FRANK ROSE MAKES REMARKS ON TRANSATLANTIC MISSILE DEFENSE

FROM:  U.S. STATE DEPARTMENT
6/26/2015 12:12 PM EDT
Transatlantic Missile Defense: Defining the Right Threat Set
Remarks
Frank A. Rose
Assistant Secretary, Bureau of Arms Control, Verification and Compliance
The Atlantic Council
Washington, DC
June 24, 2015
As prepared

Thank you Ian for that kind introduction and for having me here today.

I always appreciate the opportunity to speak at the annual Atlantic Council missile defense conference alongside so many experts in this important field. Today, I would like to focus my remarks on how the Obama Administration has defined the ballistic missile threat and how we are cooperating to address this threat. I'll keep my comments brief to maximize our time to more freely engage on these issues.

The 2010 Ballistic Missile Defense Review (or BMDR) makes clear that the United States’ missile defenses are focused on defending against limited missile threats to the U.S. homeland and regional missile threats to our deployed forces, allies and partners throughout the world. The development of ballistic missiles by countries like Iran and North Korea, and the proliferation of these systems around the world is what drives our threat assessment.

Our deployment of missile defenses is focused on strengthening the twin U.S. goals of deterrence and assurance. In so doing, they also contribute to international peace and stability and reinforce our nonproliferation aims.

At the same time, we have made clear both in our policy and in the capabilities we have deployed that our missile defense efforts are not intended to affect the strategic balance with Russia and China.

As a practical matter, the U.S. experience with missile defense suggests that attempting to develop a comprehensive missile defense system to defend against ballistic missile attack from Russia would be extremely challenging – and costly – given the size and sophistication of Russia’s strategic missile force and the relatively limited number of missile defense interceptors that would be available to defend against such a large force.

It is to address the regional threats from the Middle East and North Korea, and to enhance our regional deterrence posture, that leads us to cooperate with our allies and partners in deploying missile defense systems and architectures today.

For example, I just returned from a trip to the Middle East, where the United States and Gulf Cooperation Council (or GCC) member states have committed to develop a region-wide ballistic missile defense capability, including through the development of a Ballistic Missile Early Warning System. At the recent U.S.-GCC Summit, the United States committed to work with the GCC to conduct a study of a GCC-wide missile defense architecture and offered technical assistance in the development of a GCC-wide Ballistic Missile Early Warning System. Finally, we agreed to hold a senior leader missile defense tabletop exercise to examine improved regional ballistic missile defense cooperation.

In Europe, we continue to make excellent progress implementing the European Phased Adaptive Approach (or EPAA), which will serve as the U.S. national contribution to NATO’s missile defense system.

Starting in 2011 with Phase 1, we deployed a missile defense radar in Turkey and began the sustained deployment of Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD)-capable ships in the Mediterranean. With NATO’s declaration of Interim Capability in 2012, the radar in Turkey transitioned to NATO operational control. Additionally, we have been working with Spain to deploy four U.S. Aegis BMD-capable ships at the naval facility at Rota which will allow us to increase our rotational presence in the region and respond to potential crises.

We are on track to complete the deployment of an Aegis Ashore site in Romania as part of Phase 2 of the EPAA later this year. When operational, this site, combined with BMD-capable ships in the Mediterranean, will enhance coverage of NATO from short- and medium-range ballistic missiles launched from the Middle East.

Finally, Phase 3 will involve the construction of an Aegis Ashore site in Poland equipped with the new SM-3 Block IIA interceptor. President Obama’s Fiscal Year 2016 budget request designates approximately $200 million for the establishment of the site, including construction which will begin next year, allowing us to remain on schedule to complete this site by 2018. The Phase 3 site in Poland, when combined with other EPAA assets, will provide ballistic missile defense coverage of all NATO European territory

In the Asia-Pacific, we are continuing missile defense cooperation through our bilateral alliances and key partnerships. I’d highlight that the next generation of Aegis missile defense interceptor, the Standard Missile-3 Block IIA, which we are co-developing with Japan, just completed a successful flight test earlier this month. We also recently deployed a second AN/TPY-2 radar to Japan, which will enhance the defense of both the United States and Japan.

Finally, over the past twenty years, the United States and NATO offered Russia various proposals for missile defense cooperation. Russia declined to accept our proposals. As you’re aware, Russia’s illegal actions in Ukraine led to the suspension of our dialogue on missile defense cooperation. But prior to the suspension, Russia continued to demand that the United States provide “legally binding” guarantees that U.S. missile defenses will not harm or diminish Russia’s strategic nuclear deterrent. These guarantees would have been based on criteria that would have limited our missile defenses and undermined our ability to protect ourselves, our deployed forces, allies and friends against an evolving and growing ballistic missile threat.

The 2010 BMDR is quite clear on our policy: U.S. missile defenses are neither designed nor directed against Russia’s or China’s strategic nuclear forces. However, by the same token, we have also made it clear that we cannot and will not accept legally-binding or other constraints that would limit our ability to defend ourselves, our allies, and our partners. The United States will continue to insist on having the flexibility to respond to evolving ballistic missile threats.

Allow me to conclude by emphasizing that U.S. cooperation on missile defense is not a one size fits all approach. Threats are diverse and so must be our solutions. We tailor our unique sets of capabilities to fit with each regional security environment stretching from Europe to the Asia-Pacific. And as more actors develop sophisticated ballistic missile capabilities, it is incumbent upon us to take the appropriate steps to defend the U.S. homeland, our deployed forces, and our allies and partners. I can personally attest that our diplomatic engagements the last six years have made us, and our allies, better equipped to meet the threats of today, and nimble enough to respond to what threats may lay ahead.

Thank you and I look forward to your questions and our discussion.

FRANK ROSE MAKES REMARKS ON MISSILE DEFENSE COOPERATION

FROM:  U.S. STATE DEPARTMENT
Enhancing Regional Missile Defense Cooperation
Remarks
Frank A. Rose
Assistant Secretary, Bureau of Arms Control, Verification and Compliance
Center for Strategic and International Studies
Washington, DC
April 7, 2015

Introduction

Thank you for that kind introduction, and thanks for having me here today.

By way of introduction, while I am the Assistant Secretary for Arms Control, Verification and Compliance, my work at the State Department is focused on enhancing strategic stability around the world. Arms control, verification and compliance are some of the tools we use to enhance strategic stability and reassure our allies and partners that we will meet our security commitments.

Missile defense is another tool to do just that. At the State Department, I am responsible for overseeing a wide range of defense issues, including missile defense cooperation with our allies and partners around the world. In this capacity, I served as the lead U.S. negotiator for the missile defense bases in Romania, Turkey, and Poland.

So I’m pleased to be here today to discuss our efforts at enhancing missile defense cooperation with our allies and partners, one of the key goals outlined in the 2010 Ballistic Missile Defense Review. Now you have already heard from Elaine Bunn and General Todorov about our missile defense policy and operations. So instead, let me focus my remarks on three areas: 1) significant progress we have been made implementing the European Phased Adaptive Approach (or EPAA) and NATO missile defense; 2) cooperation on missile defense with allies and partners outside of Europe, and 3) I’ll conclude with a few points on Russia and missile defense.

Before I do that, I do want to reiterate one point that you undoubtedly heard from Elaine and Ken: the President’s Fiscal Year 2016 budget protects and enhances our important missile defense priorities such as the European Phased Adaptive Approach and reflects the high priority we place on these efforts. As such, the U.S. commitment to NATO missile defense and the sites in Romania and Poland remains “ironclad.”


European Phased Adaptive Approach

With that, let me now take a few moments to discuss where we are with regard to overall implementation of the EPAA, the United States’ national contribution to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s (or NATO) missile defense system. In 2009, the President announced that the EPAA would “provide stronger, smarter, and swifter defenses of American forces and America's Allies,” while relying on “capabilities that are proven and cost-effective.” Since then, we have been working hard to implement his vision and have made great strides in recent years.

I just returned from Turkey and Romania last week and had the opportunity to discuss our progress with these two key partners.

Turkey was the first country to receive EPPA elements in Phase 1 with the deployment of an AN/TPY-2 radar to that country in 2011. At the same time, we began the start of a sustained deployment of an Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) -capable multi-role ship to the Mediterranean. With the declaration of Interim BMD Capability at the NATO Summit in Chicago in May 2012, the radar in Turkey transitioned to NATO operational control.

Additionally, Spain agreed in 2011 to host four U.S. Aegis BMD-capable ships at the existing naval facility at Rota as a Spanish contribution to NATO missile defense.

In February 2014, the first of four missile defense-capable Aegis ships, USS DONALD COOK, arrived in Rota, Spain. A second ship, USS ROSS joined her in June. During 2015, two more of these multi-mission ships, USS PORTER and USS CARNEY will forward deploy in Rota.

These multi-mission ships will conduct maritime security operations, humanitarian missions, training exercises, and support U.S. and NATO operations, including NATO missile defense.

Currently, we are focused on completing the deployment of an Aegis Ashore site in Romania as part of Phase 2 of the EPAA. Romania’s strong support for the timely completion of the arrangements needed to implement this deployment and Romania’s provision of security and its infrastructure efforts have been superb.

In October 2014, the U.S. Navy held a historic naval support facility establishment ceremony at the missile defense facility on Deveselu Airbase Base in Romania. This ceremony established the naval facility and installed its first U.S. commander. Currently, this site is on schedule to be completed by the end of this year and when operational, this site, combined with BMD-capable ships in the Mediterranean, will enhance coverage of NATO from short- and medium-range ballistic missiles launched from the Middle East.

And finally there is Phase 3. This phase includes an Aegis Ashore site in Poland equipped with the new SM-3 Block IIA interceptor. This site is on schedule for deployment in the 2018 time frame. For example, the President’s FY16 budget request includes approximately $200 million for the establishment of the site. The interceptor site in Poland is key to the EPAA: when combined with other EPAA assets, Phase 3 will provide the necessary capabilities to provide ballistic missile defense coverage of all NATO European territory in the 2018 time frame.

So, as you can see, we are continuing to implement the President’s vision for stronger, smarter, and swifter missile defenses in Europe.


National Contributions to NATO Missile Defense

I would also like to highlight the efforts of our NATO Allies to develop and deploy their own national contributions for missile defense. A great example is that today, Patriot batteries from three NATO countries are deployed in Turkey under NATO command and control to augment Turkey’s air defense capabilities in response to the crisis on Turkey’s south-eastern border.

Voluntary national contributions are foundation of the NATO missile defense system, and there are several approaches Allies can take to make important and valuable contributions in this area.

First, Allies can acquire fully capable BMD systems possessing sensor, shooter and command and control capabilities.

Second, Allies can acquire new sensors or upgrade existing ones to provide a key ballistic missile defense capability.

Finally, Allies can contribute to NATO’s ballistic missile defense capability by providing essential basing support, such as Turkey, Romania, Poland, and Spain have agreed to do.

In all of these approaches, however, the most critical requirement is NATO interoperability.

Yes, acquiring a ballistic missile defense capability is, of course, good in and of itself.

But if the capability is not interoperable with the Alliance then its value as a contribution to Alliance deterrence and defense is significantly diminished.

It is only through interoperability that the Alliance can gain the optimum effects from BMD cooperation that enhance NATO BMD through shared battle-space awareness and reduced interceptor wastage.


Missile Defense Developments in Other Regions

Let me turn now to some of the other regions of the world. The United States, in cooperation with our allies and partners, is continuing to bolster missile defenses in other key regions, such as the Middle East and the Asia-Pacific, in order to strengthen regional deterrence architectures.

In the Middle East, we are already cooperating with our key partners bilaterally and multilaterally through fora such as the recently established U.S.-Gulf Cooperation Council (or GCC) Strategic Cooperation Forum (or SCF).

At the September 26, 2013, SCF, Secretary Kerry and his Foreign Ministry counterparts reaffirmed their intent, first stated at the September 28, 2012, SCF, to “work toward enhanced U.S.-GCC coordination on Ballistic Missile Defense.”

Several of our partners in the region have expressed an interest in buying missile defense systems, and some have already done so. For example, the United Arab Emirates (UAE) has contracted to buy two Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (or THAAD) batteries that, when operational, will enhance the UAE’s national security as well as regional stability.

The UAE also has taken delivery of its Patriot PAC-3 batteries, which provide a lower-tier, point defense of critical national assets. We look forward to advancing cooperation and interoperability with our GCC partners in the months and years ahead.

Additionally and separately, the United States maintains a strong defense relationship with Israel, and our cooperation on missile defense has resulted in comprehensive missile defense architecture for Israel. Israeli programs such as Iron Dome, the David’s Sling Weapon System, and the Arrow Weapon System, in conjunction with operational cooperation with the United States, create a multilayered architecture designed to protect the Israeli people from varying types of missile threats.

In the Asia-Pacific, we are continuing to cooperate through our bilateral alliances and key partnerships.

For example, the United States and Japan already are working closely together to develop the SM-3 Block IIA, which will make a key contribution to the EPAA as well as being deployed elsewhere in the world. We also recently completed the deployment of a second AN/TPY-2 radar to Japan, which will enhance the defense of both the U.S. and Japan. And finally, we are continuing to work on enhancing interoperability between U.S. and Japanese forces, which will be aided by recent changes to the U.S.-Japan Defense Cooperation Guidelines, which we expect to complete soon.

We also continue to consult closely with Australia. For example, as a result of U.S.-Australia Foreign and Defense ministerial-level consultations over the past year, the United States and Australia have established a bilateral BMD Working Group to examine options for potential Australian contributions to the BMD architecture in the Asia-Pacific region.

Additionally, we are also consulting closely with the Republic of Korea as it develops the Korean Air and Missile Defense system, which is designed to defend the Republic of Korea against air and missile threats from North Korea. The Republic of Korea recently announced its plans to purchase Patriot PAC-3 missiles, which will enhance its capability to defend against the North Korean ballistic missile threat.


A Constraint Free Missile Defense

Finally, let me say a few things about missile defense and Russia.

Prior to the suspension of our dialogue as a result of Russia’s illegal actions in Ukraine, Russia continued to demand that the United States provide it “legally binding” guarantees that our missile defense will not harm or diminish its strategic nuclear deterrent. These guarantees would have been based on criteria that would have limited our missile defenses and undermined our ability to stay ahead of the ballistic missile threat.

The Ballistic Missile Defense Review is quite clear on our policy: U.S. missile defense is not designed nor directed against Russia and China’s strategic nuclear forces.

However, at the same time, we have also made it clear that we cannot and will not accept legally-binding or other constraints that limit our ability to defend ourselves, our allies, and our partners.

The security of the United States, its allies and partners is our foremost and solemn responsibility. As such, the United States will continue to insist on having the flexibility to respond to evolving ballistic missile threats, free from obligations or other constraints that limit our BMD capabilities.


Conclusion

Let me conclude by saying that we have made a great deal of progress on missile defense cooperation with allies and partners around the world over the past several years. This was a key goal of the 2010 Ballistic Missile Defense Review.

In Europe, implementation of the EPAA and NATO missile defense is going well. For example, the missile defense radar in Turkey has been operating since 2011, and the Aegis Ashore site in Romania is scheduled to become operational later this year.

In the Middle East, we are continuing to work bilaterally and multilaterally with our partners in the GCC to deploy effective missile defense. For example, later this year the United Arab Emirates will take delivery of its first THAAD battery.

Furthermore, we continue to work with Israel to expand its multilayered architecture to protect it from missile threats.

In the Asia-Pacific, we are working actively with our allies to enhance our missile defense capabilities in the region. On that note, we recently completed deployment of second missile defense radar in Japan, which will enhance the defense of both the U.S. and Japan.

Finally, we continue to oppose Russia’s attempts to impose limitations on our missile defenses that would limit our ability to defend ourselves, our allies, and our partners.

Suffice to say, defense of our allies and partners through assistance on missile defense cooperation is and will remain a key priority of the U.S. Government.

Thank you and I look forward to your questions.

STATE DEPARTMENT UNDER SECRETARY ROSE GOTTEMOELLER'S REMARKS ON NUCLEAR WEAPONS TESTING

FROM:  U.S. STATE DEPARTMENT 

Nuclear Weapons Testing: History, Progress, Challenges: Verification and Entry Into Force of the CTBT

Remarks

Rose Gottemoeller

Under Secretary for Arms Control and International Security 

Washington, DC

September 15, 2014

As Prepared

Thank you, Daryl. Thank you also to my esteemed colleague, General Klotz. I think this might be the first time we have been on a panel together in our current positions, but I hope it won’t be the last. On this subject in particular, it is great to have the opportunity for us to communicate why the entire Administration sees this Treaty as effective, verifiable and absolutely beneficial to our national security.

Thank you also to the Embassy of Kazakhstan, Deputy Chief of Mission Yerkin Akhinzhanov, the Embassy of Canada, the Arms Control Association, Global Green and partners for hosting us here at USIP. Finally, thank you to my former boss, Secretary Moniz for his remarks earlier.

Secretary Kerry was actually right here just a year ago, speaking about nuclear security and the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT). He quoted a line from President Kennedy’s American University speech that talked about a total ban on nuclear explosive test being “so near and yet so far.” We remain somewhat in this place today, fifty years later – “so near and yet so far.” We know the goal remains worthy and we know that it is still the right one for American national security. The difference today is that we know we have the tools to make it a reality.

General Klotz has just covered some stockpile and verification issues, so I would like to focus on the national security benefits of the Treaty and the process of moving the United States towards entry into force. I will also give you a little readout on how I’ve used my time this year to advance the case for the Treaty.

First and foremost, it is clear that CTBT is a key part of leading nuclear weapons states toward a world of diminished reliance on nuclear weapons, reduced nuclear competition, and eventual nuclear disarmament.

An in-force CTBT will hinder states that do not have nuclear weapons from developing advanced nuclear weapons capabilities.

States interested in pursuing or advancing a nuclear weapons program would have to either risk deploying weapons without the confidence that they would work properly, or accept the international condemnation and reprisals that would follow a nuclear explosive test.

An in-force Treaty would also impede states with more established nuclear weapon capabilities from confirming the performance of advanced nuclear weapon designs that they have not tested successfully in the past.

Because of this, an in-force CTBT will also constrain regional arms races. These constraints will be particularly important in Asia, where states are building up and modernizing nuclear forces.

For our part, ratification will help enhance our leadership role in nonproliferation and strengthen our hand in pursuing tough actions against suspected proliferators. That is more important than ever, in our current global environment. Nuclear security is a preeminent goal for President Obama and this Administration.

All told, it is in our interest to close the door on nuclear explosive testing forever.

As many of you know, I was invited to speak in the Marshall Islands on the 60th anniversary of the Castle Bravo nuclear test. It was quite an honor and while there, I was able to meet with government and community leaders, as well as displaced communities. I told them that it is the United States’ deep understanding of the consequences of nuclear weapons – including the devastating health effects– that has guided and motivated our efforts to reduce and ultimately eliminate these most hazardous of weapons.

About a month after visiting the Marshall Islands, I travelled to Hiroshima. Upon arriving, I visited the Cenotaph and the Peace Museum and spoke with an atomic survivor. The day was a somber, but critically important reminder that all nations should avoid the horrors of nuclear war.

We have made great strides over the past forty years, achieving an 85 percent reduction in the U.S. nuclear stockpile since 1967 and creating agreements such as the Limited Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, START, New START and more. But, we still have far to go.

It was President Ronald Reagan who, speaking before the Japanese Diet, pronounced clearly and with conviction that “there can be only one policy for preserving our precious civilization in this modern age. A nuclear war can never be won and must never be fought.”

Those words had great resonance for the students that I spoke with at Hiroshima University last April. My conversation with them focused on the CTBT and how it could contribute to reducing global nuclear threats.

Bright, engaged and motivated, the students were eager to know what they could do to help in the push towards entry into force. I told them, as I tell all the students I meet, that the most important thing that supporters of the Treaty can do is to educate their friends, their family and their communities.

That is something that I will be continuing to do throughout the year, with trips to various U.S. states to speak with students, faith and community groups, as well as expert audiences. In fact, I will be at Stanford on Wednesday to do just that.

Now, I will pivot to the question that is asked each and every time this Treaty is discussed: “What is the plan for Senate ratification?”

The answer is simple. First comes education, and then comes discussion and last and most importantly, comes debate. It is only through that process that you get to a place where a vote could happen.

We are reintroducing this Treaty to the American public, since it has been quite some time it has been discussed outside the Capital Beltway. We are and will continue to outline the clear and convincing facts about our ability to maintain the nuclear stockpile without explosive testing and our ability to effectively monitor and verify Treaty compliance. Both Secretary Moniz and General Klotz have spoken about these two issues this afternoon and they are strong allies in this effort.

We are and will continue to make it clear that a global ban on nuclear explosive testing will hinder regional arms races and impede advancements in nuclear stockpiles around the world.

With an emphasis on a healthy, open dialogue, rather than a timeline, we are working with the Senate to re-familiarize Members with the Treaty. A lot of CTBT-related issues have changed since 1999, but the Senate has changed a lot since then, too. It is up to us, as policymakers and experts before the American people, to practice due diligence in consideration of this Treaty – that means briefings, hearings at the appropriate time, more briefings, trips to Labs, trips to Vienna and the CTBTO, more briefings, etc., etc.. The Senators should have every opportunity to ask questions, many questions, until they are satisfied.

I want to make one thing very clear: this Administration has no intention of rushing this or demanding premature action before we have had a thorough and rigorous discussion and debate.

I know that it is the official sport of Washington, but I would ask people to refrain from counting votes right now. Our first priority is education and our focus should be on the hard work that goes into any Senate consideration of a Treaty. The New START process can serve as our touchstone. I realize that is less fun than reading tea leaves. I realize that it’s unglamorous and deliberate, but that is how good policy is made and that is how treaties get across the finish line.

Of course, as we have said many times, there is no reason for the remaining Annex 2 states to wait for the United States before completing their own ratification processes. We have been pleased to hear some positive statements coming from Annex 2 states in recent months, and we hope that positive vibe turns into action. I would also like to congratulate Congo, which very recently ratified the CTBT.

Finally, we urge States to provide adequate financial and political support for the completion of the CTBT verification regime and its provisional operations between now and the entry into force of the treaty. The CTBTO, now under the able guidance of Dr. Zerbo, has and will continue to do a fantastic job of readying the Treaty’s verification regime for eventual entry into force. For those of you who have the chance to visit the CTBTO headquarters in Vienna, I recommend the tour of the radionuclide detection equipment on the roof. It’s really impressive!

In closing, I will reiterate that we have a lot of work to do, but the goal is worthy. An in-force CTBT will benefit the United States and indeed, the whole world.

Let’s get to work on it together. Thank you.

STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL'S REMARKS ON U.S.-RUSSIA NUCLEAR ARMS NEGOTIATIONS

FROM:  U.S. STATE DEPARTMENT 

U.S.-Russia Nuclear Arms Negotiations: Ukraine and Beyond

Remarks

Anita E. Friedt

Acting Assistant Secretary, Bureau of Arms Control, Verification and Compliance

Testimony Before House Foreign Affairs Committee Joint Subcommittee

Washington, DC

April 29, 2014

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Chairmen Poe and Rohrabacher, Ranking Members Sherman and Keating, and members of this Committee, I am grateful for the opportunity to speak to you about the Administration’s arms control policy toward Russia.

Today, I want to speak to you about: 1) why arms control agreements with Russia continue to be an important tool to enhance the security of the United States, our allies and partners; 2) how we have used numerous arms control tools since the crisis in Ukraine began to increase transparency and stability in support of our broader regional efforts; and 3) the seriousness with which the Administration takes compliance with arms control treaties.

First, as has been recognized for over four decades, arms control is a tool that can be used to enhance the security of the United States, our Allies and our partners. It is one of the many diplomatic, military, and economic tools that the United States uses to address 21^st century challenges. Many of our allies and partners are signatories and States-Parties to these same arms control agreements and we have worked closely with them to negotiate and implement these agreements. The Obama Administration has continued the longstanding bipartisan approach to arms control with Russia that had its origins in the days of the Cold War. The administrations of Presidents Ronald Reagan and George H.W. Bush were the architects of many of our most successful and enduring arms control efforts. Let me affirm that the United States is committed to maintaining strategic stability between the United States and Russia and to encouraging mutual steps to foster a more stable, resilient, predictable, and transparent security relationship.

That said, Russia’s illegal actions in Ukraine have undermined trust. While diplomacy between the United States and Russia continues, no one can ignore that Russia’s actions in Ukraine have violated the very principles upon which cooperation is built. Further, as we consider arms control priorities this year or in any year, we will continue to consult closely with our allies and partners every step of the way. Our security and defense, as well as that of our allies and partners, is non-negotiable. We will only pursue arms control agreements that advance our national interest.

The New START Treaty and Next Steps

During the Cold War, Washington and Moscow found it in our mutual interest to work together to cap and then to begin reducing the number of nuclear weapons to reverse the nuclear arms race and improve mutual security and stability. For the same reasons, we judged that the New START was in the U.S. national security interest, and that is why we continue to implement the New START Treaty with Russia even today. We are now in the fourth year of implementation and, despite the crisis in Ukraine, we and Russia continue to implement the Treaty in a business-like manner.

Since entry into force in 2011, the United States has inspected—with boots on the ground—Russian nuclear weapons facilities 58 times. Moreover, the United States and the Russian Federation have exchanged more than six thousand notifications on one another’s nuclear forces since entry into force. These notifications provide predictability by enabling the tracking of strategic offensive arms from location to location, giving advance notice of upcoming ballistic missile test launches, and providing updates of changes in the status of systems covered by the Treaty. For example, a notification is sent every time a heavy bomber is moved out of its home base for more than 24 hours. Additionally, when either party conducts a flight test of an ICBM or SLBM, they are required to notify the other party one day in advance.

The Treaty’s verification mechanisms allow us to monitor and inspect Russia’s strategic nuclear forces to ensure compliance with the Treaty. For both the United States and Russia, accurate and timely knowledge of each other’s nuclear forces helps to prevent the risks of misunderstandings, mistrust, and worst-case analysis and worst-case policymaking. Put another way, the New START Treaty’s verification regime is a vital tool in ensuring transparency and predictability between the world’s largest nuclear powers.

The 2010 Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) highlighted the importance of aligning U.S. forces to address the 21^st century security threats. As a result of further analysis called for by the NPR, the President announced in Berlin last June that, after a comprehensive review of our nuclear forces, we have determined that we can ensure the security of the United States and our allies and partners and maintain a strong and credible strategic deterrent while safely pursuing up to a one-third reduction in deployed strategic warheads from the level established in the New START Treaty. We have sought to negotiate reductions with Russia, but to date Russia has not expressed interest in nuclear reductions below the New START levels. We will also continue to work within NATO to develop ideas for reciprocal measures that we could in the future propose to Russia to build confidence and increase transparency with regard to non-strategic nuclear weapons in Europe. This will lay important groundwork for the future when conditions may be more conducive to progress in this area. Any changes to NATO’s nuclear posture must be taken by consensus within the Alliance.

Conventional Arms Control

In the realm of conventional arms control, the United States and our allies have been using arms control mechanisms in an effort to promote stability in Europe, provide transparency on Russia’s provocative actions in and around Ukraine, and assure our allies and partners in the face of Russian aggression.

The Vienna Document on Confidence and Security Building Measures is a series of politically binding confidence and security-building measures (CSBMs) designed to increase openness and transparency concerning military activities conducted inside the OSCE's zone of application (ZOA), which includes the territory, surrounding sea areas, and air space of all European (Russia from the western border to the Ural Mountains) and Central Asian participating States. The Vienna Document allows for a variety of information exchanges, on-site inspections, evaluation visits, observation visits, and other military-to-military contacts to take place according to Vienna Document provisions. In the case of the United States, only military forces and activities inside the ZOA are impacted.

It was designed to increase openness and transparency on military activities across Europe and Russia. Since the crisis in Ukraine began, allies and partners from six countries have participated in four Vienna Document inspections in Russia and Ukraine. Using additional Vienna Document provisions, inspectors continue a near-continuous presence in Ukraine, providing insight into events there. So far, inspectors from 16 countries have participated in five such missions since March 20.

Ukraine has also implemented provisions of the Vienna Document in order to host observers to dispel any concerns about its own military activities by inviting all OSCE participating States to Ukraine from March 5-20. A total of 77 people from 32 OSCE states and the OSCE Secretariat participated in this visit. Ukraine called on Russia to host a similar visit in western Russia near the border with Ukraine, but Russia has not offered to do so.

The use of these tools in Ukraine demonstrates that the Vienna Document can help provide insight and transparency into military activities during a crisis. However, it is not designed to address a crisis when one OSCE participating State ignores the OSCE principles and commitments it has undertaken. Moving forward, the United States will work with our allies and partners to develop ideas to update the Vienna Document to reflect lessons learned.
The United States and its Treaty partners have also made active use of the Open Skies Treaty to monitor events in Ukraine and Russia. The Open Skies treaty establishes a regime of aerial observation flights over the territories of its signatories. The Treaty is designed to enhance mutual understanding and confidence by giving Treaty partners the ability to gather information through aerial imaging on military forces and activities of concern to them. During special OSCE meetings on April 7 and 17 that were convened under Vienna Document provisions to address unusual military activities, the U.S. delegation was able to display Open Skies Treaty imagery of the Russian forces, in order to show that concerns about Russia’s actions and military movements are valid and disturbing. Unfortunately, the Russian Federation has refused to provide information that could dispel the concerns of other states.

Since the Ukraine crisis began, the United States and 15 Treaty partners have flown 11 missions over Ukraine and Western Russia yielding imagery of thousands of square miles of territory. These flights have resulted in valuable data and insights for not only the United States but our partners and allies who are also States Parties.

One particularly notable event which has occurred in light of the crisis: the Treaty’s provision for “Extraordinary Observation Flights” was invoked for the first time. Per Ukraine’s request, two extraordinary flights were conducted over Ukrainian territory to observe whether Russia forces had moved beyond Crimea. In response to this request, Sweden flew from Kiev south to Odessa, with observers from Norway, Belgium, and the U.K. on March 13. On March 14, the U.S. flew along Ukraine’s eastern border with Russia, with observers from Canada and Estonia. These flights provided reassurance to Ukraine and demonstrated our commitment to work with allies to uphold key elements of the Euro-Atlantic security architecture. The following week, Russia accepted an extraordinary flight by Ukraine over its territory near the border. The U.S. is in Kyiv this week flying another extraordinary flight over eastern Ukraine in response to the latest Russian activities.

Since then, a number of allies have conducted observation flights in Russia. We are working closely with allies to maximize the benefit of these missions, coordinating on mission planning as well as sharing imagery and analysis. As an example of the utility of these flights, the German/U.S. mission on March 24 over Russia near the border with Ukraine provided unclassified imagery helping substantiate Russian military activity in Belgorod, Boguchar, and Rostov despite Russia’s denials.

We believe these arms control mechanisms have great importance not only in providing insight and transparency into Russian actions in and around Ukraine, but demonstrating support for our allies and partners in ensuring their sovereignty and territorial integrity. More broadly, such mechanisms contribute to greater transparency and stability in the Euro-Atlantic region.
I want to underscore that our NATO allies and other partners in Europe are strong supporters of arms control in Europe and our active participation and leadership in those efforts.

Compliance Report

Let me turn now to the issue of compliance. First and foremost, the Administration takes compliance with all arms control agreements extremely seriously. For this reason, this Administration worked hard to produce a compliance report in July of 2010 – the first delivered to Congress after a five year lapse – and has produced one every year since. Prior to this Administration, 2005 was the last year that a report had been delivered to Congress.
We endeavor every year to produce a compliance report by April 15. This is challenging, as the reporting period ends at the end of each calendar year, leaving us just three and one half months to gather the necessary input from the Departments of State, Defense, and Energy, as well as the Intelligence Community. Given the volume of information and seriousness with which the Administration conducts its annual compliance review, a thorough collecting, weighing, and reviewing of all available information throughout the reporting period is required and takes time. As such, despite our best efforts we have not always been able to complete the coordination process in time to provide the report by April 15. This will be true again this year, however, the report will be fully coordinated and available later in the spring. The report is currently in final interagency review.

Let me add that when countries do not uphold their arms control obligations, we hold them accountable. Russia ceased implementation of its Conventional-Armed Forces in Europe Treaty (CFE) obligations in December 2007. After two intense diplomatic efforts to break the impasse and encourage Russia to resume implementation, in November 2011, the United States ceased carrying out certain obligations under the CFE Treaty with regard to Russia. We were joined by our NATO Allies that are party to the Treaty, as well as Georgia and Moldova, in taking this step – in all, 24 of the 30 countries that are party to the Treaty.

As we have previously stated, we have concerns about Russian compliance with the INF Treaty. We have raised them with Russia and are pressing for clear answers in an effort to resolve our concerns because of the importance of the INF Treaty to Euro-Atlantic security. We’ve briefed our NATO allies on our concerns and will continue to coordinate with them on this and other matters that affect our common security. We have been keeping Congress informed on this matter through briefings with relevant congressional committees and will continue to do so. We will continue to work with Russia to resolve our concerns, and to encourage mutual steps to help foster a more stable, resilient, transparent security relationship. We’re not going to drop the issue until our concerns have been addressed. As I hope you understand, I am not able to go more deeply into this subject in an open hearing, and would ask that you not press me to do so in open session.

As another example of how we seek to address compliance concerns, several years ago we had questions with regard to China’s implementation of the Chemical Weapons Convention. Through active engagement with Chinese officials about whether China should have declared production and subsequent consumption of a particular chemical, our technical experts outlined U.S. concerns and China addressed each of our questions in a collegial and productive manner to close out this issue.

Conclusion

Arms control treaties and agreements continue to be an important tool that can enhance the security of the United States and our friends and allies. The successful implementation of the New START Treaty, and the important contributions that the Open Skies Treaty and the Vienna Document have played recently in Ukraine, demonstrate the continued relevance of arms control for our national security. Thank you very much. I look forward to your questions.

TECHNICAL UNDERSTANDINGS SUMMARY ON IRAN'S NUCLEAR PROGRAM

FROM:  THE WHITE HOUSE

Summary of Technical Understandings Related to the Implementation of the Joint Plan of Action on the Islamic Republic of Iran’s Nuclear Program

On January 12, 2014, the P5+1 (the United States, United Kingdom, Germany, France, Russia, and China, coordinated by EU High Representative Catherine Ashton) and Iran arrived at technical understandings for the Joint Plan of Action, which will be implemented beginning on January 20, 2014.

The Joint Plan of Action marks the first time in nearly a decade that the Islamic Republic of Iran has agreed to specific actions that stop the advance of its nuclear program, roll back key aspects of the program, and include unprecedented access for international inspectors.  The technical understandings set forth how the provisions of the Joint Plan of Action will be implemented and verified, and the timing of implementation of its provisions.  Specifically, the technical understandings specify the actions that Iran will take to limit its enrichment capacity at Natanz and Fordow, as well as the limits on safeguarded research and development (R&D); the actions Iran will take to implement its commitments not to fuel the Arak reactor or install remaining components at the reactor; and the actions Iran will take to facilitate International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) verification and confirmation that Iran is fully implementing these commitments.  The understandings also clarify the reciprocal actions that the P5+1 and the EU will take.

Between now and January 20th, Iran, the IAEA, the United States, and our international partners, will take the remaining required steps to begin implementing the Joint Plan of Action on that date.

What Iran Has Committed To Do

On January 20th, the IAEA will report on the current status of Iran’s nuclear program, and particularly on its uranium enrichment program and the Arak reactor.  The IAEA will also report on several specific steps that Iran has committed to take by or on the first day of implementation, including:

Halting production of near-20% enriched uranium and disabling the configuration of the centrifuge cascades Iran has been using to produce it.
Starting to dilute half of the near-20% enriched uranium stockpile that is in hexafluoride form, and continuing to convert the rest to oxide form not suitable for further enrichment.
In addition, over the course of the Joint Plan of Action, the IAEA will verify that Iran is:

Not enriching uranium in roughly half of installed centrifuges at Natanz and three-quarters of installed centrifuges at Fordow, including all next generation centrifuges.
Limiting its centrifuge production to those needed to replace damaged machines, so Iran cannot use the six-month period to stockpile centrifuges.
Not constructing additional enrichment facilities.
Not going beyond its current enrichment R&D practices.
Not commissioning or fueling the Arak reactor.
Halting the production and additional testing of fuel for the Arak reactor.
Not installing any additional reactor components at Arak.
Not transferring fuel and heavy water to the Arak reactor site.
Not constructing a facility capable of reprocessing.  Without reprocessing, Iran cannot separate plutonium from spent fuel.
Iran has also committed to a schedule for taking certain actions during the six-month period.  This includes:

Completion of dilution of half of its stockpile of near-20% uranium hexafluoride in three months, and completion of conversion of the rest of that material to oxide in six months.
A cap on the permitted size of Iran’s up to 5% enriched uranium stockpile at the end of the six-month period.
Verification Mechanisms

To ensure Iran is fulfilling its commitments, the IAEA will be solely responsible for verifying and confirming all nuclear-related measures, consistent with its ongoing inspection role in Iran.  In addition, the EU, P5+1 and Iran will establish a Joint Commission to work with the IAEA to monitor implementation of the Joint Plan of Action.  The Joint Commission will also work with the IAEA to facilitate resolution of past and present concerns with respect to Iran’s nuclear program.

The Joint Commission will be composed of experts of the EU, P5+1 and Iran, and it will convene at least monthly to consider the implementation of the Joint Plan of Action and any issues that may arise.  Any decisions that are required on the basis of these discussions will be referred to the Political Directors of the EU, the P5+1, and Iran.

Transparency and Monitoring

Iran committed in the Joint Plan of Action to provide increased and unprecedented transparency into its nuclear program, including through more frequent and intrusive inspections as well as expanded provision of information to the IAEA.

The Iranian enrichment facilities at Natanz and Fordow will now be subject to daily IAEA inspector access as set out in the Joint Plan of Action (as opposed to every few weeks).  The IAEA and Iran are working to update procedures, which will permit IAEA inspectors to review surveillance information on a daily basis to shorten detection time for any Iranian non-compliance.  In addition, these facilities will continue to be subjected to a variety of other physical inspections, including scheduled and unannounced inspections.

The Arak reactor and associated facilities will be subject to at least monthly IAEA inspections – an increase from the current inspection schedule permitting IAEA access approximately once every three months or longer.

Iran has also agreed to provide for the first time:

Long-sought design information on the Arak reactor;
Figures to verify that centrifuge production will be dedicated to the replacement of damaged machines; and
Information to enable managed access at centrifuge assembly workshops, centrifuge rotor production workshops and storage facilities, and uranium mines and mills.
These enhanced monitoring measures will enable the IAEA to provide monthly updates to the Joint Commission on the status of Iran’s implementation of its commitments and enable the international community to more quickly detect breakout or the diversion of materials to a secret program.

What the P5+1 and EU Have Committed To Do

As part of this initial step, the P5+1 and EU will provide limited, temporary, and targeted relief to Iran.  The total value of the relief is between $6 and $7 billion – a small fraction of the $100 billion in Iranian foreign exchange holdings that will continue to be blocked or restricted.  Some relief will be provided from the first day; most will be provided in installments over the span of the entire six-month period.  The relief is structured so that the overwhelming majority of the sanctions regime, including the key oil, banking, and financial sanctions architecture, remains in place – and sanctions will continue to be vigorously implemented throughout the six-month period.

Once the IAEA has confirmed Iran is implementing its commitments, in return the P5+1 and EU have committed to do the following on the first day of implementation:

Suspend the implementation of sanctions on Iran’s petrochemical exports and Iran’s imports of goods and services for its automotive manufacturing sector.
Suspend sanctions on Iran’s import and export of gold and other precious metals, with significant limitations that prevent Iran from using its restricted assets overseas to pay for these purchases.
License expeditiously the supply of spare parts and services, including inspection services, for the safety of flight of Iran’s civil aviation sector.
Pause efforts to further reduce purchases of crude oil from Iran by the six economies still purchasing oil from Iran.
Facilitate the establishment of a financial channel intended to support humanitarian trade that is already permitted with Iran and facilitate payments for UN obligations and tuition payments for students studying abroad.
Modify the thresholds for EU internal procedures for the authorization of financial transactions.
The P5+1 and EU have also committed to take certain actions to facilitate Iran’s access to $4.2 billion in restricted Iranian funds on a set schedule at regular intervals throughout the six months.  Access to a small portion of these funds will be linked to Iran’s progress in completing the dilution process for near-20% enriched uranium.  Iran will not have access to the final installment of the $4.2 billion until the last day of the six-month period.

The installments will be released on the schedule below, contingent on the IAEA confirming that Iran is fulfilling its commitments.

February 1st - $550 million (installment #1)

March 1st - $450million (contingent on the IAEA confirming that Iran has completed dilution of half of the stockpile of near-20% enriched uranium it is required to dilute)

March 7th - $550 million (installment #2)

April 10th - $550 million (installment #3)

April 15th - $450 million (contingent on the IAEA confirming that Iran has completed dilution of its entire stockpile of near-20% enriched uranium it is required to dilute)

May 14th - $550 million (installment #4)

June 17th - $550 million (installment #5)

July 20th - $550million (installment #6 is on day 180) (contingent on the IAEA confirming that Iran has fulfilled all of its commitments)

A Comprehensive Solution

With this implementation plan, we have made concrete progress.  We will now focus on the critical work of pursuing a comprehensive resolution that addresses our concerns over Iran’s nuclear program.  Shortly after the Joint Plan of Action takes effect on January 20th, the United States will determine with our P5+1 partners our approach to the comprehensive solution.  Discussions with Iran will follow that coordination process.

With respect to the comprehensive solution, nothing is agreed to until everything is agreed to.  We have no illusions about how hard it will be to achieve this objective, but for the sake of our national security and the peace and security of the world, now is the time to give diplomacy a chance to succeed.

STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL'S REMARKS ON U.S. NUCLEAR POLICY

FROM: U.S. STATE DEPARTMENT
The Future of U.S. Nuclear Policy
Remarks
Frank A. Rose
Deputy Assistant Secretary, Bureau of Arms Control, Verification and Compliance
As Prepared
The Pryzbyla Center, Catholic University of America
Washington, DC
April 9, 2013

Thank you for that kind introduction, Stephen. I am glad to be here at Catholic University today to talk about U.S. nuclear policy. I want to thank the Catholic Peacebuilding Network for sponsoring this program. It is my pleasure to represent the State Department this afternoon.

Today, I would like to provide an update on our work, which the President laid out four years ago in Prague, when he committed the United States to seeking the peace and security of a world without nuclear weapons.

As President Obama noted in his famous speech, this will not be easy. Nor is it likely to happen in his lifetime. Still, over the last four years we have succeeded in moving closer to this goal.

In 2010, the Administration concluded a Nuclear Posture Review, or NPR, which outlines the President’s agenda for reducing nuclear dangers, as well as advancing the broader security interests of the United States and its allies. As the NPR states nuclear terrorism is one of the greatest threats facing the United States. The traditional concept of nuclear deterrence — the idea that a country would not initiate a nuclear war for fear of nuclear retaliation — does not apply to terrorists. While our nuclear arsenal has little relevance in deterring this threat, concerted action by the United States and Russia – and indeed, by all nuclear weapon states – to reduce their arsenals is key to garnering support from partners around the world for strengthening the nuclear nonproliferation regime, while also securing nuclear materials worldwide to make it harder for terrorists to acquire nuclear materials.

For instance, by the end of this year, we expect the 1993 U.S.-Russia HEU Purchase Agreement to be completed, under which 500 MT of highly enriched uranium or HEU from dismantled Russian weapons will have been converted into low-enriched uranium or LEU to fuel U.S. commercial nuclear power plants. Over 472 MT (equivalent to approximately 18,900 nuclear warheads) has been downblended and sent to the United States so far. In the United States, 374 MT of U.S. HEU has been declared excess to nuclear weapons; most of the remainder will be downblended or used as fuel in naval or research reactors. In 2011, the United States and Russia brought into force the Plutonium Management and Disposition Agreement and its 2006 and 2010 protocols, which requires each side to dispose of 34 MT of weapon-grade plutonium – enough in total for about 17,000 nuclear weapons – and thus permanently remove this material from military programs. Russia has also been an essential partner in the U.S. Global Threat Reduction Initiative efforts to convert research reactors from HEU to LEU and repatriate those reactors’ HEU to the country of origin. These efforts have now converted or verified the shutdown of over 75 research and test reactors, and repatriated to the United States or to Russia over 3,000 kg of HEU for secure storage, downblending and disposition.

In addition to working on the prevention of nuclear proliferation and nuclear terrorism, we have taken steps to reduce the role of nuclear weapons in U.S. national security strategy. We are not developing new nuclear weapons or pursuing new nuclear missions; we have committed not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear weapon states that are party to the NPT and in compliance with their nonproliferation obligations; and we have clearly stated that it is in the U.S. interest and that of all other nations that the nearly 68-year record of non-use of nuclear weapons be extended forever.

As President Obama said in Seoul in March of last year:

"[W]e can already say with confidence that we have more nuclear weapons than we need. I firmly believe that we can ensure the security of the United States and our allies, maintain a strong deterrent against any threat, and still pursue further reductions in our nuclear arsenal."

Let me now address what we believe our next steps should be.

The Administration continues to believe that the next step in nuclear arms reductions should be pursued on a bilateral basis. The United States and Russia still possess the vast majority of nuclear weapons in the world. With that in mind, we have a great example in the New START Treaty. The implementation of New START, now in its third year, is going well. When New START is fully implemented, the United States and the Russian Federation will each have no more than 1,550 deployed strategic nuclear warheads – the lowest levels since the 1950s.

Going forward, the United States has made it clear that we are committed to continuing a step-by-step process to reduce the overall number of nuclear weapons, including the pursuit of a future agreement with Russia to address all categories of nuclear weapons – strategic, non-strategic, deployed and non-deployed.

To this end, we are engaged in a bilateral dialogue to promote strategic stability and increase transparency on a reciprocal basis with the Russian Federation. We are hopeful our dialogue will lead to greater reciprocal transparency and negotiation of even further nuclear weapons reductions.

As part of this process, the Administration is consulting with Allies to lay the groundwork for future negotiations. As you may know, NATO has already dramatically reduced its holdings of, and reliance on, nuclear weapons since the end of the Cold War. That said, NATO is prepared to consider further reducing its requirement for nonstrategic nuclear weapons assigned to the Alliance in the context of reciprocal steps by Russia, taking into account the greater Russian stockpiles of nonstrategic nuclear weapons stationed in the Euro-Atlantic area. While seeking to create the conditions for further nuclear reductions, NATO will continue to ensure that the Alliance’s nuclear deterrent remains safe, secure, and effective as NATO is committed to remaining a nuclear alliance for as long as nuclear weapons exist.

There are still further initiatives that are part of this Administration’s nuclear agenda. The United States is revitalizing an international effort to advance a new multilateral treaty to verifiably ban the production of fissile material for use in nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. A Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty or FMCT– would for the first time put an end to the dedicated production of weapons-grade fissile material needed to create nuclear weapons and provide the basis for further, deeper, reductions in nuclear arsenals.

Beginning multilateral negotiations on the FMCT is a priority objective for the United States and for the vast majority of states, and we have been working to initiate such negotiations at the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva. An overwhelming majority of nations support the immediate commencement of FMCT negotiations. The United States is consulting with China, France, Russia, and the United Kingdom, as well as others, to find a way to commencing negotiation of an FMCT.

In 2009, the five nuclear-weapon states, or "P5," began to meet regularly to have discussions on issues of transparency, mutual confidence, and verification. Since the 2010 NPT Review Conference, these discussions have expanded to address P5 implementation of our commitments under the NPT and the 2010 Review Conference’s Action Plan. The U.S. hosted the most recent P5 conference in Washington in June 2012, where the P5 tackled issues related to all three pillars of the NPT – nonproliferation, the peaceful uses of nuclear energy and disarmament, including confidence-building, transparency, and verification experiences. We are looking forward to a fourth conference on April 18-19, which Russia will host in Geneva prior to the next NPT Preparatory Committee meeting.

In addition to providing a senior level policy forum for discussion and coordination among the P5, this process has spawned a series of discussions among policymakers and government experts on a variety of issues. China is leading a P5 working group on nuclear definitions and terminology. The P5 are discussing approaches to a common format for NPT reporting, and we are also beginning to engage at expert levels on some important verification and transparency issues. In the future, we would like the P5 conferences and intersessional meetings to expand and to develop practical transparency measures that build confidence and predictability.

I should add at this point that when discussing areas to broaden and deepen our cooperation and to advance our common interests, it’s necessary to address the question of Missile Defense. Thirty years ago at the height of the Cold War, President Ronald Reagan saw virtue in cooperating with Moscow on Missile Defense.

While we have our differences on this issue, we remain convinced that missile defense cooperation between the United States and Russia (and between NATO and Russia) is in the national security interests of all countries involved. For that reason, missile defense cooperation with Russia remains a priority for the President. To be clear, U.S. missile defense efforts are focused on defending our homeland as well as our European, Middle Eastern, and Asian allies and partners against ballistic missile threats coming from Iran and North Korea. These are threats that are growing, and must be met.

In meeting those threats, it is important to note that U.S. missile defenses are not designed for, or capable of, undermining the Russian or Chinese strategic deterrents. For its part, Russia has been insistent on legally binding guarantees that our missile defenses will not threaten its strategic deterrent. Rather than legal guarantees, we believe that the best way for Russia to see that U.S. and NATO missile defenses in Europe do not undermine its strategic deterrent would be for it to cooperate with us. In addition to making all of us safer, cooperation would send a strong message to proliferators that the United States, NATO, and Russia are working together to counter proliferation. With regard to China, the United States welcomes the opportunity to engage in a dialogue about missile defense and other security issues of strategic importance.

As our work together over the past four years has shown, we can produce significant results that benefit both countries. As mentioned earlier, the New START Treaty is a great example of this. Cooperation on missile defense would also facilitate improved relations between the United States and Russia. In fact, it would be a game-changer for those relations. It has the potential to enhance the national security of both the United States and Russia, as well as build a genuine strategic partnership.

None of this will be easy, but the policies the Administration is pursuing are suited for our security needs and tailored for the global security threats of the 21st century. By maintaining and supporting a safe, secure and effective stockpile — sufficient to deter any adversary and guarantee the defense of our allies — at the same time that we pursue responsible verifiable reductions through arms control, we will make this world a safer place.

To paraphrase President Kennedy, whose speech 50 years ago at American University launched the NPT process, we will succeed by moving forward step by step, confident and unafraid. There is something very appropriate in mentioning President Kennedy and his era because your generation has a unique advantage. You are not burdened by the memories of the Cuban Missile Crisis, or the experience of duck and cover drills, events that characterize the experience of those who lived through the Cold War at its most dangerous points. You have the freedom to bring fresh thinking and new perspectives to how we can best enhance our national security. Positive change is hard to accomplish, so we will need your energy and your expertise to extend this debate beyond college campuses if we are to move safely and securely to a world without nuclear weapons. Your energy and your commitment are important to our efforts to reduce global nuclear dangers.

Thank you and I look forward to your questions.

STATE DEPARTENT'S GOTTEMOELLER SPEAKS ON STRENGTHENING GLOBAL SECURITY

FROM: U.S. STATE DEPARTMENT
Mobilizing Ingenuity to Strengthen Global Security
Remarks
Rose Gottemoeller
Acting Under Secretary for Arms Control and International Security
South by Southwest Conference (SXSW)
Austin, TX
March 8, 2013

Thank you so much for the introduction, Daniel and thank you all for being here. I’m really excited about being here in Austin at the South by Southwest Conference.

Now, I realize that being the government’s chief arms control negotiator might seem a little out of place here. What can the tech community do to help is get rid of the thousands and thousands of nuclear weapons still in the world? We worry about them getting into the hands of terrorists. Add to that the increased threat from chemical and biological agents – you can see the threat from CW in Syria -- and technologies that are easily switched from peaceful to threatening purposes. We have a big problem on our hands.

In truth, I came here for your help. The United States has laid out a comprehensive approach to dealing with these threats. But we need new ideas, and the information revolution is an obvious place to look. I hope you come away from this session energized to help us in our efforts to combat the threats of weapons of mass destruction (WMD).

A Problem

Let me start by giving you a feel for our nuclear treaty verification problem. When signing our most recent treaty – New START – with the Russian Federation, the President said our next step would be to pursue reductions in all types of nuclear weapons, even nuclear weapons held in secret storage facilities. In the past, we focused on eliminating nuclear weapons on big missiles or bombers – items you could count from satellites in space. The idea was, eliminate the missile and you eliminate the threat of the warhead.

Now the President has said that is not good enough – if we’re worried terrorists will get their hands on nuclear weapons, we have to reduce and eliminate those weapons, even if they’re hidden away in storage. That is a big challenge for a nuclear arms controller: how can we monitor warheads, know where they are and that the other guys don’t have hidden stashes somewhere?

For bomb-making material, these challenges only increase. This stuff is portable and easy to hide. Major ports have radiation detectors, but these systems are very sensitive and can pick up the radioactivity coming from everyday items like bananas, kitty litter and porcelain toilets. Bet you didn’t know those things were radioactive.

For biological and chemical agents, the main problem comes from the dual-use nature of the work and technologies. How can we tell if work being done is good or bad? Or if we cannot, how do we build in activities to reassure people that the work being done is safe and peaceful?

So our goal is to devise and enhance systems for tracking and monitoring, as well as devise new ways to verify compliance with future agreements and treaties. Of course, as you who work in technology know, no system is ever 100% foolproof. To paraphrase Douglas Adams, foolproof systems tend to underestimate the ingenuity of complete fools and for that matter, highly-motivated cheaters.

How do we even come close to 100% verification? In the treaty context, we are looking for effective verification. Paul Nitze, a brilliant, esteemed national security expert and long-serving government official, explained effective verification as follows:

"[I]f the other side moves beyond the limits of the treaty in any militarily significant way, we would be able to detect such violations in time to respond effectively and thereby deny the other side the benefit of the violation."

That’s effective verification. Nitze’s definition has been and continues to be the benchmark for verifying arms control treaties. But the world is changing, as I’ve described, and with it, the nature of what we need to monitor and verify. To help us meet the challenges ahead, we need your help.

A Light Bulb

New information tools are popping up everywhere and their potential impact is magnified by the global connectivity of the Internet. Our new reality is a smaller, increasingly-networked world where the average citizen connects to other citizens in cyberspace hundreds of times each day. Today, any event, anywhere on the planet, could be broadcast globally in seconds. That means it is harder to hide things. When it is harder to hide things, it is easier to be caught. The neighborhood gaze is a powerful tool, and it can help us to verify the treaties and agreements we’ve created.

A New Plan

The way we at the State Department see it so far, there are two elements we are working with when it comes to incorporating the information age into WMD verification and monitoring – tools for inspectors and data acquisition and analysis.

Using Tools

First, it is already apparent that digital tools are revolutionizing the way diplomacy is conducted, much like the telegraph did in the 19th century. Email is a good example: it rapidly accelerated the pace of the negotiation of New START, in comparison with the 1991 Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START).

Information technologies could also be useful in the hands of a WMD inspector. Smartphone and tablet apps could be created for the express purpose of aiding in the verification and monitoring process. For example, by having all safeguards and verification sensors in an inspected facility wirelessly connected through the cloud to the inspector’s tablet, he or she could note anomalies and flag specific items for closer inspections, as well as compare readings in real time and interpret them in context. In the 90’s, U.S. weapons inspectors in Russia had to be able to cross country ski to do their jobs. They had to ski around the perimeters of facilities searching for things – with the kinds of tablet apps I mentioned, perhaps we could make the cardio optional.

Using the Crowd

The second way we could incorporate the new tools of the information age into WMD verification and monitoring is by harnessing of the power of the crowd to generate data and then analyze it.

Already, critical information generated through social networking is being incorporated into local safety systems in the United States. RAVEN911—the Regional Asset Verification & Emergency Network—is a multilayer mapping tool that supports emergency first response in Cincinnati, Ohio and its regional neighbors. RAVEN911 uses live data feeds, geospatial imagery, and information gathered through Twitter and other public sources to provide details that cannot be shown on an everyday geographic map, such as the location of downed electric power lines and flooded roads. This helps emergency first responders get to where they need to go more quickly.

Sound far-fetched to extend such ideas to arms control? It shouldn’t. There are apps that can convert your smartphone camera into a radiation detector. Your tablet could help detect nuclear explosions! Tablets have tiny accelerometers installed – that’s what tells the tablet which way is up. But the accelerometers also have the capability to detect small earth tremors.

You can imagine a whole community of tablets, all containing an "earth tremor" app. Users are dispersed randomly around the country, their tablets connected to a centralized network. If the sensors all start shaking at once, you may have a natural occurrence – an earthquake – or you may have an illicit nuclear weapon test. Which is which would need to be confirmed with official sensors and analysis.

This kind of ubiquitous sensing I see as one of the most exciting areas for new arms control monitoring tools.

A Hitch?

So, we have a brand new set of exciting possibilities to pursue, but there is a hitch. For any of this to work, there are a lot of technical, legal, political, and diplomatic barriers ahead that would need to be overcome—never easy.

In the end, the goal of using information technology and social networks should add to our existing arms control monitoring and verification capabilities, not to supersede them.

A Challenge

Last summer, we launched our first Innovation in Arms Control Challenge and asked the American public, "How Can the Crowd Support Arms Control Transparency Efforts?" This challenge sought creative ideas from the public to use commonly available technologies to support arms control policy and education efforts.

We received interest from more than 500 people from across the United States with solutions that largely fell into four broad categories: smartphone apps, internet websites and games, sensor array schemes, and "big data" crunching.

Our first prize winner is Ms. Lovely Umayam, a graduate student from the Monterey Institute of International Studies in California. She developed "Bombshelltoe", an online education platform that examines the intersection of culture and nuclear issues in order to facilitate better public understanding. Mr. Allan Childers, an Aerospace/Defense industry consultant from Florida, was a runner-up with his proposal for a mobile application that provides a platform for users to connect and interact, as well as a rewards program for sharing information on various arms agreement regimes. Dr. Rudolph "Chip" Mappus, a research scientist at Georgia Tech Research Institute working on computational neurology and brain-machine interfaces, was also a runner up. He proposed a geographically-based online game about verifying treaty compliance that experts and everyday citizens could play together.

This challenge was a first step focused on public education, and I am excited about the results and our prizewinners. This spring we’re preparing to launch a second Innovation in Arms Control Challenge that will ask the American public to design an information technology tool that can aid arms control inspections, so please stay tuned to www.state.gov on that front. We would love to get submissions from SxSW Interactive attendees!

A Pitch

So now I am eager to hear from you. As many of you are aware, there is a grand tradition of citizen science in this country – two of the greatest were among our earliest diplomats: Thomas Jefferson and Ben Franklin. I hope that this State Department tradition continues as we tackle these enormous challenges. Experts like you, particularly experts outside of the Beltway, can help us think bigger and bolder. It is sometimes strange to think that the government helped plant the seed of the information revolution, but at times seems to have no clue about how to harvest its rewards. That is why speaking to people like you is so important.

Thanks again for your attention and I would now love to take some questions and even better – to hear some ideas!