Showing posts with label DODD-FRANK. Show all posts
Showing posts with label DODD-FRANK. Show all posts

Wednesday, May 28, 2014

COURT ORDERS OWNERS, COMPANIES TO PAY $108 MILLION RELATED TO PRECIOUS METALS FRAUD SCHEME

FROM:  COMMODITY FUTURES TRADING COMMISSION 
CFTC Wins Fraud Trial against Hunter Wise Related Precious Metals Firms and Their Owners

Federal court orders Fred Jager, Harold E. Martin, Jr. and the Hunter Wise Companies to Pay over $108 Million in Restitution and Penalties

Court Calls Fraudulent Conduct “repeated, callous and blatant”

Washington, DC – The U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) today announced that on May 16, 2014, a federal court in Florida entered an Order finding in the CFTC’s favor following a trial against four Hunter Wise related companies and their owners on charges that they had fraudulently misrepresented the nature of precious metals transactions that resulted in millions of dollars in customer losses.

Hunter Wise Commodities, LLC, Hunter Wise Services, LLC, Hunter Wise Credit, LLC, and Hunter Wise Trading, LLC and the individuals running the companies, Fred Jager and Harold Edward Martin, Jr., have been ordered to pay, jointly and severally, $52.6 million in restitution to the defrauded customers, and to pay a civil monetary penalty, jointly and severally, of $55.4 million, the maximum provided by law.

“This result makes clear that the CFTC will aggressively act to protect customers from fraud. Customers are entitled to know the truth of how their hard-earned money is being used. Here, customers thought Defendants were purchasing precious metals on their behalf and they were not,” said Gretchen L. Lowe, Acting Director of the CFTC’s Division of Enforcement. “This is also another excellent example of how the CFTC is using its new enforcement authority under Dodd-Frank to go after fraudsters.”

The CFTC charged Hunter Wise, Martin, Jager, and others in December 2012 (see CFTC Press Release 6447-12, December 5, 2012). The Court entered a Preliminary Injunction against all of the Defendants on February 22, 2013 (see CFTC Press Release 6522-13, February 27, 2013). Defendants appealed that ruling, arguing that the CFTC lacked jurisdiction over the conduct at issue, and lost when the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the lower’s court’s issuance of the preliminary injunction (see CFTC v. Hunter Wise Commodities, LLC, Case No. 13-10993, April 15, 2014).

In his 58-page Opinion and Order (see under Related Links), Judge Donald M. Middlebrooks of the U.S. District Court, Southern District of Florida, found that Jager and Martin knowingly defrauded more than 3,200 retail customers for more than 16 months, between July 2011 and February 2013.  The Court found that Jager and Martin’s fraudulent conduct was “repeated, callous and blatant.”

According to the Order, Hunter Wise orchestrated a multi-level marketing scheme in which so-called retail dealers served a sales function for Hunter Wise, soliciting customer accounts. The dealers advertised and claimed that they sold physical metals, including gold, silver, platinum, palladium, and copper, to retail customers on a financed basis, and forwarded customer funds to Hunter Wise, whose identity was not disclosed to the customers.

As explained in the Order, using marketing materials and training provided to them by Jager, Martin and other Hunter Wise employees, the dealers claimed to arrange loans for the purchase of physical metals, and advised customers that their physical metals would be stored in a secure depository. The Order finds that customers were then charged “exorbitant interest” on the purported loans and storage fees for the metal they thought they had purchased. In fact, the Order finds that neither Hunter Wise nor any of the dealers purchased any physical metals, arranged actual loans for their customers to purchase physical metals, or stored physical metals for any customers participating in their retail commodity transactions – in other words, there was “no metal at the end of the rainbow.” According to the Order, over 90 percent of the retail customers lost money.

The Court found that Jager and Martin knew that they were defrauding customers and violating the law. “[Jager and Martin] purposefully decided to risk criminal and civil liability by continuing Hunter Wise’s fraudulent and illegal operations. … The house cannot win when, in violation of the law, the game is rigged.”

The Court further found Martin and Jager’s proferred excuses for their conduct “implausible,” “disingenuous” and “highly unreasonable.” For example, the Court noted that Hunter Wise’s attorneys had advised them to change their business or shut down, so that Jager and Martin were keenly aware of the choices available to them and the possible criminal consequences of continuing to operate, to the extent that Martin wrote in an email to Jager, “With any luck we will have adjoining cells.”

In considering the appropriate penalties, the Court noted that the fraudulent scheme was “egregious and recurrent” and “calculated to deceive retail customers.” The Court held that the likelihood of future violations was “strong” given that Jager and Martin did not acknowledge any wrongdoing. Further, the “systematic and pervasive nature” of the fraud necessitated full restitution for all customers who lost money between July 16, 2011 and February 25, 2013.

In a separate Order, the District Court entered default judgments against C.D. Hopkins Financial Group, LLC, Hard Asset Lending Group, LLC, and their principal, Chadewick Hopkins (CD Hopkins Defendants), and Blackstone Metals Group, LLC and its principal Baris Keser (Blackstone Defendants). CD Hopkins Defendants were ordered to pay $1,158,278.78 in restitution and $3,474,000 in civil penalties. Blackstone Defendants were ordered to pay $617,818.93 in restitution and $1,853,000 in civil penalties.

The CFTC Division of Enforcement staff members responsible for this action are Carlin Metzger, Joseph Konizeski, Heather Johnson, Nancy Hooper, Jeff LeRiche, Peter Riggs, Jennifer Chapin, Thaddeus Glotfelty, Stephen Turley, Brigitte Weyls, Scott Williamson, Rosemary Hollinger, and Richard Wagner.

The CFTC thanks the Florida Office of Financial Regulation, the Florida Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services, and the United Kingdom Financial Conduct Authority for their assistance in this matter.

Recent CFTC Precious Metals Enforcement Actions

The CFTC has taken action against numerous precious metals telemarketing firms that unlawfully solicited precious metals orders from retail customers to be executed through Hunter Wise, including:

• London Metals LLC (CFTC Press Release 6680-13);

• Matthew Hall d/b/a Pacific Exchange Group (CFTC Press Release 6681-13);

• Lloyds Commodities LLC (CFTC Press Release 6850-14);

• Newbridge Metals, LLC (CFTC Press Release 6705-13);

• Joseph Glenn Commodities, LLC (CFTC Press Release 6542-13);

• Newbridge Alliance, Inc. & U.S. Capital Trust, LLC (CFTC Press Release 6903-14);

• Pan American Metals of Miami (CFTC Press Release 6653-13);

• Secured Precious Metals (CFTC Press Release 6503-13);

• Barclay Metals (CFTC Press Release 6503-13);

• Vertical Integration Group (CFTC Press Release 6824-14);

• Lions Wealth (CFTC Press Release 6729-13);

• Yorkshire Group (CFTC Press Release 6713-13);

• PGS Capital Wealth Management and Rockwell Asset Management (CFTC Press Release 6909-14);

• Empire Sterling Metals Corp. and I.P.M. Investments, Inc. (CFTC Press Release 6912-14); and,

• Palm Beach Capital LLC (CFTC Press Release 6931-14).

Sunday, May 18, 2014

FLORIDA COMPANY CHARGED WITH MAKING ILLEGAL, OFF-EXCHANGE PRECIOUS METALS TRANSACTIONS

FROM:  COMMODITY FUTURES TRADING COMMISSION
CFTC Charges Florida-Based Palm Beach Capital LLC and Lawrence Scott Spain with Engaging in Illegal, Off-Exchange Precious Metals Transactions

Washington, DC – The U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) today announced that it filed a civil injunctive enforcement action in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Florida against Defendants Palm Beach Capital LLC (PBC) of Palm Beach, Florida, and its owner and manager, Lawrence Scott Spain, of Boca Raton, Florida. The CFTC Complaint charges the Defendants with engaging in illegal, off-exchange transactions in precious metals with retail customers on a leveraged, margined, or financed basis. The Complaint further alleges that Spain, as controlling person for PBC, is liable for PBC’s violations of the Commodity Exchange Act (CEA).

According to the Complaint, since at least July 16, 2011 and continuing through at least August 2012, PBC, by and through its employees including Spain, solicited retail customers by telephone and on PBC’s website, to engage in leveraged, margined, or financed precious metals (including gold, silver, platinum and palladium) transactions. During that period, the Complaint alleges, approximately 39 of PBC’s customers paid at least $1.35 million to PBC in connection with precious metals transactions. The Complaint alleges that these customers lost at least $1.25 million of these funds to trading losses, commissions, fees, and other charges by PBC and other companies. PBC received commissions and fees totaling at least $526,000 in connection with these precious metals transactions, according to the Complaint.

Under the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010, leveraged, margined, or financed transactions such as those conducted by PBC, are illegal off-exchange transactions unless they result in actual delivery of metal within 28 days. The Complaint alleges that metals were never actually delivered in connection with the leveraged, margined, or financed precious metals transactions made on behalf of PBC’s customers.

The Complaint further alleges that PBC executed the illegal precious metals transactions through Lloyds Commodities, LLC and associated entities (collectively, Lloyds Commodities) and Hunter Wise, LLC and associated entities (collectively, Hunter Wise). The CFTC filed enforcement actions against, among others, Lloyds Commodities and Hunter Wise in December 2012, charging both Lloyds Commodities and Hunter Wise with engaging in illegal, off-exchange precious metals transactions, and charging Hunter Wise with fraud and other violations (see CFTC Press Release 6447-12). On February 5, 2014, in a consent order resolving the Commission’s claims against Lloyds Commodities, the District Court found that the CFTC had jurisdiction over the transactions at issue pursuant to Section 2(c)(2)(D) of the CEA and ordered Lloyds Commodities to pay over $5 million in restitution and penalties (see CFTC Press Release 6850-14).

On February 19, 2014, the District Court found that Hunter Wise had no actual metal to deliver to customers and held that Hunter Wise engaged in illegal precious metals transactions and was required to register as a futures commission merchant but did not do so and therefore violated Sections 4(a) and 4d of the CEA (see CFTC v. Hunter Wise Commodities, LLC, et al., 12-81311-CIV (Order on the Parties’ Motions for Summary Judgment). A bench trial against Hunter Wise on remaining charges, which allege fraud, was concluded on March 3, 2014, and the parties are awaiting the court’s final judgment. And on April 15, 2014, in CFTC v. Hunter Wise Commodities, LLC, et al., the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the District Court’s issuance of a preliminary injunction and held that the Commission’s jurisdiction under Section 2(c)(2)(D) of the CEA extends to the precious metals transactions at issue in the case and that no exception to the Commission’s jurisdiction applied.

In its continuing litigation against PBC and Spain, the CFTC seeks disgorgement of ill-gotten gains, restitution for the benefit of customers, civil monetary penalties, permanent registration and trading bans, and a permanent injunction from future violations of the CEA, as charged.

CFTC Division of Enforcement staff members responsible for this action are R. Stephen Painter, Jr., Michael C. McLaughlin, David W. MacGregor, Lenel Hickson, Jr., and Manal M. Sultan.

Monday, May 12, 2014

SEC COMMISSIONER GALLAGHER'S REMARKS AT ROCKY MOUNTAIN SECURITIES CONFERENCE

FROM:  U.S. SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION 
Remarks at the 46th Annual Rocky Mountain Securities Conference
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Commissioner Daniel M. Gallagher
Denver, CO
May 9, 2014

Thank you, Julie [Lutz], for that kind introduction. I’m very pleased to be here today, and I’m proud to say that this will be my fourth time addressing this conference, the last three as a Commissioner. I am always happy to visit Denver, in large part given the presence of a key SEC regional office here. I am a big supporter of our regional offices, and I am very pleased to report that yesterday I made good on my oath to visit all of our offices when I made it to Fort Worth. Now I will try to pull off second visits before the end of my term.

* * *

Despite the onslaught of regulation over the past ten years and the consistency with which extremely costly and often frivolous plaintiff actions are brought, our capital markets continue to be the strongest and most vibrant in the world. As the primary U.S. capital markets regulator, the SEC administers a regulatory framework built upon our threefold mandate to protect investors, maintain fair, orderly and efficient markets, and facilitate capital formation.

Consistent with that framework, industry professionals such as registered representatives of broker-dealers and investment advisors are required by law to be licensed or registered and to subject themselves to the regulatory oversight, examination, and reporting requirements of the federal securities laws. In other words, we require market professionals, particularly those who interact with retail investors, to apply for, and prove themselves worthy of, the privilege of working in the industry.

Unfortunately, this privilege is all too often abused by scoundrels, including some that repeatedly engage in egregious misconduct that directly impacts retail “mom and pop” investors, destroying their nest eggs and financial security. These repeat offenders, despite accumulating dozens of customer complaints and disciplinary actions, have been able to remain in the industry by jumping from one disreputable firm to another and hiding behind false and misleading CRD filings and Form BD representations. They are, to be blunt, cockroaches, and it is in all of our interests to purge them from our markets.

This is, of course, not a new problem. After all, capital markets are risk-taking markets, and unfortunately a risk as old and as certain as time is that where there is opportunity, there will be unscrupulous characters trying to take advantage of the unwary. The SEC has been struggling for decades to find the best approach to rooting out recidivist misconduct by the worst of the bad apples, but unfortunately, there are no easy answers.

Illustrating this point, exactly 20 years ago this month, the SEC released a report in conjunction with the NASD and NYSE called the “Large Firm Project” that reviewed the hiring, retention, and supervisory practices of nine of the country’s largest broker dealers, which at the time were responsible for handling approximately 50% of all public customer securities accounts in the United States.[1] The report’s findings were grim, reflecting a number of significant concerns about the business activities and conduct of broker-dealers and their registered representatives. Some of the more noteworthy findings may sound depressingly familiar to you.

For example, the study found high turnover rates: over a third of the registered representatives selected as a sample set for the study had left the industry within the two-year examination period, including many who left involuntarily or were barred from the industry altogether.

It also reflected a high incidence of potential enforcement violations, with fully 25% of exams leading to enforcement referrals. The study showed that bad actors are concentrated in select firms: three of the nine firms examined accounted for 88% of the study group’s enforcement referrals. The study also revealed numerous findings of inadequate supervision. Perhaps most concerning is the fact that these bad actors were able to move between firms freely after customers registered complaints.

Do these findings—now two decades old—sound familiar to you? The sad truth is that these are exactly the same types of behavioral red flags we still see today. Only two months ago, for example, the Wall Street Journal reported the results of a study finding that more than 1,500 broker-dealer registered representatives had failed to report bankruptcy filings in their CRD disclosures, while over 150 had failed to report criminal charges or convictions.[2] In response, FINRA announced that it would perform a comprehensive vetting of public disclosures for the more than 600,000 investment professionals it oversees—brokers, not investment advisors—against public court records. FINRA will also propose rules requiring employee background checks.[3]

I recently asked staff in the Office of Compliance, Inspections, and Examinations to put together some statistics based on disclosure information submitted by broker-dealer registered representatives on FINRA’s BrokerCheck system. The results are eye-opening.

An astounding 20% of the 600,000 plus actively licensed registered representatives have between one and five disclosures for items such as customer complaints, regulatory violations, terminations, bankruptcy, judgments, and liens. One active—and currently employed—registered rep has disclosed a whopping 96 customer complaints and disputes. Another individual has made 21 financial disclosures relating to bankruptcies, yet still is licensed and working in the industry. At the firm level, 17% of broker-dealers had more than six total disclosures, and 5% had more than 20 disclosures.

These numbers illustrate a real and growing problem in the securities industry. These repeat offenders are swindling seniors out of their hard-earned retirement funds, looting our kids’ custodial accounts, and diverting assets from charities and religious organizations. But despite our best efforts, they manage to stay in the industry and continue to wreak havoc on the investing public.

I would be remiss if I did not point out that a common misconception is that this is exclusively or even primarily a broker-dealer problem rather than an investment adviser problem as well. In reality, there are plenty of repeat offenders at investment advisory firms who are engaging in misconduct. We’re just not finding them as quickly because the SEC allocates a disproportionate amount of resources to policing the activities of broker-dealers when compared to those we expend policing investment advisers. There are nearly three times as many investment advisors registered with the SEC than there are broker dealers: approximately 11,100 investment advisors versus about 4,300 broker-dealers. This is due in large part to unfunded mandates imposed upon the SEC by Title IV of Dodd-Frank. Even more importantly in the context of resource allocation, there is no SRO interposed between the adviser industry and the SEC like there is for broker-dealers.

I worry that this has created the unfortunate side effect of underreported investment advisor rule violations, inappropriately skewing our enforcement statistics by revealing a disproportionate amount of problems on the broker-dealer side. Simply put, it is impossible to separate the fact that we find many more broker-dealer violations than investment advisor violations from the fact that thanks to the assistance of the SROs, we examine a greater proportion of broker-dealers than investment advisors.

One way to address this imbalance would be to provide for third party examiners of investment advisors—including, potentially, defining the term “third party” to include SROs in order to allow the SROs currently involved in broker-dealer oversight to conduct examinations of “dual hatted” investment advisors as well.[4] In the past, questions regarding the wisdom of creating an SRO for investment advisors have been addressed in a binary sense: should the Commission push Congress to create an SRO for investment advisors, or keep things as they are? Leveraging the current resources and expertise of broker-dealer SROs to assist in investment advisor examinations could greatly facilitate our ability to examine advisors without undertaking the daunting project, with Congress, of creating a new investment advisor SRO out of whole cloth.

Regardless of how we do so, enhancing our ability to examine investment advisors would also serve the critical purpose of allowing us to have informed deliberations on Section 913 of Dodd-Frank Act. Section 913, as you may know, authorized, but did not require, the Commission to adopt rules establishing a duty of care for brokers-dealers that is no less stringent than that which applies to investment advisors and to undertake further efforts to harmonize the two regulatory regimes.[5]

Mind you, as with so many Dodd-Frank requirements, Section 913 has absolutely nothing to do with the financial crisis, but as we proved in the case of conflict mineral disclosure, that may not dissuade the Commission from pursuing a rulemaking. Indeed, it is becoming painfully obvious that many special interest groups and members of the Administration believe this is a terrific election year issue to pursue. As an independent agency, the SEC should never be persuaded by such political forces.

And, although many in Washington seem to have concluded after the high profile issuance of the Volcker Rule that Dodd-Frank rulemaking is “done,” the Commission still needs to complete almost 60 mandated Dodd-Frank rulemakings. In addition to these rulemakings, which include key elements of Title VII derivatives regulation and the removal of references to credit ratings from Commission rules, the Commission still has significant—and well overdue—work to do on implementing the JOBS Act. And, by the way, we still have eight decades worth of securities laws to administer on a daily basis and critical projects on the horizon such as a much needed holistic equity market structure review, and critical reforms in the fixed income markets, such as the disclosure of riskless principal markups.

In light of this agenda, I question the wisdom of rushing into purely discretionary Section 913 rulemaking, especially when the purported substantive impetus is the potentially false narrative that broker-dealers represent a greater potential threat to retail investors than investment advisors. The truth is that we simply don’t know whether or not that is the case. There have been far too many laws and regulations that stemmed directly from false narratives of the financial crisis and its causes. The Commission should slow down and get all of the facts before adding to the long list of rules resulting from these false narratives.

* * *

So what is the SEC doing to curb the abuses perpetrated by the recidivist bad actors I mentioned, whether on the broker-dealer or investment advisor side? I am pleased to report that in recent years, the agency has made great strides in developing programmatic and technological tools aimed at efficiently ferreting out the most egregious misconduct and identifying those individuals and firms most likely to be recidivists.

Some of the most exciting developments are coming out of OCIE under the able leadership of Drew Bowden. Drew’s dedicated and talented staff has developed a number of innovative tools that have moved the examination program into the 21st Century and enabled the staff to surgically and efficiently zero in on potential abuses.

For example, OCIE’s Risk Assessment and Surveillance group, which is responsible for identifying candidates for examination among registered entities, has developed new analytics to track the migratory patterns of registered representatives. Using public disclosures—including U4 and U5 filings and other data from the SROs—the team can track industry professionals who are hopping from firm to firm and single out firms that appear to be havens for individuals with long rap sheets of customer complaints and disciplinary actions. This targeted approach to risk assessment enables our examiners to immediately identify the statistical outliers who are most likely to engage in misconduct.

OCIE’s boots-on-the-ground examiners also have been deploying a new analytics tool, the National Exam Analytics Program, that allows them to review massive amounts of registrant data in a matter of minutes. Rather than relying on a small sample of activity for a few dozen accounts over a compressed time period, OCIE examiners can import a registrant’s entire trade blotter for multiple years and immediately generate over 50 types of customized reports identifying potential red flags for account churning, excessive commissions, P&L irregularities, suspect asset allocation, front running, and even insider trading.

Complementing these efforts is OCIE’s Risk Analysis Examination initiative, which uses advanced analytics to examine data from the largest clearing firms and broker-dealers to identify potentially problematic trends industry-wide. In 2013 alone, this group reviewed hundreds of millions of transactions by more than 500 firms, including trading data that enables OCIE to target for examination broker-dealer firms that appear to be systematically engaged in high pressure sales tactics and excessive trading. With this data, we are able to zero in on firms that are, in essence, nothing more than a criminal enterprise designed to separate investors from their money.

The best part of the story is that all of these tools were developed in-house by the SEC staff. They have revolutionized the way our teams conduct examinations and have done much to level the playing field in terms of our ability to root out potential misconduct by recidivists.

And, OCIE isn’t the only arm of the agency making progress in this area. Under the strong leadership of Director Andrew Ceresney, the Division of Enforcement has made several programmatic changes that have greatly enhanced the SEC’s efforts in identifying and combatting the worst recidivists.

Perhaps most noteworthy is the creation of a task force late last year, a group near and dear to me, to focus on broker-dealer enforcement issues. Among other initiatives, this new task force will coordinate with OCIE and FINRA to target misconduct by “rogue” registered representatives with prior disciplinary histories or customer complaints.

My hope and expectation is that the task force will complement the work of the two specialty units created by the Division of Enforcement in 2010: the Asset Management Unit, which investigates misconduct by investment advisors, investment companies, and private funds, and the Market Abuse Unit, which focuses on difficult-to-detect frauds in which honest investors are bilked without ever knowing anything is amiss. Working collaboratively both inside and outside of the agency, these groups are making substantial progress in identifying and rooting out misconduct by the worst of the bad actors.

* * *

There is no question that we are making real progress on these issues, but more needs to be done to send a forceful message to the bottom dwellers of the securities industry that their behavior will not be tolerated. As I’ve illustrated today, the SEC has a number of tools to combat abuses by recidivists, but we need to make sure that we are using them in the most efficient manner possible and that the tools we have are sufficient for the task.

Most importantly, the agency needs to take aggressive action aimed at permanently expelling the worst offenders from the securities industry. All too often, we see the same individuals and firms featured prominently in examination reports and enforcement actions. As an agency, we need to seek out the repeat offenders and revoke their licenses and registrations rather than repeatedly mete out injunctions that can be violated and penalties that can be paid from the fruits of misconduct. Unless we put these offenders out of the industry for good, they will continue to take advantage of retail investors.

With respect to the most egregious and recidivist violations of our securities laws and regulations, whether by broker-dealers or investment advisors, we need to ask ourselves a fundamental question: should the violating entity retain the privilege of participating in our capital markets? Unbeknownst to many, both the Exchange Act and the Investment Advisers Act authorize the Commission to deregister entities if it finds such action to be in the public interest, although we have rarely done so.[6] This authority, of course, should only be invoked after full due process has been afforded to the entity in question, but it should indeed be invoked when appropriate. I have seen several instances in which I believe it would be appropriate since I’ve been a Commissioner.

As a federal agency charged with protecting investors, the SEC needs to make such existential threats—and, where appropriate, deliver on them—in the most egregious circumstances. Otherwise, the cockroaches of the industry will continue to abuse the system, shrugging off the well-meaning but all too often ineffective remedial actions taken against them.

* * *

In closing, I want to convey my sincere belief that most of the men and women who work as professionals in the securities industry have proven themselves worthy of that privilege by conducting themselves with honesty and integrity. The unparalleled strength of our capital markets is in large part the product of the work ethic and high moral character of the professionals who work with the millions of individual and institutional investors that participate in those markets.

Unfortunately, the stability, security, and attractiveness of our markets are all too easily tainted by the misconduct of a handful of reprehensible miscreants who abuse the system time and time again. Working as a registered broker-dealer representative or an investment adviser representative, holding a securities license, or operating a securities firm are privileges that carry with them a heavy responsibility, privileges that can and should be taken away in cases of abuse. As an agency, the SEC needs to lead the way in targeting and eradicating the worst offenders from the markets altogether.

Once again, thank you for this opportunity to share my thoughts with you, and I wish you an enjoyable and productive conference.


[1] The Large Firm Project, A Review of Hiring, Retention and Supervisory Practices, Divisions of Market Regulation and Enforcement, United States Securities and Exchange Commission, May 1994, available at http://www.sec.gov/news/studies/rogue.txt.

[2] Regulator Deletes Red Flags From Brokers’ Records, Says Study, Wall St. Jrnl., March 7, 2014, available at http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424052702304554004579423270046013550.

[3] Plan to Fix Cracks in Broker Records — Wall Street Regulator to Propose Rules for Background Checks, Measures to Identify Red Flags, Wall St. Jrnl., Apr. 16, 2014, available at http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB20001424052702303887804579503653564597512?mg=reno64-wsj%26url=http%3A%2F%2Fonline.wsj.com%2Farticle%2FSB20001424052702303887804579503653564597512.html.

[4] See Jim Angel, On the Regulation of Investment Advisory Services: Where Do We Go from Here?, available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1951991.

[5] Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 913, 124 Stat. 1376, 1824 (2010) (requiring analysis and rulemaking regarding fiduciary obligations of investment advisers and broker-dealers).

[6] See 15 U.S.C. 78o(b)(4) (stating that the Commission “shall . . . revoke the registration of any broker or dealer if it finds . . .[that such] revocation is in the public interest and that such broker or dealer” committed certain actions enumerated in the statute); 15 U.S.C. 80b-3(e) (stating that the Commission “shall . . . revoke the registration of any investment adviser if it finds . . .[that such] revocation is in the public interest and that such investment adviser” committed certain actions enumerated in the statute).

Sunday, March 30, 2014

SEC COMMISSIONER GALLAGHER ON FEDERAL PREEMPTIONS OF STATE CORPORATE GOVERNANCE

FROM:  U.S. SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION 
Remarks at the 26th Annual Corporate Law Institute, Tulane University Law School: Federal Preemption of State Corporate Governance
 Commissioner Daniel M. Gallagher
New Orleans, LA
March 27, 2014

Thank you, David [Katz], for that kind introduction.  I’m very pleased to be here with you this afternoon.

In April 2010, when my friend and former colleague Troy Paredes spoke at this conference, he expressed his misgivings about the draft legislation moving through Congress that ultimately became the Dodd-Frank Act.[i]  Today, nearly four years after its enactment, the fundamentally flawed nature of the Act has become clear—or, to those of us who recognized its many faults from the start, clearer.

Title I of Dodd-Frank, for example, created the apparently unaccountable and inherently politicized Financial Stability Oversight Council, or FSOC.  The FSOC is dominated by bank regulators, and Title I authorizes it to designate non-bank financial services companies as systemically important financial institutions, thereby making them subject to prudential regulation.  This can happen without regard for whether that regulatory paradigm is appropriate for non-bank entities operating in the capital markets—or, as I like to call them, the “non-centrally controlled” markets.

I believe it is important for the SEC and other capital markets regulators to openly debate and resist where necessary the encroachment of the bank regulatory paradigm into the capital markets.  I hope that market participants and lawmakers will join the debate about the proper regulatory framework for non-bank markets.  To be clear, this is not a partisan issue.  The structure of FSOC vests tremendous authority to appointees from the President’s party.  Those who enthusiastically support FSOC today may well be singing a different tune upon a change in administration.

I should also make clear that I’m not motivated by turf wars or empire building.  In fact, I believe the SEC should be willing to recognize areas where we should be the ones to stand down in favor of an alternative legal regime that is a better fit.

And so today I’d like to focus on an area where the SEC should be taking less of a role:  the regulation of corporate governance.

I.          Federalization of Corporate Governance
Unfortunately, the trend towards increased federalization of corporate governance law seems well-entrenched.[ii]  The Sarbanes-Oxley Act included significant incursions into state corporate governance regulation, but Title IX of Dodd-Frank may cause some of you to long for the simpler days of SOX § 404.

Title IX mandates an array of new federal regulations relating to matters traditionally left to state corporate governance law, the most infamous being a requirement to hold a shareholder vote on executive compensation, or “say on pay.”  Concerns that a negative vote may harm a company’s reputation or encourage litigation can lead companies to expend significant resources to guarantee passage of the vote.  Even more concerning, boards of directors could substitute proxy advisors’ views on pay for their own judgment as a means of minimizing potential conflict.

And that’s just one of the new Dodd-Frank requirements encroaching on corporate governance.  Others include the politically-motivated pay ratio disclosure requirement, proposed by a majority of the Commission in September 2013,[iii] as well as mandated rules micromanaging certain incentive-based compensation structures, which were proposed jointly with other regulators, again by a majority of the Commission, in March 2011.[iv]  In addition, Dodd-Frank calls for rules regarding compensation clawbacks in the event of an accounting restatement, pay for performance, and employee and director hedging of company stock.

Some of these requirements unashamedly interfere in corporate governance matters traditionally and appropriately left to the states.  Others masquerade as disclosure, but are in reality attempts to affect substantive behavior through disclosure regulation.  This mandated intrusion into corporate governance will impose substantial compliance costs on companies, along with a one-size-fits-all approach that will likely result in a one-size-fits-none model instead.  This stands in stark contrast with the flexibility traditionally achieved through private ordering under more open-ended state legal regimes.

II.        Shareholder Proposals
One area where the SEC’s incursions into corporate governance have had a particularly negative effect is shareholder proposals.

1.         The Problem
While the conduct of the annual shareholder meeting is generally governed by state law, the process of communicating with shareholders to solicit proxies for voting at that meeting is regulated by the Commission.  The Commission’s rules have for decades permitted qualifying shareholders to require the company to publish certain proposals in the company’s proxy statement, which are then voted upon at the annual meeting.

Unfortunately, the Commission has never adequately assessed the costs and benefits of this process.  Currently, a proponent can bring a shareholder proposal if he or she has owned $2,000 or 1% of the company’s stock for one year, so long as the proposal complies with a handful of substantive—but in some cases discretionary—requirements.  Activist investors and corporate gadflies have used these loose rules to hijack the shareholder proposal system.

The data and statistics are striking.  In 2013, the number of shareholder proposals rose,[v] with an amazing 41% of those proposals addressing social and environmental issues.[vi]  And while proposals calling for disclosure of political contributions or lobbying activities continued to predominate,[vii] these proposals received particularly poor support from shareholders.[viii]  Overall, only 7% of shareholder proposals received majority support in 2013.[ix]

These proposals are not coming from ordinary shareholders concerned with promoting shareholder value for all investors.  Rather, they are predominantly from organized labor, including union pension funds, which brought approximately 34% of last year’s shareholder proposals, as well as social or policy investors and religious institutions, which accounted for about 25% of 2013’s proposals.  Approximately 40% were brought by an array of corporate gadflies, with a staggering 24% of those proposals brought by just two individuals.[x]

In other words, the vast majority of proposals are brought by individuals or institutions with idiosyncratic and often political agendas that are often unrelated to, or in conflict with, the interests of other shareholders.  I find it particularly notable that corporations that donated more funds to Republicans than to Democrats were more than twice as likely to be targeted with political spending disclosure proposals sponsored by labor-affiliated funds.[xi]

Astonishingly, only 1% of proposals are brought by ordinary institutional investors—including hedge funds.  As you all know, hedge funds are not shy about elbowing their way into the boardroom when they believe a shake-up is overdue.  The low level of hedge fund activism here implies that their concerns with corporate management are being addressed using avenues other than shareholder proposals—as most legitimate concerns can be.[xii]

Given all of this, it’s time we asked whether the shareholder proposal system as currently designed is a net negative for the average investor.[xiii]

2.         Needed Reforms
a.         Who should be able to bring a proposal?
All of this isn’t to condemn shareholder activism per se.  I’ll leave that debate to Marty Lipton and Lucian Bebchuk.  But existing shareholders who are unhappy with management have a range of well-accepted responses other than proposals.  Given the depth and liquidity of today’s markets, passive investors can simply sell their position—taking the s0-called “Wall Street Walk.”  Activist investors can threaten to take this Walk as a means of influencing management.  Investors can also vote against directors who are not sufficiently overseeing management—this strategy doesn’t have a clever name, but perhaps “vote the bums out” will do.

And, of course, where management is breaching its fiduciary duties, investors can have recourse to the courts.  This “see you in court” strategy is particularly viable given the outstanding job the Delaware courts do, day in and day out, in refereeing disputes between shareholders and management.  Given these and other strategies, I’m not sure we need shareholder proposals at all.

But if we must have shareholder proposals, the SEC’s rules can and should do a better job ensuring that activist investors don’t crowd out everyday and long-term investors—and that their causes aren’t inconsistent with the promotion of shareholder value.

One thing is clear:  we can’t continue to take the approach of our current regulatory program, especially the all too liberal program of the last five years, and simply err on the side of over-inclusion.  It is enormously expensive for companies to manage shareholder proposals.  They must negotiate with proponents, seek SEC no-action to exclude improper ones, form and articulate views in support or opposition in the proxy, include the proposal and the statement in the proxy itself, then take the vote on it at the annual meeting.  Conversely, companies can simply fold and acquiesce to the activists’ demands.  Both approaches are costly, and these costs are borne by all shareholders.  Taking money out of the pocket of someone investing for retirement or their child’s education and using it instead to subsidize activist agendas is simply inexcusable.  It is incumbent on the Commission to create a regulatory environment that promotes shareholder value over special interest agendas.  I have a few suggestions.

First, the holding requirement to submit proxies should be updated.  $2,000 is absurdly low, and was not subject to meaningful economic analysis when adopted.[xiv]  The threshold should be substantially more, by orders of magnitude:  perhaps $200,000 or even better, $2 million.  But I don’t believe that this is actually the right fix:  a flat number is inherently over- or under-inclusive, depending on the company’s size.  A percentage threshold by contrast is scalable, varies less over time, better aligns with the way that many companies manage their shareholder relations, and is more consistent with the Commission’s existing requirements.  Therefore, I believe the flat dollar test should be dropped, leaving only a percentage test.

Of course, we’d have to make sure we get the percentage holding requirement right.  Requiring a sufficient economic stake in the company could lead to proposals that focus on promoting shareholder value rather than those championed by gadflies with only a nominal stake in the company.  We would need to apply rigorous economic analysis to determine what percentage would be an appropriate default, as well as what factors should be taken into account when deviating from that default.  This could be an opportunity to address the practice of “proposal by proxy,” where the proponent of a resolution—typically one of the corporate gadflies—has no skin in the game, but rather receives permission to act “on behalf” of a shareholder that meets the threshold.  While I would support banning proposal by proxy, we could also consider alternatives such as requiring a proponent acting on behalf of one or more shareholders to meet a higher percentage threshold of outstanding shares than would be the case for a proponent who owns the shares directly.

I also think we need to take another look at the length of the holding requirement.  A one-year holding period is hardly a serious impediment to some activists, who can easily buy into a company solely for the purpose of bringing a proposal.  All that’s needed is a bit of patience, and perhaps a hedge.  A longer investment period could help curtail some of this gamesmanship.

Making adjustments along these lines will go a long way towards ensuring that the proposals that make it onto the proxy are brought by shareholders concerned first and foremost about the company—and the value of their investments in that company—not their pet projects.

b.         What issues should proponents be able to raise?
I also believe that we need to do a better job setting requirements as to the substance of proposals.  While I don’t think a complete reevaluation of the existing categories for exclusion is necessary, we do need to re-think their application.

For example, the “ordinary business” criterion for exclusion in our rules has been perennially problematic.[xv]  This provision permits exclusion of a proposal that deals with the company’s “ordinary business operations,” unless it raises “significant policy issues.”  However, these terms are not defined and the Commission has given no guidance, leaving the Staff to fend for itself in determining whether to issue no-action relief pursuant to the provision.

As a result, we have seen a number of dubious “significant policy issue” proposals.  For example, in 2013 the Staff denied no-action relief to PNC Bank with respect to a proposal requesting a report on greenhouse gas emissions resulting from its lending portfolio, on the grounds that climate change is a significant policy issue—arguably a reversal of a prior Staff position.[xvi]  And, in 2012, Staff denials of no-action relief forced AT&T, Verizon, and Sprint to include a net neutrality proposal, even though proposals on that same topic were excludable in prior years as ordinary business.  That year, 94% of AT&T shareholders voted “no” on the net neutrality proposal despite the best efforts of Michael Diamond, who some of you will know as Mike D. of the Beastie Boys—who, by helping to bring the proposal to a vote, at least succeeded in his fight for the right to proxy.[xvii]

It is a disservice to the Staff—and, more importantly to investors—when the Commission promulgates a discretion-based rule for the Staff to administer without providing guidance as to how to exercise that discretion.  In addition to providing better guidance, the Commission needs to become more involved in the administration of this rule.  In particular, I believe that the Commission should be the final arbiter on the types of proposals for which the Staff proposes to deny no-action relief on “significant policy issue” grounds.  The Presidential appointees should vote on these often-thorny policy issues and not hide behind the Staff.

We also need to take another look at the rule which permits the exclusion of proposals that are contrary to the Commission’s proxy rules—including proposals that are materially false and misleading or that are overly vague.[xviii]  In Staff Legal Bulletin 14B, issued in 2004,[xix] the Staff curtailed the use of this ground for exclusion in light of the extensive Staff resources that were being consumed in their line-by-line review of shareholder proposals, instead forcing issuers to use their statement in opposition to take issue with factual inaccuracies or vagueness.[xx]  I believe issuers have raised some legitimate concerns with this approach.  For example, while issuers are not legally responsible for the proposals or statements in support, they are still being forced to publish, in their proxy, statements they believe are false or misleading.  Moreover, use of the statement in opposition is sometimes an incomplete remedy.  Taking valuable space to correct misstatements distracts from a substantive discussion about the proposal itself, and proposals that are overly vague make it difficult to draft a sensible rebuttal.

In light of these competing concerns, I believe the pendulum has swung too far in the direction of non-intervention.  And I’m not alone in this belief.  Recently, a district court in Missouri granted summary judgment to Express Scripts, permitting it to exclude a proposal that contained four separate misstatements.[xxi]  While I support companies exercising their right to take matters to the court system,[xxii] which can serve as a useful external check on the SEC’s no-action process, companies shouldn’t have to go through the time and expense of litigation to vindicate their substantive rights under our rules.  The burden to ensure that a submission is clear and factually accurate should be placed on the proponent, not the company.  I believe that the Staff should take a more aggressive posture toward proponents that fail to meet that burden.  And I hope issuers would refrain from using our rule to quibble over minutiae.  If this happy medium is not achievable, I believe the SEC needs to revisit our rules:  we as a Commission either need to give the Staff the capacity to enforce the rule as it is currently written, or craft a rule that is enforceable.

c.         How many times may a proposal be repeated?
The final issue I want to raise today with respect to the shareholder proposal process is the frequency of reproposals.  Currently, once a proposal is required to be included in the proxy, it can be resubmitted for years to come, even if it never comes close to commanding majority support.  Proposals need only 3, 6, or 10% of votes in support to stay alive, depending on whether the proposal has been brought once, twice, or three times or more in the past five years.[xxiii]  So a proposal that gets a bare 10% of the votes, year after year, is not excludable on that basis under our current rules.  Such proposals are an enormous waste of time and shareholder money.

We need to substantially strengthen the resubmission thresholds, perhaps by taking a “three strikes and you’re out” policy.  That is, if a proposal fails in its third year to garner majority support, the proposal should be excludable for the following 5 years.  The thresholds for the prior 2 years should be high enough to demonstrate that the proposal is realistically on the path toward 50%, for example, 5% and 20%.

3.         Conclusion
Implementing these kinds of reforms can, I believe, help provide some much-needed improvement to the shareholder proposal system.  I hope the Commission can consider such common-sense issues in the near future.  These are real and substantial issues, and the Commission has the authority to effectuate needed change.  We should not dare Congress to intervene due to our inaction, as it had to with the JOBS Act.

III.       Remaining the Right Regulator
Finally, I want to return to my original theme:  good government requires that, when we must regulate, we should do so in the most efficient manner possible.  This means assigning the right regulator to the issue and minimizing unnecessary regulatory overlap.  And of course, the Commission must continue to ensure that its regulatory approach advances its core goals of investor protection and the promotion of efficiency, competition, and capital formation.

That means, for example, pressing ahead with much-needed reforms to our corporate disclosure requirements to ensure that our filings provide investors with the information they need to make informed investment decisions and are not overwhelmed by extraneous information—like conflict minerals reports.

We must also take exception to efforts by third parties that attempt to prescribe what should be in corporate filings.  It is the Commission’s responsibility to set the parameters of required disclosure.

The somewhat confusingly-named Sustainability Accounting Standards Board provides a good example of an outside party attempting to prescribe disclosure standards.  I say “confusingly-named” because the SASB does not actually promulgate accounting standards, nor does it limit itself to sustainability topics, although I suppose it is in fact a Board.  The SASB argues that its disclosure standards elicit material information that management should assess for inclusion in companies’ periodic filings with the Commission.[xxiv]

I don’t mean to single out the SASB, but it’s important to stress that, with the sole exception of financial accounting—where the Commission, as authorized by Congress, has recognized the standards of the Financial Accounting Standards Board as generally accepted, and therefore required under Regulation S‑X—the Commission does not and should not delegate to outside, non-governmental bodies the responsibility for setting disclosure requirements.  So while companies are free to make whatever disclosures they choose on their own time, so to speak, it is important to remember that groups like SASB have no role in the establishment of mandated disclosure requirements.

With respect to information that the Commission requires to be included in filings, we need to be sure that our requirements are eliciting decision-useful and up-to-date information.  We should be willing to reexamine all of our disclosure requirements.  Indeed, the Commission should be engaged in a comprehensive program of periodic re-assessment of its disclosure rules to ensure that the benefits of disclosure continue to justify its often-substantial costs.

This is of course a tall order, but I know the fine men and women who serve the public at the Commission are up for the challenge.

* * *

Thank you all for your time and attention today, and I hope you enjoy the rest of the conference.


  [i]       See Troy A. Paredes, Speech by SEC Commissioner:  Remarks at the 22nd Annual Tulane Corporate Law Institute (Apr. 15, 2010), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/2010/spch041510tap.htm.

  [ii]       See Daniel M. Gallagher, Speech, Remarks before the Corporate Directors Forum (Jan. 29, 2013), available at www.sec.gov/News/Speech/Detail/Speech/1365171492142; see also, e.g., J. Robert Brown, Jr., The Politicization of Corporate Governance:  Bureaucratic Discretion, the SEC, and Shareholder Ratification of Auditors, 2 Harv. Bus. L. Rev. 61, 62 (2012).

  [iii]      Rel. 33-9452, Pay Ratio Disclosure (Sept. 18, 2013).

  [iv]      Rel. 34-64140, Incentive-based Compensation Arrangements (Mar. 29, 2011).

  [v]       James R. Copeland & Margaret M. O’Keefe, Proxy Monitor 2013:  A Report on Corporate Governance and Shareholder Activism (Manhattan Institute, Fall 2013) at 2 (average Fortune 250 company faced 1.26 proposals in 2013 versus 1.22 in 2012); Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher LLP, Shareholder Proposal Developments During the 2013 Proxy Season (July 9, 2013) at 1 (noting more proposals in 2013 (~820) than 2012 (~739)).

  [vi]      Proxy Monitor 2013 at 7.

  [vii]     Proxy Monitor 2013 at 12 (“[P]roposals related to corporate political spending or lobbying have been more numerous than any other class of proposal in each of the last two years.”).

  [viii]     ISS reports political contribution/lobbying activity approval percentage at 29%, an increase of 7.3% over 2012.  See Gibson Dunn at 6.  However, Proxy Monitor finds the opposite trend, at least with respect to the Fortune 250 companies.  See Proxy Monitor 2013 at 2.  Specifically, disaggregating lobbying and political spending proposals shows a decline in y-o-y support for both proposal classes:  22% in 2012 to 20% in 2013 for lobbying, and 17% to 16% for political spending.  Id.  But a change in the mix of proposals—there were more lobbying-related proposals, which typically garner higher support, given that 2013 is a non-election year—creates the impression of an increasing overall rate.

  [ix]      Proxy Monitor 2013 at 2 (contrasting with 9% in 2012).

  [x]       Proxy Monitor 2013 at 6–7.

  [xi]      Proxy Monitor 2013 at 8 (“Those companies [giving at least $1.5 million to candidates or PACs], as a group, were much more likely to be targeted by shareholder proposals introduced by labor-affiliated pension funds in 2013: 44 percent of these politically most active companies faced a labor-sponsored proposal, as opposed to only 18 percent of all other companies.  What’s more, those corporations that gave at least half of their donations to support Republicans were more than twice as likely to be targeted by shareholder proposals sponsored by labor-affiliated funds as those companies that gave a majority of their politics-related contributions on behalf of Democrats.”).

  [xii]     James R. Copeland, Proxy Monitor 2011: A Report on Corporate Governance and Shareholder Activism (Manhattan Institute, Sept. 2011) at 4.

  [xiii]     Allan T. Ingraham & Anna Koyfman, Analysis of the Wealth Effects of Shareholder Proposals–Vol. III (U.S. Chamber of Commerce, May 2, 2013).

  [xiv]     See Rel. 34-40018, Amendments to Rules on Shareholder Proposals (May 21, 1998) (describing the change from $1,000 to $2,000 as an adjustment for inflation).

  [xv]     Exchange Act Rule 14a‑8(i)(7).

  [xvi]     See, e.g., Hunton & Williams, Client Alert, SEC Refused to Allow Bank to Omit Climate Change Proposal from Proxy Materials (Mar. 2013).  It has been argued, however, that PNC was not a reversal, but rather was driven by some substantive differences with PNC’s lending portfolio.  See Gibson Dunn at 9–10 (citing a “SEC spokesman” commenting to that effect).  This may indicate a need for the Staff to provide fuller statements of their reasoning in no-action letters, so as to avoid confusion among practitioners and the public.

  [xvii]    See Larry Downes, AT&T, Verizon, and Sprint Net Neutrality Proposals: Simply Awful, Forbes.com (Apr. 12, 2012, updated Apr. 27, 2012), at http://www.forbes.com/sites/larrydownes/2012/04/12/att-verizon-and-sprint-net-neutrality-proposals-simply-awful/.

  [xviii]   Exchange Act Rule 14a‑8(i)(3).

  [xix]     See SLB 14B (2004).

  [xx]     Of 90 denials of exclusion during the 2013 proxy season, 63% of them had raised (i)(3) arguments.  Gibson Dunn at 2.  While there could be several reasons for this trend, it calls for further examination.

  [xxi]     Express Scripts Holding Co. v. Chevedden, No. 4:13-CV-2520-JAR (E.D. Mo., Feb. 18, 2014).

  [xxii]    See Waste Connections v. Chevedden, No. 13-20336, slip op. (5th Cir., Feb. 13, 2014) (affirming court’s subject matter jurisdiction over company’s declaratory judgment action despite Chevedden’s promise not to sue if company excluded the proposal).

  [xxiii]   See Exchange Act Rule 14a‑8(i)(12).

  [xxiv]   See, e.g., SASB, Commercial Banks Sustainability Accounting Standard, Provisional Version (Feb. 2014) (“SASB Standards are comprised of (1) disclosure guidance and (2) accounting standards on sustainability topics for use by U.S. and foreign public companies in their annual filings (Form 10-K or 20-F) with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC).  To the extent relevant, SASB Standards may also be applicable to other periodic mandatory fillings with the SEC, such as the Form 10-Q, Form S-1, and Form 8-K.  SASB’s disclosure guidance identifies sustainability topics at an industry level, which may be material—depending on a company’s specific operating context—to a company within that industry.  Each company is ultimately responsible for determining which information is material and is therefore required to be included in its Form 10-K or 20-F and other periodic SEC filings.”).

Saturday, March 22, 2014

CFTC CHARGES COMPANY, OWNER WITH ILLEGAL, OFF-EXCHANGE TRANSACTIONS

FROM:  COMMODITY FUTURES TRADING COMMISSION 
CFTC Charges Florida-Based Gold Distributors Inc. and Its Owner, Jordan Cain, with Engaging in Illegal, Off-exchange Commodity Transactions

Washington, DC – The U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) today announced that it filed a civil injunctive enforcement action in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Florida against Defendants Gold Distributors Inc. (GDI) of Hallandale Beach, Florida, and its sole owner, Jordan Cain of Miami, Florida. The CFTC Complaint charges the Defendants with engaging in illegal, off-exchange financed transactions in precious metals with retail customers.

According to the Complaint, between January 2012 and February 2013, GDI and Cain solicited retail customers by telephone and in person to buy physical precious metals, such as gold and silver, in off-exchange leverage transactions. Customers paid GDI a portion of the purchase price for the metals, and another entity, AmeriFirst Management, LLC (AmeriFirst), financed the remainder of the purchase price, while charging the customers interest on the amount they purportedly loaned to customers, the Complaint alleges.

Retail customers engaging in financed transactions with GDI were told that they were borrowing money to purchase precious metals, according to the Complaint. Under the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010 (Dodd-Frank), financed transactions such as those conducted by GDI, are illegal off-exchange transactions unless they result in actual delivery of metal within 28 days. The Complaint alleges that GDI’s customers never took delivery of the precious metals they purportedly purchased.

The Complaint further alleges that when GDI engaged in these illegal transactions it was acting as a dealer for metals merchant AmeriFirst, which the CFTC charged with fraud and other violations in federal court in Florida on July 30, 2013 (see CFTC Press Release 6655-13). As alleged in the CFTC Complaint against AmeriFirst and the Complaint in this case, neither GDI nor AmeriFirst purchased or held metal on the customers’ behalf. The Complaint alleges that Defendants’ customers thus never owned, possessed, or received title to the physical commodities that they believed they purchased. Cain, as the owner, operator and controlling person of GDI, is liable for GDI’s violations of the Commodity Exchange Act and CFTC Regulations, according to the Complaint.

In its continuing litigation, the CFTC seeks disgorgement of ill-gotten gains, restitution for the benefit of defrauded customers, civil monetary penalties, permanent registration and trading bans, and a permanent injunction from future violations of federal commodities laws, as charged.

CFTC Division of Enforcement staff members responsible for this action are Nathan B. Ploener, Christopher Giglio, Lenel Hickson, Jr., and Manal M. Sultan.

Wednesday, March 5, 2014

SEC COMMISSIONER GALLAGHER'S REMARKS AT INSTITUTE OF INTERNATIONAL BANKERS CONFERENCE

FROM:  SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION 
Remarks Given at the Institute of International Bankers 25th Annual Washington Conference
 Commissioner Daniel M. Gallagher
U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission
Washington, D.C.

March 3, 2014

Thank you, Roger [Blissett].

Before I begin, I’d like to point out that two years ago, I spoke at this conference and discussed the Financial Stability Oversight Council, or FSOC, in great detail.  I spoke about the inherently political nature of FSOC, how it had been vested with tremendous power, and how it could threaten our capital markets.  So, given everything that has happened since then, I have to say: I told you so.[1]

Today, I’d like to share some thoughts about regulatory capital requirements.  I’ve spoken before about the significant differences between bank capital and broker-dealer capital, because I fear that these distinctions are all too often overlooked in the debates over regulatory capital.  After all, in order to come up with the right answers on how to set capital requirements, we need to ask the right questions – and that’s impossible without a proper understanding of the important differences between broker-dealer and bank capital requirements.  Those differences are fundamental, and we ignore them at our peril.

In many ways, the philosophy of bank capital is easier to understand.  In the banking sector, which features leveraged institutions operating in a principal capacity, capital requirements are designed with the goal of enhancing safety and soundness, both for individual banks and for the banking system as a whole.  Bank capital requirements serve as an important cushion against unexpected losses.  They incentivize banks to operate in a prudent manner by placing the bank owners’ equity at risk in the event of a failure.  They serve, in short, to reduce risk and protect against failure, and they reduce the potential that taxpayers will be required to backstop the bank in a time of stress.

Capital requirements for broker-dealers, however, serve a different purpose, one that, to be fair, can be somewhat counterintuitive.  The capital markets within which broker-dealers operate are premised on risk-taking – ideally, informed risks freely chosen in pursuit of a greater return on investments.  In the capital markets, there is no opportunity without risk – and that means real risk, with a real potential for losses.  Whereas bank capital requirements are based on the reduction of risk and the avoidance of failure, broker-dealer capital requirements are designed to manage risk – and the corresponding potential for failure - by providing enough of a cushion to ensure that a failed broker-dealer can liquidate in an orderly manner, allowing for the transfer of customer assets to another broker-dealer.

As I said, it’s counterintuitive, but the possibility – and the reality – of failure is part of our capital markets.  Indeed, our capital markets are too big – as well as vibrant, fluid, and resilient – not to allow for failure.  Our job as capital markets regulators is to accept the inevitability that some brokerage firms will fail and to craft a capital regime that fully protects customers in the event of such failures.  A safety-and-soundness bank-based capital regime simply doesn’t work in the context of capital markets.

To put it another way, when you deposit a dollar into a bank account, you expect to get that dollar back, plus a bit of interest.  We place our savings into bank accounts for safekeeping, and while we know that the bank makes use of our funds, we also know that we are entitled to receive all of our principal back – and bank capital requirements, along with government backstops, are designed to ensure the availability of that principal.  When you invest a dollar through a broker-dealer account, however, the market determines how much you get back.  You could break even, you could double your investment, or, of course, you could lose part or all of that initial investment.  The point is that when we make a bank deposit, we expect, at a minimum, to receive the entirety of our principal back, while when we make an investment, we expect the market to dictate what we receive in return. It stands to reason, therefore, that the capital requirements for broker-dealers must be tailored accordingly.

I’m sure you didn’t need an SEC Commissioner to explain to you the difference between a deposit and an investment.  And yet, when it comes to setting capital requirements, bank regulators seem increasingly determined to seek a one-size-fits-all regulatory construct for financial institutions.  In addition, as noted by my friend Peter Wallison in an important recent op-ed in The Hill, both the Dodd-Frank-created FSOC and the G-20-created – and bank regulator dominated – Financial Stability Board seem intent on applying the bank regulatory model to all financial institutions they deem to be systemically important.[2]

Traditionally, the Fed, as the nation’s central bank, has been known more for its role as the lender of last resort to banks than as a regulator.  By offering access to its discount window to illiquid, but not insolvent, banks offering good collateral, the Fed can provide crucial liquidity and stabilize otherwise solvent banks in times of difficulties.  During the recent financial crisis, however, the Fed went beyond offering access to the discount window to depository institutions in its capacity as the lender of last resort to serving as the investor of last resort.  The acquisition of almost 80 percent of AIG in exchange for an $85 billion loan, for example, as well as the ownership of $29 billion in former Bear Stearns assets, marked a fundamental departure from the Fed’s traditional role.  After Dodd-Frank, there is a confusion about the Fed’s lender of last resort function that is warping regulatory debates and is being used to the advantage of the Fed and central bankers around the world to increase their jurisdiction.  Policymakers today incorrectly conflate ‘lender of last resort’ with the rightly dreaded ‘bailout.’  This confusion must be addressed by policymakers before we can have a constructive discussion about capital and margin requirements for non-bank financial services firms.

The recent FSOC intervention in the money market mutual fund space shined a spotlight on this newly expansive vision of the role of banking regulators.  The money market mutual fund reform debates that raged through 2012 focused in large part on the concept of a “NAV buffer,” which effectively is a capital requirement for money market funds.  This debate culminated in the November 2012 issuance of a report by FSOC which incorporated the concept of a so-called “NAV buffer.”[3]

The reasoning behind capital buffer requirements for money market funds is that they would serve to mitigate the risk of investor panic leading to a run on a fund.  The figures under discussion, however, were far too low to promise any serious effect on panic, while the imposition of real, bank- or even broker-dealer-like capital requirements in this space, on the other hand, would simply kill the market for money market mutual funds.  A 50 basis point buffer, to be phased in over a several year period, would hardly stem investor panic, unless one believes that investors would be comforted by the knowledge that for every dollar they had on deposit, the money market fund had set aside half a penny as a capital buffer.

Crucially, as I’ve noted before, there is no limiting principle to the application of this bank-based view of capital – indeed, last September, Treasury’s Office of Financial Research issued a fatally-flawed “Asset Management and Financial Stability” report featuring similar reasoning, as reflected in its implied support for “liquidity buffers” for asset managers.[4]

It remains unclear as to whether the Fed is indeed seeking to impose bank-based capital charges on non-bank entities in conjunction with granting them access to the discount window - at the cost of submitting to prudential regulation - or whether it is instead proposing those additional capital charges in order to prevent non-prudentially regulated financial entities from ever relying upon the “government safety net” provided by the discount window.[5]

Dodd-Frank Act’s grants of authority and mandates to the Fed further expand its traditional role.  Section 165 of the Dodd-Frank Act requires, among other things, that the Fed’s Board of Governors establish enhanced prudential standards for bank holding companies with consolidated assets of greater than $50 billion.  Although Section 165 nowhere mentions broker-dealers or asset management firms, last month, the Fed issued a final rule under Section 165 that could have a profound impact on the SEC-regulated subsidiaries of large foreign banks, one that would ripple through our capital markets as a whole.[6]

The Fed’s new rule will require foreign banking organizations with U.S. non-branch assets of $50 billion or more to establish a U.S. intermediate holding company over their U.S. subsidiaries.  These new holding companies will be subject to the same risk-based and leverage capital standards that the Fed applies to U.S. bank holding companies. As such, they will be subject to the Fed’s rules requiring regular capital plans and stress tests and will be required to establish a U.S. risk committee and employ a U.S. chief risk officer.  The new holding companies will be required to meet enhanced liquidity risk-management standards, conduct liquidity stress tests, and hold a buffer of highly liquid assets based on projected funding needs during a 30-day stress event.  They will, in short, be subject to the same Fed requirements as domestic banks with assets totaling $50 billion or more.

Now, I should take a moment to make clear that I support stringent capital requirements for all financial institutions that pose risks to our financial system.  Furthermore, it’s certainly not unreasonable in theory to subject foreign bank holding companies operating in the U.S. to the same requirements as domestic ones.  That’s not, however, all that the Fed’s new rules do.  They also require a foreign entity operating non-bank subsidiaries in the U.S. to superimpose an entirely new organizational structure for those non-bank U.S. holdings – one that artificially brings those holdings under the jurisdiction of the Fed and subjects them to regulations crafted to ensure the safety and stability of banking entities.

There’s an old joke about a physicist, a chemist, and an economist finding themselves stranded on a desert island with a supply of canned food.  The physicist says, “Let’s drop the cans from the top of that tree over there – it will hit the rocks below and break open.”  The chemist counters, “No, that would spill too much of the food.  Let’s build a fire and place them in the flames until they burst open.”  As the physicist and chemist argue, the economist silently scratches out equations in the sand.  Finally, he looks up and exclaims, “I’ve got it! First, assume we have a can opener…”  Apologies to all of my economist friends!

The Fed’s new rules come a little too close to turning this joke into reality.  Broker-dealers, of course, are regulated by the SEC, as they have been for almost eight decades now.  The Fed, on the other hand, regulates banks, or more specifically, bank holding companies.  The Fed’s Section 165 rulemaking, in essence, forces a foreign bank organization to impose a bank holding company into existence over its non-bank holdings, thus subjecting those entities’ broker-dealer subsidiaries to regulation by the Fed.  In essence, by requiring a foreign bank to create a wholly new structure for its U.S. operations subject to new regulatory requirements that will have a direct impact on the liquidity available to those operations, including broker-dealers, the Fed in fact assumes a can into which the foreign bank’s U.S. operations must be packed.  Only then can the Fed employ its can opener of regulation to oversee those operations.

Among the other requirements to which these new intermediate holding companies will be subject is the Fed’s leverage ratio.  The Fed has proposed that the largest bank holding companies be subject to an additional 2% leverage buffer on top of the 3% mandated by Basel III.[7]  This will incentivize broker-dealers within bank holding companies to reduce the size of their balance sheets.  Specifically, it could induce broker-dealers to reduce the amount of seemingly highly leveraged but low risk and thin margin transactions in which they engage – most importantly, repo and stock loan activity.  In addition, Basel III contains a so-called net stable funding ratio, which, by favoring long term, “stable” assets, would further constrain the ability of broker-dealers to fund their day-to-day operations through the short-term wholesale funding markets.

The Fed has also proposed a new liquidity coverage ratio that would require a bank holding company to maintain a sufficient amount of high quality liquid assets that could immediately be converted into cash to meet liquidity needs in times of stress.  This could affect broker-dealer subsidiaries of large financial institutions organized as bank holding companies, in that the broker-dealers’ holdings would be taken into account when determining the parent holding company’s ratio.  The same reasoning applies to potential enhanced market risk standards under Basel 2.5 and Basel III, which could also affect the capital holdings of bank-affiliated broker-dealers.

Now, let’s be clear about one thing: whether or not you agree with these proposals and initiatives, their net effect will be a reduction in the amount of liquidity in the securities markets.  This, like the bailouts that led to this regulatory frenzy, is hardly something that Americans would vote for if they had the chance.  From the central banker’s perspective, however, this may be an acceptable cost to bring under its control the short-term wholesale funding markets I just referenced, which have long been a cause of concern for regulators.  

Bank regulators and their wide-eyed admirers have spoken at length about the risks of “shadow banking,” which they define broadly to include the types of “securities funding transactions,” such as repo and reverse repo, securities lending and borrowing, and securities margin lending, used by both banks and broker-dealers for short-term funding.[8]  The loaded term “shadow banking” isn’t exactly used as an honorific, and I find it concerning that so many bank regulators routinely use the term to describe the day-to-day transactions so crucial to ensuring the ongoing operations of our capital markets.

To me, this onslaught of bank regulator rulemaking impacting non-bank markets is the result of a central, albeit unannounced, pillar of Dodd-Frank: the institutionalization of “too big to fail.”  The continued focus on “going concern” capital for institutions like broker-dealers that should fail when they take on undue risk can mean only one thing – despite the lessons learned from the financial crisis, despite the rightful disgust the American people directed at the bailouts, the U.S. government is focused on propping up institutions instead of refining the processes by which their failures will be handled.  This betrays the tenets of Title II of Dodd-Frank and reflects the absurdity of that portion of the legislation.  Why, after the failure of Lehman, we aren’t focusing on bankruptcy code amendments and related regulatory refinements, as many experts have called for,[9] is beyond me.

To be clear, I respect the Fed’s concerns about capital requirements for bank affiliated non-bank financial institutions, notwithstanding my fears as to the steps the Fed might take to address those concerns.  Our financial institutions are interconnected as never before, increasing the importance of taking a holistic view of those institutions, subsidiaries and all.  In doing so, however, it is crucial that we bring to bear the specialized experience and expertise of the regulators with primary oversight responsibility over the constituent parts of those institutions.  In the case of broker-dealers, this means the Commission, with its nearly eight decades of experiences in this regulatory space.  Since taking the reins of the agency, Chair White has strived to return the SEC to the center of the policy debates taking place with respect to large, interconnected financial institutions, and I commend her for doing so.  For example, we’ve started the process of updating our broker-dealer capital rules, which I believe is particularly important for bank-affiliated broker-dealers.

It’s my hope that the bank regulators constructively participate in this dialogue as well.  The last thing anyone wants is the old Washington cliché of a “turf war.”  For one thing, we’d lose – the SEC will never have the resources of the banking agencies – after all, it’s hard to outspend agencies that can print their own money.  More to the point, however, we’d never want to “win” – not only are we busy enough as it is, with approximately sixty Dodd-Frank mandated rules yet to be completed along with the day-to-day, blocking-and-tackling work that’s so critical to the agency’s mission, but we recognize that the banking regulators are best situated to regulate banks.  When it comes to the broker-dealer subsidiaries of banks, however, we stand ready to work with the Fed and other banking regulators to ensure that any new rules applicable to those entities are enhancements to our existing regime, not duplicative, contradictory or counterproductive regulations inspired by a regulatory paradigm designed for wholly different entities.

Thank you all for your attention this afternoon.  I hope the conference is rewarding for all of you, and I’d be happy to take questions.


[1] See Daniel M. Gallagher, Commissioner, Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, “Ongoing Regulatory Reform in the Global Capital Markets,” March 5, 2012, available at http://www.sec.gov/News/Speech/Detail/Speech/1365171490004#.UxSSz_ldUdU.

[2] See Peter J. Wallison, “Congress should curb the power of the FSOC” (February 24, 2014), available at  http://thehill.com/blogs/congress-blog/economy-budget/198927-congress-should-curb-the-power-of-the-fsoc .

[3] Financial Stability Oversight Council, “Proposed Recommendations Regarding Money Market Mutual Fund Reform” (November 2012), available at http://www.treasury.gov/initiatives/fsoc/Documents/Proposed%20Recommendations%20Regarding%20Money%20Market%20Mutual%20Fund%20Reform%20-%20November%2013,%202012.pdf.

[4] U.S. Department of Treasury, Office of Financial Research, “Asset Management and Financial Stability,” (September 2013), available at http://www.treasury.gov/initiatives/ofr/research/Documents/OFR_AMFS_FINAL.pdf.

[5] See, e.g., William C. Dudley, President and Chief Executive Officer, Federal Reserve Bank of New York, “Fixing Wholesale Funding to Build a More Stable Financial System,” February 1, 2013, available at  http://www.newyorkfed.org/newsevents/speeches/2013/dud130201.html ; Daniel K. Tarullo, Governor, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, “Shadow Banking and Systemic Risk Regulation,” November 22, 2013, available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/tarullo20131122a.htm.

[6] “Enhanced Prudential Standards for Bank Holding Companies and Foreign Banking Organizations,” February 18, 2014, available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/bcreg/bcreg20140218a1.pdf.

[7] “Regulatory Capital Rules: Regulatory Capital, Enhanced Supplementary Leverage Ratio Standards for Certain Bank Holding Companies and their Subsidiary Insured Depository Institutions,” August 20, 2013, available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/bcreg/bcreg20130709a1.pdf.

[8] See, e.g., Tarullo, “Shadow Banking and Systemic Risk Regulation.”

[9] See, e.g., Thomas H. Jackson, Kenneth E. Scott, Kimberly Anne Summe, and John B. Taylor, “Resolution of Failed Financial Institutions: Orderly Liquidation Authority and a New Chapter 14, Studies by the Resolution Project at Stanford University’s Hoover Institution Working Group on Economic Policy” (April 25, 2011), available at  http://media.hoover.org/sites/default/files/documents/Resolution-Project-Booklet-4-11.pdf .

Friday, February 7, 2014

CFTC CHAIRMAN WETJEN'S TESTIMONY BEFORE SENATE COMMITTEE

FROM:  COMMODITY FUTURES TRADING COMMISSION  

Testimony of Acting Chairman Mark P. Wetjen Before the U.S. Senate Committee on Banking, Housing & Urban Affairs, Washington, DC

February 6, 2014

Good morning Chairman Johnson, Ranking Member Crapo and members of the Committee. Thank you for inviting me to today’s hearing on the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (“Dodd-Frank”) and customer information security. I am honored to testify as Acting Chairman of the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (“CFTC”). I also am pleased to join my fellow regulators in testifying today.

Now is a good time for not only this Committee, but all stakeholders in the CFTC to reflect on the agency’s progress in implementing financial reform and what the future might bring for this agency and the markets it oversees.

Due to Dodd-Frank and the efforts of my colleagues and staff at the CFTC, today there is both pre-trade and post-trade transparency in the swaps market that did not exist before. The public now can see the price and volume of swap transactions in real-time, and the CFTC’s Weekly Swaps Report provides a snapshot of the swaps market each week. The most liquid swaps are being traded on regulated platforms and exchanges, with a panoply of protections for those depending on the markets, and regulators themselves have a new window into the marketplace through swap data repositories (“SDRs”).

Transparency, of course, is helpful only if the information provided to the public and regulators can be usefully employed. Therefore, the CFTC also is taking steps to protect the integrity of that data and ensure that it continues to be reliable and useful for surveillance, systemic risk monitoring, and the enforcement of important financial reforms.

These transparency rules complement a number of equally important financial reforms. For example, the counterparty credit risks in the swaps market have been reduced as a large segment of the swaps market is now being cleared – as of last month, about 70 percent of new, arm’s-length swaps transactions were being cleared. Additionally, nearly 100 swap dealers and major swap participants (“MSPs”) have registered with the CFTC, bringing their swaps activity and internal risk-management programs under the CFTC’s oversight for the first time. We also have strengthened a range of futures and swaps customer protections.

As it has put these reforms in place, the CFTC has consistently worked to protect liquidity in the markets and ensure that end-users can continue using them to hedge risk as Congress directed.

The CFTC, in short, has completed most of its initial mandate under Dodd-Frank and has successfully ushered in improvements to the over-the-counter derivatives market structure for swaps, while balancing countervailing objectives.

Volcker Rule

In recent weeks, the Commission finalized the Volcker Rule, which was one of our last major rules under Dodd-Frank. The Volcker Rule was exceptional on account of the unprecedented coordination among the five financial regulators.

Congress required the banking regulators to adopt a joint Volcker Rule, but it also provided that the market regulators – the Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) and the CFTC – need only coordinate with the prudential banking regulators in their rulemaking efforts. One of the hallmarks of the final rule is that the market regulators went beyond the congressional requirement to simply coordinate. In fact, the CFTC’s final rule includes the same rule text as that adopted by the other agencies. Building a consensus among five different government agencies was no easy task, and the level of coordination by the financial regulators on this complicated rulemaking was exceptional.

This coordination was thanks in no small part to leadership at the Department of the Treasury. Secretary Lew, Acting Deputy Secretary Miller, and others were instrumental in keeping the agencies on task and seeing this rulemaking over the finish line. Along with the other agencies, the CFTC received more than 18,000 comments addressing numerous aspects of the proposal. CFTC staff hosted a public roundtable on the proposed rule and met with a number of commenters. Through weekly inter-agency staff meetings, along with more informal discussions, the CFTC staff and the other agencies carefully considered the comments in formulating the final rule.

Differences with Proposal

The agencies were responsive to the comments when appropriate, which led to several changes from the proposed Volcker Rule I would like to highlight.

The final Volcker Rule included some alterations to certain parts of the hedging-exemption requirements found in the proposal. For instance, the final rule requires banking entities to have controls in place through their compliance programs to demonstrate that hedges would likely be correlated with an underlying position. The final rule also requires ongoing recalibration of hedging positions in order for the entities to remain in compliance.

Additionally, the final rule provides that hedging related to a trading desk’s market-making activities is part of the trading desk’s financial exposure, which can be managed separately from the risk-mitigating hedging exemption.

Another modification to the proposal was to include under “covered funds” only those commodity pools that resemble, in terms of type of offering and investor base, a typical hedge fund.

CFTC Volcker Rule Implementation and Enforcement

The CFTC estimates that, under its Volcker regulations, it has authority over more than 100 registered swap dealers and futures commission merchants (“FCMs”) that meet the definition of “banking entity.” In addition, under Section 619, some of these banking entities may be subject to oversight by other regulators. For example, a joint FCM/broker-dealer would be subject to both CFTC and SEC jurisdiction and in such circumstances, the CFTC will monitor the activities of the entity directly and also coordinate closely with the other functional regulator(s).

In this regard, Section 619 of the Dodd-Frank Act amended the Banking Holding Company Act to direct the CFTC itself to write rules implementing Volcker Rule requirements for banking entities “for which the CFTC is the primary financial regulatory agency” as that term was defined by Congress in Dodd-Frank. Accordingly, as Congress directed, the CFTC’s final rule applies to entities that are subject to CFTC registration and that are banking entities, under the Volcker provisions of the statute.

To ensure consistent, efficient implementation of the Volcker Rule, and to address, among other things, the jurisdiction issues I just mentioned, the agencies have established a Volcker Rule implementation task force. That task force also will be the proper vehicle to examine the means for coordinated enforcement of the rule. Although compliance requirements under the Volcker Rule do not take effect until July 2015, the CFTC is exploring now whether to take additional steps, including whether to adopt formal procedures for enforcement of the rule. As part of this process, I have directed CFTC staff to consider whether the agency should adopt such procedures and to make recommendations in the near future.

Volcker Rule: Lowering Risk in Banking Entities

The final Volcker Rule closely follows the mandates of Section 619 and strikes an appropriate balance in prohibiting banking entities from engaging in the types of proprietary trading activities that Congress contemplated when considering Section 619 and in protecting liquidity and risk management through legitimate market making and hedging activities. In adopting the final rule, the CFTC and other regulators were mindful that exceptions to the prohibitions or restrictions in the statute, if not carefully defined, could conceivably swallow the rule.

Banking entities are permitted to continue market making—an important activity for providing liquidity to financial markets—but the agencies reasonably confined the meaning of the term “market making” to the extent necessary to maintain a market-making inventory to meet near-term client, customer or counterparty demands.

Likewise, the final rule permits hedging that reduces specific risks from individual or aggregated positions of the banking entity.

The final Volcker Rule also prohibits banking entities from engaging in activities that result in conflicts of interest with clients, customers or counterparties, or that pose threats to the safety and soundness of these entities, and potentially therefore to the U.S. financial system.

The final Volcker rule also limits banking entities from sponsoring or owning “covered funds,” which include hedge funds, private equity funds or certain types of commodity pools, other than under certain limited circumstances. The final rule focuses the prohibition on certain types of pooled investment vehicles that trade or invest in securities or derivatives.

Finally, and importantly, the final Volcker Rule requires banking entities to put in place a compliance program, with special attention to the firm’s compliance with the rule’s restrictions on market making, underwriting and hedging. It also requires the larger banking entities to report key metrics to regulators each month. This new transparency, once phased-in, will buttress the CFTC’s oversight of swap dealers and FCMs by providing it additional information regarding the risk levels at these registrants.

TruPS Interim Final Rule

Even with resource constraints, the CFTC has been responsive to public input and willing to explore course corrections, when appropriate. With respect to the Volcker Rule, the CFTC, along with the other agencies, last month unanimously finalized an interim final rule to allow banks to retain collateralized debt obligations backed primarily by trust-preferred securities (TruPS) issued by community banks. The agencies acted quickly to address concerns about restrictions in the final rule, demonstrating again the commitment of the agencies at this table to ongoing coordination. In doing so, the CFTC and the other agencies protected important markets for community banks, as Congress directed.

Implementation Stage of Dodd-Frank

Looking ahead through the lens of what already has been done, it is clear that the Commission and all stakeholders will need to closely monitor and, if appropriate, address the inevitable challenges that will come with implementing the new regulatory framework under Dodd-Frank.

For the CFTC, only a few rulemakings remain to be re-proposed or finalized in order to complete the implementation of Dodd-Frank. Indeed, in just a matter of days, the compliance date for perhaps the last remaining, major hallmark of the reform effort will arrive: the effective date of the swap-trading mandate.

Rules the Commission is working to address in the coming months include capital and margin requirements for un-cleared swaps, rulemakings intended to harmonize global regulations for clearinghouses and trading venues, and finalizing position limits.

There are other important matters in the months ahead as well.

Allow me to mention some of these matters before the Commission as we move forward with Dodd-Frank implementation.

Made Available to Trade Determinations

As a result of the trade execution mandate, many swaps will, for the first time, trade on regulated platforms and benefit from market-wide, pre-trade transparency. These platforms are designed to improve pricing for the buy-side, commercial end-users, and other participants that use these markets to manage risk. Additionally, SEFs, as registered entities, are required to establish and enforce comprehensive compliance and surveillance programs.

The Commission’s trade execution rules complement our other efforts to streamline participation in the markets by doing away with the need to negotiate bilateral credit arrangements and removing impediments to accessing liquidity. This not only benefits the end-users that the markets are intended to serve, but also new entrants seeking to compete for liquidity who now are able to access the markets on impartial terms. In essence, the Commission’s implementation of the trade execution mandate supports a transparent, risk-reducing swap-market structure under CFTC oversight.

In recent weeks, the “Made Available to Trade Determinations” filed by four swap execution facilities (“SEFs”) have been deemed certified, making mandatory the trading of a number of interest rate and credit default swaps on regulated platforms.

There have been some questions in this context about the trading of so-called “package transactions,” which often include a combination of financial instruments and at least one swap that is subject to the trade execution requirement. I have directed Division of Market Oversight (“DMO”) staff to hold an open-to-the-public roundtable, which will take place February 12, and to further examine these issues so that the CFTC can further consider the appropriate regulatory treatment of basis trades falling within the meaning of a “package transaction.”

Data

In order for the Commission to enforce the significant Dodd-Frank reforms, the agency must have accurate data and a clear picture of activity in the marketplace.

Last month, with the support of my fellow commissioners, I directed an interdivisional staff working group to review certain swap transaction data, recordkeeping and reporting provisions under Dodd-Frank. The working group, led by the director of DMO, will formulate and recommend questions for public comment regarding compliance with Part 45 reporting rules and related provisions, as well as consistency in regulatory reporting among market participants.

We have seen an incredible shift to a transparent, regulated swaps marketplace, and this is an appropriate review to ensure the data we are receiving is of the best possible quality so the Commission can effectively oversee the marketplace. I have asked the working group to review the incoming public comments and make recommendations to the Commission in June.

Concept Release on Risk Controls and System Safeguards for Automated Trading Environments

The CFTC’s Concept Release on Risk Controls and System Safeguards for Automated Trading Environments provides an overview of the automated trading environment, including its principal actors, potential risks, and responsive measures taken to date by the Commission or industry participants. It also discusses pre-trade risk controls; post-trade reports; system safeguards related to the design, testing and supervision of automated trading systems; and additional protections designed to promote safe and orderly markets. Within the release, the Commission asks 124 questions and is seeking extensive public input.

To give the public more time to provide comments, the CFTC extended the comment period, which continues through February 14.

Position Limits

The futures markets have a long history of embracing speculative position limits as a tool to reduce unwarranted price fluctuations and minimize the risk of manipulation, particularly in the spot month, such as corners and squeezes. Our proposed position limits rule builds on that history, increases transparency, and lessens the likelihood that a trader will accumulate excessively large speculative positions.

The Commission’s proposed rule respects congressional intent and addresses a district court decision related to the Commission’s new position-limits authority under Dodd-Frank.

The comment period on the re-proposed rule closes February 10, and I look forward to reviewing the public input.

International Coordination

Given that the U.S. has nearly delivered on its G20 commitments to derivatives reform, and the European Union is close behind, financial regulators recently have focused more time on the developing global market structure for swaps.

The G20 commitments were a reaction to a global financial crisis. Although the causes of that crisis are not as clear as some suggest, few would disagree that liquidity constraints at certain firms were at least exacerbated by exposures to derivatives.

The plain truth is that risk associated with derivatives is mobile and can migrate rapidly across borders in modern financial markets. An equally plain truth is that any efforts to monitor and manage global systemic risk therefore must be global in nature.

Risk mobility means that regulators in the U.S. and abroad do not have the luxury of limiting their oversight to financial activities occurring solely within their borders. Financial activities abroad may be confined to local markets in some cases, but the financial crisis, and more recent events, make clear that the rights and responsibilities that flow from these activities often are not.

Perhaps as important, Congress reacted to the financial crisis by authorizing the CFTC to oversee activities conducted beyond its borders in appropriate cases. It could have limited the CFTC’s oversight to only those entities and activities located or occurring within our shores, but it did not. In fact, Congress recognized in Dodd-Frank that even when activities do not obviously implicate U.S. interests, they can still create less obvious but legally binding obligations that are significant and directly relevant to the health of a U.S. firm; and which in the aggregate could have a material impact on the U.S. financial system as a whole.

So it is clear to me that the CFTC took the correct approach in adopting cross-border policies that account for the varied ways that risk can be imported into the U.S. At the same time, the CFTC’s policies tried to respect the limits of U.S. law and the resource constraints of U.S. and global regulators. That is in part why, last December, the CFTC approved a series of determinations allowing non-U.S. swap dealers and MSPs to comply with Dodd-Frank by relying on comparable and comprehensive home country regulations, otherwise known as “substituted compliance.”

Those approvals by the CFTC reflect a collaborative effort with authorities and market participants from each of the six jurisdictions with registered swap dealers. Working closely with authorities in Australia, Canada, the EU, Hong Kong, Japan, and Switzerland, the CFTC issued comparability determinations for a broad range of entity-level requirements. And in two jurisdictions, the EU and Japan, the CFTC also issued comparability determinations for a number of key transaction-level requirements.

It appears at this time that the substituted compliance approach has been successful in supporting financial reform efforts around the globe and a race-to-the-top in global derivatives regulation. Last month, for example, the European Union (“EU”) agreed on updated rules for markets in financial derivatives, or the Markets in Financial Instruments Directive II (“MiFiD II”), reflecting great progress on derivatives reform in the EU. Other jurisdictions that host a substantial market for swap activity are still working on their reforms, and certainly will be informed by the EU’s work and the CFTC’s ongoing coordination with foreign regulators.

As jurisdictions outside the U.S. continue to strengthen their regulatory regimes and meet their G20 commitments, the CFTC may determine that additional foreign regulatory requirements are comparable to and as comprehensive as certain requirements under Dodd-Frank.

The CFTC also has made great progress with the European Commission since both regulators issued the Path Forward statement last summer, and we are actively working with the Europeans to ensure that harmonized regulations on the two continents promote liquidity formation and sound risk management. Fragmented liquidity, and the regulatory and financial arbitrage that both drives and follows it, can lead to increased operational costs and risks as entities structure around the rules in primary swap markets.

Harmonizing regulations governing clearinghouses and trading venues, in particular, is critical to sound and efficient market structure. Even if firms are able to navigate the conflicts and complexities of differing regulatory regimes, regulators here and abroad must do what they can to avoid incentivizing corporate structures and inter-affiliate relationships that will only make global financial firms more difficult to understand, manage, and unwind during a period of market distress.

Conversely, this translates to open, competitive derivatives markets. It means efficient and liquid markets. A global regime is the best means to avoid balkanization of risk and risk management that may expose the U.S. financial system over time to risks that are unnecessary, needlessly complex, and difficult to predict and contain.

In light of the CFTC’s swaps authority, and the complexities of implementing a global regulatory regime, the Commission is working with numerous foreign authorities to negotiate and sign supervisory arrangements that address regulator-to-regulator cooperation and information sharing in a supervisory context. We currently are negotiating such arrangements with respect to swap dealers and MSPs, SDRs, SEFs, and derivatives clearing organizations.

As a final note on cross-border issues, on February 12 the Global Markets Advisory Committee (“GMAC”), which I sponsor, will meet to discuss the November 14, 2013, CFTC staff advisory on applicability of transaction-level requirements in certain cross-border situations.

The CFTC and Customer Information Security

The CFTC takes our responsibility to protect against the loss or theft of customer information seriously. However, the CFTC’s funding challenges, and thus our limited examinations staff, have an impact on the agency’s ability to examine and enforce critical rules that protect customer privacy and ensure firms have robust information security and other risk management policies in place.

The Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act was enacted in 1999 to ensure that financial institutions respect the privacy of their customers. Part 160 of the CFTC’s regulations was adopted pursuant to the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act and addresses privacy and security safeguards for customer information. Under the law, swap dealers, FCMs and other CFTC registrants must have “policies and procedures that address administrative, technical and physical safeguards for the protection of customer records and information.” These policies and procedures are designed to protect against unauthorized access to customer records or information.

The CFTC is working to strengthen our registrants’ compliance with the law. The agency is poised to release a staff advisory to market participants outlining best practices for compliance. The advisory recommends, among other best practices, that registrants should assess existing privacy and security risks; design and implement a system of procedures and controls to minimize such risks; regularly test privacy and security controls, including periodic testing by an independent party; annually report to the board on these issues; and implement an incident response program that includes notifying the Commission and individuals whose information was or may be misused. In addition, the CFTC has recently issued new customer protection regulations that include, among other regulations, new requirements for risk management by firms. Security safeguards are an element of risk management that needs to be addressed by this new regulation.

Last year, the CFTC also issued interpretive guidance, mirroring that of other financial agencies, clarifying that reporting of suspected financial abuse of older Americans to appropriate law enforcement agencies does not violate the privacy provisions within Part 160 of the Commission’s rules.

Though enforcement of CFTC Part 160 rules is a challenge given our limited resources, we have enforced them in the past. In one instance, the CFTC settled a case with an FCM when an employee of that FCM placed files containing sensitive personally identifiable information on a public website, and the FCM did not have effective procedures in place to safeguard customer information.

In addition to Part 160, the CFTC’s Dodd-Frank rules for DCMs, SEFs and SDRs require these entities to notify the CFTC of all cybersecurity incidents that could potentially or actually jeopardize the security of information.

Last spring, the CFTC and SEC adopted final “red flags” rules under the Dodd-Frank Act requiring CFTC and SEC registrants to adopt programs to identify and address the risk of identity theft. As the law required, our rules establish special requirements for credit and debit card issuers to assess the validity of change of address, but currently, the CFTC entities that must follow these identity theft rules do not issue credit or debit cards. A number of firms, however, do accept credit and debit cards for payment, which presents a different type of risk.

The CFTC also has adopted a rule regarding the proper disposal of consumer information requiring reasonable measures, such as shredding, to protect against unauthorized access.

Retail Payment Systems

The Commission’s new customer protection rules on risk management require FCMs to develop risk management policies that address risks related to retail payment systems, such as anti-money laundering, identity theft, unauthorized access, and cybersecurity.

The CFTC currently does not have the resources to conduct any direct examinations of retail payment systems. The CFTC does indirectly look at the risks of retail payment systems through designated self-regulatory organizations (DSRO). The DSRO covers the operational aspects of the money movement through their risk-based programs. Additionally, DSROs perform a review of anti-money laundering at FCMs looking at a number of aspects of a retail payment system – source of funds, cash transactions, customer identity, money laundering and staff training.

For the vast majority of our registrants, the retail payment system is through normal banking channels, such as wire transfers. Only a few of our registrants accept credit or debit cards, and none currently accept virtual currency payment systems. Virtual currency, however, does present new risk, as a firm would be interacting outside of bank payment channels, increasing the risk of hacking or fraud, among other cybersecurity issues. The CFTC is working with registrants that are seeking to accept virtual currencies to educate them about best practices.

Data Breach Response

The CFTC’s response to a data breach incident would include immediately assessing the situation with the registrant to understand the magnitude of the breach and its implications on customers and the marketplace. We would coordinate with other regulators and law enforcement and together determine the appropriate course of action. Our response would include an analysis of the data compromised, immediate notification to affected customers (unless law enforcement prohibits that notification), supporting customers by having the firm provide free credit monitoring services, ensuring customers know how to change user IDs and passwords, and having the firm closely monitor customer activity to look for signs of identity theft.

Looking ahead, the Commission is considering implementing rules under Gramm-Leach-Bliley to expand upon our current customer protection regulations with more specificity regarding the security of customer information.

Resources

To be effective, the CFTC’s oversight of these registrants requires technological tools and staff with expertise to analyze complex financial information. On that note, I am pleased that the House and Senate have agreed to an appropriations bill that includes a modest budgetary increase to $215 million for the CFTC, lifting the agency’s appropriations above the sequestration level that has been challenging for planning and orderly operation of the agency. The new funding level is a step in the right direction. We will continue working with Congress to secure resources that match the agency’s critical responsibilities in protecting the safety and integrity of the financial markets under its jurisdiction. We need additional staff for surveillance, examinations, and enforcement, as well as investments in technology, to give the public confidence in our ability to oversee the vast derivatives markets.

Conclusion

For the CFTC, the Volcker Rule was one of the last remaining rulemakings required by Dodd-Frank. Only a few rulemakings remain to be re-proposed or finalized in order to complete the implementation of the legislation. Indeed, in just a matter of days, the compliance date for perhaps the last remaining major hallmark of the reform effort will arrive: the effective date of the swap-trading mandate. Looking forward, the agency will continue working to ensure an orderly transition to, and adoption of, the new market structure for swaps, and adjusting as necessary.

Thank you again for inviting me today. I would be happy to answer any questions from the Committee.

Last Updated: February 6, 2014

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