Showing posts with label NUCLEAR POLICY. Show all posts
Showing posts with label NUCLEAR POLICY. Show all posts

Tuesday, November 11, 2014

ROSE GOTTENMOELLER'S REMARKS: "NUCLEAR POLICY AND NEGOTIATIONS IN 21ST CENTURY"

FROM:  U.S. STATE DEPARTMENT 
Nuclear Policy and Negotiations in the 21st Century
Remarks
Rose Gottemoeller
Under Secretary for Arms Control and International Security 
The Warren B. Rudman Center for Justice, Leadership & Public Policy, University of New Hampshire School of Law
Concord, New Hampshire
November 6, 2014

Good Afternoon. Thank you, John, for the kind introduction. Thank you very much for inviting me to join you at here at the Rudman Center. I was last here in May of 2013 to talk about export control reform with Senator Jeanne Shaheen. I am glad to be back to talk about arms control and nonproliferation negotiations in the 21st century.

While we are gathered here tonight in Concord, the world is facing serious challenges: the threats to Ukraine’s sovereignty and Russia’s flagrant disregard for international law, the continuing conflicts in the Middle East, a dangerous Ebola outbreak in West Africa that has travelled to our shores. It is not surprising that most people are not focused on nuclear weapons or nuclear deterrence.

When the Cold War ended, the looming threat of nuclear war seemed to drift away for the average American. When was the last time you even heard of someone doing a duck-and-cover drill or building a bomb shelter in their backyard? Unfortunately, there are still thousands and thousands of nuclear weapons in the world. The threat from these weapons is real and I would argue that it has become more serious due to the threat from nuclear weapons in the hands of terrorists.

That is why this Administration, like the Administrations before it, is working so hard to reduce the nuclear threat. One of the steps in that process was the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START) – a Treaty for which I led the U.S. negotiating team.

In negotiating New START, we knew that it was necessary to replace the expiring START Treaty with a new agreement reflecting progress in arms control and the changes in the world in the 20 years since START came into force.

This was no small task and it took many, many months to complete, but we were successful and in December of 2010, the Senate gave its advice and consent to its ratification. The implementation of this Treaty is now well underway and when it is completed, we will have the lowest levels of deployed strategic nuclear arms since the 1950’s.

As we now look to the future of arms control and nonproliferation agreements and treaties, it is important to recognize that we will need a host of new technical and legal experts to conduct these discussions. It is true that diplomacy is an art, not a science, but there are a number of reliable tools upon which I rely during negotiations.

One: Building Relationships

First, I cannot emphasize enough the importance of building good, professional relationships. With the New START Treaty, the two delegations launched into the negotiations committed to conducting them in an atmosphere of mutual respect with a premium on keeping the tone businesslike and productive, even when we did not agree. My counterpart on the Russian delegation, Ambassador Anatoly Antonov, always used to say, “business is business.” And what he meant was that we needed to keep the tone of the discussion businesslike even when we were butting heads – as we frequently did.

We also were very aware of the role of a human gesture. Even things as simple as acknowledging national holidays, cultural and sport events are important. The Vancouver Olympics were going on while were in Geneva for New START, and we cheered on each other’s teams. Well, maybe not each other’s hockey teams.

Also, never underestimate the power of a smile or a joke. You would be very surprised about how much a well-placed joke can help move talks along.

Two: Establishing Trust

Second, building relationships is one thing, but establishing trust is another, and it takes longer. Between negotiating teams, it is pivotal and more difficult than it sounds. In our case, we had over a year to get to know our counterparts. Further, members of both delegations brought valuable experience to the table, having worked as inspectors under START. They had inspected each other’s ICBM bases, SLBM bases, heavy bomber bases, and storage facilities multiple times. They regarded each other as professionals. That helped to establish trust.

One of the most important very important things is that our delegations agreed to disagree in private. That was good considering how easily either delegation could have broadcast negative comments that would have reached Moscow or Washington before we could pick up a phone.

Trying to work out issues and disagreements through the press is – as you can imagine – is not a great model for success.

So make sure the people you are working with know that they can trust you. Trust is the foundation of any good agreement.

Three: Creating Value for Both Sides

Third, and particularly important right now, is the fact that negotiations should not be a zero-sum game. The point is to negotiate for mutual benefit. When we finished negotiating New START, then-President Medvedev referred to it as a “win-win” situation. That should always be our goal.

This is especially important for multilateral discussions, but harder to accomplish. No one will ever get everything they want – the point is to come away with a fair deal all-around. You may not get a “win-win” situation all the time, but you can avoid a situation where parties come away from a negotiation feeling that they have lost.

Four: LISTENING

It may seem simple, but another key to negotiating is listening.

During New START, it really helped that we spoke each other’s languages. I am very proud to say that there were probably as many Russian speakers on the U.S. delegation as there were English speakers on the Russian delegation. For me, hearing things twice helped me to listen to things extra well.

It is also something you probably heard from your mothers, but you also need to make sure you are really listening to people and not just waiting for your turn to talk. You might miss something important!

Five: Negotiating Process AND Substance

In addition to negotiating skills, you also need expertise on the substance. One of the things that made the New START negotiations work smoothly was the fact that we had experienced diplomats and experienced inspectors, as well as weapon systems operators. All of them had to work together.

You can negotiate beautiful language, but if you don’t understand the ins and outs of an inspection on the ground, imprecise language in the treaty can come back to haunt you. But you also need room for flexibility. You may think you understand exactly how to inspect a re-entry vehicle on a missile, but you need to tread lightly when codifying the requirement to conduct such an inspection in a treaty. An inspector also needs room to use his or her judgment.

You always have to think about both the big picture and the little details: it’s a balancing act.

Six: Be Thorough and Be Prepared

Finally, it is important to remember that every negotiation is different. While the START negotiations from over 20 years ago informed our approach, we were in a completely new era with New START. We had to think about what worked and didn’t work for previous treaties, without letting that bind our creativity.

One of the great strengths of the New START Treaty rested on the fact that we took into account the broad perspectives of the State Department, the Department of Defense, the uniformed military, the Department of Energy, and other agencies, from the very beginning and at every step throughout the negotiations. It was a true inter-agency effort from day one until the day it entered into force and that cooperation continues, as we work to implement the Treaty.

Dealing with Difficulties

Even with the tools that I have discussed in hand, there were some days during the New START negotiations that were very rough and very long. Beyond that, I like to joke that I went through two sets of negotiations- one with the Russian Federation and one with the Senate. We had a tough, vigorous debate up on Capitol Hill, but in the process, I think we rekindled some important interest in arms control and nonproliferation issues.

In the end, the hard work paid off. New START is enhancing our national security, as well as strategic stability with Russia. The current tensions with Russia highlight the importance of mutual confidence provided by data exchanges and on-site inspections under the Treaty, and the security and predictability provided by verifiable, mutual limits on strategic weapons.

As we look to the future with respect to future nuclear reduction agreements, the United States will only pursue agreements that are in our national security interest and that of our allies. Historically, the United States and Russia have always been able to continue our work to reduce nuclear threats. That fact should not change.

The United States has made clear that we are prepared to engage Russia on the full range of issues affecting strategic stability and that there are real and meaningful steps we should be taking that can contribute to a more predictable and safer security environment.

In June 2013 in Berlin, President Obama stated U.S. willingness to negotiate a reduction of up to one-third of our deployed strategic warheads from the level established in the New START Treaty.

Progress requires a willing partner and a conducive strategic environment.

As I have said, no one here should doubt that we are in a difficult crisis period with Russia, but we need nuclear cooperation with Russia and others to address global threats – first and foremost the threat of terrorists acquiring a nuclear weapon or nuclear material.

The reason we can and must continue to pursue arms control and nonproliferation tools is that they are the best - and quite frankly - the only path that we can take to effectively prevent a terrorist nuclear threat and reduce nuclear dangers more broadly.

That will take new, and I am sure, difficult negotiations.

Final Thoughts

With that I would like to wrap up and take some questions, but I want to leave you with some final thoughts. With all the challenges in the world, it is sometimes easy to despair, but I assure you that through hard work, humor, patience and persistence, we can meet and solve these challenges.

One of our less-quoted presidents, Calvin Coolidge had a quote about persistence that I often think of:

“Nothing in the world can take the place of Persistence. Talent will not; nothing is more common than unsuccessful men with talent. Genius will not; unrewarded genius is almost a proverb. Education will not; the world is full of educated derelicts. Persistence and determination alone are omnipotent. The slogan 'Press On' has solved and always will solve the problems of the human race.”

That is what I think about when I think about the next set of negotiations in front of me. Whether that involves the next steps in nuclear reductions or banning the production of the fissile material used in nuclear weapons, we will be patient, but we will be persistent. Progress will not only require building on the success of New START, but new and innovative approaches to the challenges we face…and some really good negotiating. Thank you.

Saturday, April 13, 2013

STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL'S REMARKS ON U.S. NUCLEAR POLICY

FROM: U.S. STATE DEPARTMENT
The Future of U.S. Nuclear Policy
Remarks
Frank A. Rose
Deputy Assistant Secretary, Bureau of Arms Control, Verification and Compliance
As Prepared
The Pryzbyla Center, Catholic University of America
Washington, DC
April 9, 2013


Thank you for that kind introduction, Stephen. I am glad to be here at Catholic University today to talk about U.S. nuclear policy. I want to thank the Catholic Peacebuilding Network for sponsoring this program. It is my pleasure to represent the State Department this afternoon.

Today, I would like to provide an update on our work, which the President laid out four years ago in Prague, when he committed the United States to seeking the peace and security of a world without nuclear weapons.

As President Obama noted in his famous speech, this will not be easy. Nor is it likely to happen in his lifetime. Still, over the last four years we have succeeded in moving closer to this goal.

In 2010, the Administration concluded a Nuclear Posture Review, or NPR, which outlines the President’s agenda for reducing nuclear dangers, as well as advancing the broader security interests of the United States and its allies. As the NPR states nuclear terrorism is one of the greatest threats facing the United States. The traditional concept of nuclear deterrence — the idea that a country would not initiate a nuclear war for fear of nuclear retaliation — does not apply to terrorists. While our nuclear arsenal has little relevance in deterring this threat, concerted action by the United States and Russia – and indeed, by all nuclear weapon states – to reduce their arsenals is key to garnering support from partners around the world for strengthening the nuclear nonproliferation regime, while also securing nuclear materials worldwide to make it harder for terrorists to acquire nuclear materials.

For instance, by the end of this year, we expect the 1993 U.S.-Russia HEU Purchase Agreement to be completed, under which 500 MT of highly enriched uranium or HEU from dismantled Russian weapons will have been converted into low-enriched uranium or LEU to fuel U.S. commercial nuclear power plants. Over 472 MT (equivalent to approximately 18,900 nuclear warheads) has been downblended and sent to the United States so far. In the United States, 374 MT of U.S. HEU has been declared excess to nuclear weapons; most of the remainder will be downblended or used as fuel in naval or research reactors. In 2011, the United States and Russia brought into force the Plutonium Management and Disposition Agreement and its 2006 and 2010 protocols, which requires each side to dispose of 34 MT of weapon-grade plutonium – enough in total for about 17,000 nuclear weapons – and thus permanently remove this material from military programs. Russia has also been an essential partner in the U.S. Global Threat Reduction Initiative efforts to convert research reactors from HEU to LEU and repatriate those reactors’ HEU to the country of origin. These efforts have now converted or verified the shutdown of over 75 research and test reactors, and repatriated to the United States or to Russia over 3,000 kg of HEU for secure storage, downblending and disposition.

In addition to working on the prevention of nuclear proliferation and nuclear terrorism, we have taken steps to reduce the role of nuclear weapons in U.S. national security strategy. We are not developing new nuclear weapons or pursuing new nuclear missions; we have committed not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear weapon states that are party to the NPT and in compliance with their nonproliferation obligations; and we have clearly stated that it is in the U.S. interest and that of all other nations that the nearly 68-year record of non-use of nuclear weapons be extended forever.

As President Obama said in Seoul in March of last year:

"[W]e can already say with confidence that we have more nuclear weapons than we need. I firmly believe that we can ensure the security of the United States and our allies, maintain a strong deterrent against any threat, and still pursue further reductions in our nuclear arsenal."

Let me now address what we believe our next steps should be.

The Administration continues to believe that the next step in nuclear arms reductions should be pursued on a bilateral basis. The United States and Russia still possess the vast majority of nuclear weapons in the world. With that in mind, we have a great example in the New START Treaty. The implementation of New START, now in its third year, is going well. When New START is fully implemented, the United States and the Russian Federation will each have no more than 1,550 deployed strategic nuclear warheads – the lowest levels since the 1950s.

Going forward, the United States has made it clear that we are committed to continuing a step-by-step process to reduce the overall number of nuclear weapons, including the pursuit of a future agreement with Russia to address all categories of nuclear weapons – strategic, non-strategic, deployed and non-deployed.

To this end, we are engaged in a bilateral dialogue to promote strategic stability and increase transparency on a reciprocal basis with the Russian Federation. We are hopeful our dialogue will lead to greater reciprocal transparency and negotiation of even further nuclear weapons reductions.

As part of this process, the Administration is consulting with Allies to lay the groundwork for future negotiations. As you may know, NATO has already dramatically reduced its holdings of, and reliance on, nuclear weapons since the end of the Cold War. That said, NATO is prepared to consider further reducing its requirement for nonstrategic nuclear weapons assigned to the Alliance in the context of reciprocal steps by Russia, taking into account the greater Russian stockpiles of nonstrategic nuclear weapons stationed in the Euro-Atlantic area. While seeking to create the conditions for further nuclear reductions, NATO will continue to ensure that the Alliance’s nuclear deterrent remains safe, secure, and effective as NATO is committed to remaining a nuclear alliance for as long as nuclear weapons exist.

There are still further initiatives that are part of this Administration’s nuclear agenda. The United States is revitalizing an international effort to advance a new multilateral treaty to verifiably ban the production of fissile material for use in nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. A Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty or FMCT– would for the first time put an end to the dedicated production of weapons-grade fissile material needed to create nuclear weapons and provide the basis for further, deeper, reductions in nuclear arsenals.

Beginning multilateral negotiations on the FMCT is a priority objective for the United States and for the vast majority of states, and we have been working to initiate such negotiations at the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva. An overwhelming majority of nations support the immediate commencement of FMCT negotiations. The United States is consulting with China, France, Russia, and the United Kingdom, as well as others, to find a way to commencing negotiation of an FMCT.

In 2009, the five nuclear-weapon states, or "P5," began to meet regularly to have discussions on issues of transparency, mutual confidence, and verification. Since the 2010 NPT Review Conference, these discussions have expanded to address P5 implementation of our commitments under the NPT and the 2010 Review Conference’s Action Plan. The U.S. hosted the most recent P5 conference in Washington in June 2012, where the P5 tackled issues related to all three pillars of the NPT – nonproliferation, the peaceful uses of nuclear energy and disarmament, including confidence-building, transparency, and verification experiences. We are looking forward to a fourth conference on April 18-19, which Russia will host in Geneva prior to the next NPT Preparatory Committee meeting.

In addition to providing a senior level policy forum for discussion and coordination among the P5, this process has spawned a series of discussions among policymakers and government experts on a variety of issues. China is leading a P5 working group on nuclear definitions and terminology. The P5 are discussing approaches to a common format for NPT reporting, and we are also beginning to engage at expert levels on some important verification and transparency issues. In the future, we would like the P5 conferences and intersessional meetings to expand and to develop practical transparency measures that build confidence and predictability.

I should add at this point that when discussing areas to broaden and deepen our cooperation and to advance our common interests, it’s necessary to address the question of Missile Defense. Thirty years ago at the height of the Cold War, President Ronald Reagan saw virtue in cooperating with Moscow on Missile Defense.

While we have our differences on this issue, we remain convinced that missile defense cooperation between the United States and Russia (and between NATO and Russia) is in the national security interests of all countries involved. For that reason, missile defense cooperation with Russia remains a priority for the President. To be clear, U.S. missile defense efforts are focused on defending our homeland as well as our European, Middle Eastern, and Asian allies and partners against ballistic missile threats coming from Iran and North Korea. These are threats that are growing, and must be met.

In meeting those threats, it is important to note that U.S. missile defenses are not designed for, or capable of, undermining the Russian or Chinese strategic deterrents. For its part, Russia has been insistent on legally binding guarantees that our missile defenses will not threaten its strategic deterrent. Rather than legal guarantees, we believe that the best way for Russia to see that U.S. and NATO missile defenses in Europe do not undermine its strategic deterrent would be for it to cooperate with us. In addition to making all of us safer, cooperation would send a strong message to proliferators that the United States, NATO, and Russia are working together to counter proliferation. With regard to China, the United States welcomes the opportunity to engage in a dialogue about missile defense and other security issues of strategic importance.

As our work together over the past four years has shown, we can produce significant results that benefit both countries. As mentioned earlier, the New START Treaty is a great example of this. Cooperation on missile defense would also facilitate improved relations between the United States and Russia. In fact, it would be a game-changer for those relations. It has the potential to enhance the national security of both the United States and Russia, as well as build a genuine strategic partnership.

None of this will be easy, but the policies the Administration is pursuing are suited for our security needs and tailored for the global security threats of the 21st century. By maintaining and supporting a safe, secure and effective stockpile — sufficient to deter any adversary and guarantee the defense of our allies — at the same time that we pursue responsible verifiable reductions through arms control, we will make this world a safer place.

To paraphrase President Kennedy, whose speech 50 years ago at American University launched the NPT process, we will succeed by moving forward step by step, confident and unafraid. There is something very appropriate in mentioning President Kennedy and his era because your generation has a unique advantage. You are not burdened by the memories of the Cuban Missile Crisis, or the experience of duck and cover drills, events that characterize the experience of those who lived through the Cold War at its most dangerous points. You have the freedom to bring fresh thinking and new perspectives to how we can best enhance our national security. Positive change is hard to accomplish, so we will need your energy and your expertise to extend this debate beyond college campuses if we are to move safely and securely to a world without nuclear weapons. Your energy and your commitment are important to our efforts to reduce global nuclear dangers.

Thank you and I look forward to your questions.

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