Showing posts with label PARIS. Show all posts
Showing posts with label PARIS. Show all posts

Wednesday, May 13, 2015

SECRETARY KERRY'S REMARKS WITH SAUDI FOREIGN MINISTER ADEL AL-JUBEIR

FROM:  U.S. STATE DEPARTMENT
Secretary's Remarks: Press Availability with Saudi Foreign Minister Adel al-Jubeir
05/08/2015 05:12 PM EDT
Press Availability with Saudi Foreign Minister Adel al-Jubeir
Press Availability
John Kerry
Secretary of State
Paris, France
May 8, 2015

SECRETARY KERRY: Well, good afternoon, everybody, and thank you very much for your patience. This afternoon we’re going to do this a little bit differently. It’s my pleasure to first introduce my friend and the distinguished Foreign Minister of Saudi Arabia Adel al-Jubeir, and then I will have a few comments, and then we’ll be open to some questions.

So welcome to the Embassy of the United States in Paris, and thank you for your help and cooperation through a very productive day.

FOREIGN MINISTER AL-JUBEIR: Thank you very much, John, for hosting the GCC foreign ministers at this beautiful building in Paris. We had what I thought was a very productive discussion about the status of the P5+1 talks regarding Iran’s nuclear program. We also – we had an extensive briefing about the technical aspects of the talks that lasted over two hours.

We also spent another hour and a half on Camp David and the objectives of Camp David and the issues that will be discussed at Camp David. Don’t ask me to talk about it because I won’t; I can just tell you in general terms that they have to do with the intensifying and strengthening the security-military relationship between the United States of America and the Gulf Cooperation Council countries, as well as dealing with new challenges that we face in the region, foremost of which is the Iranian interference in the affairs of the countries of the region.

We were very pleased with the discussions. I thought they were very – extremely productive, very useful. And we believe that now we have a much clearer sense of the – what we will be discussing at Camp – what our leaders will be discussing at Camp David. And having said so, I will leave that part here. Thanks, John, for hosting that meeting and for having it be such a productive and useful meeting for all of us. We look forward to visiting Washington and Camp David.

I wanted to also pick up on something that I mentioned to you yesterday when we announced that we were looking at a five-day ceasefire in Yemen for humanitarian purposes in order to allow the flow of humanitarian assistance to Yemen. We have made a decision that the ceasefire will begin this Tuesday, May 12th, at 11:00 p.m. and will last for five days and is subject to renewal if it’s – if it works out.

The requirements are first and foremost that there is a commitment by the Houthis and their allies, including Ali Abdullah Saleh and those forces that are loyal to him, to abide by the ceasefire. As I said yesterday at Riyadh, this ceasefire will be throughout Yemen or nowhere in Yemen, and the matter is entirely up to the Houthis and their allies. During the ceasefire there will be a continuation of the air and sea interdiction regarding the flow of weapons to the Houthis and their allies in Yemen.

I’m also happy and pleased to announce that the King Salman Humanitarian and Relief Center in Riyadh will be operational on this Sunday, May 10th. It will be the location in Riyadh where a number of organizations and UN efforts and any other country that wants to participate in the distribution of aid to Yemen to coordinate is free to come and be part of it. We believe that it is critically important that all countries be able to send as much relief supplies as efficiently and as quickly to as many Yemenis as possible.

As you know, that the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, the Custodian of the Two Holy Mosques, King Salman bin Abdulaziz, ordered the contribution of $274 million to the United Nations for emergency relief efforts in Yemen. This is above and beyond the assistance that we are deploying to Yemen every day as well as the assistance that we will be providing to Yemen going forward.

It is our hope and our desire that the Houthis will come to their senses and realize that the interests of Yemen and the Yemeni people are – should be the top priority for everyone. And I want to make sure that I make clear that the ceasefire will end should the Houthis or their allies not live up to the agreement contained in this issue. This is, I believe, a chance for the Houthis to show that they care about their people and that they care about the Yemeni people, and we hope that they take up this offer for the good of Yemen and the people of Yemen.

So thank you very much once again, John. Thank you for hosting the GCC foreign ministers in this wonderful building. It’s always a pleasure to be here and be with you and exchange views and ideas, and I think we did this today in a very positive spirit, so we thank you for this.

SECRETARY KERRY: Well, Adel, thank you very much. It was indeed constructive and positive and very, very productive, and I’m grateful to you and all of our colleagues who came here together in order to help make it that. It was well prepared, and I think in the end has really set the stage for a constructive meeting at Camp David.

I’ll say a word just first, if I may, I want to start by expressing my congratulations to Prime Minister Cameron and to my counterpart Secretary of State Philip Hammond and their party for their defying the polls and winning an outright majority in the elections yesterday. As everybody knows, we have a very special relationship with Great Britain. We have deeply shared interests and values. We work together on almost every issue that there is, and now there will obviously be continuity in the relationships built and in the work that we have invested on a number of different priorities and initiatives. So I look forward to continuing to work with Prime Minister Cameron and with Philip on all of our efforts in order to advance global peace and stability, and particularly in this next month and a half to finish our work together on a number of very pressing security issues.

The Gulf Cooperation Council and our Gulf partners have really been at the very center of America’s national interests for a long period of time. And today we find ourselves cooperating on more and more challenges within the region. It is a region that is facing particular challenge at this time, so obviously, by necessity, we – with common interests and with our mutual security and other interests at stake, we have found that it is critical for us to be able to dig into the relationship deeper in terms of ways we can cooperate to have a greater impact on these challenges that we face. And the United States is grateful for and fortunate to have partners who have been willing to stand up with us in the coalition on Daesh, on any other number of vital interests in the region.

Yesterday in Riyadh, for instance, I was privileged to meet with King Salman, who had both the courage and the vision to embrace a full ceasefire for five days. And we said that here in Paris, we would fill out the details a little bit, and with the announcement that the foreign minister has made on behalf of His Majesty King Salman, we now know that to a certainty, on Tuesday at 11:00 p.m. Yemen time, a ceasefire will take place countrywide, providing – providing that the Houthi agree that there will be no bombing, no shooting, no movement of their troops or maneuvering to reposition for military advantage, no movement of heavy weapons or others – that the ceasefire is conditioned on the Houthis agreeing to live by these commitments. And it is a renewable commitment. In other words, if they live by it and if this holds, it opens the door to the possibility of extension and the possibility of a longer period of time for the political process to help resolve these differences.

So anyone who cares about Yemeni people or asserts that they do should take clear notice of the fact that a humanitarian catastrophe is building, and that they are running out of food, they’re running out of medicine, they’re running out of fuel, and clearly, it is an important moment. His Majesty King Salman has recognized that. And despite the fact that he has had cross-border attacks and other challenges, he has made the decision to try to fight for a peaceful resolution. We applaud that. And we believe that all those who have been supportive of the Houthi need at this time to encourage the leadership, and all the way down through the rank and file, to live by this opportunity that is a very important one and very significant in the potential consequences for Yemen itself.

The United States is working with the international community now to try to organize as much humanitarian assistance as possible to be able to flow once that ceasefire takes effect, working with and through the United Nations. And anybody who hears this who has an idea that they want to get assistance into the people, there are organizations – World Food Organization, International Red Cross, others – who work through the United Nations, whom they should be in contact with so that this is an organized and clearly not military movement of goods in any way whatsoever.

Now, I want to be very clear about another thing. A ceasefire is not peace. Ultimately, the parties are going to have to find a way back to the table. And they’re going to have to make tough choices about more than just a ceasefire, because even the most durable of ceasefires is not a substitute for peace. Even the most durable of ceasefires is not a substitute for an inclusive, Yemeni-led political dialogue that all sides can support. And King Salman of Saudi Arabia has made another initiative in order to try to create that dialogue. He has announced a conference in Riyadh to which he invites all Yemeni parties. Now, it may be that not everybody shows up. We don’t know. But they’re invited.

And we support that conference with the hopes that it might produce some further steps forward to have the political resolution, but knowing that everyone agrees that that will lead into the subsequent talks to be held under the auspices of the United Nations and the UN envoy. And we’re very pleased that Saudi Arabia has agreed to support the UN in efforts to also try to help find a peaceful resolution to the situation in Yemen. Only a political solution by Yemenis for Yemenis, in the end, will actually bring an end to Yemen’s crisis. And we are committed to working toward the rapid, unconditional resumption of all party negotiations that will allow Yemen to be able to resume an inclusive transition process that brings peace and stability.

In addition to Yemen, we discussed with our GCC counterparts today preparations for the summit, as Foreign Minister Jubeir – al-Jubeir just said, and that’s going to address a wide range of security issues, folks. It’s going to discuss the threat of regional terrorism, the metastasizing of various terrorist organizations that has become prevalent. It will discuss, obviously, the challenge of Iranian support in some of those particular conflicts. It will discuss the threat of terrorism broadly. And it will discuss how to resolve more effectively those regional conflicts themselves.

So let me be very clear also. Our effort to find a diplomatic solution to the nuclear issue with respect to Iran does not stem from any lessening of our concerns about all of these other destabilizing events within the region. And it’s obvious to all, I think, that it’s easier to address those events if the potential of a nuclear weapon has been eliminated from the equation with respect to the challenges that we face.

We’re also very focused on a continuing basis with the challenge of Daesh and the other terrorist groups. And together, we believe that we are making real progress. A large part of that was, frankly, because of the nations that are represented in the room there. There’s been a very significant diminution of the capacity of Daesh within Iraq to be able to control the territory it used to control, to be able to communicate the way it used to communicate, to be able to move the way they used to be able to move. And so we believe, steadily, that that stranglehold is appropriately ending, and we are forcing them to change tactics. And that is encouraging progress, but we still need more.

And that’s why we were meeting here today in addition to the other reasons that I’ve described, because we need to, all of us, come together in the most effective way possible to meet these newer challenges of this moment in history. And President Obama completely understands the stakes, and that’s why today and at Camp David, we are fleshing out a series of new commitments that will create, between the United States and the GCC, a new security understanding, a new set of security initiatives, that will take us beyond anything that we have had before in ways that will ask our partners to work with us, and they will contribute and we will contribute. It is not a one-way street. It is a two-way street with mutual interests and mutual needs that need to be addressed.

That is why we are also strengthening, together, the moderate opposition in Syria against Daesh and against a regime that has committed an organized, wholesale effort of torture, used chemical weapons against its own people, dropped barrel bombs indiscriminately on women and children in schools and hospitals, and blocked whole communities from getting food and medical supplies to civilians in need.

So we have a big agenda. That’s why we met. And that agenda is marked by new developments almost every single day. I came here to share our views, and we listened a lot today to other views, and I am confident that with Camp David, those views are going to take shape in a form that will greatly enhance our ability to meet the needs of our people and the needs of all those people who want a future that is free of terrorism, free of coercion, free of violence – a future that is reflected by the opportunities that this incredible world we live in today offers people who have that kind of peace and stability. That’s what we’re working for and that’s what we will continue to work for.

Thank you, and we’d be happy to take a few questions.

MODERATOR: Okay. Is this on? The first question is – can you hear me? Hello? Okay. I’ll just speak loudly. The first question’s from Nicolas Revise of AFP. Go ahead. I hope your microphone works.

QUESTION: Thank you very much, Mr. Secretary and Mr. Foreign Minister. Mr. Secretary, first on Yemen: Do you think that the Houthis will accept the ceasefire, and are you going to talk to your Iranian and Russian counterparts to ask them to use their influence? Secondly, Mr. Secretary, on France: The French president made a landmark visit to Riyadh. What’s your take on this growing strategic relationship between the French and the Saudis? Do you see it affecting the unity of the P5+1 negotiating with Iran? And what are your thoughts on the Corker bill passing the Senate in the United States?

And Mr. Foreign Minister, if I may, the coalition has declared all of Sadah in Yemen a military target. How can you talk about a ceasefire and at the same time expand military operations? Thank you.

SECRETARY KERRY: Do you want to go first?

FOREIGN MINISTER AL-JUBEIR: Very simple. We set the ceasefire at five days, on Tuesday at mid – at 11 p.m. in the evening. The operations in Sadah are in direct response to the Houthis attacking civilians in Saudi Arabia and killing civilians in Saudi Arabia. This is something that we will not tolerate. This was a grave escalation on the part of the Houthis that we had to respond to. We cannot allow people to lob missiles into our territory and murder our people. It’s just not going to happen without there being a very, very severe response. And that’s what we’re doing.

But the ceasefire will begin on Tuesday at 11 p.m. It will last initially for five days. We are in touch with international relief organizations and UN organizations to see how we can facilitate the flow of humanitarian supplies into Yemen. There are a lot of supplies in the region. We want to be able to get them into Yemen, distribute them. Whether or not we succeed in doing so will depend on what the Houthis and their allies do. If they interdict, if they advance, if they commit aggression, there will be no ceasefire. If they abide by the terms of the ceasefire, then there will be an opportunity to help the people of Yemen.

So whether there is a ceasefire or not is entirely in the hands of the Houthis.

SECRETARY KERRY: I would just add to that, if I may quickly, sort of honing in on that issue, but I think it’s an important one for all of us. Really, it is not hard if you pass the word and give strict orders to your people to condition the behavior of people in the context of five days of requirement here. And our hope is that the Houthis will spread the word rapidly. That is the reason that it’s not beginning till Tuesday. The reason is to give time, assuming people accept it, to both accept it, to have their deliberations, not to miss an opportunity, to let the people outside weigh in in order to give good counsel, and ultimately to get the word down to the rank and file what the rules are.

And the rules are very straightforward: Don’t shoot. Don’t move around and start to reposition and take advantage of this. This is a humanitarian pause, and they should treat it accordingly. And if that could happen, that could be the beginning of an opportunity for a genuine transition. So as the foreign minister has said, Saudi Arabia has made the big decision – they were the ones with the aircraft, they control the airspace, they were flying, and they totally said we’re not going to fly. We’re not going to bomb. And they’re not in every community on the ground to be the ones to initiate an action. So if the Houthi will live by this, there is a chance to move forward, and we hope that they will take every advantage to pass the word down the ranks.

Now it is possible in one place or another that somebody misses the word and something doesn’t happen and something – but the Saudis have indicated they’re not going to not break this up over some mistake or some minor thing. They’re going to try to keep this alive, but not for some bold, significant, clear effort to attack people, move people, reposition equipment, and so forth. The rules are pretty clear. And we hope people will understand that.

The – and we encourage the countries that have the greatest influence with them and we will be in touch with those countries in order to try to encourage them to take advantage of this moment.

With respect to whether they will accept, however – or not, obviously – we hope they will. We’ve had some indications that that might take place, but no certainty, and the diplomacy will now take place to try to increase that possibility.

With respect to Saudi Arabia’s visit – the visit that was made by the French president to Saudi Arabia, that’s normal course of business, terrific. We have no issue whatsoever with it. We’ve received a full debrief. We appreciate the relationship of Saudi Arabia with many countries. And I met this morning with Foreign Minister Laurent Fabius; we had a good discussion. I met briefly, obviously, at the Arc de Triomphe with the president. We’re all on the same page, and France and the United States agree completely, as we do with the rest of the P5+1, about what we need to achieve in the agreement with Iran and what the standards are that need to apply to it. We all agree it needs to be robust, it needs to be clear, it needs to be defined, and that’s what we’re working towards. So we think that the visit enhances the relationship between all of us and Saudi Arabia, and that’s important. And we welcome it.

With respect to the bill in Congress, let me just say that we’ve been very, very clear that the bill that was passed out by this Foreign Relations Committee was really the kind of reasonable and acceptable compromise that the President was prepared to support. And that’s why he did support it, because it was changed from the original. And we’re pleased to see that it’s overwhelmingly passed the Senate, staying true to the bipartisan compromise. And we’re very hopeful that the House is going to similarly protect this in the same way that the Senate did and give Congress the opportunity that we think and I, as a 28-year veteran of Congress, believe ought to have to be able to review this deal in a responsible way. I was also very pleased to see that 151 members of the House of Representatives signed a letter supporting the President’s efforts to achieve this deal, to achieve a good deal, and they supported the idea the President ought to be able to continue to negotiate without interference on the terms of that negotiation by the Congress.

So all in all, I think it was very constructive, and we welcome where we are. Now the necessity is to get down to the nitty-gritty of the tough part of the negotiations to get the details pinned down over the course of the next weeks.

FOREIGN MINISTER AL-JUBEIR: If I may, could I follow up on your questions with regards to Yemen? I want to make clear that no country in the world has given more economic assistance to Yemen than the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia has over the last 40-plus years. No country in the world will give more to Yemen going forward in the future than Saudi Arabia, I have no doubt about it. We want what’s best for Yemen. We want Yemen to overcome the difficult period it is going through. It was Saudi Arabia and the GCC countries that came up with the GCC initiative which set the stage for the transition in Yemen.

It was, ironically, the GCC initiative that brought the Houthis into the political process from which they were excluded. The transition was then negatively affected by former President Ali Abdullah Saleh and by the Houthis, and they tried to take over the country by force, which we will not allow. They had a militia that operated outside the control of the Yemeni Government, which should not be allowed. The last thing we need on our border is a militia armed with missiles, in control of an air force, that is loyal to Iran and Hizballah. It’s just not going to happen. You cannot have a normal country where one group has arms. And so our advice to the Houthis is: You are part of Yemen. You have a role to play in Yemen. You have a right to be in the Yemeni Government like every other Yemeni group, but you cannot have a privileged position where you have veto power over the country or where you take over the country.

So it was extremely painful for us to take the step of using force in Yemen. It was a last resort. Had we not done this, Yemen would have fallen. And so we responded to the request by the legitimate government in order to protect the Yemeni people and to protect the legitimate government of Yemen. The intention was not to commit aggression against the Houthis – quite the contrary; it was to stop the Houthis from committing aggression against Yemen and its people.

And so I hope that the Houthis will accept the terms of the ceasefire, that they will stop their aggression against the Yemeni people and against Yemen, and that they will allow relief to flow into Yemen so we can help the Yemeni people. And I hope that they will be able to participate in the political process so that we can resolve Yemen’s problems peacefully around the negotiating table rather than on the battlefield.

MODERATOR: Hussein Kneiber of al-Arabiya.

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, you said yesterday in Riyadh and you have just repeated it now that the United States is concerned deeply about Iran’s action in the region. Yesterday, also in Riyadh, you said that there are some steps to provide greater stability and security in the region. What are these steps, and are they related with the military cooperation that you intend to widen with Saudi Arabia?

A question for Excellency al-Jubeir – Foreign Minister al-Jubeir. (In Arabic.)

FOREIGN MINISTER AL-JUBEIR: (Via interpreter) -- the assurances are there and the will is there on both sides, by the U.S. and the GCC. And it does not require assurances.

As for the assurances concerning defending the GCC, these have been in place for over six or eight decades. We have witnessed in the ’80s when the Soviet Union entered Afghanistan, the United States worked with Saudi Arabia to support – to defend against the Mujahedeen, and when Saddam Hussein invaded Kuwait, also the U.S. worked to establish an international coalition of more than 30 countries to liberate Kuwait and defend the region as a whole.

The United States and Saudi Arabia are working closely also with our partners and allies in the region to face – to confront terrorism, extremism, and Daesh, and also to protect the navigation routes.

And now I expect in the coming period there will be further strengthening and enhancement of these efforts so that the relations or joint action will be more effective and more expansive in all areas, whether it relates to cyber security or defense against ballistic missiles or training – military training or equipping. These are further progress in issues that we are already working on, and it’s natural for them to be enhanced and intensified between friendly countries.

SECRETARY KERRY: So today and yesterday I referenced sort of concerns about one particular country, but I think that you know, everybody knows, that no security arrangement or agreement among a whole group of countries, particularly in that region, is confined to one concern. We have a broad array of concerns, which we will be expressing in the context of Camp David, which relate to destabilizing efforts by anybody in the region, which relate to terrorist organizations that are spreading in the region. You have, obviously, al-Shabaab in Somalia; you’ve had Boko Haram in Mali; you have Daesh in Libya; you have al-Nusrah and al-Qaida and ISIL and others all through. I mean, those are the concerns: the destabilization of the region by a number of different entities, and obviously we all know that Iran has supported Hizballah and has supported Houthis and other efforts.

So – but this is not one-country specific as an initiative. This is a broad understanding that countries that want to have stability and peace and play by the rules and live up to international law and not have UN sanctions against them and begin to live to standards, that’s what we’re seeking and our belief is that the challenges we’re facing in terms of these predatory entities that come into challenged governing spaces or no governing spaces. As we learned in Afghanistan, the absence of governed – ungoverned spaces filled often by the worst – the worst actors, and we saw the results in 2001 and we’ve seen them in other times.

So we are banding together to expand our capacity to deal with the future. And that is not limited only to – it’s not a military arrangement. The last choice for everybody ought to be military. It’s how do you prevent these things from happening, how do you stop them metastasizing, how do you eliminate intrusive activities in your country that aren’t an overt attack externally but are rather a insidious kind of eating away at the innards of a country through various nefarious activities that take place. And so we have to guard against the breadth of that kind of activity in various ways, and we’re going to explore that very, very thoroughly in the context of this arrangement.

But I think that – the other parts of it that we all have agreed we need to work on are making sure that a lot of young people have jobs, making sure that there’s opportunity for the future, making sure that people are included in global aspirations and in global possibilities. And that will come about by working at these things, listening to each other, understanding the differences of culture, the differences of history, the transitional timeframes that are possible and so forth. And there’s no stereotype. There’s no cookie-cutter stamp that can be put on any one of these countries in any way. And I think the more we sit together and the more we talk about these challenges, the more we become aware of the subtleties that have to be taken into account as you try to find a common way forward.

That’s what we’re doing. That’s what I think makes this particularly healthy as a discussion, as an enterprise, and we look forward to trying to see our leaders come out of Camp David with a common understanding of that way forward.

MODERATOR: Great. Thank you all very much.

SECRETARY KERRY: Thank you, all.

Wednesday, March 18, 2015

LISA KUBISKE MAKES REMARKS ON U.S. INVESTMENT TREATIES

FROM:  U.S. STATE DEPARTMENT
U.S. Investment Treaties: Working For Investors and Government
Remarks
Lisa J. Kubiske
Deputy Assistant Secretary for International Finance and Development, Bureau of Economic and Business Affairs
OECD Conference Center
Paris, France
March 16, 2015
As prepared

I thank the OECD for hosting this workshop on international investment agreements and treaties, and am pleased to share the U.S. experience with you. I’ll make three points.

The first is that we use our international investment agreements both to promote fair treatment for investors, and to leverage investment to support economic growth.

Taking the latter (growth) first, we know that investment is vital to the global economy. OECD research shows that multinational enterprises employ nearly 80 million people worldwide and their global sales are roughly double world exports. A third of global trade is intra-firm trade. Approximately 18 percent of U.S. merchandise exports are sent by U.S. parent companies to their foreign affiliates.

Investment also supports sustainable development. I am involved in the US Government’s preparation for the UN Financing for Development conference in Addis Ababa in July. A key focus will be mobilizing international resources for development, including foreign direct investment and other private investment flows. This is critical, because official development assistance alone cannot meet all the challenges facing the developing world.

Strong investment agreements help create a healthy investment environment. They contain core investor protections that help countries compete for foreign direct investment by supporting transparency, predictability, and openness to investment. Businessmen tell us they consider these factors when deciding where and how much to invest. This healthy environment creates opportunity and broadly shared prosperity. Remember the 80 million jobs?

Also, in our experience, investment agreements often complement countries’ efforts toward economic reform.

A key aspect of ensuring the fair treatment of investors is having strong investor-State Dispute Settlement (ISDS) provisions, which allows for the fair and efficient resolution of disputes. In the days before BITs, disputes frequently became tense bilateral diplomatic issues. ISDS has served to depoliticize investment disputes.

The United States now has 50 investment agreements in place, and we are actively negotiating new ones, including a BIT with China, and investment chapters in TPP and TTIP.

My second point is that it is possible to strike a balance in investment agreements between investor interests and governments’ regulatory ones.

Stakeholders have raised some valid concerns with certain provisions of some BITs.

We have held extensive public consultations to develop our current – 2012 – model BIT. These consultations were further informed by the experiences of our U.S. investors abroad, our efforts to attract investment into the United States, and what we have learned to date as a State defending ourselves against arbitration claims.

Our current model includes several important innovations that help improve the ISDS process and avoid inappropriate claims. For example:

We provide greater clarification of key obligations, such as “fair & equitable treatment” and “expropriation;”
We build in mechanisms to dismiss frivolous claims early in the process;
There also are mechanisms for the Parties to help ensure that tribunals interpret the treaty correctly;
We provide for full transparency of ISDS proceedings, requiring public documents and open hearings, and affording the opportunity for outside parties to submit amicus curiae submissions.

These advancements are intended to create a process that investors can rely on, and also one that is transparent and not subject to abuse.

Third and final point: there are various ways to manage the existing network of investment treaties/agreements to ensure that both investor and government interests are preserved. We can, for example:

Improve countries’ capacity to meet their international obligations,
Monitor developments in investor-State arbitration, and
Foster dialogue and mutual understanding on key issues.

We value open, inclusive, and multilateral dialogue on investment rules – such as we are having today.

Thank you.

Monday, March 31, 2014

PRESS AVAILABILITY REMARKS BY SECRETARY OF STATE KERRY IN PARIS, FRANCE

FROM:  U.S. STATE DEPARTMENT 

Remarks at Press Availability - Paris, France

Press Availability
John Kerry
Secretary of State
Chief of Mission Residence
Paris, France
March 30, 2014


SECRETARY KERRY: Good evening, everybody. Thank you very much for your patience. I know it’s late, at least here. And I apologize to everyone for running a little late, but we spent a fair amount of time in these talks.

As you know, I came to Paris today to meet with Foreign Minister Lavrov because President Obama and the United States believe firmly that diplomacy has a critical role to play in helping the people of Ukraine to achieve their goal of living in dignity and in a stable, peaceful, and unified democracy. And we are here because of our firm conviction that diplomatic solutions ought to be the first resort in solving international problems.

The U.S. and Russia have differences of opinion about the events that led to this crisis, but both of us recognize the importance of finding a diplomatic solution and of simultaneously meeting the needs of the Ukrainian people – and that we agreed on tonight.

Both sides made suggestions on ways to deescalate the security and political situation in and around Ukraine. We also agreed to work with the Ukrainian Government and the people to implement the steps that they are taking to assure the following priorities: the rights of national minorities; language rights; demobilization and disarmament of irregular forces and provocateurs; an inclusive constitutional reform process, and free and fair elections monitored by the international community.

We agreed to consider the ideas and the suggestions that we developed tonight and to continue our discussions soon.

The United States is consulting with Ukraine at every step of this process, and we will not accept a path forward where the legitimate Government of Ukraine is not at the table. This principle is clear: No decisions about Ukraine without Ukraine.

This afternoon when I spoke with Prime Minister Yatsenyuk, I reiterated the United States’ commitment to coordinate closely with Ukraine and to sustain our strong support throughout this process. With the full support of the Ukrainian people, Prime Minister Yatsenyuk is moving ahead with constitutional change, democratic elections, and painful but necessary economic reforms. And as we have seen in the past week at the IMF and the UN, as well as in the EU and the G7, the international community stands firmly with Ukraine. We will continue working in lockstep to provide them with the economic and the political support that they need during their transition.

In a frank conversation this evening with Foreign Minister Lavrov, I made clear that the United States still considers the Russian actions to be illegal and illegitimate, and Russians’ actions over the past several weeks have placed it at odds, obviously, with the rule of law and the international community, and we still believe on the wrong side of history.
But any real progress in Ukraine must include a pullback of the very large Russian force that is currently massing along Ukraine’s borders. And tonight I raised with the foreign minister our strong concern about these forces. We believe that these forces are creating a climate of fear and intimidation in Ukraine. It certainly does not create the climate that we need for the dialogue and for the messages sent to both the international community as well as to Ukrainians themselves about the diplomatic channel.

The United States and the international community stand in firm support of Ukraine’s sovereignty and Ukraine’s territorial integrity. We will continue to support the people of Ukraine’s right to choose their own future. And I will say that at least tonight Foreign Minister Lavrov indicated that Russia wants to respect the right of Ukrainians to make that choice. They obviously in Ukraine are traveling a difficult democratic path towards the possibility of prosperity and peace, and tonight Foreign Minister Lavrov indicated in our conversation that Russia wants to support Ukraine in its independence and in its ability to be able to make that transition.

The Ukrainian Government has demonstrated remarkable restraint in the face of enormous pressure. It has shown the world a kind of courage and resilience that every country ought to applaud. And as it continues down this path, the United States of America and our partners will remain firmly by its side.

I’d be delighted to take any questions.

MS. PSAKI: Michael Gordon, New York Times.

QUESTION: Sir, as you noted, the Russian have massed a considerable force, some people say as many as 50,000 troops maybe, right at the border, perhaps as a means of intimidation, perhaps because they have a military option in mind. You noted that you raised this force and asked the Russian side to pull its forces back from the border. Did they agree to do so? If not, what reason did they give?

And secondly, both sides talked in recent weeks about the possibility of federalization in Ukraine, largely as a means of protecting the interests of the Russian-speaking population. But the Russian side appears to have a far-reaching concept of federalization in mind, one that would give the regions veto authority over national policies, even foreign policy. Did you make any headway tonight in narrowing the gap on this core issue, and what are the next steps? Thank you.

SECRETARY KERRY: Well, thank you very much, Michael. As I said earlier, both sides made suggestions today on how we can deescalate the security as well as the political situation in and around Ukraine. And yes, we talked very seriously and at length about the impact of the massing of troops and the importance of including the drawdown and redeployment of some of those troops with respect to the process moving forward.

We both made suggestions as to how that might be able to be achieved, and I will return to Washington to consult with President Obama about his choices with respect to that. But in the end, let’s be clear: It is the Ukrainians who have to ultimately agree to or make any decisions with respect to the road ahead. We’re trying to find a way to defuse this, deescalate it, and provide a climate within which good negotiations can take place regarding the other issues.
And that brings me to the other issue that you raised, Michael, about the question of federalization. I said in my opening comments and I will repeat again: It’s not up to us to make any decision or any agreement regarding federalization. We talked about it. But it’s up to Ukrainians, and Ukrainians will decide their future for themselves, by themselves, with respect to what kind of definitions work for them. And it will have to be an input, obviously, of what the Russian view is. I think it’s important to take that into account because Russia obviously has long ties and serious interests. But in the end, Ukrainians are going to have to make that decision.

And so tonight we did not explore that because it would have been inappropriate for me to do so without Ukrainian input directly with respect to that. What we’re looking for here is a process, not a substantive resolution of each of the issues because Ukrainians have to do that substance. What we’re looking for is how do we deescalate it, how do we get on a track to be able to give the Ukrainians the opportunity that they deserve to be able to do that.

MS. PSAKI: Anne Gearan, Washington Post.

QUESTION: Hi. Just to clarify on your answer on the discussion of troops, is there any scenario under which the United States would accept having any of those troops remain?
And secondly on the Middle East, Prime Minister Netanyahu told the Likud meeting today that the prisoner issue could take several days to resolve, and that he will make no decision about prisoners that doesn’t clearly benefit Israel. What is your reading of where Israel is on that – on the release issue? And how large a hurdle has that placed in your effort to get a framework agreement by the end of April?

SECRETARY KERRY: Well, with respect to the troop deployment issue, I think I’ve really answered it. We have ideas. We have some proposals that both sides made. And it’s really important for the appropriate consultations to take place before there’s any discussion about that.

But in the end, obviously the troops are in Russia on Russian soil. The question is not one of right or legality; the question is one of strategic appropriateness and whether it’s smart at this moment in time to have that number of troops massed on a border when you’re trying to send a message conceivably that you want to deescalate and begin to move in the other direction.
So those are the choices that have to be made, but Ukrainians have to be front and center in whatever the lasting, long-term possibilities are, and I’m not going to venture there tonight because it’s really up to them what’s appropriate or not.

Secondly, with respect to the Middle East peace process and the prisoners, I’m just not going to comment at this important moment. I think it’d be inappropriate to get into any kind of judgments about what may or may not occur or happen because it’s really a question between the Palestinians and the Israelis, and what Prime Minister Netanyahu is prepared to do. So he has – he is working diligently, I know. I just literally talked to him 15 minutes ago. And he’s working at it.

Our team is on the ground. We have our chief negotiator and the full team there. They’re working every moment. I’ve been in touch with them constantly through the day. And we’ll see where we are tomorrow when some judgments have to be made.
MS. PSAKI: Thanks, everyone.

SECRETARY KERRY: Thank you all. Appreciate it. Thanks.

Wednesday, February 19, 2014

REMARKS: SECRETARY OF STATE KERRY AND FRENCH FOREIGN MINISTER FABIUS

FROM:  U.S. STATE DEPARTMENT 
Remarks With French Foreign Minister Laurent Fabius Before Their Meeting
Remarks
John Kerry
Secretary of State
Quai d'Orsay
Paris, France
February 19, 2014


SECRETARY KERRY: Hello, everybody. First of all, let me say I’m very happy to be back visiting with Foreign Minister Fabius so soon after his visit to Washington. And we all appreciated the state visit, and we’re still feeling positive results of that meeting, which was very, very productive for all of us.
I wanted to say a word about the situation in Ukraine. All of us are deeply disturbed by the scenes of the violence, by the level of abuse that the citizens in the streets have felt over the course of the last days. And our hearts go out to the people of Ukraine for what has been happening.

President Yanukovych has the opportunity to make a choice. The choice is between protecting the people that he serves, all of the people, and a choice for a compromise and dialogue versus violence and mayhem. We believe the choice is clear, and we are talking about the possibility of sanctions or other steps with our friends in Europe and elsewhere in order to try to create the environment for compromise.

Our desire is for Mr. Yanukovych to bring people together, dialogue with the opposition, find the measure of compromise, and put the broad interests of the people of Ukraine out front. We are convinced there is still space for that to happen. The violence can be avoided, and in the end, the aspirations of the people of Ukraine can be met through that kind of dialogue. That is our hope. Vice President Biden talked yesterday, I believe even today again, with President Yanukovych. But really it’s in his hands to decide what the future of Ukraine and the future hopes of his people will be. And we hope very, very much that violence will be avoided and compromise will be found.

FOREIGN MINISTER FABIUS: (In French.)

SECRETARY KERRY: (Inaudible.) Tomorrow the foreign minister will be leaving to join with the German foreign minister and the Polish foreign minister in Kyiv, where they will gather the latest information regarding the situation on the ground. And then they will go to Brussels, where they will have a meeting in order to discuss the possibility of sanctions or whatever steps might be appropriate.

FOREIGN MINISTER FABIUS: We shall meet tomorrow morning, the different element, the different actors, in Kyiv. And stemming from that, we shall encourage them to find a way of dialogue. And stemming from that, we should be back in Brussels to take the decisions which are necessary.

SECRETARY KERRY: Thank you all very much. Thank you.

Tuesday, October 22, 2013

SECRETARY OF STATE KERRY MAKES REMARKS WITH QATARI FOREIGN MINISTER KHALID AL-ATIYAH

FROM:  U.S. STATE DEPARTMENT 
Remarks With Qatari Foreign Minister Khalid al-Atiyah Before Their Meeting
Remarks
John Kerry
Secretary of State
U.S. Chief of Mission Residence
Paris, France
October 21, 2013

SECRETARY KERRY: Thank you very much. I want to thank Foreign Minister Laurent Fabius for his gracious hospitality here in Paris, and I will be meeting with him tomorrow morning. I look forward to that meeting. And I want to express my deep appreciation to Secretary General Elaraby of the Arab League and to the members of the Arab League Follow-On Committee in the Mideast peace process for their commitment to peace and for their willingness to come to Paris today for yet another meeting and briefing which we have promised them with respect to the Mideast peace process, and we’ve promised to do it on a regular basis or as needed.

I especially want to recognize my friend, the Foreign Minister of Qatar, Khalid al-Atiyah. I am very appreciative to him. He’s been a good partner in this effort of keeping the committee moving and of keeping it engaged. And this is the fourth time now in six months that the United States and the Arab League have gathered as part of our regular consultations in order to make sure that the final status negotiations between the Israelis and the Palestinians are very much accountable to those who have a great stake in it. And as everybody knows, the Arab Peace Initiative, which I have many times mentioned, was a very significant step forward, is still a very important ingredient of the possibilities of peace.

Excuse me. The breadth and the depth of the participation that we had here today and in all of our meetings is really a clear demonstration of the continued support that President Abbas and the Palestinian Authority continue to receive from the Arab community as a whole, and I think it is significant. The Arab League understands precisely what is at stake here. I might comment that in the middle of our meeting today, His Highness Prince Saud al-Faisal of Saudi Arabia very eloquently stated, “You know, if you’re thinking about what the vision for peace of the Arab world, all you really have to do is look at the Arab Peace Initiative, which offers immediate peace to Israel when settling the Palestinian issue, a peace that will bring normal commerce, embassies, normal relations, connections between people and between countries, not with one or two nations, but with 57 nations all at one time – 35 Muslim nations, 22 Arab nations. That’s a vision, and it’s a vision worth fighting for.

From the very first visit with the Arab Peace Initiative Follow-up Committee in Washington earlier this year, to the key meeting that we had in Amman in July, the Arab League Follow-on Committee has shown a remarkable commitment to this effort, and we’re very grateful to them for that.

Their support for a final status agreement is essential to the agreement of a negotiated, two-state solution for Palestinians and Israelis, and it is critical to creating the momentum and the seriousness of purpose that is essential in order to be able to be successful in these talks.

It’s no secret to anybody that this is and remains a difficult process, there is no shortage of passionate skeptics. But I want to underscore that the goal is clear and it is achievable, and those who are closest to it – the neighbors as well as the parties themselves – understand what is at stake: a just and a lasting peace that’s based on a two-state solution which is the only solution. Two states for a simple reason, because two proud peoples deserve the opportunity to realize their legitimate aspirations, their security, and their freedom, and their future.

The Israeli and the Palestinian people both have leaders who absolutely understand what is at stake, and they have taken risks in order to bring both parties to the table. They showed courage to begin the process and they have shown courage to continue it even in the face of criticism. The two parties have been engaged now in 13 meetings, serious meetings. They had three meetings in the last four days. The pace has intensified. All the core issues are on the table, and they have been meeting with increased intensity.

But for everybody to live up to the challenges of making peace, we have to support them, including living up to our obligations on the economic front. I want to stress that no economic track, no economic package or financial assistance will ever be a substitute for the political track. But with our partnership and with our support and our economic investment, we can all help in order to provide a difference to the lives of people living in the neighborhood. That is why I am especially pleased to announce tonight – and I’m very grateful to the Amir of Qatar, to the Qatari people, and to the Foreign Minister who has really helped bring this about – they have agreed to provide $150 million in urgently needed debt relief to the Palestinian Authority. And I am very grateful to Khalid al-Atiyah for helping to make that happen. I’m confident that other Arab governments are currently evaluating and making their decisions, and there will be others who will join in this initiative as we go forward.

So the support of donors has been critical to helping us get where we are today, and it is important ultimately for the parties themselves to make the key decisions and reasonable compromises necessary for a final status agreement. That includes taking all of the steps that are necessary to create a positive atmosphere for the negotiations, which incidentally was one of the key things agreed upon by both parties as they entered into these negotiations.

So my friends, I might comment that in his – in that vein, I was very pleased to see that Prime Minister Netanyahu made an Eid al-Adha statement, a message earlier this week, and he made it clear that Israel is committed to maintaining the status quo in the holy places, and he made it clear that the hand of Israel is extended to the Palestinian people in the hope of peace.

So my friends, there is an opportunity for peace over the horizon. But to seize that opportunity, we need the continued support of the Arab League, we need the engagement of the Arab League, and we need the rest of the international community also to continue to be supportive. I believe that with our work together, we can provide for the peaceful, prosperous, hopeful outcome that people in the region, and particularly Israelis and Palestinians, have hoped for for a long, long time.

Mr. Foreign Minister, thank you.

FOREIGN MINISTER AL-ATIYAH: Thank you very much, and I’ll do it in Arabic if you’d like to put your headset, please.

(Via interpreter) In the beginning, as my friend John Kerry did, I would like to extend my thanks also to our common friend Laurent for allowing for this meeting to take place in France. Yes, indeed, we did meet today for a fourth time about the peace process. We discussed and confirmed some (inaudible) issues, which is the solution – a two-state solution based on the 1967 borders with Jerusalem as its capital. We also addressed some very important issues.

I would like to be very brief because my friend John here covered most of the issues. But there are some issues that we addressed in this meeting. For example, we talked about the issue of Gaza and the futility of isolating Gaza because that wouldn’t help the peace process, and the closure of crossing points. There are millions of people living in Gaza, and they are in need of supply – food supplies and medicine. Therefore, there must be a way to open crossing points by all parties so that we could enable the people of Gaza to live, because they are an inseparable part of the Palestinian people.

As for the negotiations, we confirmed the need – affirmed the need for American participation, actual participation, in the negotiations. And I would like to thank my friend John for the serious effort that is expended, but we would like him to be fully engaged in this process. We are concerned concerning the environment surrounding the negotiations, and we did address this concern. For example, the most recent measures, we are seeing settlement expansion, not just destruction of homes but destruction of entire communities similar to what’s happening in the Jordan Valley. Also, raising the Israeli flag, we consider this to be a transgression that we cannot possibly accept, not in the Arab world or the Islamic world. Therefore, we urge that the conducive environment for the negotiations be created. Also, some statements made by Israeli officials harm the peace process.

We addressed – we talked about most – several issues – economics and economic openness, and we asserted that the initiative of the sovereignty of the holy places in 2002 was very clear, and it also included all the possibilities that could take place in the event of a comprehensive peace. I would like also to – I wanted to shed light on these issues because my friend John has gone into the specifics of the meeting, and thank you very much.

MODERATOR: The first question will be from Arshad Mohammed of Reuters.

QUESTION: Thank you. Secretary Kerry, when you took office as Secretary of State, you repeatedly said that it was necessary to change President Assad’s calculation. When you and Foreign Minister Lavrov announced your hopes to hold Geneva 2 in May, the circumstances seemed somewhat better for the possibility of a peace conference. The government seemed – the Syrian Government seemed to be losing ground at the time. Now, many months later, the Syrian Government seems to be in a stronger position. President Assad says – is talking about the possibility of running for re-election. And the opposition, as you well know, is fighting on two fronts, something that your – even your own aides say makes it harder to extract concessions from the Syrian Government. What makes you think that the Assad government has any reason, given the way events have moved in the last six months, to actually make concessions and give up power? And what makes you think that the opposition, which seems to grow more fractured and has seen defections even in the last few weeks, is in any position or shape to assume a transitional governing role?

SECRETARY KERRY: Well, Arshad, obviously a central question to all of this, and I’ll give you as complete and direct an answer as I can. You are correct to say that when Sergey Lavrov and I announced this in Moscow, I think back in May, that the situation on the ground was different than the way it is today. But the situation on the ground is irrelevant to the question of the implementation of Geneva 1. And maybe President Assad needs to go back and read Geneva 1 again, or for the first time, but Geneva 1 says you will have a transition government by mutual consent. So it doesn’t matter whether you’re up or whether you’re down on the battlefield; the objective of Geneva 2 remains the same, which is the implementation of Geneva 1, which means a transition government arrived at by mutual consent of the parties.

Now, I don’t know anybody who believes that the opposition will ever consent to Bashar al-Assad being part of that government. And if he thinks he’s going to solve problems by running for re-election, I can say to him, I think with certainty, this war will not end as long as that’s the case or he is there.

Now, the Geneva 2 process is a negotiated resolution of a war that is taking place because Bashar al-Assad decided to meet the demands of young people in his country for a participatory role in the future of Syria – he decided to meet them with bullets and bombs and artillery shells. And he has shelled universities and killed innocent students sitting at their desks. He shelled schools with napalm and burned innocent children who were there trying to learn. He has bombed and gassed people in his country so that more than 115,000 or so are dead. How can that man claim to rule under any legitimacy in the future?

So I believe that it’s very clear what the purpose of this negotiated settlement is. And those who support the implementation of Geneva 1 should come to Geneva and be part of the process of building a new future for the people of Syria. But I do not believe that it is dependent on whether you’re up or down.

Now secondly, there are plenty of qualified people within the opposition in Syria – not necessarily fighters, but people who are opposed to Assad who run a business or a hospital or who have a great distinguished career and have been part of building the fabric of a secular society of Syria. And there are people who are qualified to be able to help manage the future affairs of Syria. There is nothing ordained, nothing is written that suggests that it belongs to one family and one man, particularly after what has happened over the course of these past two and a half years.

Now, there’s a human catastrophe awaiting the world if you can’t have a negotiated solution, because there are more and more refugees, more and more displaced people, more and more destruction, and the potential of the absolute implosion of the state of Syria is what lies in front of everybody if there cannot be a negotiated solution. I would hope that ultimately, Assad himself, certainly his supporters like the Russians, the Iranians, would understand that if you want peace in the region, it’s not going to come by prolonging the war with the presence of Bashar al-Assad.

Now, finally, why has the situation on the ground changed? Not because of the Syrian military, but because of Iran and Hezbollah, and Hezbollah and Iran represent the two only outside organized forces in Syria fighting on behalf of a party, the only two. And they are the ones who have made that difference. So I think it’s time for the United Nations and for others to consider the appropriateness of their activity and the need to try to press towards the negotiated solution that is critical to the people of Syria and to its future.

MODERATOR: The next question will be from Randa Takieddine from Al-Hayat.

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, I have a question for you and a question for Minister Khalid al-Atiyah. In Arabic, if possible, to Mr. al-Atiyah, and English for you.

Mr. Secretary, the concerns of people came about the American policy change on Syria – they came out of the fact that you are insisting so much on the chemical disarmament of Syria, and that people thought that you want really to do with this regime – with Assad’s regime. So do you need, in fact, this coordination with this regime for the chemical disarmament? And when is Geneva 2, actually? Because we don’t – we still don’t have a date. Some people say 23rd, some others say no. And then, is Iran going to be part of this conference?

(Via interpreter.) Is Qatar – has Qatar changed its policy regarding Syria? Is there a rapprochement or letters with President – being exchanged with President Bashar al-Assad?

SECRETARY KERRY: Well, just very quickly, on the date, I can’t tell you precisely when the date is. That’s up to the United Nations and up to the Special Envoy Lakhdar Brahimi to announce. But I have heard people talking about sometime in later part of November. Foreign Minister Lavrov and I both urged that it be as soon as possible, and we both certainly would be in agreement, along with a lot of other ministers who believe that it ought to happen sooner, not later. So I hope it would be somewhere in that period of time. But it’s up to them to announce it.

With respect to the question of the weapons, is Assad necessary, the answer is no. Assad doesn’t go out into the field and control a particular depot where you have chemical weapons. Assad isn’t driving the trucks that back up to the depot and pick up the weapons and take them somewhere. There are lots of people in Syria within the military structure who have knowledge of where the weapons are and how they can be moved who actually have responsibilities for safeguarding them. So Assad himself is not critical to the containment and the identification and ultimate removal of those weapons, number one.

Number two, those weapons could be gathered and located and brought to a location over the course of these next few months, barring something surprising. I’m not sure this will be settled in that period of time, but he is not absolutely essential to the effort to remove the chemical weapons. They can be removed once identified and secured by the normal process of chemical weapons destruction.

With respect to the first part of your question, which was the policy change, no, there has been no policy change. President Obama made a decision with respect to military force, and I am absolutely 100 percent convinced that had he not made that decision, those weapons would not be being removed now under an agreement that we reached at the United Nations. It happened because of that decision. And you have to ask yourself: Is it better that all of the weapons are being secured and removed, rather than that you had a military strike that tried to deter him from using them again but left them in his possession? That’s the choice. I think it’s clear there’s a benefit.

Now, some were disappointed the strike didn’t take place because they thought it was a sign of other things. But the fact is that the same airplanes that were killing people before the chemical weapons and the same artillery that was killing people before the chemical weapons and the same bombs and Scud missiles are still doing it. And we remain as concerned about that today, if not more so, than we were before the chemical weapons agreement.

And that is why we are focused on assisting the moderate opposition. We are helping them. It’s a known fact. And we will continue, as are others of our friends continuing, to help them, because we believe you need to get to the negotiation because there is no ultimate military solution. But we’re not going to sit by while Assad slaughters his people with impunity and not help those who are struggling against him to have their ability to do so with some of the support from the international community.

QUESTION: On Iran?

SECRETARY KERRY: Oh, Iran. Fourth question, okay.

On Iran, the answer is if Iran accepts – Iran has not accepted the implementation of Geneva 1, so it’s very hard to see how Iran can be constructive in the absence of their willingness to come for the purpose of the negotiation. So if they accept Geneva 1 and want to be constructive in helping to set up a transition government, that’s a different issue. But until that happens, it would be very difficult to see how it could be constructive.

FOREIGN MINISTER AL-ATIYAH: (Via interpreter) The question is: Did the Syrian regime stop its massacres against its people? Did the Syrian people attain its freedom that it deserves? And did it get the justice and freedom? If the answer is no, then the position of Qatar is the same. We are standing by the Syrians until they attain their freedom, and even though we’re pushing for a political solution that would help the Syrian people, but the Qatari decision has not changed. Thank you.

SECRETARY KERRY: Thank you. Is that it?

MS. PSAKI: One more. The final question is from Patricia Allemoniere – I don’t know if I said it the right way – TF-1.

QUESTION: (Via interpreter) Mr. Secretary, I have one question, first question. The French this evening are deeply shocked by the revelations that were made by the newspaper Le Monde regarding the extent of the wiretaps conducted by an allied and friendly country to France. What answer can you give? Can the United States stop and does it want an end to these listenings?

And another question for Qatar. Qatar is oftentimes accused in the West of being at the origin of the rise of radical Islamic groups because Qatar helped them to obtain weapons. What do you have to say with respect to that comment or analysis?

SECRETARY KERRY: Well, thank you very much for the question. Look, France is one of our oldest allies in the world, and I have a very close working relationship with Laurent Fabius since the day I started this job on many issues, ranging from Syria to protecting the security of our citizens. And protecting the security of our citizens in today’s world is a very complicated, very challenging task, and it is an everyday, 24/7, 365 task, unfortunately, because there are lots of people out there seeking to do harm to other people. We see much more suicide bombs taking place in various parts of the world right now.

So Ambassador Rivkin met today with Alexandre Ziegler, the cabinet director to Foreign Minister Fabius, at the request of the Government of France. And our ongoing – we will have ongoing bilateral consultations, including with our French partners, that address this question of any reports by the United States Government gathering information from some of the agencies, and those consultations are going to continue.

Now, I’m not going to comment on the specifics. As a matter of policy, we don’t discuss intelligence matters. And lots of countries are engaged in the activity of trying to protect their citizens and the world. As the President – as President Obama said very clearly in a recent speech that he gave at the United Nations General Assembly just a few weeks ago, he said we in the United States are currently reviewing the way that we gather intelligence. And I think that’s appropriate. And our goal is always to try to find the right balance between protecting the security and the privacy of our citizens. And this work is going to continue, as well as our very consultations with our friends here in France.

FOREIGN MINISTER AL-ATIYAH: (Via interpreter) In the beginning, I would like to say that anyone who doesn’t know what’s happening in Syria would say that Qatar is supporting radical groups. But the truth is when someone is Christian or Jewish or even Muslim and is subjected to a catastrophe similar to what the Syrian people have experienced, then it will be very closer to God. So this is the situation in Syria.

We are working in Syria through the Friends of Syria group, and there’s also a group that all people have agreed to support the Syrian people, whether in terms of helping it defend itself or in terms of humanitarian aid. We are working through this group and the allies to support very known parties. Therefore, talking about us supporting radical groups or extremist groups, this cannot be true in any way when we’re working with allies closely.

SECRETARY KERRY: Thank you very much.

Wednesday, July 4, 2012

STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL REMARKS ON MISSILE DEFENSE AND EUROPEAN SECURITY



Photo:  Missile Launch.  Credit:  U.S. DOD.
FROM:  U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Missile Defense and European Security
Remarks Frank A. Rose
Deputy Assistant Secretary, Bureau of Arms Control, Verification and Compliance8th International Conference on Missile Defence
Paris, France
July 3, 2012
Thank you so much for inviting me to speak today. This venue provides an opportunity for constructive dialogue on missile defense, and in this context, I will share an update on the U.S. approach to missile defense. At the State Department, I am responsible for overseeing a wide range of defense policy issues, including missile defense. In that capacity, it was my responsibility to negotiate the details of the Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) agreements with Poland, Romania, and Turkey that will enable the United States to implement the European Phased Adaptive Approach, the U.S. contribution to NATO missile defense. I will touch more on this later in my presentation, but suffice to say that I have been focused over the last couple of years on ensuring that we are able to meet the vision President Obama laid out in his 2009 announcement regarding the European Phased Adaptive Approach.

Missile Defense Policy
Today, there is a growing threat from short-, medium-, and intermediate-range ballistic missiles to our deployed forces, allies, and partners. This threat is likely to increase in both quantitative and qualitative terms in the coming years, as some states are increasing their inventories, and making their ballistic missiles more accurate, reliable, and survivable.

Recognizing the seriousness of the ballistic missile threat, the United States seeks to create an environment, based on strong cooperation with allies and partners, which will diminish an adversary’s confidence in the effectiveness of ballistic missile attacks. This will devalue ballistic missiles and provide a disincentive for their development, acquisition, deployment, and use. To that end, President Obama has made international cooperation on missile defense a key priority, and we are pursuing a region-by-region approach based on the following three principles:

1) First, the United States will strengthen regional deterrence architectures built upon solid cooperative relationships with an eye toward efficiently incorporating assets and structures that our partners already have today or are seeking.

2) Second, the United States is pursuing phased adaptive approaches (PAAs) to missile defense within key regions that are tailored to their unique deterrence requirements and threats, including the scale, scope, and pace of their development, and the capabilities available and most suited for deployment. Specifically, we will phase in the best available technology to meet existing and evolving threats, and adapt to situations that evolve in the future.

3) Third, recognizing that our supply of missile defense assets cannot meet the global demand we face, the United States is developing mobile capabilities that can be relocated to adapt to a changing threat and provide surge defense capabilities where they are most needed.

Missile defense plays an important role in the broader U.S. international security strategy, supporting both deterrence and diplomacy. Missile defense assures our allies and partners that the United States has the will and the means to deter and, if necessary, defeat a limited ballistic missile attack against the U.S. homeland and regional ballistic missile attacks against our deployed forces, allies, and partners.

NATO and European Missile Defense
Today I will focus on our work in Europe, which continues to receive a great deal of attention. In order to augment the defense of the United States against a future long-range threat and provide more comprehensive and more rapid protection to our deployed forces and European Allies against the current short- and medium- range threat, President Obama outlined a four-phase approach for European missile defense called the European Phased Adaptive Approach or EPAA. Through the EPAA, the United States will deploy increasingly capable BMD assets to defend Europe against a ballistic missile threat from the Middle East that is increasing both quantitatively and qualitatively.

The EPAA is designed to protect our deployed forces and Allies in Europe, as well as improve protection of the U.S. homeland against potential ICBMs from the Middle East. As part of Phase 1, we have deployed to Turkey a missile defense radar, referred to as the AN/TPY-2 radar in support of NATO’s common missile defense efforts. Also, as part of Phase 1, the United States deployed a BMD-capable Aegis ship to the Mediterranean Sea in March of 2011, and has maintained a BMD-capable ship presence in the region ever since.

Slightly more than a year ago, we reached an agreement with Romania to host a U.S. land-based SM-3 BMD interceptor site, designed to extend missile defense protection to a greater portion of Europe. The land-based SM-3 system to be deployed to Romania is anticipated to become operational in the 2015 timeframe. We also reached an agreement with Poland to place a similar U.S. BMD interceptor site there in the 2018 timeframe, which will extend missile defense protection to all of NATO Europe. Spain has also agreed to host four U.S. Aegis destroyers at the existing naval facility at Rota. These multi-mission ships will support the EPAA as well as other EUCOM and NATO maritime missions.

The Obama Administration is implementing the EPAA within the NATO context. At the 2010 Lisbon Summit, NATO Heads of State and Government approved a new Strategic Concept and took the historic decision to develop the capability to defend NATO European populations and territory against the increasing threat posed by ballistic missile proliferation. The Allies also welcomed the EPAA as a U.S. national contribution to the new NATO territorial missile defense capability, in support of our commitment to the collective defense of the Alliance under Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty.

At the Lisbon Summit, NATO Heads of State and Government also decided to expand the scope of the NATO Active Layered Theatre Ballistic Missile Defense (ALTBMD) program to serve as the command, control, and communications network to support this new capability. NATO allies have committed to investing over $1 billion for command, control, and communications infrastructure to support NATO missile defense. NATO’s plan for missile defense is based on the principle that individual Allies will make voluntary national contributions of the sensors and interceptor systems, BMD capabilities that will be integrated into the NATO ALTBMD C2 backbone. As with any national contribution, Allies are responsible for the costs associated with their own contributions. NATO agreed at Chicago that only the command and control systems of ALTBMD and their expansion to territorial defense are eligible for common funding.

On May 20-21, the NATO Heads of State and Government met in Chicago for the NATO Summit and announced that NATO has achieved an interim BMD capability. This means that the Alliance has an operationally meaningful standing peacetime ballistic missile defense capability. NATO also agreed on the command and control procedures for ballistic missile defense, designated Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR) as the commander for this mission, and demonstrated an interoperable command and control capability. As with all of NATO’s operations, full political control by Allies over military actions undertaken pursuant to Interim Capability will be ensured.

To support this interim BMD capability, the United States will offer EPAA assets to the Alliance as voluntary national contributions to the BMD mission, and will welcome contributions by other Allies. For example, President Obama announced in Chicago that he has directed the transfer of the AN/TPY-2 radar deployed in Turkey to NATO operational control. The EPAA also includes BMD-capable Aegis ships that can perform many roles besides BMD. U.S. missile defense-capable ships in Europe are able to operate under NATO operational control when necessary.

These decisions have created a framework for Allies to contribute and optimize their own BMD assets for our collective defense, and the United States welcomes contributions from other Allies. We believe that NATO missile defense will be more effective should Allies decide to provide sensors and interceptors to complement the U.S. EPAA contributions. If Allies should decide to develop their own missile defense capabilities, that would create significant opportunities for European industries. In short, there is absolutely no requirement or assumption that NATO missile defense will be “made in the USA.” The only requirement is that the systems contributed by Allies be interoperable with NATO's missile defense command and control capability. Several NATO Allies possess land- and sea-based sensors that could be linked into the system, as well as lower tier systems that can be integrated and used to provide point defense. For example, the Netherlands has indicated that it will spend close to 250 million Euros to modify the radars on its frigates to detect and track ballistic missiles at long ranges and has indicated it will contribute its Patriot BMD systems to the NATO missile defense mission. There are potentially many more opportunities for joint development and procurement.

Russia
An update on missile defense cooperation with Europe should also include a discussion of our efforts to pursue cooperation with the Russian Federation. Missile defense cooperation with Russia is a Presidential priority, as it has been for several Administrations going back to President George H.W. Bush in the early 1990s.

When President Obama announced his new vision for missile defense in Europe in September 2009, he stated that “we welcome Russia’s cooperation to bring its missile defense capabilities into a broader defense of our common strategic interests.” Missile defense cooperation with Russia will not only strengthen our bilateral and NATO-Russia relationships, but also could enhance NATO’s missile defense capabilities. Successful missile defense cooperation would provide concrete benefits to Russia, our NATO Allies, and the United States and will strengthen – not weaken – strategic stability over the long term.

This means it is important to get the Russian Federation inside the missile defense tent now, working alongside the United States and NATO, while we are in the early stages of our efforts. Close cooperation between Russia and the United States and NATO is the best and most enduring way for Russia to gain the assurance that European missile defenses cannot and will not undermine its strategic deterrent.
Russia is not being asked to blindly trust us. Through cooperation, Russia would see firsthand that this system is designed for the ballistic missile threat from outside the Euro-Atlantic area, and that NATO missile defense systems will not undermine Russia’s strategic nuclear deterrent capabilities. Cooperation would send a strong message to proliferators that the United States, NATO, and Russia are working together to counter their efforts.

That said, Russia has raised the issue of wanting a legal guarantee with a set of “military-technical criteria” that could, in effect, create limitations on our ability to develop and deploy future missile defense systems against regional ballistic missile threats such as those presented by Iran and North Korea. We have made it clear that we cannot and will not accept limitations on our ability to defend ourselves, our allies, and our partners, including where we deploy our BMD-capable Aegis ships. These are multi-mission ships that are used for a variety of purposes around the world, not just for missile defense.

While we seek to develop ways to cooperate with Russia on missile defense, it is important to remember that under the terms of Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty, NATO alone bears responsibility for defending the Alliance from the ballistic missile threat. This is why the United States and NATO cannot agree to Russia’s proposal for “sectoral” missile defense. Just as Russia must ensure the defense of Russian territory, NATO must ensure the defense of NATO territory. NATO cannot and will not outsource its Article 5 commitments.

We would, however, be willing to agree to a political framework for cooperation that includes a statement that our missile defenses are not oriented toward Russia. Any such statement would publicly proclaim our intent to work together and chart the direction for cooperation.

During the G-20 Meeting in Los Cabos, Mexico, President Obama and President Putin announced in their June 18 Joint Statement that “despite differences in assessments, we have agreed to continue a joint search for solutions to challenges in the field of missile defense.”

The United States looks forward to continuing discussions with the Russian Federation to develop a mutually agreed framework for missile defense cooperation.

I want to close by noting the obvious which is that the worst-case scenario for dealing with missile threats is after a missile has launched. We are taking several steps diplomatically to counter missile proliferation and address missile programs of concern. We are working with the other 33 Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) Partners to create the global standard for controlling the transfer of equipment, software, and technology that could make a contribution to rockets and unmanned aerial vehicles. We also are working to support the efforts of the Hague Code of Conduct Against Ballistic Missile Proliferation (HCOC), and are working through the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) to help partners improve their ability to stop shipments of proliferation concern. Those are just some of the efforts that are ongoing to address missile threats, and while we do this work quietly, these efforts are having an impact.

Conclusion
Let me conclude by saying that today’s ballistic missile threats continue to increase in number and sophistication. This increasing threat reinforces the importance of our collaborative missile defense efforts with allies and partners around the world, which not only strengthen regional stability, but also provide protection for our forces serving abroad and augment the defense of the United States.
Thank you for your time and attention.

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