FROM: U.S. STATE DEPARTMENT
Samantha Power
U.S. Permanent Representative to the United Nations
New York, NY
June 5, 2015
AS DELIVERED
Thank you, Mr. President, for organizing today’s meeting to speak to the recent developments in eastern Ukraine. And I join others in thanking our briefers, Under Secretary-General Feltman and OSCE Deputy Chief Monitor Hug, for providing the Security Council and the international community with the facts underlying the escalation in violence, which are critical in a conflict where some continue to try to obscure the truth.
On June 3rd, combined Russian-separatist forces launched multiple, coordinated attacks west of the Minsk line of contact in Donetsk. The attacks were concentrated on the towns of Marinka and Krasnohorivka.
The Russian Federation and its separatist allies have offered multiple – often conflicting – explanations for these attacks.
In some instances, Russia and the separatists have blamed Ukraine for inciting the attacks. For example, a Russian presidential spokesman attributed the violations of the ceasefire to the “provocative actions by the Ukrainian armed forces,” claiming, “the Ukrainian side has repeatedly taken similar efforts to escalate tensions against the backdrop of international operations.” Similarly, the so-called “Defense Minister” of the self-proclaimed Donetsk People’s Republic blamed Ukraine for “provocations” and, what he called, “a breach in the Minsk agreements,” which led to the fighting. Exactly what the so-called provocations are was never explained.
This argument, this set of arguments, have been undermined by some of the separatists themselves, who seem to have forgotten to run their tweets and their blog posts by Moscow. During the attacks, one tweeted, “Marinka is ours!” – posting a photo of armed soldiers atop a tank flying the separatists’ flag. A post on a separatist website said, “As a result of a massive attack by [DPR] armed forces, Marinka has been liberated.”
In other instances, Russia has argued that the attacks were justified because the areas that are actually part of the separatist-controlled territory under the Minsk agreements are these areas. They are not. This was the case Russia made about Marinka and Krasnohorivka yesterday, at a meeting of the OSCE. We’ve seen this tactic before; when combined Russian-separatist forces encircled and attacked Debaltseve immediately after signing the package of measures at Minsk on February 12th, 2015. As a separatist commander Eduard Basurin told Reuters on February 15th, “Of course we can open fire [on Debaltseve]…The territory is internal: ours. And internal is internal. But along the line of confrontation there is no shooting.”
The problem with this line of argument is, quite simply, that it is false. At no point did the Minsk Agreements recognize Marinka and Krasnohorivka as separatist-controlled territory. Nor did they grant the separatists control over Debaltseve or other areas combined Russian-separatist forces have seized, or tried to seize. Yet for Russia and the separatists, it seems the contact line can shift to include the territories that they feel they deserve.
The Kyiv-born surrealist master Mikhail Bulgakov put this problem a different way: “The tongue can conceal the truth, but the eyes, never!” In this case, the objective eyes in eastern Ukraine belong to the OSCE’s Special Monitoring Mission, the SMM. And what they tell us is that, on the evening of June 2nd and early morning of June 3rd, “SMM observed the movement of a large amount of heavy weapons in DPR-controlled areas – generally in a westerly direction toward the contact line – close to Marinka, preceding and during the fighting.” So, to repeat: according to the SMM, heavy weapons from the Russian-backed separatist side moved westward “preceding as well as during the fighting.”
The SMM tried to contact high-ranking DPR personnel over an hour-and-a-half period on the morning of June 3rd, but reported, “Either they were unavailable or did not wish to speak to the SMM.” The eyes do not conceal the truth. And the truth here is that the recent violence was rooted in a combined Russian-separatist assault.
These and other joint attacks by Russian-separatist forces have deadly consequences. At least 5 Ukrainian soldiers were killed, and 38 wounded, in the assault on the towns. The number of casualties is surely higher, but we do not, unfortunately, have reliable reports from the separatists’ side. That is because, as the UN’s Human Rights Monitoring Unit noted in its May 15th report, independent media have been prosecuted, threatened, and otherwise muzzled in separatist-controlled territory.
We also do not know how many Russian soldiers were killed in recent attacks – or in any of their operations in eastern Ukraine, for that matter. Russia continues – despite incidents such as the recent capture of two special operations Russian soldiers in Schastya last month – to deny any military involvement in eastern Ukraine.
And just last week, President Putin signed a decree classifying any death of Russian soldiers in “special operations” in peacetime a state secret, a policy which previously was limited to wartime only. Not content with denying their military service in life, Russia now denies their loved ones the respect and closure – not to mention social services – for their service in death. And it denies the Russian people knowledge to which they are entitled – of a conflict their government has been fueling with weapons, training, and soldiers. No matter what your opinion of the open secret that is Russia’s military involvement in eastern Ukraine and occupied Crimea, the dignified recognition of one’s dead should have primacy.
Of course, suffering is hardly limited to those involved in the fighting. Civilians living near and along the front lines continue to endure profound hardship. Approximately 1.3 million Ukrainians have been displaced by the fighting. Small children on the front lines have gotten used to going to school and sleeping in basements. Families live underground for months at a time. The elderly and disabled are trapped with little access to vital medicine and other forms of assistance. A health professional working in Debaltseve said, “I’ve met elderly people who say that they would just like to die. They don’t have depression; they just don’t want to be 80 years old and living in a basement.”
By now, the international community is quite familiar with Russia’s playbook when it comes to efforts to occupy the territory of its sovereign neighbors – as it did in Crimea, and before that in Transnistria, Abkhazia, and South Ossetia. The consensus here, and in the international community, remains that Minsk’s implementation is the only viable way out of this deadly conflict.
The Ukrainian government has made good faith efforts to honor that consensus – notwithstanding the seemingly endless violations by Russia and the separatists – and deliver on the commitments made at Minsk. Ukraine is holding direct dialogue with the separatists, a bitter pill to swallow, but one they have swallowed for the sake of peace and for the sake of the implementation of the Minsk Agreements. At the same time, Ukraine has undertaken critical efforts, with the participation of Ukrainian civil society, to address pervasive problems it inherited from its predecessors, like widespread corruption, as well as to pursue crucial reforms such as decentralization. Ukraine cooperates with the international monitors and bodies, and has committed to address identified areas of concern. The United States will continue to raise tough issues and these areas of concern, including some raised here today by the briefers, with the Government of Ukraine, and we will support the government and Ukrainian people as they continue their efforts toward meaningful reform.
Yet Russia – and the separatists it trains, arms, fights alongside, and with whom it shares command and control systems in eastern Ukraine – continues to ignore this consensus, flouting the commitments it made at Minsk. It goes right on applying its playbook in new territories – as though this Council and the world are too blind, or too easily deceived to notice.
We must not let ourselves be deceived. The consequences of Russia’s contempt for Minsk and the rules undergirding our international peace and security are too great – both for the integrity of the international system, and for the rights and welfare of the Ukrainian people. We cannot fail to see and fail to act. We must not stop applying pressure until Ukrainians get the stable democracy, the territorial integrity, and sovereignty they yearn for and deserve. Thank you.
Showing posts with label RUSSIAN FEDERATION. Show all posts
Showing posts with label RUSSIAN FEDERATION. Show all posts
Sunday, June 7, 2015
Thursday, June 12, 2014
U.S. FACT SHEET: G-7 DECLARATION ON NON-PROLIFERATION AND DISARMAMENT FOR 2014
FROM: U.S. STATE DEPARTMENT
G-7 Declaration on Non-Proliferation and Disarmament for 2014
Fact Sheet
Bureau of International Security and Nonproliferation
June 5, 2014
1. We are committed to seeking a safer world for all. Preventing the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and their means of delivery remains a top priority. Such proliferation poses a major threat to international peace and security as recognized in UN Security Council Resolutions (UNSCRs) 1540, 1673, 1810, 1887, and 1977. During this tenth anniversary year of UNSCR 1540, we reaffirm our commitment to working together towards full implementation of the resolution by 2021 and to strengthen our efforts to combat the proliferation of nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons and their means of delivery.
2. In seeking this safer world, we reiterate our commitment to create the conditions for a world without nuclear weapons, in accordance with the goals of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), in a way that promotes international stability, based on the principle of equal and undiminished security for all, and underlining the vital importance of non-proliferation for achieving this goal.
3. We reaffirm our unconditional support for all three pillars of the NPT, which remains the cornerstone of the nuclear non-proliferation regime and the essential foundation for the pursuit of disarmament and the peaceful uses of nuclear energy.
4. We call on all NPT Parties to fulfill their obligations under the Treaty and to preserve and strengthen the international nuclear non-proliferation regime. The 2015 NPT Review Conference presents a vital opportunity for all NPT Parties to further strengthen the Treaty in all its aspects. We recall the successful, consensus outcome of the 2010 NPT Review Conference, including its Action Plan. We remain fully committed to the Action Plan’s implementation, and call on all States Parties to implement its actions. In this regard, we welcome and encourage continued engagement of and among the NPT nuclear-weapon States on verification, transparency and confidence-building measures, with a view to strengthening implementation of all three pillars of the NPT. We welcome the April 2014 meeting of China, France, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom, and the United States (P5) in Beijing, the latest in this ongoing dialogue, and welcome the timely submission of the individual reports made to the third session of the NPT Preparatory Committee in New York in April, 2014, pursuant to Actions 5, 20, and 21 of the Action Plan. We encourage all States Parties, consistent with Action 20 of the Action Plan, to make similar reports.
5. The G7 partners continue to attach great importance to the development of internationally recognized nuclear weapon free zones, established on the basis of agreements freely arrived at among States of the regions concerned, in line with the principles set out by the UN Disarmament Commission in 1999 and recognize the legitimate interest of non-nuclear-weapon States in receiving security assurances from nuclear-weapon States in the framework of the relevant legally binding protocols of nuclear-weapon-free zone treaties. These protocols enhance regional and international security by helping to build confidence between nuclear and non-nuclear weapon states. We welcome the signature of the protocol to the Treaty on a Nuclear Weapon-Free-Zone in Central Asia. We also welcome the commitment of the P5 States to continue to consult with the States Parties to the Treaty on the Southeast Asia Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone.
6. We reaffirm the importance of commitments and assurances given by the NPT nuclear weapons States to the NPT non-nuclear weapon States. We deplore the recent and ongoing breaches of the commitments given to Ukraine by the Russian Federation in the Budapest Memorandum. In this Memorandum, the Russian Federation, United Kingdom and the United States reaffirmed their commitment to respect Ukraine’s independence and sovereignty and existing borders; reaffirmed their obligation to refrain from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of Ukraine and that none of their weapons will ever be used against Ukraine except in self-defense or otherwise in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, and reaffirmed their commitment to Ukraine to refrain from economic coercion. We consider that Ukraine’s historic decisions in 1994 were significant steps in promoting its own and wider regional and international security. We also welcome Ukraine’s statement at the 2014 Non-Proliferation Treaty Preparatory Committee that Ukraine remains committed to the provisions of the NPT.
7. The G-7 strongly support the goal of a zone free of nuclear weapons, as well as other weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery in the Middle East. Recalling the decision at the 2010 NPT Review Conference to hold a Conference on the establishment of such a zone, we strongly support Finnish Ambassador Laajava’s work as facilitator of the Conference, and welcome the continued commitment of the co-sponsors of the 1995 Resolution (the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom and the United States). We call upon the States of the region to continue their direct engagement with each other in order to finalize the preparation and convening of the Conference in the nearest future.
8. While acknowledging the right of withdrawal from the NPT contained in Article X.1, we consider that modalities and measures to address withdrawal from that Treaty are needed as demonstrated by North Korea’s announcement of withdrawal. We underscore the role of the UN Security Council in addressing announcements of withdrawal promptly and without delay, assessing the consequences of such withdrawal, including possible adoption of measures in this regard. We also emphasize that a State Party will remain responsible under international law for violations of the NPT committed prior to its withdrawal. We also underscore that nuclear transfers received prior to withdrawal should remain in peaceful uses and subject to IAEA safeguards. We welcome the growing recognition that this issue needs to be addressed urgently at the 2015 Review Conference and we support the adoption of appropriate recommendations on measures that address withdrawal in the Final Document.
Nuclear Proliferation Challenges
9. We underscore our support for E3+3 efforts led by High Representative Ashton to reach a long-term comprehensive solution to the Iranian nuclear issue that resolves fully the international community’s concerns regarding the exclusively peaceful nature of Iran’s nuclear program and ensures Iran does not acquire nuclear weapons. We welcome the implementation of the Joint Plan of Action (JPOA) between the E3+3 and Iran and the essential role played by the IAEA in verifying the nuclear-related measures. We commend those states which made financial contributions in this context for the monitoring work of the IAEA. We reaffirm our strong support for the IAEA’s ongoing efforts to verify the exclusively peaceful nature of Iran’s nuclear program and we call on Iran to cooperate fully with the IAEA to resolve all outstanding issues, particularly those which give rise to concerns about the possible military dimensions (PMD) of Iran’s nuclear program, the satisfactory resolution of which will be critical for a long-term comprehensive solution to the Iranian nuclear issue.
10. We call on Syria to remedy its noncompliance with its nuclear safeguards obligations, and to cooperate fully with the IAEA in resolving all outstanding questions regarding the nature of its nuclear program.
11. We will not accept North Korea as a nuclear armed state and urge North Korea to abandon all nuclear weapons and existing nuclear programs, and to return, at an early date, to the NPT and to IAEA safeguards and come into full compliance with its nonproliferation obligations. We condemn in the strongest possible terms North Korea’s continued development of its nuclear and ballistic missile programs in direct violation of UN Security Council Resolutions 1718, 1874, 2087 and 2094. In this regard, we condemn North Korea’s February and March 2014 ballistic missile launches in clear violation of its UNSCR obligations and call on North Korea to refrain from further provocations. We urge North Korea to halt any efforts to restart, readjust, and expand its nuclear facilities at Yongbyon, and cease immediately all nuclear activities including the ones related to its uranium enrichment and plutonium programs. We reaffirm our collective hope for lasting peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula and call on North Korea to refrain from any actions that escalate tensions in the region. We firmly support diplomatic efforts to implement the 2005 Joint Statement and to bring North Korea into compliance with its UN Security Council obligations, and call on North Korea to take concrete steps toward complete, verifiable and irreversible denuclearization. We commend the international community’s unified resolve in the face of North Korea’s defiance of it and urge continued vigilance by all states to curtail North Korea’s proliferation activities and impede the continued pursuit of its proscribed nuclear and ballistic missile programs.
Nuclear Disarmament
12. We encourage the P5 to continue their important dialogue, including on nuclear arms reductions and their work on confidence-building and transparency that represent major steps in accordance with Article VI of the NPT and the Action Plan adopted by the NPT Review Conference in May 2010. We welcome the continued implementation of the New START Treaty by the U.S. and Russia and the disarmament-related actions already made by France and the UK, as well as urge others that possess nuclear weapons but have not yet engaged in nuclear disarmament efforts to reduce their arsenals.
13. Early entry into force and universalization of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) is in the security interests of every nation. States that have yet to sign or ratify the Treaty should do so without waiting for others. For the Treaty to be an effective mechanism for nuclear disarmament and nonproliferation, we believe all States must maintain the political will and provide adequate resources to complete the Treaty’s verification regime and maximize the capabilities of the Provisional Technical Secretariat. We welcome the voluntary adherence to unilateral moratoria on nuclear explosive tests and call on all States to refrain from acts which would defeat the object and purpose of the Treaty. We also welcome the establishment of the Group of Eminent Persons and support its activities, which will inject new energy and dynamics into the push for entry into force.
14. The Conference on Disarmament (CD) and its predecessor bodies have a long history of delivering landmark agreements, but we share the growing impatience of many in the international community at the impasse at the CD. We believe the next logical step in multilateral negotiations to advance both nuclear nonproliferation and disarmament goals is the negotiation of a Treaty banning the production of fissile material for use in nuclear or other nuclear explosive devices (FMCT), on the basis of document CD/1299 and the mandate contained therein. While we welcome declared moratoria by some states on the production of fissile material for use in nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, a binding and verifiable ban on such production is a necessary step toward a world without nuclear weapons. We welcome the work of the UN Group of Governmental Experts (GGE), which will make recommendations on possible aspects that could contribute to a future Treaty, and can build momentum towards eventual negotiations in the CD.
Peaceful Use of Nuclear Energy
15. All States Parties to the NPT have an inalienable right to use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, in compliance with their international obligations. We reiterate our willingness to cooperate with States that meet their nuclear non-proliferation obligations and wish to develop a civil nuclear program in a manner that meets the highest standards of safety, security, non-proliferation, and respect for the environment.
16. We urge strong support for implementation of the IAEA’s Nuclear Safety Action Plan, including working towards establishing a global nuclear liability regime, and welcome the progress in enhancing the effectiveness of the Convention on Nuclear Safety. We emphasize the importance of the establishment, implementation and continuous improvement of national emergency preparedness and response measures.
17. Multilateral approaches to the nuclear fuel cycle contribute to nuclear energy programs. We support the IAEA’s work to establish a bank of Low Enriched Uranium in Kazakhstan and urge the conclusion of a Host State Agreement at an early date in order to allow for the beginning of operation of the bank.
IAEA Safeguards
18. We support the central role of the IAEA, and in particular its safeguards system, which remains essential for the effective implementation of the nuclear non-proliferation regime. The IAEA must continue to have the necessary resources and legal authorities to be able to carry out its mission in full, in accordance with its statutory mandate. We will continue to help promote an IAEA Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement together with an Additional Protocol as the universally accepted international verification standard, which should be a consideration in decisions on the supply of nuclear fuel, equipment, or technology. We call on all States which have not yet done so to sign and bring into force the Additional Protocol and apply its provisions as soon as possible.
Nuclear Security
19. We welcome the outcomes of the Nuclear Security Summit in The Hague on 24-25 March 2014 where 58 world leaders worked to further reduce the threat of nuclear terrorism by securing vulnerable nuclear and other radioactive material around the globe. The Hague Summit participants agreed to a Communique that reaffirms the fundamental responsibility of States, the need to further strengthen and coordinate international cooperation, and the need for a strengthened and comprehensive international security architecture. Many countries agreed to multilateral joint commitments intended to advance the goal of nuclear security. We highlight Belgian and Italian work to complete the removal of their excess supplies of highly enriched uranium and plutonium for elimination, and Japan for announcing that it will work with the United States to eliminate hundreds of kilograms of nuclear material from one of its experimental reactors. We call on others to take additional transparency measures. We also continue to encourage nations to join existing relevant international initiatives that support Summit goals.
20. We urge all States Parties to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material (CPPNM) to ratify, accept or approve the 2005 Amendment to the Convention as soon as possible. In addition to securing nuclear and radiological material at their source, we recognize the need to locate and secure material currently available on the illicit market and prosecute those involved in the trafficking of these materials.
21. We commend the work of the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism and other international efforts to counter nuclear smuggling and combat nuclear terrorism. The ongoing occurrence for more than 20 years of nuclear and radioactive trafficking highlights the threat that terrorists or other malicious actors can acquire these dangerous materials. The international community must be vigilant to prevent the world’s most dangerous materials from falling into the wrong hands.
The Nuclear Suppliers Group
22. We welcome the call by the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) on all states to exercise vigilance to ensure that the supply of nuclear related technologies and materials is for peaceful purposes and to make best efforts to ensure that none of their exports of goods and technologies contributes to the spread of nuclear weapons. In this regard, we recognize that the NSG Guidelines serve as the standard for nuclear and nuclear-related dual-use exports. We call on NSG Participating Governments to strictly observe the Guidelines and encourage nuclear supplier states that are not NSG participating governments to act in conformity with the Guidelines on a voluntary basis. We also support the discussion of the Additional Protocol as a condition of supply to enhance nuclear non-proliferation efforts. We welcome the progress that is being made by the Technical Experts Group to ensure that control lists remain current, and we welcome the Group’s outreach efforts to enhance non-proliferation. We welcome the membership of Mexico in 2012 and Serbia in 2013.
Chemical Weapons
23. We reaffirm our unconditional support for the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) and the functions of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW). We applaud the success of the Convention and the awarding of the Nobel Peace Prize to the OPCW for its ongoing work to eliminate an entire class of WMD and toward preventing the re-emergence of chemical weapons. We look forward to continuing the work set out in the final document of the 2013 Review Conference and support efforts to ensure the universalisation and effective implementation of the Convention, and we call on all states not party to the Convention to adhere to it now. Destroying chemical weapons remains a key objective of the Convention together with refraining from the development, production, acquisition, stockpiling, use and proliferation of chemical weapons. We welcome the progress being made by the possessor states as reported recently to the OPCW Executive Council (EC) and Conference of the States Parties. We encourage all possessor states to continue to take every necessary measure to complete their destruction processes as soon as possible in a transparent fashion, and within the framework of the existing verification regime. We reiterate the importance of an effective industry verification regime.
24. We share deep concern over the use of chemical weapons by the Assad regime against its citizens. We share further concern about the more recent allegations of use of a toxic chemical as a weapon in Syria and we support the OPCW fact-finding mission. We urge the regime to cooperate fully with the mission to ensure those who are responsible for such attacks are brought to account. The continued possession of chemical weapons material by the Assad regime represents a sustained danger to Syria’s population and all of its neighbors. We support the full implementation of the OPCW Executive Council Decision of September 27, 2013 and UN Security Council Resolution (2118), which resulted from the Russia U.S. Geneva framework to eliminate Syria’s chemical weapons program. We welcome the efforts of the Joint OPCW-UN Mission and the assistance provided by individual States and by the international community at large to support safe elimination of Syria’s chemical weapons program. Whilst efforts have been made, the removal process remains behind schedule. We call upon Syria to make sustained efforts in meeting its obligations under the CWC, OPCW EC decisions and UNSCR 2118. International confidence that the program has been completely eliminated requires further review of Syria’s declaration of its CW program. Syria must also take immediate steps to physically destroy the remaining 13 chemical production facilities in accordance with the CWC.
Biological Weapons
25. We welcome the work undertaken so far to implement the outcome of the Seventh Review Conference of the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC). We are committed to achieving real progress to promote national implementation, confidence-building measures, and cooperation and assistance, to reviewing developments in science and technology, and to strengthening the Convention’s Article VII on responding to use of biological or toxin weapons. We support further exploration or consideration of practical approaches to promote the exchange of best practices, enhance transparency, and build trust among states parties, such as peer review, voluntary transparency visits and briefings, and constructive approaches to raising and addressing concerns where they arise. Such approaches may play a role in strengthening implementation and enhancing assurance of compliance with BWC obligations. We reaffirm our commitment to promote universal membership of the BTWC, and we are determined to work with all the State Parties to reinforce its regime.
Addressing the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction
26. WMD and delivery means- related export controls by members of the international nonproliferation regimes (Australia Group, Missile Technology Control Regime, Nuclear Suppliers Group) and the Zangger Committee has significantly reduced the availability to proliferators of support from countries with the most advanced technology. These controls, and the information-sharing, best practices, and patterns of cooperation fostered by the regimes, have made it more difficult, time-consuming, and costly for proliferators to produce or acquire WMD and their delivery systems. We plan to continue to work through the regimes to reduce the global proliferation threat and urge all countries to unilaterally adopt and apply on a national basis the guidelines and standards of the regimes.
27. We fully support the key role played by the United Nations Security Council in addressing proliferation issues. We welcome the adoption by the Security Council of Resolution 1977, which renewed the mandate of the 1540 Committee for ten years and reaffirmed Resolution 1540’s obligations. We invite all States to nominate a national point of contact and to work toward full implementation of UNSCR 1540. We stand ready to provide assistance to States in this regard and we reiterate our support to the 1540 Committee in the discharge of its mandate.
28. We strongly believe that the proliferation of missiles, especially those capable of delivering weapons of mass destruction, continues to be a serious concern to us all and a threat to international peace and security, as reaffirmed in UN Security Council Resolutions 1540, 1887, and 1977. We believe that a multilateral response and international norms are the most adequate and effective way to address this issue. We strongly endorse the MTCR and the Hague Code of Conduct in that regard.
29. We affirm our commitment to the Global Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons and Material of Mass Destruction (Global Partnership) and this commitment remains unwavering. We therefore commend the Global Partnership on its efforts to coordinate and collaborate on programs and activities in the areas of nuclear and radiological security, biological security, chemical security, scientist engagement and countering knowledge proliferation, and in the implementation of UN Security Council Resolution 1540. The Global Partnership has continued its valuable work on engagement with centers of excellence and the expansion of its membership. Since 2013, the Global Partnership has welcomed the Philippines, Hungary and Spain as new members. Members of the Global Partnership also welcome the ongoing participation and closer cooperation of relevant international organizations and bodies in global efforts to improve information sharing and coordination of WMD threat reduction projects. The sub-groups that focused on each of the substantive areas of chemical, biological, nuclear and radiological security helped the Global Partnership improve information sharing, funding and project coordination. The Global Partnership has provided significant funding for the destruction of chemical weapons in Syria. In addition, strengthened matchmaking has begun to enable the Global Partnership to improve coordination of projects globally.
30. We continue to promote robust counter-proliferation tools. We support the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI). The list of endorsing nations continues to grow, with Vietnam recently being the 104th endorsing nation. We commit to undertake further measures to enhance the capabilities and authorities required to interdict shipments of weapons of mass destruction, their delivery systems, and related materials to and from states and non-state actors of proliferation concern. We promote outreach for enhanced participation in the PSI and continue to focus on legal and operational issues.
Conventional
31. Conventional arms play a legitimate role in enabling governments to defend their citizens, as enshrined in the UN Charter. However, in the wrong hands they pose a threat to global, regional and national security. Improperly controlled, they can fuel terrorism and threaten peace and stability. For this reason, we welcome the adoption of UNSCR 2117 and stress the need for full and effective implementation by States at the national, regional and international levels, of the UN Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons. In this context, we also reiterate our support for full implementation of UNSCR 2017 in order to stem arms proliferation from Libya. In addition, the Wassenaar Arrangement on Export Controls for Conventional Arms and Dual-use Goods and Technologies contributes to preventing de-stabilizing accumulations of these arms, goods and technologies. We urge those which currently sit outside the regime to make every effort to apply the Wassenaar Arrangement’s standards and control lists. Conventional arms agreements and commitments can also address specific regional security concerns. The Vienna Document and Open Skies Treaty have provided useful transparency about military activities in Ukraine and western Russia in recent months, reflecting the importance of continued implementation and modernization of these agreements and commitments.
32. We welcome the rapid progress that has been made towards entry into force of the Arms Trade Treaty since it was opened for signature on 3 June 2013. We call upon States who have not yet done so to join the Treaty as soon as possible. Effective implementation of the Treaty’s obligations will contribute to saving lives, reducing human suffering, protecting human rights, preventing the diversion of conventional arms to the illegal market and combating terrorism, while upholding the legitimate trade in arms, which is vital for national defense and security. We urge States in a position to do so to render assistance in capacity building to enable States Parties needing such assistance to fulfill and implement the Treaty’s obligations.
Outer Space
33. Outer space activities continue to play a significant role in the social, economic, scientific, and technological development of states, as well as in maintaining international peace and security. We acknowledge the need to take collaborative, timely, and pragmatic steps to enhance the long-term safety, security, sustainability, and stability of the space environment. In this context, the G-7 supports and encourages constructive discussion on the development and implementation of transparency and confidence building measures to enhance stability in space, taking into account the recommendations of the United Nations Group of Governmental Experts on Transparency and Confidence-Building Measures in Outer Space. The G7 continues to support ongoing efforts to develop a non-legally-binding International Code of Conduct for Outer Space Activities and strongly encourages completion of the Code in the near future or in the first half of 2015 at the latest. We also support the efforts to complete the United Nations Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space Guidelines on Long-Term Sustainability for Space Activities in 2015.
2. In seeking this safer world, we reiterate our commitment to create the conditions for a world without nuclear weapons, in accordance with the goals of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), in a way that promotes international stability, based on the principle of equal and undiminished security for all, and underlining the vital importance of non-proliferation for achieving this goal.
3. We reaffirm our unconditional support for all three pillars of the NPT, which remains the cornerstone of the nuclear non-proliferation regime and the essential foundation for the pursuit of disarmament and the peaceful uses of nuclear energy.
4. We call on all NPT Parties to fulfill their obligations under the Treaty and to preserve and strengthen the international nuclear non-proliferation regime. The 2015 NPT Review Conference presents a vital opportunity for all NPT Parties to further strengthen the Treaty in all its aspects. We recall the successful, consensus outcome of the 2010 NPT Review Conference, including its Action Plan. We remain fully committed to the Action Plan’s implementation, and call on all States Parties to implement its actions. In this regard, we welcome and encourage continued engagement of and among the NPT nuclear-weapon States on verification, transparency and confidence-building measures, with a view to strengthening implementation of all three pillars of the NPT. We welcome the April 2014 meeting of China, France, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom, and the United States (P5) in Beijing, the latest in this ongoing dialogue, and welcome the timely submission of the individual reports made to the third session of the NPT Preparatory Committee in New York in April, 2014, pursuant to Actions 5, 20, and 21 of the Action Plan. We encourage all States Parties, consistent with Action 20 of the Action Plan, to make similar reports.
5. The G7 partners continue to attach great importance to the development of internationally recognized nuclear weapon free zones, established on the basis of agreements freely arrived at among States of the regions concerned, in line with the principles set out by the UN Disarmament Commission in 1999 and recognize the legitimate interest of non-nuclear-weapon States in receiving security assurances from nuclear-weapon States in the framework of the relevant legally binding protocols of nuclear-weapon-free zone treaties. These protocols enhance regional and international security by helping to build confidence between nuclear and non-nuclear weapon states. We welcome the signature of the protocol to the Treaty on a Nuclear Weapon-Free-Zone in Central Asia. We also welcome the commitment of the P5 States to continue to consult with the States Parties to the Treaty on the Southeast Asia Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone.
6. We reaffirm the importance of commitments and assurances given by the NPT nuclear weapons States to the NPT non-nuclear weapon States. We deplore the recent and ongoing breaches of the commitments given to Ukraine by the Russian Federation in the Budapest Memorandum. In this Memorandum, the Russian Federation, United Kingdom and the United States reaffirmed their commitment to respect Ukraine’s independence and sovereignty and existing borders; reaffirmed their obligation to refrain from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of Ukraine and that none of their weapons will ever be used against Ukraine except in self-defense or otherwise in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, and reaffirmed their commitment to Ukraine to refrain from economic coercion. We consider that Ukraine’s historic decisions in 1994 were significant steps in promoting its own and wider regional and international security. We also welcome Ukraine’s statement at the 2014 Non-Proliferation Treaty Preparatory Committee that Ukraine remains committed to the provisions of the NPT.
7. The G-7 strongly support the goal of a zone free of nuclear weapons, as well as other weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery in the Middle East. Recalling the decision at the 2010 NPT Review Conference to hold a Conference on the establishment of such a zone, we strongly support Finnish Ambassador Laajava’s work as facilitator of the Conference, and welcome the continued commitment of the co-sponsors of the 1995 Resolution (the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom and the United States). We call upon the States of the region to continue their direct engagement with each other in order to finalize the preparation and convening of the Conference in the nearest future.
8. While acknowledging the right of withdrawal from the NPT contained in Article X.1, we consider that modalities and measures to address withdrawal from that Treaty are needed as demonstrated by North Korea’s announcement of withdrawal. We underscore the role of the UN Security Council in addressing announcements of withdrawal promptly and without delay, assessing the consequences of such withdrawal, including possible adoption of measures in this regard. We also emphasize that a State Party will remain responsible under international law for violations of the NPT committed prior to its withdrawal. We also underscore that nuclear transfers received prior to withdrawal should remain in peaceful uses and subject to IAEA safeguards. We welcome the growing recognition that this issue needs to be addressed urgently at the 2015 Review Conference and we support the adoption of appropriate recommendations on measures that address withdrawal in the Final Document.
Nuclear Proliferation Challenges
9. We underscore our support for E3+3 efforts led by High Representative Ashton to reach a long-term comprehensive solution to the Iranian nuclear issue that resolves fully the international community’s concerns regarding the exclusively peaceful nature of Iran’s nuclear program and ensures Iran does not acquire nuclear weapons. We welcome the implementation of the Joint Plan of Action (JPOA) between the E3+3 and Iran and the essential role played by the IAEA in verifying the nuclear-related measures. We commend those states which made financial contributions in this context for the monitoring work of the IAEA. We reaffirm our strong support for the IAEA’s ongoing efforts to verify the exclusively peaceful nature of Iran’s nuclear program and we call on Iran to cooperate fully with the IAEA to resolve all outstanding issues, particularly those which give rise to concerns about the possible military dimensions (PMD) of Iran’s nuclear program, the satisfactory resolution of which will be critical for a long-term comprehensive solution to the Iranian nuclear issue.
10. We call on Syria to remedy its noncompliance with its nuclear safeguards obligations, and to cooperate fully with the IAEA in resolving all outstanding questions regarding the nature of its nuclear program.
11. We will not accept North Korea as a nuclear armed state and urge North Korea to abandon all nuclear weapons and existing nuclear programs, and to return, at an early date, to the NPT and to IAEA safeguards and come into full compliance with its nonproliferation obligations. We condemn in the strongest possible terms North Korea’s continued development of its nuclear and ballistic missile programs in direct violation of UN Security Council Resolutions 1718, 1874, 2087 and 2094. In this regard, we condemn North Korea’s February and March 2014 ballistic missile launches in clear violation of its UNSCR obligations and call on North Korea to refrain from further provocations. We urge North Korea to halt any efforts to restart, readjust, and expand its nuclear facilities at Yongbyon, and cease immediately all nuclear activities including the ones related to its uranium enrichment and plutonium programs. We reaffirm our collective hope for lasting peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula and call on North Korea to refrain from any actions that escalate tensions in the region. We firmly support diplomatic efforts to implement the 2005 Joint Statement and to bring North Korea into compliance with its UN Security Council obligations, and call on North Korea to take concrete steps toward complete, verifiable and irreversible denuclearization. We commend the international community’s unified resolve in the face of North Korea’s defiance of it and urge continued vigilance by all states to curtail North Korea’s proliferation activities and impede the continued pursuit of its proscribed nuclear and ballistic missile programs.
Nuclear Disarmament
12. We encourage the P5 to continue their important dialogue, including on nuclear arms reductions and their work on confidence-building and transparency that represent major steps in accordance with Article VI of the NPT and the Action Plan adopted by the NPT Review Conference in May 2010. We welcome the continued implementation of the New START Treaty by the U.S. and Russia and the disarmament-related actions already made by France and the UK, as well as urge others that possess nuclear weapons but have not yet engaged in nuclear disarmament efforts to reduce their arsenals.
13. Early entry into force and universalization of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) is in the security interests of every nation. States that have yet to sign or ratify the Treaty should do so without waiting for others. For the Treaty to be an effective mechanism for nuclear disarmament and nonproliferation, we believe all States must maintain the political will and provide adequate resources to complete the Treaty’s verification regime and maximize the capabilities of the Provisional Technical Secretariat. We welcome the voluntary adherence to unilateral moratoria on nuclear explosive tests and call on all States to refrain from acts which would defeat the object and purpose of the Treaty. We also welcome the establishment of the Group of Eminent Persons and support its activities, which will inject new energy and dynamics into the push for entry into force.
14. The Conference on Disarmament (CD) and its predecessor bodies have a long history of delivering landmark agreements, but we share the growing impatience of many in the international community at the impasse at the CD. We believe the next logical step in multilateral negotiations to advance both nuclear nonproliferation and disarmament goals is the negotiation of a Treaty banning the production of fissile material for use in nuclear or other nuclear explosive devices (FMCT), on the basis of document CD/1299 and the mandate contained therein. While we welcome declared moratoria by some states on the production of fissile material for use in nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, a binding and verifiable ban on such production is a necessary step toward a world without nuclear weapons. We welcome the work of the UN Group of Governmental Experts (GGE), which will make recommendations on possible aspects that could contribute to a future Treaty, and can build momentum towards eventual negotiations in the CD.
Peaceful Use of Nuclear Energy
15. All States Parties to the NPT have an inalienable right to use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, in compliance with their international obligations. We reiterate our willingness to cooperate with States that meet their nuclear non-proliferation obligations and wish to develop a civil nuclear program in a manner that meets the highest standards of safety, security, non-proliferation, and respect for the environment.
16. We urge strong support for implementation of the IAEA’s Nuclear Safety Action Plan, including working towards establishing a global nuclear liability regime, and welcome the progress in enhancing the effectiveness of the Convention on Nuclear Safety. We emphasize the importance of the establishment, implementation and continuous improvement of national emergency preparedness and response measures.
17. Multilateral approaches to the nuclear fuel cycle contribute to nuclear energy programs. We support the IAEA’s work to establish a bank of Low Enriched Uranium in Kazakhstan and urge the conclusion of a Host State Agreement at an early date in order to allow for the beginning of operation of the bank.
IAEA Safeguards
18. We support the central role of the IAEA, and in particular its safeguards system, which remains essential for the effective implementation of the nuclear non-proliferation regime. The IAEA must continue to have the necessary resources and legal authorities to be able to carry out its mission in full, in accordance with its statutory mandate. We will continue to help promote an IAEA Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement together with an Additional Protocol as the universally accepted international verification standard, which should be a consideration in decisions on the supply of nuclear fuel, equipment, or technology. We call on all States which have not yet done so to sign and bring into force the Additional Protocol and apply its provisions as soon as possible.
Nuclear Security
19. We welcome the outcomes of the Nuclear Security Summit in The Hague on 24-25 March 2014 where 58 world leaders worked to further reduce the threat of nuclear terrorism by securing vulnerable nuclear and other radioactive material around the globe. The Hague Summit participants agreed to a Communique that reaffirms the fundamental responsibility of States, the need to further strengthen and coordinate international cooperation, and the need for a strengthened and comprehensive international security architecture. Many countries agreed to multilateral joint commitments intended to advance the goal of nuclear security. We highlight Belgian and Italian work to complete the removal of their excess supplies of highly enriched uranium and plutonium for elimination, and Japan for announcing that it will work with the United States to eliminate hundreds of kilograms of nuclear material from one of its experimental reactors. We call on others to take additional transparency measures. We also continue to encourage nations to join existing relevant international initiatives that support Summit goals.
20. We urge all States Parties to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material (CPPNM) to ratify, accept or approve the 2005 Amendment to the Convention as soon as possible. In addition to securing nuclear and radiological material at their source, we recognize the need to locate and secure material currently available on the illicit market and prosecute those involved in the trafficking of these materials.
21. We commend the work of the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism and other international efforts to counter nuclear smuggling and combat nuclear terrorism. The ongoing occurrence for more than 20 years of nuclear and radioactive trafficking highlights the threat that terrorists or other malicious actors can acquire these dangerous materials. The international community must be vigilant to prevent the world’s most dangerous materials from falling into the wrong hands.
The Nuclear Suppliers Group
22. We welcome the call by the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) on all states to exercise vigilance to ensure that the supply of nuclear related technologies and materials is for peaceful purposes and to make best efforts to ensure that none of their exports of goods and technologies contributes to the spread of nuclear weapons. In this regard, we recognize that the NSG Guidelines serve as the standard for nuclear and nuclear-related dual-use exports. We call on NSG Participating Governments to strictly observe the Guidelines and encourage nuclear supplier states that are not NSG participating governments to act in conformity with the Guidelines on a voluntary basis. We also support the discussion of the Additional Protocol as a condition of supply to enhance nuclear non-proliferation efforts. We welcome the progress that is being made by the Technical Experts Group to ensure that control lists remain current, and we welcome the Group’s outreach efforts to enhance non-proliferation. We welcome the membership of Mexico in 2012 and Serbia in 2013.
Chemical Weapons
23. We reaffirm our unconditional support for the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) and the functions of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW). We applaud the success of the Convention and the awarding of the Nobel Peace Prize to the OPCW for its ongoing work to eliminate an entire class of WMD and toward preventing the re-emergence of chemical weapons. We look forward to continuing the work set out in the final document of the 2013 Review Conference and support efforts to ensure the universalisation and effective implementation of the Convention, and we call on all states not party to the Convention to adhere to it now. Destroying chemical weapons remains a key objective of the Convention together with refraining from the development, production, acquisition, stockpiling, use and proliferation of chemical weapons. We welcome the progress being made by the possessor states as reported recently to the OPCW Executive Council (EC) and Conference of the States Parties. We encourage all possessor states to continue to take every necessary measure to complete their destruction processes as soon as possible in a transparent fashion, and within the framework of the existing verification regime. We reiterate the importance of an effective industry verification regime.
24. We share deep concern over the use of chemical weapons by the Assad regime against its citizens. We share further concern about the more recent allegations of use of a toxic chemical as a weapon in Syria and we support the OPCW fact-finding mission. We urge the regime to cooperate fully with the mission to ensure those who are responsible for such attacks are brought to account. The continued possession of chemical weapons material by the Assad regime represents a sustained danger to Syria’s population and all of its neighbors. We support the full implementation of the OPCW Executive Council Decision of September 27, 2013 and UN Security Council Resolution (2118), which resulted from the Russia U.S. Geneva framework to eliminate Syria’s chemical weapons program. We welcome the efforts of the Joint OPCW-UN Mission and the assistance provided by individual States and by the international community at large to support safe elimination of Syria’s chemical weapons program. Whilst efforts have been made, the removal process remains behind schedule. We call upon Syria to make sustained efforts in meeting its obligations under the CWC, OPCW EC decisions and UNSCR 2118. International confidence that the program has been completely eliminated requires further review of Syria’s declaration of its CW program. Syria must also take immediate steps to physically destroy the remaining 13 chemical production facilities in accordance with the CWC.
Biological Weapons
25. We welcome the work undertaken so far to implement the outcome of the Seventh Review Conference of the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC). We are committed to achieving real progress to promote national implementation, confidence-building measures, and cooperation and assistance, to reviewing developments in science and technology, and to strengthening the Convention’s Article VII on responding to use of biological or toxin weapons. We support further exploration or consideration of practical approaches to promote the exchange of best practices, enhance transparency, and build trust among states parties, such as peer review, voluntary transparency visits and briefings, and constructive approaches to raising and addressing concerns where they arise. Such approaches may play a role in strengthening implementation and enhancing assurance of compliance with BWC obligations. We reaffirm our commitment to promote universal membership of the BTWC, and we are determined to work with all the State Parties to reinforce its regime.
Addressing the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction
26. WMD and delivery means- related export controls by members of the international nonproliferation regimes (Australia Group, Missile Technology Control Regime, Nuclear Suppliers Group) and the Zangger Committee has significantly reduced the availability to proliferators of support from countries with the most advanced technology. These controls, and the information-sharing, best practices, and patterns of cooperation fostered by the regimes, have made it more difficult, time-consuming, and costly for proliferators to produce or acquire WMD and their delivery systems. We plan to continue to work through the regimes to reduce the global proliferation threat and urge all countries to unilaterally adopt and apply on a national basis the guidelines and standards of the regimes.
27. We fully support the key role played by the United Nations Security Council in addressing proliferation issues. We welcome the adoption by the Security Council of Resolution 1977, which renewed the mandate of the 1540 Committee for ten years and reaffirmed Resolution 1540’s obligations. We invite all States to nominate a national point of contact and to work toward full implementation of UNSCR 1540. We stand ready to provide assistance to States in this regard and we reiterate our support to the 1540 Committee in the discharge of its mandate.
28. We strongly believe that the proliferation of missiles, especially those capable of delivering weapons of mass destruction, continues to be a serious concern to us all and a threat to international peace and security, as reaffirmed in UN Security Council Resolutions 1540, 1887, and 1977. We believe that a multilateral response and international norms are the most adequate and effective way to address this issue. We strongly endorse the MTCR and the Hague Code of Conduct in that regard.
29. We affirm our commitment to the Global Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons and Material of Mass Destruction (Global Partnership) and this commitment remains unwavering. We therefore commend the Global Partnership on its efforts to coordinate and collaborate on programs and activities in the areas of nuclear and radiological security, biological security, chemical security, scientist engagement and countering knowledge proliferation, and in the implementation of UN Security Council Resolution 1540. The Global Partnership has continued its valuable work on engagement with centers of excellence and the expansion of its membership. Since 2013, the Global Partnership has welcomed the Philippines, Hungary and Spain as new members. Members of the Global Partnership also welcome the ongoing participation and closer cooperation of relevant international organizations and bodies in global efforts to improve information sharing and coordination of WMD threat reduction projects. The sub-groups that focused on each of the substantive areas of chemical, biological, nuclear and radiological security helped the Global Partnership improve information sharing, funding and project coordination. The Global Partnership has provided significant funding for the destruction of chemical weapons in Syria. In addition, strengthened matchmaking has begun to enable the Global Partnership to improve coordination of projects globally.
30. We continue to promote robust counter-proliferation tools. We support the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI). The list of endorsing nations continues to grow, with Vietnam recently being the 104th endorsing nation. We commit to undertake further measures to enhance the capabilities and authorities required to interdict shipments of weapons of mass destruction, their delivery systems, and related materials to and from states and non-state actors of proliferation concern. We promote outreach for enhanced participation in the PSI and continue to focus on legal and operational issues.
Conventional
31. Conventional arms play a legitimate role in enabling governments to defend their citizens, as enshrined in the UN Charter. However, in the wrong hands they pose a threat to global, regional and national security. Improperly controlled, they can fuel terrorism and threaten peace and stability. For this reason, we welcome the adoption of UNSCR 2117 and stress the need for full and effective implementation by States at the national, regional and international levels, of the UN Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons. In this context, we also reiterate our support for full implementation of UNSCR 2017 in order to stem arms proliferation from Libya. In addition, the Wassenaar Arrangement on Export Controls for Conventional Arms and Dual-use Goods and Technologies contributes to preventing de-stabilizing accumulations of these arms, goods and technologies. We urge those which currently sit outside the regime to make every effort to apply the Wassenaar Arrangement’s standards and control lists. Conventional arms agreements and commitments can also address specific regional security concerns. The Vienna Document and Open Skies Treaty have provided useful transparency about military activities in Ukraine and western Russia in recent months, reflecting the importance of continued implementation and modernization of these agreements and commitments.
32. We welcome the rapid progress that has been made towards entry into force of the Arms Trade Treaty since it was opened for signature on 3 June 2013. We call upon States who have not yet done so to join the Treaty as soon as possible. Effective implementation of the Treaty’s obligations will contribute to saving lives, reducing human suffering, protecting human rights, preventing the diversion of conventional arms to the illegal market and combating terrorism, while upholding the legitimate trade in arms, which is vital for national defense and security. We urge States in a position to do so to render assistance in capacity building to enable States Parties needing such assistance to fulfill and implement the Treaty’s obligations.
Outer Space
33. Outer space activities continue to play a significant role in the social, economic, scientific, and technological development of states, as well as in maintaining international peace and security. We acknowledge the need to take collaborative, timely, and pragmatic steps to enhance the long-term safety, security, sustainability, and stability of the space environment. In this context, the G-7 supports and encourages constructive discussion on the development and implementation of transparency and confidence building measures to enhance stability in space, taking into account the recommendations of the United Nations Group of Governmental Experts on Transparency and Confidence-Building Measures in Outer Space. The G7 continues to support ongoing efforts to develop a non-legally-binding International Code of Conduct for Outer Space Activities and strongly encourages completion of the Code in the near future or in the first half of 2015 at the latest. We also support the efforts to complete the United Nations Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space Guidelines on Long-Term Sustainability for Space Activities in 2015.
Wednesday, March 26, 2014
SUNNY DAY AT THE SOYUZ LAUNCH PAD
The sun rises behind the Soyuz launch pad shortly before the Soyuz TMA-12M spacecraft is rolled out by train to the launch pad at the Baikonur Cosmodrome, Kazakhstan, Sunday, March, 23, 2014. Launch of the Soyuz rocket is scheduled for March 26 (5:17 p.m. U.S. EDT on March 25) and will send Expedition 39 Soyuz Commander Alexander Skvortsov of the Russian Federal Space Agency, Roscosmos, Flight Engineer Steven Swanson of NASA, and Flight Engineer Oleg Artemyev of Roscosmos on a six-month mission aboard the International Space Station. Credit-NASA-Bill Ingalls
Monday, March 3, 2014
G-7 STATEMENT ON UKRAINE
FROM: THE WHITE HOUSE
G-7 Leaders Statement
We, the leaders of Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the United Kingdom and the United States and the President of the European Council and President of the European Commission, join together today to condemn the Russian Federation’s clear violation of the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Ukraine, in contravention of Russia’s obligations under the UN Charter and its 1997 basing agreement with Ukraine. We call on Russia to address any ongoing security or human rights concerns that it has with Ukraine through direct negotiations, and/or via international observation or mediation under the auspices of the UN or the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe. We stand ready to assist with these efforts.
We also call on all parties concerned to behave with the greatest extent of self-restraint and responsibility, and to decrease the tensions.
We note that Russia’s actions in Ukraine also contravene the principles and values on which the G-7 and the G-8 operate. As such, we have decided for the time being to suspend our participation in activities associated with the preparation of the scheduled G-8 Summit in Sochi in June, until the environment comes back where the G-8 is able to have meaningful discussion.
We are united in supporting Ukraine’s sovereignty and territorial integrity, and its right to choose its own future. We commit ourselves to support Ukraine in its efforts to restore unity, stability, and political and economic health to the country. To that end, we will support Ukraine’s work with the International Monetary Fund to negotiate a new program and to implement needed reforms. IMF support will be critical in unlocking additional assistance from the World Bank, other international financial institutions, the EU, and bilateral sources.
G-7 Leaders Statement
We, the leaders of Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the United Kingdom and the United States and the President of the European Council and President of the European Commission, join together today to condemn the Russian Federation’s clear violation of the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Ukraine, in contravention of Russia’s obligations under the UN Charter and its 1997 basing agreement with Ukraine. We call on Russia to address any ongoing security or human rights concerns that it has with Ukraine through direct negotiations, and/or via international observation or mediation under the auspices of the UN or the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe. We stand ready to assist with these efforts.
We also call on all parties concerned to behave with the greatest extent of self-restraint and responsibility, and to decrease the tensions.
We note that Russia’s actions in Ukraine also contravene the principles and values on which the G-7 and the G-8 operate. As such, we have decided for the time being to suspend our participation in activities associated with the preparation of the scheduled G-8 Summit in Sochi in June, until the environment comes back where the G-8 is able to have meaningful discussion.
We are united in supporting Ukraine’s sovereignty and territorial integrity, and its right to choose its own future. We commit ourselves to support Ukraine in its efforts to restore unity, stability, and political and economic health to the country. To that end, we will support Ukraine’s work with the International Monetary Fund to negotiate a new program and to implement needed reforms. IMF support will be critical in unlocking additional assistance from the World Bank, other international financial institutions, the EU, and bilateral sources.
Sunday, March 2, 2014
REMARKS ON UKRAINE BY U.S. UN AMBASSADOR POWER
FROM: U.S. STATE DEPARTMENT
Remarks by Ambassador Samantha Power, U.S. Permanent Representative to the United Nations, at a Security Council Stakeout on Ukraine
Samantha Power
U.S. Permanent Representative to the United Nations
New York, NY
March 1, 2014
AS DELIVERED
Good evening. Today in the Council, the United States renewed its call for the international community to support the newly formed government of Ukraine and prevent unnecessary violence.
Unfortunately, the Russian Federation Council's authorization of the use of military force in Ukraine is as dangerous as it is destabilizing. It is past time for the threats to end. The Russian military must pull back.
It is ironic that the Russian Federation regularly goes out of its way in the Security Council chamber to emphasize the sanctity of national borders and sovereignty. Today, Russia would do well to heed its own warnings. Russia's actions in Ukraine violate Russia's commitment to protect the sovereignty, territorial integrity, and independence of Ukraine, and pose a threat to international peace and security. We have said from the outset that we recognize and respect Russia's historical ties to Ukraine. But instead of engaging the government of Ukraine and international institutions about its concerns for ethnic Russians, it ignored both and has instead acted unilaterally and militarily.
The United States, again, calls for the immediate deployment of international observers from either the OSCE or United Nations to Crimea and other parts of Ukraine to provide transparency about the movement and activities of military and para-military forces in the region and to defuse the tension between groups. The best way to get the facts, to monitor conduct and to prevent any abuses is to get international monitors and observers - including from UN and OSCE - on the ground as soon as possible. We are also working to stand up an international mediation mission to the Crimea to begin to deescalate the situation, and to facilitate productive and peaceful political dialogue among all Ukrainian parties.
Less than one week since the sun set on the Sochi Olympics, we are at a critical moment. The United States considers the current actions by Russia in Ukraine as unacceptable behavior for a G-8 member. The United States will stand with the people of Ukraine and the Ukrainian government in Kyiv. And as the President has said, intervention by the Russian military will be both a grave mistake and have costs and consequences.
With that, I'll take a couple questions.
Reporter: James Bays from Al Jazeera. I know that President Obama has been speaking to President Putin. President Putin now has this authorization, but there's clearly now a gap before he decides whether he's going to use it. Just, explain to us if you can on camera what is the message from the U.S. to President Putin right now?
Ambassador Power: The message is, pull back your forces. Let us engage in political dialogue. Engage with the Ukrainian government which is reaching out to you for that dialogue. The occupation . . . the military presence in Crimea is a violation of international law and we all need to allow cooler heads to prevail and to negotiate a peaceful way out of this crisis. Military force will never be the answer to this crisis.
Reporter: Ambassador, what are those costs that the United States says that Russia will suffer; and secondly, as a champion of human rights, doesn't it trouble you that there are four senior members of this Ukrainian government who have come from very far right, extremist parties?
Ambassador: I think what you heard from President Obama in the readout that the White House issued is that the United States has already suspended its preparation for the G-8 Summit that was supposed to take place in Sochi. And what I can say is that, again, the political and economic isolation that that represents is only going to deepen as this crisis escalates. And that is why, again, it is incredibly important that an international observer mission get into Ukraine as soon as possible; that all countries embrace the prospect of international mediation, such as that offered by the UN Special Envoy Robert Serry; and that we embrace the fundamental tenets of the UN Charter: territorial integrity, sovereignty and unity of Ukraine, avoiding the use of force, and the threat of force, and returning to the path of peaceful dialogue.
Thank you.
Remarks by Ambassador Samantha Power, U.S. Permanent Representative to the United Nations, at a Security Council Stakeout on Ukraine
Samantha Power
U.S. Permanent Representative to the United Nations
New York, NY
March 1, 2014
AS DELIVERED
Good evening. Today in the Council, the United States renewed its call for the international community to support the newly formed government of Ukraine and prevent unnecessary violence.
Unfortunately, the Russian Federation Council's authorization of the use of military force in Ukraine is as dangerous as it is destabilizing. It is past time for the threats to end. The Russian military must pull back.
It is ironic that the Russian Federation regularly goes out of its way in the Security Council chamber to emphasize the sanctity of national borders and sovereignty. Today, Russia would do well to heed its own warnings. Russia's actions in Ukraine violate Russia's commitment to protect the sovereignty, territorial integrity, and independence of Ukraine, and pose a threat to international peace and security. We have said from the outset that we recognize and respect Russia's historical ties to Ukraine. But instead of engaging the government of Ukraine and international institutions about its concerns for ethnic Russians, it ignored both and has instead acted unilaterally and militarily.
The United States, again, calls for the immediate deployment of international observers from either the OSCE or United Nations to Crimea and other parts of Ukraine to provide transparency about the movement and activities of military and para-military forces in the region and to defuse the tension between groups. The best way to get the facts, to monitor conduct and to prevent any abuses is to get international monitors and observers - including from UN and OSCE - on the ground as soon as possible. We are also working to stand up an international mediation mission to the Crimea to begin to deescalate the situation, and to facilitate productive and peaceful political dialogue among all Ukrainian parties.
Less than one week since the sun set on the Sochi Olympics, we are at a critical moment. The United States considers the current actions by Russia in Ukraine as unacceptable behavior for a G-8 member. The United States will stand with the people of Ukraine and the Ukrainian government in Kyiv. And as the President has said, intervention by the Russian military will be both a grave mistake and have costs and consequences.
With that, I'll take a couple questions.
Reporter: James Bays from Al Jazeera. I know that President Obama has been speaking to President Putin. President Putin now has this authorization, but there's clearly now a gap before he decides whether he's going to use it. Just, explain to us if you can on camera what is the message from the U.S. to President Putin right now?
Ambassador Power: The message is, pull back your forces. Let us engage in political dialogue. Engage with the Ukrainian government which is reaching out to you for that dialogue. The occupation . . . the military presence in Crimea is a violation of international law and we all need to allow cooler heads to prevail and to negotiate a peaceful way out of this crisis. Military force will never be the answer to this crisis.
Reporter: Ambassador, what are those costs that the United States says that Russia will suffer; and secondly, as a champion of human rights, doesn't it trouble you that there are four senior members of this Ukrainian government who have come from very far right, extremist parties?
Ambassador: I think what you heard from President Obama in the readout that the White House issued is that the United States has already suspended its preparation for the G-8 Summit that was supposed to take place in Sochi. And what I can say is that, again, the political and economic isolation that that represents is only going to deepen as this crisis escalates. And that is why, again, it is incredibly important that an international observer mission get into Ukraine as soon as possible; that all countries embrace the prospect of international mediation, such as that offered by the UN Special Envoy Robert Serry; and that we embrace the fundamental tenets of the UN Charter: territorial integrity, sovereignty and unity of Ukraine, avoiding the use of force, and the threat of force, and returning to the path of peaceful dialogue.
Thank you.
Tuesday, December 11, 2012
U.S. AND RUSSIAN FEDERATION TEAM CONCLUDE ANTARTICA INSPECTION
 |
| Gentoo penguins nesting. The distinguishing feature of these penguins is the wide white stripe across the top of the head that in some ways resembles a bonnet. From: CIA World Factbook. |
.FROM: U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE
United States and Russian Federation Conclude Joint Inspection in Antarctica
Media Note
Office of the Spokesperson
Washington, DC
December 10, 2012
A joint team from the United States and the Russian Federation concluded a 10-day inspection of foreign research stations, installations and equipment in Antarctica on December 8, 2012. The team inspected the following stations: Bharati (India), Maitri (India), Princess Elisabeth (Belgium), Syowa (Japan), Troll (Norway) and Zhongshan (China). The United States appreciates the assistance provided by the personnel at all of the visited stations.
The joint inspection was conducted pursuant to the Antarctic Treaty of 1959 and its Environmental Protocol, and was designed to review compliance with Antarctic Treaty system rules and regulations. This included verification that the stations are implementing relevant environmental rules and that facilities are used only for peaceful purposes -- honoring the Treaty’s prohibition on measures of a military nature. This inspection effort was facilitated by a Memorandum of Understanding on Cooperation in Antarctica signed by Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton and Foreign Minister of the Russian Federation Sergey Lavrov on September 8, 2012.
Officials from the U.S. Department of State and the Russian Federation Ministry of Foreign Affairs led the inspection, which is the second phase of a two-phase process. A report will be jointly presented by the United States and Russia at the next Antarctic Treaty Consultative Meeting, to be held in Brussels, Belgium, in May 2013.
The United States and Russia were architects of the Antarctic Treaty of 1959 and today conduct some of the most extensive and diverse scientific activities in Antarctica. Working closely with our Russian counterparts provides an excellent opportunity to reinforce our shared objectives for the peaceful use of Antarctica - and further expands our diplomatic cooperation.
Subscribe to:
Posts (Atom)