people to grab onto. It’s a big concept. But I’ll say more about why I think it’s so essential that we do grab onto it in a few minutes.

I want to thank this guy sitting right in front of me. I don’t know why you’re sort of singled out there, Dick, but it’s great to see you again and to be with you here. He was my former Chairman, and for nearly 30 years we worked together on the Senate Foreign Relations together, which is a long time. And as every one of you knows – and I think you’re going to hear from Dick shortly – there is no nobody who’s spent more energy in more worthy ways to try to make the world safer than Dick Lugar. And I’m glad to call him a friend across the aisle. (Applause.) Good to be with you.

Needless to say, we need a lot more of Dick’s brand of common sense as well as his courage in reaching across the aisle at a time where we know how difficult that is, and his commitment to finding serious foreign policy answers to very, very challenging issues. We’re living in a time of much greater conflict in many ways, but far fewer people – despite the fact that it doesn’t’ seem that way – far fewer people dying in wars than did in the last century. And as asymmetrical as these challenges are, the reality is that we still face the great challenge that has been with us since 1945 and which so many people have expended their energy to try to control. I will always appreciate Dick Lugar’s partnership and persistence as we worked together on the New START Treaty. And without a doubt, we would not have made it through the Senate without Dick’s bipartisan efforts and without his common sense and courage.

I also want to thank all of you. It is heartening to see a lot of people here who are so committed to ensuring that one day, our children and grandchildren might actually be able to live in a world that is free from nuclear weapons, and that nuclear weaponry is a subject to be read about in a history book and not dealt with on the front pages of the newspapers on a daily basis.

In order for that to happen, above all we need two things. One, we need leadership that is willing to try to embrace this vision and give it life and make the world safer from the proliferation of nuclear weapons; and we also need – and I think you will agree that President Obama has actually stood up and provided that kind of leadership, in Prague, which was mentioned a few minutes ago, but also in Moscow, in Berlin, and across our own country. And I am convinced with all of the conversations we’ve had over the course of the last months, as I begin my tenure as Secretary of State, that is deeply committed, passionate and moved by this cause.

The second thing we need is you. We need organizations like Ploughshares and people who are willing to work the grassroots and people who are willing to educate. Educate – let me tell you about that for a minute. Dick will remember when I came to the United States Senate when we were there in the 1980s and Ronald Reagan was engaged in efforts then, before he became engaged in Reykjavik with Gorbachev, in what was then called Star Wars, as well as satellite weaponry, other discussion, the MX missiles. It was a time of enormous discussion in the United States Senate about these issues. We actually had an arms control observer group, and I worked for years to get onto that group. Ted Kennedy was on it, Sam Nunn, John Warner – a group of people who really cared about these issues and understood them and worked at them.

And then over time, as the Cold War ended and as we began both Dick and Sam Nunn’s work and other work to destroy nuclear weapons, the United States Senate changed. I’m willing to bet that maybe 10 senators, if that, have actually debated deeply and voted on issues of arms control in the United States Senate today.

So when I say educate, it’s not just the American public at large that has to be educated about these issues, about Comprehensive Test Ban, about computer testing, about all the mechanisms that are available today and all of the things we know about this weaponry. We need the United States Congress to spend more time and pay more attention and to be more importuned by all of you with respect to this challenge. None of this goal that we are trying to achieve here can be realized without your help – every single one of you here.

And those of us who lived through the Cuban Missile Crisis – and I look around the room, I see some of you here qualify with me for that – we remember firsthand the palpable fear of duck-and-cover drills at the height of the Cold War. I remember as a kid in middle school, I guess it was, getting under my desk in the daytime and covering our heads and being told what we had to do in the event of a nuclear war. Those of us who have experienced that are obviously too quickly becoming the minority today.

So it’s our responsibility to educate the public about the challenges and the opportunities that we face. I learned some of it firsthand when I was in the United States Navy, the first school they sent me to – to was Damage Control, and then in conjunction with it Nuclear, Chemical, Biological Warfare School, Treasure Island, San Francisco. Now, Treasure Island, San Francisco back then was pretty damn good. We used to go hear the Grateful Dead and Rolling Stones and Fillmore West and it was a pretty good time, although our daytime activities with nuclear weaponry was somewhat of a contradiction to all of that.

But I will tell you that I learned enough about throw weights and circles of damage and radiation and the consequences to say to myself, “This is insanity.” And back then we had about 50,000 warheads deployed on both sides staring at each other, until Ronald Reagan and Mikhail Gorbachev brought people to their senses with a notion that was inconceivable back then that you might actually try to move to a world of no weapons.

So we have moved through START 2. We are moving down to a level where we’ll have 1,500 or so nuclear warheads. And it is a very good thing that our children don’t know what the threat of nuclear war really feels like, and we need to work to ensure that they never do, that their future is not going to be defined in the same way that ours was.

So I want to just say that I’m the first to acknowledge that getting there is a very, very challenging effort. I’ve listened to Henry Kissinger and I’ve listened to George Shultz, after whom this room is called, and I’ve listened to Bill Perry and people I have enormous respect for talk about this.

When President Kennedy so eloquently outlined his strategy of peace at American University over half a century ago, he called the goal of a complete ban on nuclear explosive testing “so near, yet so far.” And for better or worse, that diagnosis still applies today to the total elimination of nuclear weapons. And as President Obama has said, this goal is going to be the work of generations. But I’ve got news for you: Every step you take towards it, rather than in the opposite direction, is a step that will make this planet safer. And it may take those generations. But because every step means you are learning how to resolve conflicts in a different way, you are learning how to deal with international conflict far differently from the way we do today, that you don’t rely on the same kind of deterrence, to imagine that, to conjure up a vision of what that might be like, is not such a far reach, I believe.

Now, we have made important progress even towards that, and it shouldn’t be overlooked, from the Limited Test Ban Treaty that went into effect, what, 50 years ago this month, to the total moratorium on nuclear testing that President George H.W. Bush first proposed in 1992. And it’s only been breached by one country in this century: North Korea. We have made great progress in bringing leaders together to secure materials around the globe, especially through the establishment of a nuclear security summit, and we have voluntarily assumed a much greater role in the role in the international nonproliferation regime.

And of course, as I mentioned, there’s the New START Treaty, which will leave the world with the fewest deployed nuclear weapons since Dwight Eisenhower presided over the earliest standoffs with the Soviet Union, and Michael’s father was filming standoffs at the O.K. Corral. New START was a hard-fought – and because of the difficulties of bringing people along in this climate, a very significant agreement that does far more than reduce the number of weapons. It institutes a new and an effective verification regime, and it brings more of what was happening behind the scenes out into the open. It increases transparency, and it gives us much greater visibility into Russia’s nuclear activities, and they to us, which helps build confidence and actually reduces risk. It ensures that a strong nuclear deterrent remains the cornerstone of U.S. national security and that of our allies and our partners.

New START is a hallmark of the practical, commonsense approach that is needed to address the nuclear weapons threat. It’s not ideological. It’s not radical. And that’s why the satisfaction that Dick Lugar and I shared at its passage was tempered by the fact that the treaty passed the United States Senate with only four votes to spare. Now I don’t know about you, but I know that I do not want to accept as the new normal a standard of just 71 votes to be able to ratify the kind of treaty that used to pass the United States Senate near unanimously, a treaty that is so absolutely on its face prima facie without any doubt whatsoever in our common interests as inhabitants of this Earth. And none of you should be satisfied either. There is nothing the slightest bit partisan about our shared survival. And even at the height of gridlock, we ought to all be able to agree on the goal of eliminating the risk of annihilation.

So I’m encouraged by the representation here, and by the bipartisan capacity that is represented in Ploughshares and the spectrum of elected citizens – elected leaders and everyday citizens alike who consider solutions and ask one basic question above all else: What will make the world safer? Devising solutions and answering that question is no longer just the responsibility of the superpowers, as it was during the Cold War. It isn’t just the responsibility of the United States alone. All states can and must contribute to the conditions for disarmament and nonproliferation, and those two goals are actually the flips sides of the same coin. Peace will be, as President Kennedy said, the product of many nations, the sum of many acts. And we have to commit to doing our part. That’s what Joe said about George Shultz, about we’ve got to get into the field, you’ve got to get into the action, you’ve got to take the lead. Offense, not defense. As the sole surviving nation that ushered in the nuclear age, and accelerated it, we have, I think, a special burden to help usher it out. President Obama believes that. And if we see a future for big-ticket accomplishments like the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty – and President Obama and I do see that – we need more nonpartisanship, more education, and more advocacy from everybody here and from a lot of people who need to be brought here.

We need you out there to make the case, because the case, frankly, is stronger than ever. I was still in the United States Senate in 1999, on the losing side of a vote to ratify the CTBT. I thought it was a good idea then. I think it’s an even better idea now. And in a way that we could never have imagined 14 years ago, today we can maintain a safe and secure and effective arsenal without resorting to explosive testing. In a way we that we couldn’t 14 years ago – we didn’t know how – today we have a much more advanced monitoring capacity that will ensure that the treaty is, in fact, verifiable and reliable.

And don’t get me wrong. I’m realistic about the timeframe to try to begin to lower these numbers. Not going to happen tomorrow or the next day. But it’s time to re-start the conversation, to have the open debate, the full airing of every single argument and the chance to ask every question, just as we did on the START Treaty. And in the meantime, none of us here can dare to underestimate the message that we would send to the world if we began to rein in the most dangerous weapons.

Let me just say I know there are some who question the twin strategies of disarmament and nonproliferation. They think it’s somehow inconsistent. They think it makes us weak. But the simple truth remains that while our ability to deter our adversaries and protect our allies will never be compromised, as President Obama has made clear, we have more nuclear weapons today than we need to meet that standard. (Applause.)

And I might add, for all those budget-conscious folks up on the Hill, in an era of difficult budgeting, it’s very important to remember these weapons and their maintenance do not come cheap. Now, I’m not suggesting that you balance that against your security, but when you know your security is well met, and completely and totally spoken for, there’s no reason to fear reducing to lower levels and reducing the capacity for other nations to feel that they have to join the crowd.

Obviously, we are now facing a test of that – two tests – in North Korea and in Iran. And we are engaged, as the President has charged me to be and has welcomed, an opportunity to try to put to test whether or not Iran really desires to pursue only a peaceful program, and will submit to the standards of the international community in the effort to prove that to the world. Some have suggested that somehow there’s something wrong with even putting that to the test. I suggest that the idea that the United States of America is a responsible nation to all of humankind would not explore that possibility would be the height of irresponsibility and dangerous in itself, and we will not succumb to those fear tactics and forces that suggest otherwise. (Applause.)

Nor will be stampeded into some notion that this is easy, or that somehow just the mere statement you’re willing to do something means you have done it. Our eyes are wide open. The actions must be real. They must be fully verifiable. They must get the job done. And no words can replace those actions. And we have made it crystal clear, and I will repeat again, no deal is better than a bad deal, because a bad deal could actually wind up creating greater danger.

So we will do what is necessary here, but it is important for everybody to remember that in a world with fewer nuclear weapons, every nation can actually be stronger, not weaker. Everybody can actually be safer and more secure because of the regimen that you set up in order to guarantee that. These are principles that guide us as we work to keep these weapons out of the hands of terrorists who seek to buy a nuclear bomb or get one off the black market, people who are nihilists with little interest in diplomacy, with no economy to sanction, no desire to join the international community, no concern for the next generation growing up on this earth.

The principles that guide us are the same principles as we work with our international partners to eliminate Syria’s chemical weapons that Michael talked about a few minutes ago. Who would have imagined a few months ago that we would be removing weapons that hadn’t even been acknowledged to exist? We have to seize these opportunities. We have to explore this in the name of humankind and in keeping with our responsibilities as stewards of this planet.

And I will say that it is not words alone, as we call on North Korea to comply with its international obligations. We need to move forward. We need to see how North Korea will respond. How can you excuse a state, a rogue state, that spends its scarce resources on missiles designed to kill rather than investments that makes its citizens lives better? We are reminded through that contradiction of the very foundation of the Ploughshares Fund. Ploughshares, as all of you know all too well, echoes the biblical responsibility, the call of the scriptures to turn weapons of war into the tools that till the earth. It is a noble calling.

And you recognize that our responsibility does not stop with eliminating the weapons. It is not enough just to take them out and retire them. We have to redirect our resources and our energy into creating jobs and opportunity, encouraging advancement and growth, helping our neighbors, helping the needy, fulfilling the rest of the requirements of the scriptures. President Obama and I believe that this needs to be an age of construction, not destruction, one that will be defined by innovation, interactivity, and greater integration of ideas and cultures, more so than at any other time in human history.

So while weapons that were created to destroy have no place in our future, it is not enough just to melt the swords into silver. We have to make them into those ploughshares if we stand any chance of fulfilling the vision promoted by the prophets and presidents alike that one day we might be able to no longer know war. President Kennedy’s peace strategy was a courageous one. Think about it, at the height of the Cold War. President Obama’s agenda is equally bold, especially at a time when non-state actors have changed the way that we think about the nuclear threat.

These are not just high-minded dreams of leaders, my friends. These are the concerns of parents all across this planet, people who will never forget our responsibility to the next generation. And if we care about our children and what they will inherit – not just the kinds of weapons but what kind of world – then we have to act with courage today. Believe me, we’re not naive. Brent Scowcroft is not naive. Henry Kissinger is not naive. Bill Perry, Jim Schlesinger -- none of them – they’re not naive. We know that our goal of a world free of nuclear threat is a lofty one, but it is worth fighting for. We can’t just wish this world into a different reality. We have to fight for it, and that’s what I know every single one of you have come here committed to do. It’s a privilege to be with you. Let’s keep fighting and making it happen. God bless. Thank you. (Applause.)

Thursday, October 24, 2013

REMARKS AT UNGA DISCUSSION ON OTHER WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION

FROM:  U.S. STATE DEPARTMENT 
Sixty-Eighth UNGA First Committee Thematic Discussion on Other Weapons of Mass Destruction
Remarks
Katharine C. Crittenberger, Delegation of the United States
Washington, DC
October 24, 2013

Mr. Chairman,

A year ago in this forum, as reports of chemical weapons use in Syria were prompting increasing concerns, the United States emphasized the very real possibility that the world may be faced with a situation where the use of chemical weapons could become a reality. With the confirmation of the senseless killing, on August 21, of over 1000 Syrians including hundreds of young children by the use of chemical weapons, the world saw that horrible reality come true. The United States and the international community quickly and unconditionally condemned such actions. We continue to stand firm on such use as reprehensible; it goes against what has been an international norm for nearly a century. The use of chemical weapons anywhere constitutes a threat to international peace and security.

It remains our overarching goal, and that of 98% of the world community, to exclude completely the possibility of the use of chemical weapons. However, the United States believes that such a commitment should be reflected in deeds and not just words, which is why the United States was prepared to take the action that led to the historic U.S.-Russia Framework and subsequently the adoption on September 27th of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) Executive Council Decision and UN Security Council Resolution 2118, that imposes legally binding obligations on Syria to cooperate fully in the rapid elimination of its chemical weapons program under stringent verification procedures.

The fact that just a month ago the Syrian regime did not even acknowledge it possessed chemical weapons, and now inspectors are not only on the ground but they are overseeing the initial stages of destruction, is a step forward. UN Security Council Resolution 2118 requires that the Syrian Government provide the OPCW, the UN and designated personnel with immediate and unfettered access to any and all sites in Syria. Such access will be critical for the elimination of the Syrian CW program. The OPCW reports that the process of destroying Syria’s chemical weapons program began on October 6. We believe that the OPCW, UN and other designated personnel on the ground will see whether the Syrians are prepared to allow this kind of access and consent to efforts to move forward rapidly and comprehensively. It is now up to the Syrian Government and there is clearly more work to be done. The international community will be paying close attention to whether the Syrian regime is abiding by all of its obligations under the Chemical Weapons Convention, OPCW Executive Council decision and UNSCR 2118.

In this regard, we welcome and strongly support the successful efforts of the Director General of the OPCW, Ahmet Uzumcu, and the extraordinary work being done by him and the experts in the OPCW Technical Secretariat. The recent awarding of the Nobel Peace Prize to the OPCW for its long-standing efforts to eliminate chemical weapons is further validation of its commitment and resolve toward eliminating an entire class of WMD. The OPCW has been instrumental in verifying the elimination of chemical weapons around the world and is dedicated to the vision of a world free of chemical weapons and the prevention of the reemergence of such weapons.

It is also equally important to recognize UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon and his staff of professionals who are partnering with the OPCW in the important work going on in Syria. We acknowledge the bravery and professionalism of the staffs that make up the OPCW-UN teams and the important mission they have undertaken despite the dangers involved. Their efforts are to be commended and remembered.

Mr. Chairman,

On other CWC related matters, the OPCW held its Third CWC Review Conference (RevCon) in April of this year. Its final document provides a strong, balanced, and forward-looking call for continued and improved implementation of the Convention. It provides guidance on chemical weapons for the next five years and focuses on CW destruction, verification, chemical industry, economic cooperation, and preserving the expertise of the Technical Secretariat.

I would like to emphasize that the United States remains encouraged by the progress made by the OPCW in working toward a world free of chemical weapons. Since entry into force of the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), the OPCW has accomplished a great deal and remains an indispensable multilateral body with a global responsibility. With a near universal membership of 190 member states, with Somalia and Syria joining this year, over 81% of all declared chemical weapon stockpiles verifiably destroyed, and over 5,200 inspections conducted at military and industry sites since entry into force, we are certainly pleased with what the OPCW has accomplished. This progress is due to the combined efforts and commitment of States Parties, along with the OPCW’s Technical Secretariat.

For our part, the United States has safely destroyed nearly 90 percent of its chemical weapons stockpile under OPCW verification. The United States continues its steadfast commitment to the Chemical Weapons Convention and will continue working in a transparent manner towards the complete destruction of our remaining amount of chemical weapons.

The United States remains fully committed to the nonproliferation of chemical weapons. Such a goal will take commitment from all States Parties and a continued effort in a number of areas to include universality. We recognize that preventing the reemergence of chemical weapons requires a strong inspectorate, a credible industrial verification regime, and enactment by all States Parties of the necessary domestic legal regimes to fully enforce the CWC. These are all areas of vital importance for the success and longevity of the CWC and the Organization responsible for its implementation. In the preamble of the Chemical Weapons Convention, all States Parties “determined for the sake of all mankind, to exclude completely the possibility of the use of chemical weapons through the implementation of the provisions of this Convention.” We must stand together to make this goal a reality.

Mr. Chairman,

The United States, as one of the depositaries of the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BWC), would like to congratulate Cameroon, Guyana, Malawi, the Marshall Islands, and Nauru for becoming States Parties to the Convention since the last meeting of this Committee. The BWC now has 170 States Parties, and we urge all to make efforts toward the universality of this important treaty.

The Seventh BWC Review Conference (RevCon) in 2011 was an opportunity for greater imagination and collective effort in confronting the threat of biological weapons, and for continuing the important work of adapting our international efforts to a changing world and a changing threat. While the RevCon did not achieve everything the United States hoped it would, we were satisfied with the outcome, and believe the stage is set for enhancing the important work of the BWC Intersessional Process.

The RevCon adopted a five-year work plan with agenda items for 2012-2013 on international cooperation and assistance, developments in science and technology (S&T), strengthening national implementation, and Confidence-Building Measures (CBMs). Since then, we have made progress on the work plan, both at the December 2012 BWC Meeting of States Parties, which produced a constructive final report, and at the August 2013 Meeting of Experts, which held useful discussions on many details of these agenda items in a positive atmosphere.

Mr. Chairman,

Discussions and briefings at these two meetings on international cooperation and assistance have demonstrated the diversity and extensiveness of ongoing global exchanges in the life sciences, including in areas of particular importance to the Convention such as biosecurity. With regard to S&T, Parties acknowledged that the rapid pace of technological change presents both challenges and opportunities for the BWC. An important focus was the challenge presented by dual-use research of concern and the utility of voluntary codes of conduct, education and awareness-raising for addressing it.

States Parties also continued to share information on the status of national implementation of the Convention and on the assistance available for effectively implementing it, and considered ways in which they could promote confidence in their compliance through transparency about implementation. Finally, a range of proposals to enhance the value of CBMs to States Parties were discussed, though it is still unclear why many Parties do not submit CBMs and what challenges they face in making use of them. More broadly, the 2013 BWC meetings reflected the link of the Convention to global health security, emphasizing the need to strengthen adherence to international norms, such as the International Health Regulations, and the value of working with international organizations such as the World Health Organization, the Food and Agriculture Organization, and the World Organization for Animal Health. The United States recognizes that the unique nature of the biological threat makes it essential to accelerate progress to achieve global health security, including international capacity to prevent, detect and respond to infectious disease threats whether the result of a naturally occurring outbreak, accidental release or intentional event.

We look forward to reaching clear understandings and pragmatic, meaningful actions to strengthen the Biological Weapons Convention in each of these areas and demonstrate the value of effective multilateralism at the BWC Meeting of States Parties in December. It is also important for Parties to remember that, while agreeing on new understandings and new actions is important, we all have much work to do, acting individually and in like-minded groups, to implement the obligations of the Convention and the understandings already reached. We should never lose sight of these challenges.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.


Saturday, June 1, 2013

JOINT STATEMENT ON U.S.-PAKISTAN SECURITY, WMD

FROM: U.S. STATE DEPARTMENT
Joint Statement United States and Pakistan Discuss Security, Strategic Stability, and Nonproliferation Issues

Media Note
Office of the Spokesperson
Washington, DC
May 31, 2013


Acting Under Secretary of State for Arms Control and International Security Rose Gottemoeller and Permanent Representative of Pakistan to the United Nations and other International Organizations in Geneva, Ambassador Zamir Akram, co-Chaired the 5th round of the US-Pakistan Security, Strategic Stability, and Nonproliferation (SSS&NP) Working Group in Washington on May 30, 2013.

The delegations had a cordial and productive exchange of views on issues of mutual importance, including international efforts to enhance nuclear security and peaceful applications of nuclear energy. The participants also shared views on nonproliferation challenges, as well as on the multilateral regimes on chemical and biological weapons, export controls, and the importance of regional stability and security.

This meeting is part of an ongoing series of senior level engagements between the United States and Pakistan on a range of issues related to our bilateral relationship. The delegations reaffirmed that the SSS&NP Working Group remains an invaluable forum. Reflecting the significance of these issues, both delegations look forward to continuing the process and will explore meeting in Islamabad this fall.

Tuesday, April 23, 2013

REMARKS ON IMPLIMENTATION OF EUROPEAN PHASED ADAPTIVE APPROACH

FROM: U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE EUROPEAN

Implementation of the European Phased Adaptive Approach
Remarks
Frank A. Rose
Deputy Assistant Secretary, Bureau of Arms Control, Verification and Compliance
Polish National Defense University
Warsaw, Poland
April 18, 2013

Thank you so much for inviting me to join you today. At the State Department, I am responsible for overseeing a wide range of defense policy issues, including missile defense policy. In that capacity, it was my responsibility and privilege to negotiate the details of the Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) agreements with Poland, Romania, and Turkey that will enable the United States to implement the European Phased Adaptive Approach (or EPAA), the U.S. contribution to NATO missile defense. Poland is a strong ally and valued friend of the United States. Our bilateral defense ties run deep and are growing -- our new Aviation Detachment and Poland's agreement to host an EPAA missile defense site are but two recent examples of our partnership.

Implementation of the European Phased Adaptive Approach

Since 2009, the United States Government has focused on carrying out the vision articulated by President Obama when he announced that the EPAA would "provide stronger, smarter, and swifter defenses of American forces and America's Allies," while relying on "capabilities that are proven and cost-effective."

As you know, we have made great progress in implementing the President’s vision in Europe.

EPAA Phase One gained its first operational elements in 2011 with the start of a sustained deployment of an Aegis BMD-capable multi-role ship to the Mediterranean and the deployment of an AN/TPY-2 radar in Turkey. With the declaration of Interim Operational Capability at the NATO Summit in Chicago, this radar transitioned to NATO operational control.

Demonstrating their support for both NATO and the EPAA, Spain agreed in 2011 to host four U.S. Aegis-capable ships at the existing naval facility at Rota. These ships will arrive in the 2014- 2015 timeframe, in time for EPAA Phase Two.

For Phase Two of the EPAA, we have an agreement with Romania that was ratified in December of 2011 to host a U.S. land-based SM-3 interceptor site beginning in the 2015 timeframe. This site, combined with BMD-capable ships in the Mediterranean, will enhance coverage of NATO from short- and medium-range ballistic missiles launched from the Middle East.

And finally there is Phase 3, which is centered on the first of the three host nations to ratify their hosting agreement – Poland. The Ballistic Missile Defense Agreement between the U.S. and Poland entered into force in September of 2011. This agreement places a land-based interceptor site, similar to Phase 2, in Redzikowo, and includes the SM-3 Block IIA interceptor. This EPAA Phase 3 site is on schedule and on budget for deployment in the 2018 timeframe. The interceptor site here in Poland will be key to the EPAA. Not only will it protect Poland itself, but when combined with the rest of the EPAA assets, Phase 3 will be able to protect all of NATO Europe against ballistic missile threats from the Middle East.

On March 15, Secretary Hagel announced changes to U.S. missile defense policy to strengthen U.S. homeland missile defenses due to the growing ballistic missile threat from Iran and North Korea. One of these policy changes is that the SM-3 IIB missile defense interceptor program - the core element of EPAA Phase 4 - is being restructured into a technology development program.

With the SM-3 IIB interceptor, Phase 4 would have provided an intercept capability against ICBMs launched at the U.S. homeland from the Middle East. But the SM-3 IIB program also experienced significant delays, in part due to the U.S. Congress underfunding this interceptor. So as you know, the SM-3 IIB interceptor will no longer be developed or procured. The United States will instead strengthen its homeland defense by procuring additional Ground Based Interceptors – GBIs- for deployment at our existing missile defense site in Fort Greely, Alaska.

As Secretary Hagel announced, we will increase the number of deployed GBIs from the current 30 to 44, providing a nearly 50 percent increase in our capability.

The other two steps that Secretary Hagel announced include:
Deploying, with the support of the Japanese Government, an additional AN/TPY-2 radar in Japan. This will provide improved early warning and tracking of any missile launched from North Korea at the United States and/or Japan; and
Conducting studies for a potential additional GBI site in the United States. While the Obama Administration has not made any decision on whether to proceed with an additional site, conducting these studies would shorten the timeline for construction should that decision be made.

Finally, let me emphasize that the U.S. commitment to Phases One through Three of the EPAA and NATO missile defense remains ironclad, including the planned sites in Poland and Romania. Like the Administration, the U.S. Congress has supported, and continues to support full funding for Phases 1 through 3.

These U.S. missile defense deployments to Europe will provide the necessary capabilities to provide ballistic missile defense coverage of all NATO European territory in the 2018 timeframe.

I know that some may believe that not fielding Phase 4 may weaken the Transatlantic connection of the EPAA. I would tell you that the connection is still strong. I would emphasize that Phases One through Three of the EPAA will continue to provide important contributions to the defense of the United States homeland and U.S. deployed forces in Europe. For example, the radar deployed in Turkey as part of EPAA can provide important early tracking data on any Iranian missile launches against the United States. The interceptor site to be deployed in Poland, as well as BMD-capable ships at sea, will also be key to protecting the U.S. radar at Fylingdales, which is important to the defense of the U.S. homeland.

Cooperation With NATO Allies

Beyond our bilateral cooperation, we have also worked with our NATO Allies, including Poland, to implement a NATO missile defense effort.

After thorough and steady progress within NATO, on May 20-21 of 2012, the NATO Heads of State and Government met in Chicago for a NATO Summit and announced that NATO had achieved an interim BMD capability. This means that the Alliance has an operationally meaningful, standing peacetime BMD capability. NATO also agreed on the BMD-related command and control procedures, designated the Supreme Allied Commander Europe as the commander for this mission, and announced an interoperable command and control capability.

To support this interim BMD capability, the United States has offered EPAA assets to the Alliance as our voluntary national contributions to the BMD mission. The AN/TPY-2 radar deployed in Turkey is under NATO operational control. In addition, U.S. BMD-capable Aegis ships in Europe are also now able to operate under NATO operational control when threat conditions warrant.

These decisions have created a framework for allies to contribute and optimize their own BMD assets for our collective self-defense, and the United States welcomes and encourages such contributions from Allies. NATO BMD will be more effective should Allies provide sensors and interceptors to complement the U.S. EPAA contributions. Several NATO Allies already possess land- and sea-based sensors that could potentially be linked into the system, as well as lower tier systems that can be integrated and used to provide point defense such as PATRIOT. It is important that the systems contributed by Allies be interoperable with NATO’s Active Layered Theater Ballistic Missile Defense – or ALTBMD – command and control capability.

Cooperation With the Russian Federation

At the same time as we are developing this missile defense cooperation with NATO, we also seek to work cooperatively with Russia. We remain convinced that missile defense cooperation between the United States and Russia (and between NATO and Russia) is in the national security interests of all countries involved. For that reason, missile defense cooperation with Russia remains a Presidential priority for this Administration.

In Chicago, the NATO Allies made a very clear statement of our intent regarding strategic stability and Russia’s strategic deterrent. NATO declared in the Chicago Summit Declaration that "…the NATO missile defense in Europe will not undermine strategic stability. NATO missile defense is not directed against Russia and will not undermine Russia’s strategic deterrence capabilities." Through transparency and cooperation with the United States and NATO, Russia would see firsthand that this system is designed for ballistic missile threats from outside the Euro-Atlantic area, and that NATO missile defense systems can neither negate nor undermine Russia’s strategic deterrent capabilities.

While we seek to develop ways to cooperate with Russia on missile defense, it is important to remember that in keeping with its collective security obligations, NATO alone bears responsibility for defending the Alliance from ballistic missile threats. This is why the United States and NATO cannot agree to Russia’s proposals for "sectoral" or "joint" missile defense architectures. Just as Russia must ensure the defense of Russian territory, NATO must ensure the defense of NATO territory. NATO cannot and will not outsource its Article 5 commitments. As ballistic missile threats continue to evolve, we cannot place limits or constraints on our ability to defend ourselves, our allies, and our partners. This includes any limitations on the operating areas of our BMD-capable multi-mission Aegis ships.

Cooperation With Poland

We can’t talk about BMD cooperation without talking about our cooperation right here with the Republic of Poland.

We also now have an enduring Aviation Detachment deployed in Lask, which supports the joint training of U.S. and Polish Air Forces. And I also have to mention our vibrant and longstanding cooperation with Poland on other efforts to combat the threat of WMD and their missile delivery systems. For example, former President Bush chose Warsaw as the site of his May 2003 public call to create a common global effort to stop WMD- and missile-related shipments to and from states of proliferation concern. Poland and the United States then worked closely to heed that call by establishing the Proliferation Security Initiative. Over the following decade, 100 other nations from every part of the world joined our two countries in the PSI to improve our common efforts to take action against WMD shipments. Next month, Acting Under Secretary Gottemoeller will have the great pleasure of leading the U.S. delegation to the PSI Tenth Anniversary meeting in Warsaw not only to mark the occasion, but to continue efforts to meet the call that President Obama made in the 2009 Prague speech to ensure the PSI is a durable international effort.

I commend my Polish colleagues for their leadership within NATO and domestically on defense modernization which will lead to new and valuable skill sets for NATO. As everyone knows, Poland is leading by example. Where many NATO countries are reducing their defense modernization, Poland is focusing on it – and the "it" that I follow most closely is the Polish efforts to upgrade its Integrated Air and Missile Defense System. This has been a topic of considerable discussion with my Polish counterparts. I expect it will be a topic of continued discussion. It is clear to me that the Government of Poland intends to embark upon a substantial effort that will provide for a greater national expertise which can contribute to NATO air and missile defense capabilities.

And Poland is not only working on defense modernization – it is also a participant in the U.S. Strategic Command’s NIMBLE TITAN multinational missile defense wargame. Polish military, Ministry of Defense and Ministry of Foreign Affairs officials are working closely with over 20 countries and NATO to collaboratively think through how regional and global coalitions might be able to innovate with equipment, tactics, techniques and procedures to provide the best and most agile defense. In a world where the threats and the technology to defend are constantly evolving, it is our responsibility to think through the problems to reach the best and most efficient solutions.

Conclusion
We are proud of how much we have already achieved by working with our allies and partners to counter the threat from ballistic missiles, but admittedly, there is still much to do – and we are looking forward to achieving higher levels of BMD cooperation and effectiveness.

I am very pleased to be here today, and I look forward to your questions.


Thank you.

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