STATE DEPARTMENT ISSUES FACT SHEET TOUTING NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY

FROM:  U.S. STATE DEPARTMENT
04/14/2015 08:22 AM EDT
Myths and Facts Regarding the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and Regime
Fact Sheet
Bureau of International Security and Nonproliferation
April 14, 2015

(1) Myth: The NPT has failed to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons.

The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) has enjoyed tremendous successes over the 45 years since its entry into force. The NPT is the most widely adhered to nuclear treaty in history. It has established an international legal framework against the proliferation of nuclear weapons to which 190 countries have subscribed. Among them are states that abandoned nuclear weapons or nuclear weapons programs with the NPT serving as an impetus. The vast majority of NPT parties meet their obligations and benefit every day from the security the Treaty provides. For the few that do not, the NPT provides a common international basis for resolving noncompliance where the actions of a country contravene the treaty’s principles.

(2) Myth: Not enough is being done to pursue nuclear disarmament.

When the NPT entered into force in 1970, the United States had a nuclear stockpile of over 26,000 nuclear weapons. By 2013 that number had been reduced by about 82 percent to 4,804 operationally deployed strategic nuclear warheads. From October 1993 through September 2013, the United States dismantled almost 10,000 nuclear warheads. Several thousand additional nuclear weapons are currently retired and awaiting dismantlement. Nuclear weapons reductions continue as we fulfill our obligations under the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START). When the New START Treaty limits are reached in 2018, the United States and Russia will have reduced our respective operationally deployed strategic forces to 1,550 deployed strategic warheads, their lowest level since the 1950s. The United States has reaffirmed our commitment to additional arms control measures, and has proposed negotiations with Russia to achieve another one-third reduction in our strategic nuclear arsenals. We also remain committed to bringing into force the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty and we seek the immediate start to negotiations on a Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty.

Beyond nuclear arms control negotiations, we seek to broaden our cooperation with non-nuclear weapons states on disarmament verification issues through a new initiative, the International Partnership for Nuclear Disarmament Verification. This program aims to develop technical solutions to challenges involved in verifying future nuclear agreements.

(3) Myth: Modernization of nuclear weapons and related infrastructure is a step backwards on disarmament and inconsistent with NPT disarmament obligations.

The United States is committed not to pursue new nuclear warheads, and life extension programs will not provide for new military capabilities. U.S. stockpile stewardship and life extension programs are designed to service the existing nuclear arsenal in order to ensure it remains safe, secure, and effective so long as nuclear weapons exist. The United States is pursuing life extension for a number of warhead types that will enable us to eliminate many of the weapons we maintain in our stockpile as a hedge against technical contingencies.

Modernization of nuclear infrastructure has nothing to do with developing new nuclear weapons. These investments are needed to replace aging infrastructure that will allow us to safely, securely, and more rapidly reduce the total stockpile. Simply put, infrastructure modernization, stockpile stewardship, and life extension programs for U.S. warheads will contribute to and do not detract from progress on our NPT nuclear disarmament obligations.

(4) Myth: There is insufficient cooperation among the nuclear weapons states on promoting nuclear disarmament, nonproliferation and peaceful uses.

The NPT Nuclear Weapon States (P5) are working to strengthen implementation of all three pillars of the NPT. Since 2009, the P5 have met annually to jointly pursue an agenda of strengthening the global nuclear nonproliferation regime and have institutionalized regular dialogue on nuclear weapons-related issues. One notable result of these meetings has been development of a common reporting framework on implementation of the 2010 NPT Review Conference Action Plan. We are also pursuing technical work on nuclear terms and definitions that can help lay the foundation for future cooperation or agreements. P5 engagement is a long-term investment to strengthen and advance the NPT, build trust and create a stronger foundation to achieve the Treaty’s disarmament, nonproliferation and peaceful uses goals.

(5) Myth: Nuclear Weapons States are insensitive to the humanitarian impact of nuclear weapons.

This is simply not true. Underpinning all of our nonproliferation and disarmament efforts, stretching back decades, has been our clear understanding and recognition of the humanitarian consequences of the use of nuclear weapons. The United States remains firmly committed to the view that it is in the interest of all states that the 70-year record of non-use of nuclear weapons be extended indefinitely. The United States participated in the Conference on the Humanitarian Impact of Nuclear Weapons in Vienna, Austria, last December to reinforce the message that it is precisely because of the destructive power of nuclear weapons that we give the highest priority to ensuring these weapons remain safe and secure for as long as they exist. While we share some of the frustration with the slow pace of nuclear disarmament, we also recognize that the realization of a world without nuclear weapons will require significant changes in the international system. For this reason, the practical path of step-by-step, verifiable nuclear reductions remains the only realistic route to our shared goal of a nuclear weapons- free world.

(6) Myth: “Hair-trigger” alert status and failures to take proper care of nuclear weapons are accidents waiting to happen, and demonstrate the urgent need to eliminate all nuclear weapons.

U.S. nuclear forces are not on “hair-trigger” alert and the U.S. employs multiple, rigorous and redundant technical and procedural safeguards to protect against accidental or unauthorized launch. Only the President can authorize the employment of U.S. nuclear weapons and we are taking further steps to maximize decision time for the President in a crisis. These steps enhance stability before and during a crisis and avoid the instability and compressed decision times that are inherent to changes in alert status.

The United States is also actively working to reduce the numbers and role of nuclear weapons in our national security strategy. These steps include taking all of our non-strategic nuclear bombers and nuclear-capable heavy bombers off day-to-day alert, engaging in the practice of open-ocean targeting for ICBMs and SLBMs, and reducing the number of warheads each ICBM carries to a single warhead. Converting ICBMs to a single warhead makes these weapons less attractive targets and therefore more stabilizing. Continuing at-sea patrols for submarines carrying nuclear weapons have a similar effect.

(7) Myth: Export controls and discriminatory policies are impeding nuclear cooperation and preventing developing countries from exercising their inalienable right to the peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

The United States fully supports the right of all Parties to the NPT to use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, in conformity with their nonproliferation obligations. An effective, transparent export control regime helps build confidence among states that assistance provided for peaceful nuclear development will not be diverted to illegal weapons purposes. The United States and other major supplier nations do not apply export controls in order to impede legitimate nuclear commerce. Rather, U.S. export controls are designed to maximize legitimate trade while raising barriers to high risk transfers that could result in the diversion or retransfer of U.S. technology, equipment and material to weapons purposes.

The United States actively lends support to NPT Parties that are in compliance with their NPT obligations to help them develop the infrastructure needed for peaceful nuclear applications and safe, secure, and safeguarded nuclear power programs. The United States is by far the largest contributor to IAEA peaceful use programs, including about $142 million in voluntary contributions to the Technical Cooperation program since 2010 and another $50 million toward the IAEA Peaceful Uses Initiative (PUI) that we helped launch. PUI programs have addressed the sustainable development needs of more than 120 Member States in areas such as human health, water resource management, food security, environmental protection, and nuclear power infrastructure development.

(8) Myth: The United States has a double standard with respect to opposing nuclear proliferation.

The United States remains committed to universality of the NPT and has consistently urged the few countries that have never signed the Treaty to accede as non-nuclear weapon states and in the interim to take actions that are supportive of NPT principles and provisions. We have also been consistent in advancing international efforts to hold NPT Parties to account for noncompliance with the Treaty – as President Obama said in his 2009 Prague Speech, rules must be binding, violations must be punished and words must mean something. We are very encouraged with process underway to address Iran’s noncompliance and we remain steadfast in our insistence that North Korea return to the NPT and IAEA safeguards and comply fully with its UN Security Council and nonproliferation obligations.

(9) Myth: The United States is not doing its part to promote a Middle East zone free of weapons of mass destruction.

The United States remains firmly committed to the goal of a Middle East free of weapons of mass destruction and their delivery systems. We continue to work with Russia, the UK, the UN and the Conference Facilitator, Ambassador Laajava, to convene the proposed conference to discuss a regional zone. We have supported five rounds of consultations between Israel and Arab states and encourage these talks to continue. Regional states bear the responsibility to reach consensus on arrangements for the conference. Efforts to turn the NPT process into a referendum on this issue should be rejected.

(10) Myth: Nuclear cooperation with India is inconsistent with the NPT.

Nothing in the U.S.-India Civil Nuclear Agreement or in the 2008 policy decision of the Nuclear Suppliers Group to enable civil nuclear cooperation with India violates the NPT. Such cooperation is permitted provided the supply of material or equipment is under safeguards. Under the parameters of the initiative, India committed to separate its civilian and military nuclear facilities and has placed all civilian-designated nuclear facilities under IAEA safeguards. All U.S. civil nuclear cooperation with India is subject to such safeguards, and cooperation on sensitive nuclear technologies is ruled out. India has also worked to bring its export controls into line with internationally-recognized standards and committed to continue its voluntary moratorium on nuclear testing and support negotiation of a fissile material cutoff treaty. These commitments constitute significant gains for global nonproliferation efforts.

SECRETARY KERRY'S STATEMENT ON ANNIVERSARY OF NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY

FROM:  U.S. STATE DEPARTMENT
Statement on the 45th Anniversary of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty
Press Statement
John Kerry
Secretary of State
Washington, DC
March 5, 2015

All countries share responsibility to confront nuclear proliferation. All countries benefit if nuclear weapons do not spread to additional countries. All countries also profit when there is smart, continuous action in the direction of nuclear disarmament. And all countries gain from cooperation on the peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

That is why the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) has served the international community well for the past 45 years.

Simply put, it is the bedrock foundation for nuclear nonproliferation, disarmament, and the peaceful use of nuclear energy. They include the areas of human health, food and agriculture, water resource management, and the environment.

There are many reasons for the success of the NPT, which entered into force on March 5, 1970.

The international consensus against the spread of nuclear weapons, embodied in the spirit and text of the Treaty, is strong and continues to be upheld. Overwhelming numbers of states have refrained from pursuing nuclear weapons and accept International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards as the standard for verification and peaceful nuclear trade. Several states that abandoned nuclear weapons efforts might have come to a different conclusion in the absence of a robust and widely supported NPT.

Today, as we mark this anniversary, we especially celebrate that more states are party to the NPT than to any other arms control or nonproliferation agreement. But there is more work to do, and we must recommit ourselves to this task.

NPT Parties share a responsibility to reinforce the global nuclear nonproliferation regime, in particular to overcome the challenges posed by a few countries that have violated their international nonproliferation obligations. This should be a concern of all states, as it is the future integrity of the nonproliferation regime that is at stake.

Our common security would be profoundly affected if additional countries crossed the nuclear threshold.

That is why President Obama and I have committed so much time and attention to seeking an agreement that will ensure Iran’s nuclear program is peaceful, and that it will formally commit to it in perpetuity as a signatory to the NPT, and through a science-based, verifiable agreement with the P5+1 member nations and their partners.

We are also working with the international community to achieve the DPRK's complete, verifiable, and irreversible denuclearization, and its return to the NPT and IAEA safeguards.

The United States is fully committed to continuing to fulfill its own Treaty obligations, as well as to strengthening the global nuclear nonproliferation regime.

Under the New START Treaty, we are reducing our deployed nuclear weapons to levels not seen since the 1950s, and we are prepared to negotiate further reductions. Through bilateral agreements and through the IAEA, we also continue to advance peaceful nuclear cooperation with other NPT Parties. We also are proud of our record as the leading contributor of funds to assist such global development.

The Ninth Review Conference of the NPT will open in New York on April 27. The United States has been working diligently to implement the items in the Action Plan adopted at the 2010 Review Conference, and we seek to strengthen that Plan.

We look forward to working with all NPT Parties to achieve a constructive outcome of the conference.

STATE DEPARTMENT STATEMENT ON P5+1 TALKS

FROM:  U.S. STATE DEPARTMENT 

Arms Control and International Security: Background Briefing on P5+1Talks

09/19/2014 06:39 AM EDT

Background Briefing on P5+1Talks

Special Briefing

Senior Administration Officials

Foreign Press Center

New York City

September 18, 2014

MODERATOR: Welcome. For those of you who I don't know, I’m [Moderator]. This will be all on background tonight with no embargo. So you know who’s up here – obviously not for reporting – this will be all be attributed to senior Administration officials, please no names and no titles. But to the left of me is [Senior Administration Official One and Senior Administration Official Two].

So in a moment, I’ll turn it over to [Senior Administration Official One] to make some opening remarks, and then we’ll go to your questions. Again, background, senior Administration officials. Please keep us all honest on this so we can keep doing this. And with that.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL ONE: Thank you. Good evening. Thank you all for coming tonight, and those of you who don’t live here – I don’t – welcome to New York.

I want to begin tonight on a personal note, not just for me but for many in this room. Michael Adler was one of our most beloved colleagues – one of yours, and in many ways, I considered him a colleague as well. He was someone who had watched and reported on these negotiations as they progressed through many, many years. He was one of the sharpest minds on these issues and one of the kindest people any of us has ever had the pleasure of knowing. He was with us in Geneva when we finished the Joint Plan of Action, and I know how much he wanted to see where these comprehensive talks would take us. He was eager to see the end of the story he had been writing for so long. He was taken from us too soon, and his absence is felt acutely here. These issues were the work of his life, and in many ways, they are ours as well.

Turning now to the talks, the last time we all met at the political director level as the P5+1 led by the European Union group was in July, when, after several weeks of intense negotiations, we decided to extend the Joint Plan of Action until November 24th. We made that decision because there had been enough progress to see a path forward; because it’s important that Iran’s nuclear program not advance further under the terms of the JPOA while we work to negotiate a comprehensive joint plan of action; and because we all know that diplomacy is the best, most enduring way to solve this most pressing security challenge.

Since that time, members of the P5+1 and the European Union have held bilateral meetings with Iran, including the United States. We’ve had expert meetings and coordination sessions, as well as ongoing contact with the Iranians, even when we’re not meeting in person. Coming into New York, I think many of us were not very optimistic. But clearly, over meetings over the last two days both with Iran and with my P5+1 and EU colleagues, it is clear that everyone has come here to go to work.

As you know, the United States and Iran held bilateral consultations over the past two days here in New York. These meetings were constructive and a lot of hard technical work that will need to be part of a comprehensive agreement is being undertaken by all parties.

In terms of this next week and a half, we will begin the P5+1 round tomorrow morning with a plenary session at the United Nations led by High Representative Cathy Ashton and Foreign Minister Zarif. During the weekend and UNGA high-level week, we will continue meeting on the Iran nuclear issue in whatever format makes the most sense. There will be plenaries, expert meetings, bilaterals. There may be a ministerial-level P5+1 meeting. And it’s very likely that Secretary Kerry and Foreign Minister Zarif will meet bilaterally, as they’ve done throughout these talks.

Over the next week and a half, you’re also going to hear a lot from President Rouhani and Foreign Minister Zarif about these nuclear negotiations, maybe about some other issues as well. It’s worth pointing out, particularly to those of you in this room, that at this moment, while senior Iranian officials have the benefit of the freedom of our press, a U.S. citizen sits in an Iranian prison, a journalist for one of our top newspapers, The Washington Post. Jason Rezaian should be freed immediately. The other American citizens being detained by Iran should also be freed as well. And additionally, we appeal again for Iran’s assistance in locating and bringing Robert Levinson home.

The Iranians have said over these many days and weeks how reasonable and flexible they are in these talks, and about how their current capacity should be acceptable. But the status quo is not doable for any of us. It is not doable for either side. The world will agree to suspend and then lift sanctions only if Iran takes convincing and verifiable steps to show that its nuclear program is and will remain exclusively peaceful.

Given Iran’s public statements that it does not seek a nuclear weapon, including the Supreme Leader’s fatwa, these practical steps should be doable. And we have consistently sought to pave a reasonable path forward in close coordination with our P5+1 partners and the European Union.

In our conversations with the Iranian negotiators, we’ve listened closely to their views about what Iran sees as their legitimate practical needs, and we’ve offered creative solutions to address them. There is a unique opportunity over this next week and a half when heads of state, foreign ministers, and many other world leaders are gathered in New York. There is an opportunity to make progress in these talks and to see whether the outlines, and more importantly, the details of a potential agreement begin to emerge in a fuller way than we’ve seen before.

And with that, I would be glad to take your questions.

MODERATOR: So as always, I’ll call the questions, and I know we know most of you, but please identify yourself and your media outlet. Lou Charbonneau, kick us off.

QUESTION: Thanks for this, and I first wanted to ask – you said that Secretary Kerry and Foreign Minister Zarif might meet as they have before. Is it possible that the presidents will also meet during this time? They did speak on the phone during last year’s UNGA, and this was one of the issues that was discussed.

And when you had your bilateral meetings with the Iranians yesterday and today, did you get any sense that there’s a willingness on their part to push forward, given their public comments about keeping the status quo and what they’ve said are unreasonable conditions put forth by the U.S. and other members of the P5+1? Thanks.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL ONE: Josh Earnest, the spokesperson for the White House, said that at this point there is no meeting scheduled between the President of the United States and President Rouhani. The President of the United States is well known for being open to such a meeting, but the choice is really Iran’s. We will continue to work and we think that there’s a lot of very important work that will go on this week, but that’s not dependent upon whether that meeting happens or not.

Secondly, in terms of the status quo and Iran saying that we are making unreasonable demands, I would make a couple points. First of all, let’s remember how we got here. We are in these talks because for years upon years, the international community – not just the United States, but through several UN Security Council resolutions – has said that Iran has not met its obligations under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, that they have taken many steps, some in secret, to undermine those obligations. And that is why we are at the table, and I do not think – and I don’t think the world thinks – that it is an unreasonable demand that says that Iran should not have a nuclear weapon. Indeed, the Supreme Leader has said Iran does not want a nuclear weapon, so showing that, in fact, in verifiable ways that they do not and will not is quite reasonable.

Secondly, I do not think it is an excessive demand to say that any agreement must, in a verifiable and transparent manner, show that Iran’s program today and into the future is exclusively peaceful.

So I don’t think either of those objectives – that Iran not acquire a nuclear weapon and that Iran’s program be exclusively peaceful, and that it be clear to everyone that it is – are unreasonable or excessive demands. I think they’re quite reasonable, and in fact is exactly what Iran has said is its intention. So showing that to the world in verifiable ways seems to me quite doable.

MODERATOR: Great. Let’s go in the middle here and wait for the microphone.

QUESTION: Thank you for doing this. BBC Persian, Bahman Kalbasi. [Senior Administration Official One], yesterday Foreign Minister Zarif in the Council on Foreign Relations talked about sanctions, and he specifically said are these sanctions worth risking not getting a deal and not having a new horizon in cooperation in the region; almost seems to be suggesting that this will open the door for other issues to be discussed, including what’s happening in Iraq.

But is there a sense – and this has been discussed on the Iranian press a lot – that America is not or has not offered a meaningful or reliable way to lift these sanctions? Or at least is the Administration really able to do so, given the situation in Congress? Is that one of the sticking points, that on the other side there is not meaningful sanction relief being discussed?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL ONE: I don’t think that’s the case at all. We’re well aware that sanctions relief is a critical part of any agreement. Iran has said so themselves, as you note. And indeed, we have done extensive work on what will be necessary to suspend and then ultimately lift those sanctions. The reason it is suspend first and lift later is because we all need to build confidence that this is a durable agreement, and so there will be many steps that Iran will take almost immediately if we get to an agreement. Some will take more time, and then one has to see whether it’s durable over a period of time, and the duration of that time is something that’s, of course, one of the things that we are discussing.

And we know how to do this. We believe we can offer very meaningful relief. We understand and have listened carefully to what Iran is looking for. We hope that Iran is listening very closely to what is necessary to obtain that relief, but I don’t have any questions that technically we can do what is necessary, and they know that.

MODERATOR: Michael Wilner. Wait, do you have the mike?

QUESTION: Thanks for doing this. Whenever I ask folks in the Administration to weigh or to measure Israeli Government concerns on this matter, they say Israel is rightly concerned with an Iranian nuclear weapon, first and foremost, and they say that the U.S. is working on an unprecedented level to bring the Israelis in, to brief them and the like. And they have expressed publicly that they appreciate that.

But here’s the thing: The Israelis that you are briefing on this unprecedented scale are now saying two months before your deadline that they are deeply, deeply concerned with what they are seeing. And given the relevance of Israel’s concerns, as you describe, it would appear that that is a significant problem. Is it a problem?

And secondly, if you’re in these negotiations to end the crisis, as you say, is it possible to do so without adopting Israel’s baseline for a good deal?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL ONE: It is not just Israel. It is the world that has said that Iran should not acquire a nuclear weapon, and the Supreme Leader’s fatwa also says that Iran does not have, does not intend to, and does not want to have a nuclear weapon. So that is the objective for everyone. We do indeed consult very closely with Israel, as we do with other partners around the world who are very, very concerned about whether we will be able to reach an agreement and whether that agreement will be a good one, which it must be.

So we appreciate that there are countries around the world that see things a little differently than we do. We have other partners around the world that have other concerns about an agreement and what it will mean in the geopolitics of the world, and what it will mean for nuclear – civilian nuclear energy. Lots of concerns are raised. We listen to all of those concerns, and of course, we listen to Israel’s concern. Israel’s security is very critical from an American point of view.

What I appreciate is that all of these countries – including Israel, with whom we closely consult – have shared their technical know-how, their understanding, their ideas, and that will create potentially a good solution to this very, very tough security challenge that we have in front of us.

At the end of the day, Israel will have to make its own judgment about an agreement, as will every other country in the world. And I understand that, but I also believe that the President of the United States will only sign off on an agreement that he believes is good for the world’s security, including Israel.

MODERATOR: Pam from Voice of America. Right here. It’s behind you.

QUESTION: Good evening. A little bit earlier you said that it was clear that everyone had come here to work and you described some of the initial bilaterals as constructive. A two-part question. First, can you shed more light, provide a little bit more insight on what you mean? And then secondly, specifically, was there any indication of movement on what’s been one of the key sticking points, and that’s the uranium enrichment?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL ONE: So, we’ve only had a few hours of talks over two days, and not even all day of those two days. We started last evening for a bit of time and then again this morning, and then we had coordination meetings with our partners in the P5+1, or as the Europeans call it the E3+3.

So this is just a beginning, so I don’t have any substantive things to report. Probably wouldn’t anyway in the middle of a negotiation. What I think is that we have – everyone has come here intent on taking whatever time it takes. This can become a very busy time here at the UN General Assembly when the high-level week starts next week. People have committed to canceling meetings if they need to if they are needed for meetings, though I think these meetings will happen in lots of different formats and lots of different ways. Some of our partners in the E3+3 will have meetings with President Rouhani, with Foreign Minister Zarif, as I believe Secretary Kerry will meet with Foreign Minister Zarif. We will have lots of different combinations and expert conversations.

It’s really the tone and the quality of the discussion. And I don’t want to overstate this either. We’re at the beginning of a very intense period here, and one never knows where it will go or whether you’ll get to an issue and hit a wall or whether you’ll break through. But everyone has come here – everyone, all parties – clearly intent on seeing if we can’t work through some of these very difficult issues.

MODERATOR: Laura Rozen, and then I’m coming to this side of the room, I promise.

QUESTION: Laura Rozen from Al-Monitor. Thank you for doing this. Back in May when the going-in bids were made in Vienna, we’ve heard from you all to not be alarmed if the going-in bids on each side were wide apart because that’s the nature of the negotiation. We heard that from you, I think, in Baghdad a few years ago, if I remember as well.

Can you give us a sense of between May, when those positions were put on the table, and I guess now in mid-September, have things narrowed, especially on the enrichment capacity issue (inaudible) from the opening bid?

And secondly, let me just say as you will hear the Iranians say many times over the next week, they kind of raise the prospect that no deal will very quickly result in their breakout time going down very quickly because they already have 20,000 centrifuges in store; they’ll flip back on at 20 percent and very quickly, all the things we’re worried about. So that the best is the enemy of the good, I think is their argument. So how do you respond to that? Thanks.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL ONE: As I said, we’ve just begun the talks here so I am not going to go into substance, and I probably wouldn’t under any circumstances. What I think has occurred is we probably understand each other a great deal better than we did back in May about the elements that are required, the parameters for how one could get there. We’ve had some creative technological thinking that’s gone on. We understand that there are different paths to the same objective. You all know the infamous Rubik’s cube comparison. So I would say there has been a deepening of understanding, and when that happens sometimes it opens some doors to some possibilities. But I can’t say anyone has walked through them to an answer, or we wouldn’t be here so intensely at work.

On the “no deal, they can break out,” we can all go through lots of escalatory talk about what they would do and what we would do if we don’t have any agreement. I don’t find that particularly productive. We each know what each other would do if things don’t work out. I’d rather be focused right now on what might be possible.

MODERATOR: We’re going to do a few from this side, and then wrap up with a few others. Go ahead, Laurence Norman of The Wall Street Journal.

QUESTION: Hey.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL ONE: Hey.

QUESTION: How are you? Thanks for doing this. Good to see you again.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL ONE: (Laughter.) We’ve having a blast. How about you?

QUESTION: Good, thank you. Two questions, if I may. First of all, I think you said you weren’t very optimistic arriving in New York. Now, I’m assuming that’s because not very much progress was made over the summer in the bilaterals, but could you just say why? And it might link into the second question, which is: What is your current reading of this Russian deal with Iran, and do you think it’s making the Iranians feel like they need a deal less?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL ONE: What Russian deal are you referring to?

QUESTION: I’m not quite sure what to call it. The memorandum that they signed to cooperate (inaudible) economics. I’m not sure they even know exactly what it is.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL ONE: I don’t know all – I don’t know what it is either, so what I would say is that countries have relationships with other countries, and they are working on ways to relate to each other all of the time. What we care about is whether any country makes an agreement that would break the sanctions enforcement of all of the sanctions that are in place. I do not expect Russia to do that. Everyone here knows, and I’m sure someone would ask, “Have all of the tensions around Ukraine entered into this negotiation?” They have not to date. [Sergei Ryabkov] is a professional who understands the nonproliferation world extremely well, and we are all focused on solving this problem in this room.

In terms of over the summer, I wouldn’t say nothing happened over the summer. I think every conversation, even when they’re tough and they seem to not make progress, sometimes people have to hear messages many, many times before realizing that unless people start to open doors, you’re just going to keep having the same conversation. So I think that not only the United States, but all of my partners in the P5+1 in the bilaterals – and all of us have had bilaterals over the last few weeks with Iran – have delivered the same messages. And sometimes messages have to get delivered many times before people really come to believe them.

QUESTION: You said you weren’t very optimistic.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL ONE: No, because messages were delivered, they were heard, but there wasn’t something forthcoming in that immediate instance. But this is a process, so I don’t find it surprising either.

MODERATOR: Okay, we’re going to do a few more. George.

QUESTION: George Jahn, Associated Press. Hi. You said in your opening remarks that the status quo is not doable for either side. That could be interpreted to mean that you’re bringing, if not new proposals, modified proposals to the table. I don’t expect you to go into specifics, but --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL ONE: What I was referring to is the status quo of – Iran has said, as one of the rest of you said, that when Foreign Minister Zarif did some of his comments – I think it was Foreign Minister Zarif – you all said that he said that we have to maintain what we currently have. Well, that’s – if that were the case, then we wouldn’t be in a negotiation if that were something that everybody could agree to. Iran would say we can’t maintain our sanctions in place in the way that we have. And I would say that the only – as I said, if Iran takes the steps necessary to ensure that they will not acquire a nuclear weapon and that their program is exclusively peaceful, then we have a way to, in fact, suspend and ultimately lift sanctions.

MODERATOR: Okay, we’re going to do two very quick ones. Indira quick and Paul quick, and then we’ll --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL ONE: Not that I don’t want to spend the evening here, but I know you all want to get to dinner. (Laughter.)

QUESTION: Indira Lakshmanan from --

MODERATOR: There will be more opportunities as well.

QUESTION: -- from Bloomberg News. Thank you for doing this. I want to start out by asking you, I mean: What is going to be your goal at the end of this week-and-a-half period where you will be able to check a box and say, “Yes, we’ve made progress; we came in pessimistic, but this shows we’ve taken one step closer.” And then if we come to November 24th and we don’t have a comprehensive deal, are you guys prepared to extend once more?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL ONE: So I’m going to do the second part of your question first. Way too early to talk about hypotheticals. We are --

QUESTION: (Off-mike.)

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL ONE: Huh? Yeah, we – no. (Laughter.) We are not – good try. We are not going to talk about any Plan B because we’re focused on getting Plan A, and we hope Iran is as well. So that’s where I am on that.

On your first part, was – I’m sorry.

QUESTION: It was about what is it going to --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL ONE: Oh, what’s success at the --

QUESTION: What’s your measure? What’s your metric that you will – that you don’t have to be negative, that the --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL ONE: Progress, progress.

QUESTION: (Inaudible.)

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL ONE: There could be many ways. It could be in many ways. It’s hard to say because this is so complex. And would I like at the end of this week to have a broad understanding on all of the major issues, even if we have to use the next October, November writing all the details? Sure, I’d love to be there. Will we be there at the end of this week? I don’t know. It’s tough, very tough. We are discussing all of the issues. We are discussing all the parameters of all of the issues. And I think this is an opportunity because we have – everybody’s here. Any consultation you have to have with anybody about anything, everybody’s here. So we ought to make use of that to try to deal with some of these very tough issues. We’ll see.

QUESTION: But we’re further than we were in July?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL ONE: Are we further than we are in July? The reason I have such a hard time answering this question is what I’ve said to you all so many times before: You can get 98 percent of the way there in this agreement and that last 2 percent means you don’t. It’s not a situation where you can say, ah, we’re 50 percent of the way there, we’re 75 percent of the way there, because that last percentage may be the crucial one and you don’t have the deal at all. That’s why this is so hard. It all fits together.

MODERATOR: I think we’re going to end tonight with Paul Richter of the L.A. Times. Wait for the mike. And there will be more opportunities, I promise, for us all to chat. Right here, Paul. Right here. Yeah.

QUESTION: As you know, a lot of people on the outside, other foreign governments, people in Congress and elsewhere, are really focused on the very concrete questions of number of Iranian centrifuges, enrichment capacity. Are those the right terms to be judging progress here?

And I’ve got a second question, too. Did the Iraq/ISIS issue come up at all in the talks with the Iranians?

MODERATOR: I’m surprised it took till the end.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL ONE: Gosh, I’m surprised that it took till the end. (Laughter.) I was having the same thought.

MODERATOR: Yeah.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL ONE: Okay. The measure of this agreement – I know you’re sick of hearing me say this. The measure of this agreement is Iran can’t acquire a nuclear weapon and we’re assured its program is exclusively peaceful. There are many components of that. So counting one thing is not going to answer that question. It’s a package of things. If you’re talking about enrichment capacity, you’re talking about infrastructure, you’re talking about centrifuges, you’re talking about SWU, you’re talking about stockpile, you’re talking about the types of equipment in centrifuges, you’re talking about duration, you’re talking about a whole bunch of elements if you’re worried about how long it’s going to take to get a weapon’s worth of fissile material, which is often the terminology used for breakthrough – breakout, sorry.

So it’s a lot of elements. So all of the things that outsiders have said to you or members of Congress are certainly elements, but they’re only elements. They have to come together in a way that gives us and the international community confidence that the program is exclusively peaceful and Iran will not acquire a nuclear weapon. That’s what we’re trying to do.

Now, as to your last question, I think you all know that tomorrow – I have to read it because I’m going to say it wrong – the Secretary of State is chairing a ministerial debate of the United Nations Security Council on the situation in Iraq at 2:00. Somebody’s phone is buzzing. Do you care?

QUESTION: I’m just going to --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL ONE: Shall we answer? We can all say hello. (Laughter.)

QUESTION: Put them on speaker phone.

MODERATOR: I don’t know what I just – I just think I --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL ONE: Okay. Well, whosever phone that is --

MODERATOR: I hope it’s still recording, whoever’s phone that is.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL ONE: Yeah. If it’s your mom, tell her I’m sorry. (Laughter.)

Any member can attend, and so the meeting was mentioned in our discussions today on the margins because it’s very present, but we are very clear and continue to be clear, as the Secretary said in his testimony, that we, of course, expect there will be time to time that we discuss this, as we discuss ISIS with everyone – ISIL. The world is focused – and I think this is what this ministerial tomorrow will show – that the world is focused on the mission that the President of the United States has set out, and that is to degrade and ultimately defeat ISIL. And I think we will all see that in a very powerful way tomorrow at the ministerial, and I believe that Iran thinks that ISIL should not be doing what it is doing either.

MODERATOR: Thank you, everyone.

QUESTION: What (inaudible) Iran (inaudible) come back tomorrow?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL ONE: Ask Iran.

MODERATOR: Thank you, everyone, for coming tonight. Again, this is on background as a senior Administration official. We will have more opportunities to do these things over the next week and a half, so email [us] with any questions. We will have a transcript done later tonight of this as well.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL ONE: Thank you all.

U.S. STATE DEPARTMENT REMARKS NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT AND SECURITY NPT CLUSTER 1

FROM:  U.S. STATE DEPARTMENT

NPT Cluster 1: Nuclear Disarmament and Security: U.S. Statement

Remarks

Christopher Buck, Deputy Chief of Mission, Delegation to the Conference on Disarmament Permanent Mission, Geneva

Third Meeting of the Preparatory Committee for the 2015 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference

United Nations, New York City

May 2, 2014

---

(As Delivered)

Mr. Chairman,

I am pleased to provide an update on ongoing U.S. activities in fulfillment of our obligations and commitments under Article VI of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and the 2010 NPT Action Plan. In this context, I highlight the extensive report that the United States has submitted to this Preparatory Committee meeting, consistent with Actions 5, 20, and 21 of the 2010 NPT Action Plan.

U.S. policy is to achieve the peace and security of a world without nuclear weapons. This remains a central element of President Obama’s nuclear agenda, and we are working to create conditions that can enable its eventual achievement by pursuing a multifaceted, step-by-step approach incorporating national, bilateral, and multilateral actions.

It is because we understand the consequences of the use of nuclear weapons that the United States continues to devote considerable resources in a decades-long effort to reduce and ultimately eliminate nuclear weapons. There is no “quick fix” to achieving nuclear disarmament. There is no path other than the hard, daily work of verifiable step-by-step disarmament to which we remain resolutely committed.

In line with our support for the NPT, in 2010 the United States changed our nuclear posture to further reduce the number and role of nuclear weapons in our national security strategy and emphasize the interest of all nations in extending the 69-year record of non-use of nuclear weapons. The President also made it clear that the United States will not develop new nuclear warheads nor will we pursue new military missions for nuclear weapons.

This important shift in U.S. nuclear posture has taken place against the backdrop of dramatic and ongoing reductions in our nuclear arsenal. In fact, when the NPT entered into force in 1970, the United States had a nuclear stockpile of over 26,000 nuclear weapons. As Under Secretary Gottemoeller announced on Tuesday, the U.S. nuclear stockpile now has been reduced to 4,804 warheads, which reflects an 85% decrease from its Cold War peak. During this period, the United States reduced its non-strategic nuclear warheads by 90 percent. To lend a better sense of the scale of this ongoing activity in the post-Cold War period, between 1994 and 2013, the United States dismantled 9,952 nuclear warheads.

Moreover, this effort continues as we fulfill our obligations under the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START) between the United States and Russia, now in its fourth year of implementation. When the Treaty limits are reached in 2018, the strategic forces of the United States and Russia will be capped at 1,550 deployed strategic warheads, their lowest level since the 1950s.

Contrary to the view expressed by some in this hall, we do not regard the achievement of nuclear disarmament as simply a rhetorical goal. It is one the United States is working on and pursuing every day.

And this work is not done. As outlined by President Obama in Berlin in June 2013, the United States remains open to negotiate further reductions with Russia in all categories of nuclear weapons – including strategic and non-strategic nuclear weapons.

We are also developing effective verification methodologies and processes that will be essential as we move toward increasingly smaller nuclear arsenals. Our experience with verified bilateral nuclear disarmament provides valuable experience and useful tools for multilateral nuclear disarmament approaches in the future. To that end, we are working closely with all NPT nuclear weapon states (or “P5”) to lay the foundation for future arms control agreements with participants beyond Russia and the United States.

Within the P5 process we have institutionalized regular dialogue on nuclear weapons-related issues. China hosted a fifth P5 Conference in Beijing on April 14 and 15, and the United Kingdom has agreed to host a sixth conference next year. Through these high-level conferences and frequent expert-level meetings, the P5 were able to reach consensus on a framework for reporting to this PrepCom in accordance with their commitments in the Action Plan. P5 CTBT experts have held productive discussions on ways they can collaborate in strengthening the CTBT monitoring regime. And the P5 Working Group on Nuclear Terms and Definitions, chaired by China, has made progress on the development of a P5 nuclear terms glossary.

The significance of this work should not be underestimated. P5 engagement is a long-term investment to strengthen and advance the NPT, build trust and create a stronger foundation to achieve the Treaty’s disarmament and nonproliferation goals. In addition, the United States and the United Kingdom are conducting a joint project to further develop verification procedures and technologies, which we will brief today at 1:15 p.m. in the North Lawn Building, Conference Room 5.

Turning to the broader multilateral context, the United States supports the immediate commencement of negotiations on a Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty (FMCT), which is the next logical and necessary step toward achieving our shared disarmament goals. A verifiable ban on the production of fissile material for use in nuclear weapons is necessary if we are to create conditions for a world without nuclear weapons. All states can contribute to achieving this goal. We are disappointed that the Conference on Disarmament (CD) has been unable to initiate negotiations on an FMCT. Even as we continue our efforts in the CD, the United States is actively engaged in the meeting of the FMCT Group of Governmental Experts (GGE), which can usefully complement efforts to promote negotiations of an FMCT in the CD.

In another important multilateral effort, the ratification and entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) remains a top priority for the U.S. Administration. Our active involvement in all activities of the CTBT Organization’s Preparatory Commission clearly demonstrates our ongoing commitment to the Treaty and the vital importance the United States attaches to completing the verification regime. The United States recognizes that the voluntary adherence to unilateral nuclear testing moratoria is no substitute for a legally binding prohibition against the conduct of such explosions. Entry into force of the CTBT is in the security interests of every nation. All States have an important role to play in providing the necessary resources to complete the Treaty’s verification regime and maximize the capabilities of the Provisional Technical Secretariat.

Mr. Chairman,

The United States recognizes the importance of security assurances in the context of the NPT. Accordingly, the United States updated and strengthened its long-standing negative security assurance policy in the context of the U.S. Nuclear Posture Review published in April 2010. The United States declared that it will not use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear weapon States that are party to the NPT and in compliance with their nuclear nonproliferation obligations. It was also made clear that the United States would only consider the use of nuclear weapons in extreme circumstances to defend the vital interests of the United States or our allies and partners.

The United States also supports well-crafted nuclear-weapon-free zones (NWFZs) that are vigorously enforced and developed in accordance with the guidelines adopted by the United Nations Disarmament Commission. We are a Party to both Protocols of the Treaty of Tlatelolco and in recent years the United States has worked toward extending legally binding negative security assurances by submitting for ratification the protocols to the African and South Pacific nuclear-weapon-free zones. We are pleased to note that the United States and other NPT nuclear weapon states will soon sign the Protocol to the Central Asian Nuclear Weapon Free Zone Treaty. The nuclear weapon states are also engaging ASEAN to resolve any remaining differences so that we can sign the revised Protocol to the Southeast Asia nuclear-weapon-free zone. These actions are a priority for us.

Mr. Chairman,

The United States is committed to achieving a world without nuclear weapons, and we are dedicated to working with all NPT States Parties to make that goal a reality. The pursuit of our shared goal will require patience and persistence from all of us. But we are confident in our purpose, and strengthened in both our methods and morale by the tremendous progress we have made thus far.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

GOTTENMOELLER'S REMARKS ON NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY

Secretary Rose Gottenmoeller.  Credit:  U.S. State Department

FROM: U.S. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
Forging Ahead: Challenges and Opportunities for the NPT
Remarks
Rose Gottemoeller
Acting Under Secretary for Arms Control and International Security
Institute for National Security Studies (INSS)
Washington, DC
February 12, 2013
As Delivered

Thank you, Yaiv, and thank you to General (Ret.) Yadlin and all the staff at INSS for hosting me. It is an honor to be here. As you all know, John Kerry was sworn in as the new U.S. Secretary of State just about a week and a half ago. He begins his tenure at State fully seized of the challenges that we face around the globe, including the future of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). Under the direction of our new Secretary, the Department of State will continue its efforts to support this vital regime. The title for this conference is apt. We are at a crossroads, but not a dead-end. Over the course of the last 40 years, the NPT has taken some hits, not least this highly provocative act announced by North Korea today. But it is precisely because of those hits that we have acquired the experience needed to deal more effectively with the challenge of nuclear proliferation.

In order to look to the future, it is important to remember the past. It was just over 50 years ago that tension brought on by the Cuban Missile Crisis threatened to turn the Cold War hot. The world watched in fear for those 13 days in October 1962 when Soviet missile placements in Cuba very nearly became the spark that would start a fire we could not possibly control.

As the United States and the Soviet Union teetered on the edge of nuclear war, leaders in Washington and Moscow sought a diplomatic solution. One of the challenges confronting both sides was making sure that their perceptions, objectives, and proposals were getting across to each other clearly. This was not an easy thing to do without email, dedicated phone lines or fifty years of cooperation across many different issues.

Resolute and sober in their determination, leaders in Washington and Moscow stepped back from the brink of a nuclear conflict, using every avenue available to settle the crisis peacefully. After those frightening 13 days, both sides learned ways to reduce the tension in our relationship.

A New Beginning

To say that things have changed dramatically since October 1962 is an understatement. The Cuban Missile Crisis was a turning point. The United States and the Soviet Union came to the edge of the abyss and then started to back away from it. In the months following the crisis, a "Hotline" between the Kremlin and the White House was established, allowing for direct, immediate communications between our leaders.

In the summer of 1963, in a Commencement Address at American University, President John F. Kennedy laid out a bold vision on how we could turn away from what had seemed like an inevitable march towards nuclear catastrophe.

"Peace need not be impracticable," he said, "and war need not be inevitable. By defining our goal more clearly, by making it seem more manageable and less remote, we can help all peoples to see it, to draw hope from it, and to move irresistibly toward it."

I like that concept. Defining goals does make things more manageable. Working step by step, we can slowly fix seemingly intractable, unsolvable problems.

In that particular speech, one of the defined goals was to achieve a ban on nuclear testing. While it was not comprehensive, the Limited Test Ban Treaty went into force just four months later. It outlawed nuclear explosive tests on land, in the sea, in the atmosphere and in space. This was a tremendous step in the right direction and one that helped create political conditions to conclude the NPT, an even more ambitious treaty, several years later.

The Path Before Us

The grand bargain of the NPT, where nuclear weapon states pursue disarmament, non-nuclear weapon states abstain from the pursuit of nuclear weapons and all countries are able to access the benefits of peaceful nuclear energy, sets an enduring standard that is as relevant today as it was at the Treaty’s inception. For over forty years, the regime has bent, frayed and broken in places, but it has never collapsed. It has slowed the tide of proliferation; it has facilitated cooperation among its States Parties; and it has institutionalized the norms of nonproliferation and disarmament.

Despite our past successes, there are very pressing challenges all around us and on the horizon. Most critically, we have grave concerns about the actions of a few countries. North Korea, Iran and Syria violated their NPT obligations, and have failed to take the steps necessary to rectify these violations. The United States is gravely concerned about all of these programs, as I am sure is the case for everyone in this room. These transgressions threaten international security and undermine confidence in the nonproliferation regime. These cases also stand directly in the way of our shared disarmament goals.

Addressing these compliance challenges is essential to preserving the integrity of the nonproliferation regime and we have taken important steps in the past several years to do so. The IAEA found Syria in noncompliance with its safeguards obligations for attempting to build a covert nuclear reactor, and we are continuing to build on the stringent sanctions the UN Security Council adopted against Iran in 2010. That, combined with actions taken before 2010, represent clear reinforcement of the importance of full compliance. NPT Parties must be willing to keep the pressure on countries that violate their obligations. As President Obama has said many times, the international community must stand up to States that violate their nonproliferation obligations. NPT rules must be binding and there must be consequences for those who break them.

There is a continued push for universal adherence to the IAEA safeguards agreements and Additional Protocols. As we have learned from past and present safeguards violations from countries such as Iran and Syria, the Additional Protocol must be the standard for verification of the NPT. Since 2010, 18 states have brought Additional Protocols into force, bringing the total to 119. Another 20 have signed the Protocol but not yet completed the ratification process. That is excellent progress, but we must continue to press for more.

The United States will also work with all Parties to discourage states from abusing the NPT’s withdrawal provision, a priority we share with many of our international partners.

Building on our pledge to reduce the role of nuclear weapons in our defense strategy, we are also making progress on nuclear-weapon-free zones (NWFZ). The nuclear-weapon states, also known as the P5, and ASEAN have agreed on a revised Protocol to the Southeast Asia NWFZ (SEANWFZ) Treaty that resolved outstanding differences. We hope that the Protocol signing can take place soon.

For its part, this Administration sent the protocols to the African and South Pacific NWFZs to the U.S. Senate for its advice and consent. The United States also remains committed to consulting with the Central Asia NWFZ (CANWFZ) parties to reach an agreement that would allow us – along with the rest of the P5 – to sign the protocol to that treaty.

A longer term goal is achievement of a Middle East zone free of all weapons of mass destruction. The United States supports this goal and stands ready to help facilitate discussions among states in the region at the proposed Helsinki conference. But we do so recognizing that the mandate for a zone can only come from within the region; it cannot be imposed from outside or without the consent of all concerned states. We regret the Helsinki conference could not be convened last year, but remain committed to working with our partners to create conditions for a successful event.

An immediate concern is securing vulnerable nuclear materials in order to keep them out of hands of terrorists. Under President Obama’s direction, we have held two Nuclear Security Summits, with a third to take place in The Hague next year. In anticipation of the Hague Summit, we will continue to build on pledges that are resulting in more material secured, removed and eliminated. These are real and durable achievements that help protect nations against the threat of nuclear terrorism. We will continue to use the Summits to strengthen the global architecture – the treaties, institutions, norms and rules – that governs nuclear security, and to promote the concept of "assurance;" that is, states execute their sovereign security responsibilities in ways that assure neighbors, allies and rivals that they are doing so effectively. Israel and others here are valued partners in the Summit process, and we look forward to continued cooperation to promote these shared goals.

Regarding the disarmament agenda, there have been successes on both the bilateral and multilateral fronts. The United States is committed to a step-by-step process to reduce the overall numbers of nuclear weapons. The two year anniversary of the New START Treaty’s entry into force has just passed. As many of you know, I was the lead New START negotiator for the United States and it is very satisfying to see how pragmatic, business-like and positive the implementation has been. We are now exploring the possibilities of what a future agreement with Russia would look like – one with reductions in all categories of nuclear weapons – strategic, non-strategic, deployed and non-deployed.

Beyond bilateral treaties, ratification and entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) remains a top priority for the United States.

As we move forward with our ratification process, we encourage all other nations to do the same. We also remain committed to launch negotiations on a Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty. It is unfortunate that, to date, the Geneva Conference on Disarmament has been blocked in its efforts to move this agreement forward.

We are also engaging with other P5 states on disarmament-related matters. Following the first meeting in London in 2009, P5 conferences were held in Paris in 2011 and Washington in 2012. At those high-level meetings, we started discussions on key nuclear weapons related issues, including confidence-building, transparency, and verification experiences. Russia announced recently that it will host the next P5 conference in April, just before the second NPT PrepCom.

While some are quick to dismiss the utility of meetings and conferences, they would be forgetting their history. As the United States and Russia approach the lowest levels of deployed nuclear warheads since the 1950’s – and that will happen when the New START Treaty is fully implemented in 2018 – it is important to remember that their success was born out of direct communication. Communication builds trust. Trust paves the way for cooperation. This is the type of process we are cultivating in the P5 setting.

We also support new frameworks for civil nuclear cooperation that reduce the spread of dangerous technologies. Establishment of an IAEA fuel bank represents an important step forward, as it can help assure the reliability of nuclear fuel supply and avoid the unnecessary investment in indigenous enrichment.

Forging Ahead

Having just run through the challenges and opportunities, the road ahead can seem daunting. Some states continue to forsake their freely taken and legally binding obligations. Proliferation is aided by the speed and anonymity provided by the information age. Conflicts around the globe make cooperation difficult or dangerous. Even in the face of these challenges, it is incumbent upon us to find ways to strengthen nonproliferation norms, bolster compliance and quickly adapt to ever-changing circumstances and security needs.

There are some new tools that could aid us in our travels. The United States is and has always been committed to innovation, and the arms control and nonproliferation arenas are no exception. To respond to the challenges we face, we are thinking about creative ways to use technologies – including open source technologies – to tackle long-standing verification and monitoring problems. We hope that other states will join us in this endeavor.

All of what I have discussed will require hard work. However, we are at a crossroads, not a cliff. We are fully able to choose the path that leads us to a safer, more secure world. We have with us the lessons of the Cold War and the knowledge that even in our darkest hours, we found a way forward. In his speech at American University 50 years ago, President Kennedy left the students with a final thought:

"Confident and unafraid, we labor on--not toward a strategy of annihilation but toward a strategy of peace."


We have come a long way since then, but we have a long way to go. We just have to keep moving forward step by step, confident and unafraid.

Thank you and I look forward to your questions.