Showing posts with label CORRUPTION. Show all posts
Showing posts with label CORRUPTION. Show all posts

Wednesday, May 27, 2015

SEVERAL FIFA OFFICIALS INDICTED FOR ROLES IN CORRUPTING INTERNATIONAL SOCCER

FROM:  U.S. JUSTICE DEPARTMENT
Wednesday, May 27, 2015
Nine FIFA Officials and Five Corporate Executives Indicted for Racketeering Conspiracy and Corruption

The Defendants Include Two Current FIFA Vice Presidents and the Current and Former Presidents of the Confederation of North, Central American and Caribbean Association Football (CONCACAF); Seven Defendants Arrested Overseas; Guilty Pleas for Four Individual Defendants and Two Corporate Defendants Also Unsealed

A 47-count indictment was unsealed early this morning in federal court in Brooklyn, New York, charging 14 defendants with racketeering, wire fraud and money laundering conspiracies, among other offenses, in connection with the defendants’ participation in a 24-year scheme to enrich themselves through the corruption of international soccer.  The guilty pleas of four individual defendants and two corporate defendants were also unsealed today.

The defendants charged in the indictment include high-ranking officials of the Fédération Internationale de Football Association (FIFA), the organization responsible for the regulation and promotion of soccer worldwide, as well as leading officials of other soccer governing bodies that operate under the FIFA umbrella.  Jeffrey Webb and Jack Warner – the current and former presidents of CONCACAF, the continental confederation under FIFA headquartered in the United States – are among the soccer officials charged with racketeering and bribery offenses.  The defendants also include U.S. and South American sports marketing executives who are alleged to have systematically paid and agreed to pay well over $150 million in bribes and kickbacks to obtain lucrative media and marketing rights to international soccer tournaments.

The charges were announced by Attorney General Loretta E. Lynch, Acting U.S. Attorney Kelly T. Currie of the Eastern District of New York, Director James B. Comey of the FBI, Assistant Director in Charge Diego W. Rodriguez of the FBI’s New York Field Office, Chief Richard Weber of the Internal Revenue Service-Criminal Investigation (IRS-CI) and Special Agent in Charge Erick Martinez of the IRS-CI’s Los Angeles Field Office.

Also earlier this morning, Swiss authorities in Zurich arrested seven of the defendants charged in the indictment, the defendants Jeffrey Webb, Eduardo Li, Julio Rocha, Costas Takkas, Eugenio Figueredo, Rafael Esquivel and José Maria Marin, at the request of the United States.  Also this morning, a search warrant is being executed at CONCACAF headquarters in Miami, Florida.

The guilty pleas of the four individual and two corporate defendants that were also unsealed today include the guilty pleas of Charles Blazer, the long-serving former general secretary of CONCACAF and former U.S. representative on the FIFA executive committee; José Hawilla, the owner and founder of the Traffic Group, a multinational sports marketing conglomerate headquartered in Brazil; and two of Hawilla’s companies, Traffic Sports International Inc. and Traffic Sports USA Inc., which is based in Florida.

“The indictment alleges corruption that is rampant, systemic, and deep-rooted both abroad and here in the United States,” said Attorney General Lynch.  “It spans at least two generations of soccer officials who, as alleged, have abused their positions of trust to acquire millions of dollars in bribes and kickbacks.  And it has profoundly harmed a multitude of victims, from the youth leagues and developing countries that should benefit from the revenue generated by the commercial rights these organizations hold, to the fans at home and throughout the world whose support for the game makes those rights valuable.  Today’s action makes clear that this Department of Justice intends to end any such corrupt practices, to root out misconduct, and to bring wrongdoers to justice – and we look forward to continuing to work with other countries in this effort.”

Attorney General Lynch extended her grateful appreciation to the authorities of the government of Switzerland, as well as several other international partners, for their outstanding assistance in this investigation.

“Today’s announcement should send a message that enough is enough,” said Acting U.S. Attorney Currie.  “After decades of what the indictment alleges to be brazen corruption, organized international soccer needs a new start – a new chance for its governing institutions to provide honest oversight and support of a sport that is beloved across the world, increasingly so here in the United States.  Let me be clear: this indictment is not the final chapter in our investigation.”

Acting U.S. Attorney Currie extended his thanks to the agents, analysts and other investigative personnel with the FBI New York Eurasian Joint Organized Crime Squad and the IRS-CI Los Angeles Field Office, as well as their colleagues abroad, for their tremendous effort in this case.

“As charged in the indictment, the defendants fostered a culture of corruption and greed that created an uneven playing field for the biggest sport in the world,” said Director Comey.  “Undisclosed and illegal payments, kickbacks, and bribes became a way of doing business at FIFA.  I want to commend the investigators and prosecutors around the world who have pursued this case so diligently, for so many years.”

“When leaders in an organization resort to cheating the very members that they are supposed to represent, they must be held accountable,” said Chief Weber.  “Corruption, tax evasion and money laundering are certainly not the cornerstones of any successful business.  Whether you call it soccer or football, the fans, players and sponsors around the world who love this game should not have to worry about officials corrupting their sport.  This case isn't about soccer, it is about fairness and following the law.  IRS-CI will continue to investigate financial crimes and follow the money wherever it may lead around the world, leveling the playing field for those who obey the law.”

The charges in the indictment are merely allegations, and the defendants are presumed innocent unless and until proven guilty.

The Enterprise

FIFA is composed of 209 member associations, each representing organized soccer in a particular nation or territory, including the United States and four of its overseas territories.  FIFA also recognizes six continental confederations that assist it in governing soccer in different regions of the world.  The U.S. Soccer Federation is one of 41 member associations of the confederation known as CONCACAF, which has been headquartered in the United States throughout the period charged in the indictment.  The South American confederation, called CONMEBOL, is also a focus of the indictment.

As alleged in the indictment, FIFA and its six continental confederations, together with affiliated regional federations, national member associations and sports marketing companies, constitute an enterprise of legal entities associated in fact for purposes of the federal racketeering laws.  The principal – and entirely legitimate – purpose of the enterprise is to regulate and promote the sport of soccer worldwide.

As alleged in the indictment, one key way the enterprise derives revenue is to commercialize the media and marketing rights associated with soccer events and tournaments.  The organizing entity that owns those rights – as FIFA and CONCACAF do with respect to the World Cup and Gold Cup, their respective flagship tournaments – sells them to sports marketing companies, often through multi-year contracts covering multiple editions of the tournaments.  The sports marketing companies, in turn, sell the rights downstream to TV and radio broadcast networks, major corporate sponsors and other sub-licensees who want to broadcast the matches or promote their brands.  The revenue generated from these contracts is substantial: according to FIFA, 70% of its $5.7 billion in total revenues between 2011 and 2014 was attributable to the sale of TV and marketing rights to the 2014 World Cup.

The Racketeering Conspiracy

The indictment alleges that, between 1991 and the present, the defendants and their co-conspirators corrupted the enterprise by engaging in various criminal activities, including fraud, bribery and money laundering.  Two generations of soccer officials abused their positions of trust for personal gain, frequently through an alliance with unscrupulous sports marketing executives who shut out competitors and kept highly lucrative contracts for themselves through the systematic payment of bribes and kickbacks.  All told, the soccer officials are charged with conspiring to solicit and receive well over $150 million in bribes and kickbacks in exchange for their official support of the sports marketing executives who agreed to make the unlawful payments.

Most of the schemes alleged in the indictment relate to the solicitation and receipt of bribes and kickbacks by soccer officials from sports marketing executives in connection with the commercialization of the media and marketing rights associated with various soccer matches and tournaments, including FIFA World Cup qualifiers in the CONCACAF region, the CONCACAF Gold Cup, the CONCACAF Champions League, the jointly organized CONMEBOL/CONCACAF Copa América Centenario, the CONMEBOL Copa América, the CONMEBOL Copa Libertadores and the Copa do Brasil, which is organized by the Brazilian national soccer federation (CBF).  Other alleged schemes relate to the payment and receipt of bribes and kickbacks in connection with the sponsorship of CBF by a major U.S. sportswear company, the selection of the host country for the 2010 World Cup and the 2011 FIFA presidential election.

The Indicted Defendants

As set forth in the indictment, the defendants and their co-conspirators fall generally into three categories: soccer officials acting in a fiduciary capacity within FIFA and one or more of its constituent organizations; sports media and marketing company executives; and businessmen, bankers and other trusted intermediaries who laundered illicit payments.

Nine of the defendants were FIFA officials by operation of the FIFA statutes, as well as officials of one or more other bodies:

Jeffrey Webb: Current FIFA vice president and executive committee member, CONCACAF president, Caribbean Football Union (CFU) executive committee member and Cayman Islands Football Association (CIFA) president.

Eduardo Li: Current FIFA executive committee member-elect, CONCACAF executive committee member and Costa Rican soccer federation (FEDEFUT) president.

Julio Rocha: Current FIFA development officer.  Former Central American Football Union (UNCAF) president and Nicaraguan soccer federation (FENIFUT) president.

Costas Takkas: Current attaché to the CONCACAF president.  Former CIFA general secretary.

Jack Warner: Former FIFA vice president and executive committee member, CONCACAF president, CFU president and Trinidad and Tobago Football Federation (TTFF) special adviser.

Eugenio Figueredo: Current FIFA vice president and executive committee member.  Former CONMEBOL president and Uruguayan soccer federation (AUF) president.

Rafael Esquivel: Current CONMEBOL executive committee member and Venezuelan soccer federation (FVF) president.

José Maria Marin: Current member of the FIFA organizing committee for the Olympic football tournaments.  Former CBF president.

Nicolás Leoz: Former FIFA executive committee member and CONMEBOL president.

            Four of the defendants were sports marketing executives:

Alejandro Burzaco: Controlling principal of Torneos y Competencias S.A., a sports marketing business based in Argentina, and its affiliates.

Aaron Davidson: President of Traffic Sports USA Inc. (Traffic USA).

Hugo and Mariano Jinkis: Controlling principals of Full Play Group S.A., a sports marketing business based in Argentina, and its affiliates.

And one of the defendants was in the broadcasting business but allegedly served as an intermediary to facilitate illicit payments between sports marketing executives and soccer officials:

José Margulies:  Controlling principal of Valente Corp. and Somerton Ltd.

The Convicted Individuals and Corporations

The following individuals and corporations previously pleaded guilty under seal:

On July 15, 2013, the defendant Daryll Warner, son of defendant Jack Warner and a former FIFA development officer, waived indictment and pleaded guilty to a two-count information charging him with wire fraud and the structuring of financial transactions.

On Oct. 25, 2013, the defendant Daryan Warner waived indictment and pleaded guilty to a three-count information charging him with wire fraud conspiracy, money laundering conspiracy and the structuring of financial transactions.  Daryan Warner forfeited over $1.1 million around the time of his plea and has agreed to pay a second forfeiture money judgment at the time of sentencing.

On Nov. 25, 2013, the defendant Charles Blazer, the former CONCACAF general secretary and a former FIFA executive committee member, waived indictment and pleaded guilty to a 10-count information charging him with racketeering conspiracy, wire fraud conspiracy, money laundering conspiracy, income tax evasion and failure to file a Report of Foreign Bank and Financial Accounts (FBAR).  Blazer forfeited over $1.9 million at the time of his plea and has agreed to pay a second amount to be determined at the time of sentencing.

On Dec. 12, 2014, the defendant José Hawilla, the owner and founder of the Traffic Group, the Brazilian sports marketing conglomerate, waived indictment and pleaded guilty to a four-count information charging him with racketeering conspiracy, wire fraud conspiracy, money laundering conspiracy and obstruction of justice.  Hawilla also agreed to forfeit over $151 million, $25 million of which was paid at the time of his plea.

On May 14, 2015, the defendants Traffic Sports USA Inc. and Traffic Sports International Inc. pleaded guilty to wire fraud conspiracy.

All money forfeited by the defendants is being held in reserve to ensure its availability to satisfy any order of restitution entered at sentencing for the benefit of any individuals or entities that qualify as victims of the defendants’ crimes under federal law.

* * * *

The indictment unsealed today has been assigned to U.S. District Court Judge Raymond J. Dearie of the Eastern District of New York.

The indicted and convicted individual defendants face maximum terms of incarceration of 20 years for the RICO conspiracy, wire fraud conspiracy, wire fraud, money laundering conspiracy, money laundering and obstruction of justice charges.  In addition, Eugenio Figueredo faces a maximum term of incarceration of 10 years for a charge of naturalization fraud and could have his U.S. citizenship revoked.  He also faces a maximum term of incarceration of five years for each tax charge.  Charles Blazer faces a maximum term of incarceration of 10 years for the FBAR charge and five years for the tax evasion charges; and Daryan and Daryll Warner face maximum terms of incarceration of 10 years for structuring financial transactions to evade currency reporting requirements.  Each individual defendant also faces mandatory restitution, forfeiture and a fine.  By the terms of their plea agreements, the corporate defendants face fines of $500,000 and one year of probation.

The government’s investigation is ongoing.

The government’s case is being prosecuted by Assistant U.S. Attorneys Evan M. Norris, Amanda Hector, Darren A. LaVerne, Samuel P. Nitze, Keith D. Edelman and Brian D. Morris of the Eastern District of New York, with assistance provided by the Justice Department’s Office of International Affairs and Organized Crime and Gang Section.

Sunday, April 26, 2015

TOM MALINOWSKI ON REMARKS IN MEXICO CITY ON ACCESS TO JUSTICE

FROM:  U.S. STATE DEPARTMENT
Public Safety and Access to Justice
Remarks
Tom Malinowski
Assistant Secretary, Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor
Open Government Partnership Steering Committee Ministerial
Mexico City, Mexico
April 23, 2015

As prepared for delivery

Thank you all for having me here. This is a timely gathering. Public safety and access to justice are high priority issues in the minds of many civil society representatives in the United States and, I should say, in the minds of American citizens generally. It is no secret that the conduct of law enforcement has been a headline issue for us this last year. In the United States, we believe that an informed and engaged civil society is essential to ensuring that government faithfully discharges its duties to protect its citizens, to guarantee human rights, and to hold itself and its officials accountable for their actions. We know that we’re not perfect. But we are committed to improvement and to upholding institutions that allow us to address our shortcomings. In this spirit, we’re looking forward to sharing ideas and best practices so that we can all build, or restore, trust between people and their government.

Because in countries where citizens lack trust and confidence in their government, where they do not feel enfranchised in decisions affecting their lives, there are a range of costs. Some can be drawn to violent extremism, others to gangs and crime. Corruption is more likely to increase; police and judicial power more likely to be abused. Basic services are distributed unjustly. Innovation and entrepreneurship are stifled as elites focus their power on maintaining a status quo that enables their unjust enrichment. In such societies, the state may seem like it’s growing stronger at the expense of civil society, but in fact institutions that lose the trust of their people often turn out to be hollow. They are strong until the day they are not; they create turmoil and instability that affects their neighbors and the world.

OGP points the way to an alternative, to creating a space where government and civil society can work together – to build trust and to ensure transparent, accountable, citizen-enabled and innovation-powered governance. Last September, President Obama challenged us to support civil society at home and abroad. The strength and success of nations depends, the President has said, on allowing citizens to solve problems without government interference, and on robust engagement between governments and civil society to advance shared goals.

One of OGP’s grand challenges, around which participants are encouraged to develop commitments, is “Promoting Safer Communities.” This is the most undersubscribed of OGP’s grand challenges, yet it is one of the most critical challenges facing countries in every corner of the world, in part because civilian insecurity can express itself in so many different ways—in gang violence and organized crime, in violent extremism, or officials who are complicit in corruption and human rights violations. Across a range of countries and communities, the security and justice sectors may be simply inadequate in creating secure conditions, guaranteeing access to justice, and protecting against human rights abuses. This creates space for crime and extremism to flourish and limits the potential for individual opportunity and economic growth. And ultimately, the persistence of these conditions can undermine the stability of the political system itself.

There is growing interest among civil society organizations in increasing OGP’s focus on this challenge area, and related issues such as access to justice and the promotion and protection of human rights. Transparency International’s new initiative on Safer Communities in Latin America is one example of how civil society and governments can work toward common goals – and I hope Cecilia will be able to share some of the ideas of this groundbreaking effort. With such examples in mind, we are hoping to start a discussion to explore how OGP can help advance the community security challenge.

In my country, events of the past year have called us to take a fresh look at questions of public safety, access to justice, and the need to strengthen police-community relations. In Ferguson, Missouri, public demonstrations and civil society interventions drew the nation’s attention to the August 2014 shooting of Michael Brown and to concerns about the practices of the Ferguson Police Department. In addition to opening civil and criminal investigations, our Department of Justice sent mediators to create a dialogue between police, city officials, and residents to reduce tension in the community. In addition, DOJ is involved in a voluntary, independent, and objective assessment of the St. Louis County Police Department, looking at training, use of force, handling of mass demonstrations, and other areas where reform may be needed.

As President Obama has said, “[t]he fact is, in too many parts of (the United States), a deep distrust exists between law enforcement and communities of color.” At the President’s request, the Attorney General convened roundtable discussions among law enforcement, elected officials, and community members in six cities in December 2014 and January 2015. The President also appointed a Task Force on 21st Century Policing, made up of governmental and civil society members, which engaged a wide range of state, local, and tribal officials; subject matter experts; and community and faith leaders to develop a series of recommendations on how to strengthen public trust and foster strong relationships between local law enforcement and the communities they protect.

As we continue to strive for what our founding fathers termed “a more perfect union,” we encourage you both to make suggestions to us on what has worked for you in addressing such challenges and to consider what in this example may work in your country contexts.

We also want to hear your thoughts on how this set of issues manifests in different regions and countries. How, in your experience, do open government initiatives strengthen public safety and access to justice? Are there ways for OGP to encourage more countries to commit to improvements in this area? And if we consider access to justice and promotion and protection of human rights core parts of the open government agenda, should we build more robust evaluations into the IRM assessment? Finally, we need to come out of this session with more than great thoughts. We invite your specific recommendations on how OGP can empower citizens to play a role in ensuring accountability in the security and justice sectors.

It’s a lot to think about so with that, I’d like to turn to Cecilia for her remarks before we open up the floor for discussion.

Friday, March 6, 2015

U.S. ASSISTS KOREA IN RECOVERING MILLIONS FROM FORMER PRESIDENT HWAN

FROM:  U.S. JUSTICE DEPARTMENT
Wednesday, March 4, 2015
United States Assists Korean Authorities in Recovering Over $28.7 Million In Corruption Proceeds of Former President of the Republic of Korea

The Department of Justice has reached a settlement of its civil forfeiture cases against $1.2 million in assets in the United States traceable to corruption proceeds accumulated by Chun Doo Hwan, the former president of the Republic of Korea.  The department also assisted the government of the Republic of Korea in recovering an additional $27.5 million in satisfaction of an outstanding criminal restitution order against former President Chun.

Assistant Attorney General Leslie R. Caldwell of the Justice Department’s Criminal Division, Director Sarah R. Saldaña of U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE)­­ and Assistant Director in Charge David Bowdich of the FBI’s Los Angeles Field Office made the announcement after the settlement was signed and papers requesting that the court execute the agreement were filed with the U.S. District Court for the Central District of California.

“Chun Doo Hwan’s campaign of corruption and bribery while serving as Korea’s president betrayed the trust of the Korean people, deprived Korea’s government of precious resources and undermined the rule of law,” said Assistant Attorney General Caldwell.  “Fighting corruption is a global imperative that demands a coordinated global response.  The close cooperation between the United States and Korea in successfully recovering corruption proceeds stands as a testament to our resolve to battle the scourge of corruption through international collaboration.”      

“Former Korean President Chun violated the trust of the people of Korea,” said Director Saldaña.  “The results in this case reflect the outstanding international cooperation that exists between U.S. law enforcement and the government of Korea.”

"The U.S. will not idly standby and serve as a money laundering haven for foreign officials to hide corrupt activities,” said Assistant Director in Charge David Bowdich.  “The FBI will continue to collaborate with our foreign partners by leveraging its resources in order to identify those engaged in foreign corruption and to recover their ill-gotten gains.”

According to court documents, President Chun was convicted in Korea in 1997 of receiving more than $200 million in bribes from Korean businesses and companies.  President Chun and his relatives laundered some of these corruption proceeds through a web of nominees, trusts and shell companies in both Korea and the United States.

Under the terms of the U.S. settlement, $1,116,951.45 in assets will be forfeited to the United States.  During the joint U.S.-Korean investigation, approximately $27.5 million in additional funds were paid by an associate of former President Chun to the Korean government to partially settle the judgment entered against former President Chun upon his criminal conviction.  Including the settlement announced today, the U.S. and Korean authorities have recovered more than $28.7 million in connection with Korea’s investigation and prosecution of former President Chun.  

The investigation was conducted jointly by the FBI’s West Covina Resident Agency of the Los Angeles Division, ICE’s Homeland Security Investigations’ (HSI) Philadelphia Office, HSI's Attaché in Seoul, South Korea and the FBI Kleptocracy Program of the International Corruption Unit within the Criminal Investigation Division.  The case is being prosecuted by Trial Attorneys Woo S. Lee and Della Sentilles of the Criminal Division’s Asset Forfeiture and Money Laundering Section, Assistant U.S. Attorneys Katharine Schonbachler and Steven R. Welk of the Central District of California, and Assistant U.S. Attorneys Joseph Minni and Alvin Stout of the Eastern District of Pennsylvania.  The Criminal Division’s Office of International Affairs provided substantial support.

The department is grateful for the significant assistance provided by the Seoul Central District Public Prosecutor’s Office, Korea’s Supreme Prosecutor’s Office - Anti-Corruption Supervisory Division and the Ministry of Justice’s International Criminal Affairs Division in investigating and forfeiting these corruption proceeds.

This case was brought under the Kleptocracy Asset Recovery Initiative by a team of dedicated prosecutors in the Criminal Division’s Asset Forfeiture and Money Laundering Section, working in partnership with federal law enforcement agencies to forfeit the proceeds of foreign official corruption and, where appropriate, return those proceeds to benefit the people harmed by these acts of corruption and abuse of office.

Friday, December 26, 2014

U.S. OFFICIAL'S OP-ED ON CORRUPTION

FROM:  THE STATE DEPARTMENT 
Stopping the Flow of Corruption
Op-Ed
Tom Malinowski
Assistant Secretary, Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor
Washington Post
December 26, 2014

When Viktor Yanukovych fled Kiev in February, the Ukrainian leader left behind a spectacular Swiss chalet-style mansion, a golf course, dozens of antique cars and a private zoo boasting $10,000 nameplates for the animal pens. Even the Ukrainian public, painfully familiar with the corruption of its leaders, was shocked. Yanukovych had managed to keep the chalet hidden because it was owned not by him but by an anonymous shell company registered in Britain. Other corrupt leaders have used the same trick to hide billions of dollars offshore, including through companies registered in the United States.

The rise and fall of Ukraine’s top kleptocrat teaches us a couple of things about corruption.
First, in many countries, corruption and human rights are tightly bound. The chance to profit from corruption is why many authoritarian leaders seize and cling to power. It becomes the glue that holds their regimes together, giving them spoils to distribute while turning their cronies into criminals who could be exposed and punished if they turn disloyal. It is also among the issues most likely to fuel popular resistance to authoritarianism, as we’ve seen from Tunisia to Russia and Venezuela. Any strategy to promote democracy and human rights must have the fight against corruption at its heart.

Second, we can’t fight corruption abroad if we don’t stop its proceeds from flowing through our companies and banks. We already work hard to return illicitly acquired assets to benefit the citizens of such countries, generally after the leaders who stole them have left office. But this kind of “departure tax” for falling autocrats is not enough: We must do more to deny safe haven to such funds while corrupt leaders are still in power. One way to do that is to prevent the registration of anonymous shell companies on our shores.

The Treasury Department recently took a significant step toward limiting the use of such companies by proposing a regulation that would require financial institutions to collect and verify the identity of the people behind company accountholders. President Obama’s 2015 budget includes a much more far-reaching proposal: It would require all companies to identify their “beneficial ownership” — the human beings who own or control them — to the IRS as part of a routine tax filing and make that information more readily available to law enforcement. Congress should enact this proposal now to ensure that our legal and financial systems are not used to hide corruption and facilitate autocracy overseas.

The overwhelming majority of U.S. companies that have a bank account or pay taxes in the United States already disclose their beneficial ownership. Thus, they would not be burdened and would only benefit from a reform that makes registration in the United States a sure sign of legitimacy rather than a cause for suspicion.

It is foreign criminals and corrupt officials who can benefit from the ability to conceal their identities under our current financial system. They are unlikely to file a U.S. tax return, and if they register a paper legal entity in the United States, they can use it to open a bank account on an offshore island. Indeed, they can create a web of 50 anonymous entities overnight simply by calling a state company registration office, or they can even purchase “shelf” companies registered a decade ago, adopting an additional guise of establishment and credibility. When U.S. law enforcement agencies investigate corruption or other crimes, often all they have is the name of a company and a dead end.

The wildly corrupt son of Equatorial Guinea’s president, for example, allegedly set up a slew of shell companies in the United States to launder millions of dollars of bribes from international logging companies, hiding any ties to himself. Teodoro Nguema Obiang Mangue used this money to purchase a $30 million Malibu, Calif., estate, a $38 million private jet and about $2 million worth of Michael Jackson memorabilia, among other luxuries. Meanwhile, most of his compatriots live on less than $2 per day.

Corruption empowers and enriches dictators. But here is another lesson from Ukraine: It can also become their greatest political vulnerability. Authoritarian governments may be able to muster excuses for shooting demonstrators, arresting political enemies or censoring the Internet, but no cultural, patriotic or national security argument can justify thievery. Disgust with corruption can also ease the ethnic, religious and social divisions such regimes exploit to stay in power — it’s a point of agreement between southern and northern Nigerians, nationalists and liberals in Russia, Shiites and Sunnis across the Middle East.

Fighting corruption by improving financial transparency may be one of the most effective ways of promoting liberty around the world. Members of Congress who believe in that cause and who want us to do better should embrace the president’s proposal to strengthen those laws by closing the shell company loophole that enables dictators to conceal their criminality from their people and the world.

Thursday, November 6, 2014

POLITICAL CONSULTANT PLEADS GUILTY IN ILLEGAL POLITICAL CONTRIBUTION CASE

FROM:  U.S. JUSTICE DEPARTMENT 
Wednesday, November 5, 2014

Washington Political Consultant Pleads Guilty in Fraud and Corruption Scheme
Political consultant Thomas Lindenfeld, 59, of Washington, D.C., pleaded guilty today in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania to conspiracy to commit wire fraud for his role in a fraud and corruption scheme related to illegal campaign contributions.

Assistant Attorney General Leslie R. Caldwell of the Justice Department’s Criminal Division, U.S. Attorney Zane David Memeger of the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, Special Agent in Charge Edward J. Hanko of the FBI’s Philadelphia Field Office and Acting Special Agent in Charge Richard Gross of the Internal Revenue Service – Criminal Investigation (IRS-CI) made the announcement.

According to admissions in his plea agreement, Lindenfeld agreed to route an illegal $1 million political contribution for “Elected Official A” during a 2007 campaign for elected office. The contribution was in the form of a loan routed through Lindenfeld’s political consulting firm, LSG Strategic Services Corporation (LSG).  When the campaign donor attempted to collect on the outstanding balance of the $1 million loan, however, Lindenfeld and his co-conspirators, at the direction of Elected Official A, engaged in a complicated series of transactions using federal grant money and monies from Sallie Mae’s charitable arm illegally to repay the loan.  These transactions were routed through several entities, including LSG, and were all falsely labeled as payments for services that were never actually rendered.

Lindenfeld admitted that, in exchange for the work he had done on the campaign, which included concealing the illegal campaign contribution, Elected Official A agreed to use his elected position to steer federal funding to Lindenfeld’s proposed environmental advocacy group, Blue Guardians.  Lindenfeld further admitted that he created Blue Guardians at the direction of Elected Official A for the purpose of receiving the federal funding.

According to Lindenfeld, Elected Official A advocated for $15 million in federal funding for Blue Guardians as a reward for Lindenfeld’s services.  Five hundred thousand dollars was approved in 2009 as an earmark through the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA).  Lindenfeld admitted, however, that the Blue Guardians did not exist in December 2009, and that he only created an email address, articles of incorporation, and a tax identification number for Blue Guardians in April 2010.  After receiving questions from NOAA and members of the press, Lindenfeld declined the funding, stating that he and Elected Official A decided it could be better spent on the oil spill in the Gulf.  NOAA did not disburse the $500,000 to Lindenfeld or Blue Guardians.

U.S. District Court Judge Harvey Bartle III scheduled a sentencing hearing for March 25, 2015.

The case is being investigated by the FBI and the IRS-CI with assistance provided by NASA’s Office of Inspector General and the Department of Commerce’s Office of Inspector General.  This case is being prosecuted by Assistant U.S. Attorney Paul L. Gray of the Eastern District of Pennsylvania and Trial Attorney Eric L. Gibson of the Criminal Division’s Public Integrity Section.

Wednesday, September 3, 2014

SEC ANNOUNCES WHISTLEBLOWER AWARD OF $300,000

 FROM:  U.S. SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION

The Securities and Exchange Commission announced a whistleblower award of more than $300,000 to a company employee who performed audit and compliance functions and reported wrongdoing to the SEC after the company failed to take action when the employee reported it internally.

It’s the first award for a whistleblower with an audit or compliance function at a company.

“Individuals who perform internal audit, compliance, and legal functions for companies are on the front lines in the battle against fraud and corruption.  They often are privy to the very kinds of specific, timely, and credible information that can prevent an imminent fraud or stop an ongoing one,” said Sean McKessy, Chief of the SEC’s Office of the Whistleblower.  “These individuals may be eligible for an SEC whistleblower award if their companies fail to take appropriate, timely action on information they first reported internally.”

This particular whistleblower award recipient reported concerns of wrongdoing to appropriate personnel within the company, including a supervisor.  But when the company took no action on the information within 120 days, the whistleblower reported the same information to the SEC.  The information provided by the whistleblower led directly to an SEC enforcement action.

The SEC’s whistleblower program rewards high-quality, original information that results in an SEC enforcement action with sanctions exceeding $1 million.  Whistleblower awards can range from 10 percent to 30 percent of the money collected in a case.  By law, the SEC must protect the confidentiality of whistleblowers and cannot disclose any information that might directly or indirectly reveal a whistleblower’s identity.

Saturday, August 9, 2014

U.S. OBTAINS $480 MILLION OF STOLEN MONEY, LARGEST FORFEITURE EVER OBTAINED THROUGH KLEPTOCRACY ACTION

FROM:  U.S. JUSTICE DEPARTMENT 
Thursday, August 7, 2014
U.S. Forfeits Over $480 Million Stolen by Former Nigerian Dictator in Largest Forfeiture Ever Obtained Through a Kleptocracy Action

The Department of Justice has forfeited more than $480 million in corruption proceeds hidden in bank accounts around the world by former Nigerian dictator Sani Abacha and his co-conspirators.

Assistant Attorney General Leslie R. Caldwell of the Justice Department’s Criminal Division and Assistant Director in Charge Valerie Parlave of the FBI’s Washington Field Office made the announcement after a judgment was entered on Aug. 6, 2014, by U.S. District Judge John D. Bates of the District of Columbia.

“Rather than serve his county, General Abacha used his public office in Nigeria to loot millions of dollars, engaging in brazen acts of kleptocracy,” said Assistant Attorney General Caldwell.  “With this judgment, we have forfeited $480 million in corruption proceeds that can be used for the benefit of the Nigerian people.  Through the Kleptocracy Asset Recovery Initiative, the Department of Justice’s Criminal Division denies kleptocrats like Abacha the fruits of their crimes, and protects the U.S. financial system from money laundering.  In coordination with our partners in Jersey, France and the United Kingdom, we are helping to end this chapter of corruption and flagrant abuse of office.”

“We remain steadfast in protecting the U.S. banking system from becoming a tool for dictators to hide their criminal proceeds,” said Assistant Director in Charge Parlave.  “This court order bolsters the FBI’s ability to combat international corruption and money laundering by seizing the assets of those involved.  I want to thank the special agents, financial analysts and prosecutors whose hard work over the years resulted in today’s announcement.”

The forfeited assets represent the proceeds of corruption during and after the military regime of General Abacha, who assumed the office of the president of the Federal Republic of Nigeria through a military coup on Nov. 17, 1993, and held that position until his death on June 8, 1998.  The complaint alleges that General Abacha, his son Mohammed Sani Abacha, their associate Abubakar Atiku Bagudu and others embezzled, misappropriated and extorted billions of dollars from the government of Nigeria and others, then laundered their criminal proceeds through U.S. financial institutions and the purchase of bonds backed by the United States.  

The judgment is the result of a civil forfeiture complaint the department filed in November 2013 against more than $625 million in the largest kleptocracy forfeiture action brought in the department’s history.  The forfeiture judgment includes approximately $303 million in two bank accounts in the Bailiwick of Jersey, $144 million in two bank accounts in France, and three bank accounts in the United Kingdom and Ireland with an expected value of at least $27 million.  The ultimate disposition of the funds will follow the execution of the judgment in each of these jurisdictions.  Claims to an additional approximately $148 million in four investment portfolios in the United Kingdom are pending.

As alleged in the complaint, General Abacha and others systematically embezzled billions of dollars in public funds from the Central Bank of Nigeria on the false pretense that the funds were necessary for national security.  The conspirators withdrew the funds in cash and then moved the money overseas through U.S. financial institutions.  General Abacha and his finance minister also allegedly caused the government of Nigeria to purchase Nigerian government bonds at vastly inflated prices from a company controlled by Bagudu and Mohammed Abacha, generating an illegal windfall of more than $282 million.  In addition, General Abacha and his associates allegedly extorted more than $11 million from a French company and its Nigerian affiliate in connection with payments on government contracts.  Funds involved in each of these schemes were allegedly laundered through the United States.

This case was brought under the Kleptocracy Asset Recovery Initiative by a team of dedicated prosecutors in the Criminal Division’s Asset Forfeiture and Money Laundering Section, working in partnership with federal law enforcement agencies to forfeit the proceeds of foreign official corruption and, where appropriate, to use those recovered assets to benefit the people harmed by these acts of corruption and abuse of office.  Individuals with information about possible proceeds of foreign corruption located in or laundered through the United States should contact federal law enforcement or send an email to kleptocracy@usdoj.gov.

The investigation was conducted by the FBI.  The case is being prosecuted by Trial Attorney Elizabeth Aloi and Assistant Deputy Chief Daniel Claman of the Criminal Division’s Asset Forfeiture and Money Laundering Section, with substantial support from the Criminal Division’s Office of International Affairs.  The department appreciates the extensive assistance provided by the governments of Jersey, France and the United Kingdom in this investigation.

Wednesday, February 26, 2014

U.S. OFFICIAL'S REMARKS ON ILLICIT TRAFFICKING ALONG CRIME-TERROR CONTINUUM

FROM:  U.S. STATE DEPARTMENT 

Trans-African Security: Combating Illicit Trafficking Along the Crime-Terror Continuum


Remarks
David M. Luna
Director for Anticrime Programs, Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs
AFSEC 14
Casablanca, Morocco
February 26, 2014


Good morning.
Your Excellencies, Distinguished Ladies and Gentlemen:
It is an honor to join you today at this important security conference.

I would like to thank IQPC, DefenseIQ, and the conference organizers for their kind invitation to discuss the U.S. government’s diplomatic efforts to confront the major security threats affecting West Africa, the Sahel, and the Maghreb.

I would especially like to thank the Government of Morocco and the Royal Moroccan Navy for their hospitality and for their leadership in working with the international community to combat the security challenges faced by many countries in this part of the world.

Let me also thank all of the representatives from governments, international organizations, and the private sector who are here in Casablanca today.

The United States applauds your continued commitment to defend your collective homeland security and safeguard communities against the threats posed by illicit trafficking networks.

Triple Threat: Corruption, Crime, and Terrorism Pave Illicit Trafficking Corridor
Today’s reality is one in which we live in a world where there is no region, no country and no people who remain untouched by the destabilizing effects and corruptive influence of transnational organized crime and violent terrorism.

Their impact is truly global and their real threat centers in some cases in their convergence. In particular, we must recognize that trans-regional illicit trafficking of drugs, arms, humans, and other illicit trade goods and services, are fuelling greater insecurity and instability across Africa, and in other parts of the world.

In December, the United Nations Security Council expressed concern over the increasing links between cross-border narcotics trafficking and other forms of transnational organized crime in West Africa and the Sahel. UN Secretary General Ban Ki-Moon said:
“West Africa is no longer just a transit route for drug traffickers but a growing destination, with more than a million users of illicit drugs. Rising consumption aggravates an already challenging public health environment and threatens socio-economic development.”
The challenge that drug trafficking poses to peace, stability, and development in the region is compounded by the dramatic social and political changes that have taken place in North Africa and the Middle East over the last few years. The tide of change has not only unleashed forces for justice, but also ignited a fury of violence and insecurity that has emboldened a variety of non-state actors to assert their agendas across the region.

On the governance front, the proceeds of drug trafficking and illicit trade are fueling a dramatic increase in corruption among the very institutions responsible for fighting crime. The collusion and complicity of some government officials have helped carve out a corridor of illicit trafficking that stretches from the West African coast to the Horn of Africa, from North Africa south to the Gulf of Guinea.

Illicit networks continue to move people and products along these routes. From the coca and opium poppy fields of Colombia and Southeast Asia to the coasts of West Africa and its hashish plantations, drug cartels and other criminal networks navigate an illicit superhighway that serves illicit markets across the continent and around the globe. They use commercial jets, fishing vessels, and container ships to move drugs, people, small arms, crude oil, cigarettes, counterfeit medicine, and toxic waste through the region, generating massive profits.
At a time when many are heralding the rise of some of the world’s fastest-growing economies in sub-Saharan Africa, these criminal entrepreneurs are undermining that growth by financing booming illicit markets, turning many vulnerable communities into a corridor of insecurity and instability. The UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) estimates that terrorist financing, trafficking in arms, drugs, and people, and other transnational forms of organized crime generate approximately $3.34 billion per year.

Cocaine trafficking is among the most lucrative illicit activities. UNODC estimates that approximately 13 percent of the global cocaine traffic moves through West Africa. In the past several years, West Africa has become a key transit route for drug trafficking from the Americas. Large seizures of drugs have been made in and along the coasts of Ghana, Sierra Leone, Cape Verde, Togo, Liberia, Benin, Senegal, and Nigeria. Smugglers and traffickers then transport these drugs through caravans, couriers, and maritime routes to destination markets in Europe and elsewhere.

West Africa is a transit point for heroin destined for the United States. In recent years, the United States disrupted and prosecuted an international cartel that moved heroin from Ghana to Dulles International Airport.

Illicit markets are growing across Africa to meet global demand for arms, counterfeits, cigarettes, diamonds and other precious minerals, wildlife, stolen luxury cars, and other illegal goods. Terrorists also engage in criminal activities, principally kidnapping for ransom and other crimes to fund their violent campaigns such as those that we are witnessing today by al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), Boko Haram, and others.

The finances of at least one terrorist networks that is engaged in or linked to illicit trafficking in the region are sometimes wired or transferred from West Africa to financial safe havens such as banks in Lebanon.

For example, the Lebanese Canadian Bank (LCB) case suggested that the terrorist organization Hizballah is actively engaged in money laundering operations in West Africa involving narcotics trafficking and used and stolen car sales.

Maritime crime has also captured the attention of the regional states and international community. The reported number of incidents in the Gulf of Guinea and the level of violence associated with those acts remain a concern. The Economic Communities of West and Central African States, the Gulf of Guinea Commission, and their member states should be commended for the outcomes of the June 2013 Yaoundé Summit. The signed Gulf of Guinea Code of Conduct (GGC) covers not only armed robbery at sea and piracy, but also other illicit maritime activity such as illegal fishing, maritime pollution, and human and drug trafficking.

Artificial Boundaries: Spillover Effects Across the Sahel and Maghreb
Unfortunately, what happens in West Africa no longer stays in West Africa. Illicit trade is feeding destabilization across West Africa, the Sahel, and the Maghreb. Communities here face a complex set of challenges that threaten the security of all nations in the region and beyond.
As the Director of National Intelligence James R. Clapper noted a few weeks ago in a statement to the U.S. Senate Select Committee on Intelligence:

“Sub-Saharan Africa…[has seen] the emergence of extremist and rebel groups, which increasingly launch deadly asymmetric attacks, and which government forces often cannot effectively counter due to a lack of capability and sometimes will. Additionally, a youth bulge will grow with unfulfilled economic expectations and political frustrations; conflict will increase for land and water resources; and strengthening transnational criminal networks will disrupt political and economic stability.”

Director Clapper also stressed that limited resources, corruption, illicit markets, smuggling, and poor governance “undercut development and the [Sahel] region’s ability to absorb international assistance and improve stability and security, which would impede terrorists’ freedom of movement.”

Such convergence of actors is further paving the corridor of illicit trafficking and crime-terror continuum across Africa as criminal insurgencies are becoming players themselves in illicit markets and using the proceeds to finance their terror campaigns, secure their training camps, establish safe havens.

We only have to look at some of the current hot spots to clearly comprehend how certain crime-terror dynamics continue to contribute to insecurity and instability.

Mali
The acute crises in Mali and trans-Africa must be understood in the broader context of a deeply strained region, particularly relating to governance, as converging threat vectors come together from all four sides to create regional security hot spots.

Though Mali’s current predicament arises largely from specific internal factors, the country’s challenges are reinforced and exacerbated by a range of transnational dynamics such as region-wide afflictions, adverse ecological changes, underdevelopment, disaffected local populations, and organized criminal networks.

The rise of violent extremism and organized crime across the region is aggravating the situation in Mali. Al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), the Movement for Unity and Jihad in West Africa, and other terrorist groups have launched attacks, fanned suicide bombers, and kidnappings for ransom from northern Mali into neighboring countries. AQIM’s game-plan in the region is to build an Islamic radical caliphate. According to West Point's Combating Terrorism Center, AQIM's objectives include ridding North Africa of Western influence; overthrowing governments deemed apostate, including those of Algeria, Libya, Mali, Mauritania, Morocco, and Tunisia; and installing fundamentalist regimes based on sharia.

So as illicit goods are trafficked through Mali, the Sahel, and Maghreb, AQIM and its sympathizers are manipulating socio-economic conditions to further advance an illegal economy, and finance their aspirations for a caliphate. For example, prior to losing territorial control after the French intervention in 2013, AQIM was reported to tax drugs passing through their territory.

Despite the transnational impacts, long-term solutions must directly address the internal factors that have made these countries so vulnerable. For example, during the 2012 rebellion, extremists were able to maintain control over cities in the north in part because they provided some semblance of security.

Mali’s civilian security services must develop the capability to provide visible, relevant, and accountable citizen security. Improving citizen participation, trust, and ownership of the national government is a key ingredient to ending the cycle of instability.

Libya
Libya also continues to be challenged with the threat of violence and insecurity.
Libya’s transitional government has been struggling to stabilize the country since a revolution led to dictator Muammar Ghaddafi’s ouster in October 2011. As in other parts of this continent in ungoverned spaces and pockets of insecurity, a proliferation of threat actors and networks including extremists and violent groups are further destabilizing Libya.

AQIM continues to forge alliances with violent extremist networks in Libya and across the Maghreb, Sahel, and West Africa.

After 42 years of dictatorship, Libya suffers from instability and poor governance due to weak institutions, wide, porous borders, huge stockpiles of loose conventional weapons, and the presence of militias, some of whom have extremist ties.

Without capable police and national security forces that work with communities, security and justice sector institutions struggle to fulfill their mandate, and rule of law is undermined, enabling criminality, illicit trade, and frustration to grow.

Border security is also a critical U.S. and international concern in Libya. Libya’s uncontrolled borders permit the flow not only of destabilizing Qadhafi-era conventional weapons, but also violent extremists throughout North Africa, the Middle East, and the Sahel.

As noted earlier, the flow of these foreign fighters has increased since the fall of Qadhafi and was highlighted by the January 2013 attack near In Amenas, Algeria.

The United States is in the process of beginning to implement a Global Security Contingency Fund (GSCF) border security program to provide technical expertise, training, and limited equipment to build Libya’s inter-ministerial border security capacity to address security along its southern land border.

This program includes training and equipment programming for Libya’s neighbors – Chad, Niger, and Algeria – to improve border security cooperation with Libya. In addition, we have a GSCF training and equipment program to build special operations forces capacity.

Nigeria
Nigerian organized criminal networks remain a major factor in moving cocaine and heroin worldwide, and have begun to produce and traffic methamphetamine to and around Southeast Asia.

In addition to drug trafficking, some of these criminal organizations also engage in other forms of trafficking and fraud targeting citizens of the United States, Europe, and globally.
Widespread corruption in Nigeria further facilitates criminal activity, and, combined with Nigeria’s central location along major trafficking routes, enables criminal groups to flourish and make Nigeria an important trafficking hub.

Nigeria is also having to confront the Boko Haram insurgency in the country’s northeast and has suffered a spate of significant terrorist attacks in recent years.

These terrorist acts are the primary reason that the United States formally designated Boko Haram and Ansaru as foreign terrorist organizations, blocking financial transactions in the United States and making it a crime for U.S. persons to provide them with material support.
The close proximity of terrorist and criminal networks in Nigeria raise the potential for illicit collaboration that will negatively influence the current state of affairs across Africa, and the spigot that is financing insecurity and instability.

Impacts on Morocco and Beyond
But the narrative is not all dire and doom. Take Morocco for example.
While Morocco remains a leading source country for cannabis, trailing only Afghanistan in hashish (cannabis resin) production, its relative importance as a source country may be waning, according to the UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), with Afghanistan and India gaining prominence as suppliers for the that market.

And while it also continues to serve as a transshipment zone for cocaine originating in Latin America that is smuggled via West Africa to Europe, international cooperation is being strengthened with our partners.

For example, the United States has good cooperation with the Moroccan Navy, the Gendarmerie, and Moroccan Customs as they continue to maintain an aggressive maritime interdiction effort against smugglers and traffickers.

On our overall bilateral relationship, we continue to enjoy a very strong partnership with Morocco, focused on promoting regional stability, supporting democratic reform efforts, countering violent extremism, and strengthening trade and cultural ties.

Sustainable Security: Climate Change and Illicit Networks
But terrorism, crime, and corruption are not the only threats we need to consider when we look at the African context.

Threats to the environment from climate change and other factors add a layer of complexity. Whether through the slaughter of wildlife, theft of natural resources, illegal logging and fishing, or other environmental challenges, Africa is losing its biodiversity and cultural heritage.
On top of all this, the changing climate in the Sahel and West Africa, and throughout Africa, can have profound security implications for the region, in the context of other destabilizing factors and existing vulnerabilities. As climate change contributes to hotter temperatures, rising coastal sea levels, desertification, natural disasters, rapid urbanization, and deforestation, greater pressure will be placed on food supplies, water levels, fisheries, and other critical resources. We must continue to work together to address global climate change, reducing our emissions and building resilience to its impacts.

The United States has committed more than a billion dollars since 2009 to humanitarian assistance for drought-affected and conflict-displaced communities in the Sahel, but we face a long road ahead that must include stemming the terrorist threat, uprooting safe havens and sanctuaries, fighting organized crime, and controlling the proliferation of weapons.
Above all, we must work with Africans to protect children from being exploited, trafficked, or recruited to become child soldiers.

U.S. Diplomatic Efforts and International Cooperation
The United States strongly supports the great strides many African countries have made to improve security, good governance, rule of law, and sustainable economic development.
As President Barack Obama highlighted in the U.S. Strategy to Combat Transnational Organized Crime, the United States will continue to assist our partners to strengthen their security footprint and capabilities to combat today’s threat networks.

A key pillar of the Strategy is to enhance international cooperation with key partners to combat threats posed by organized crime, narco-trafficking, and terrorism, and to protect our communities from the violence, harm, and exploitation wrought by transnational threat networks.
The Strategy also challenges the U.S. government and our international partners to work together to combat transnational illicit networks and converging threats, and take that fight to the next level by breaking their corruptive power, attacking their financial underpinnings, stripping them of their illicit wealth, and severing their access to the financial system.
Throughout this conference, you will have heard presentations about the breadth of U.S. technical assistance from my colleagues from the U.S. Department of Defense, AFRICOM, U.S. law enforcement, and other agencies.

I would like to outline what the Department of State is doing, and in particular to outline some of the programs of the Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (INL). In May 2011, my boss, Ambassador William Brownfield, led a delegation of senior U.S. officials to West Africa to begin formulating a strategic approach to undermine transnational criminal networks in West Africa and to reduce their ability to operate illicit criminal enterprises.
Through consultations with partners in the region, our U.S. government team developed a plan called the West Africa Cooperative Security Initiative, or WACSI. WACSI is built around five objectives designed to respond to the underlying factors that allow transnational crime to flourish in West Africa.

Drawing on lessons learned from the law enforcement, development, and military perspectives, as well as the conditions on the ground unique to West Africa, WACSI offers the first comprehensive U.S. government approach to drug trafficking in West Africa.
The U.S. government has identified existing and new U.S. assistance to support this initiative and it is anticipated that additional U.S. government resources will be dedicated to support it in the future. Programming under WACSI will be aligned with the five pillars to focus on efforts such as:
  1. Technical assistance and capacity building to help governments and civil societies develop the skills to combat impunity;
  2. Technical assistance drafting anti-TOC laws and policies, assisting in the process of getting these laws enacted, and creating awareness about the laws and policies on anti-TOC;
  3. Investing in elite counternarcotics units, operational training and equipping of accountable institutions, and technical assistance to build basic law enforcement skills and institutional capacity;
  4. Technical assistance to build the capacity of prosecutors and judges to prosecute and adjudicate complex TOC cases; and
  5. Drug demand reduction and raising public awareness of TOC.
West Africa Cooperative Security Initiative (WACSI) in Action
Within the WACSI framework, INL is revamping our assistance programs to create a regional effect, maximize our impact, and coordinate with international partners, including West Africans, other donors, and international organizations.

In 2011 and 2012, the U.S. government provided approximately $95 million for WACSI programs. With this funding, we have undertaken several new projects that help Africans build skills and abilities to fight transnational crime, including maritime crime.

For example, we opened the West Africa Regional Training Center (RTC) in Accra, Ghana, in January 2013. The RTC brings together law enforcement, security, and judicial officials from multiple countries, creating relationships across the region, and building knowledge and skills on topics ranging from investigative analysis to anti-corruption to counternarcotics. In 2013, we conducted 19 courses and trained more than 675 officials from 17 countries.

To address maritime security, we supported a series of three regional workshops focused on maritime criminal justice for ECOWAS member states.

We continue to explore future areas of assistance to include strengthening capabilities to preserve crime scenes for complex investigations, create strong case packages, and build more effective, evidence-based trials.

Trans-Saharan Counter-Terrorism Partnership

The Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership (TSCTP) is a multi-faceted U.S. strategy aimed at disrupting terrorist organizations by strengthening regional counterterrorism capabilities, and enhancing and institutionalizing cooperation among the region’s security forces. This effort has taken an increasingly holistic view of counter-terrorism, focusing on the drivers of extremism, and the importance of effective, resilient, and accountable security and justice institutions.

In 2014, INL will be working with governments in the Maghreb and Sahel to improve the responsiveness of their security institutions to their citizens. In particular, INL will provide mentorship and training to law enforcement and corrections services to help them proactively and accountably provide the valuable citizen security their citizens expect and need. INL is also looking to engage with communities to help them more proactively advocate for their interests and work with law enforcement to find practical solutions to their security concerns.
We are also exploring how regional networks can help improve the sustainability and effectiveness of key security sector reforms, both within the Sahel and the Maghreb.

Conclusion: Partnerships for Sustainable Security
I applaud the organizers of the AFSEC14 conference for focusing on the importance of strengthening international cooperation on sea and on land to effectively disrupt and dismantle transnational organized crime, illicit flows, and terrorism across Africa.
I want to again extend my appreciation on behalf of the United States to our partners in attendance for their commitment to work across borders, improve coordination and information-sharing, and leverage our respective capabilities and capacities to defeat our common adversaries.

Many of our partners, including the European Union, NATO, the African Union, and others, are undertaking multi-dimensional, trans-African strategies, and we must continue to coordinate closely to ensure a common and complementary approach.

The United States will be an active partner in this endeavor and will continue to support the ongoing efforts of the UN Special Envoy for the Sahel, Romano Prodi, to develop an integrated UN strategy for tackling the multiple crises trans Africa. We must continue our efforts to approach the Sahel and the Maghreb’s interconnected problems with a comprehensive inter-regional and international effort.

The United States, China, France, and other countries must work more closely with the international community to better coordinate efforts and resources, build Africa’s sustainable future and work together to combat the threats that undermine the capital and investments that are necessary to sustain economic prosperity throughout Africa.

We must continue to leverage all national economic, intelligence, and diplomatic powers to make it riskier, harder, and costlier for threat networks to do business within Africa.
Illicit trafficking remains the lifeblood of the numerous bad actors and networks, creating vulnerabilities for nations. We must crackdown on corruption at all levels and cut off the ability of kleptocrats, criminals, and terrorists to enjoy the fruits of illicit enterprise and that enable the financial capacity to execute their operations.

By combating the triple threat of corruption, organized crime, and terrorism, we can also shut the door and keep criminals and extremists alike from exploiting vulnerable and corrupt nodes or their grievances to wage jihad. We must prevent narco-corruption from destroying countries like Guinea and Guinea-Bissau.

Finally, just as Al-Qaeda, al-Shabaab, Boko Haram, and other violent extremist groups are determined to spread insecurity and despair, the international community must support governments in the region to offer the better alternative—the option of hope, economic freedom, and sustainable futures that are real investments in peoples’ lives.

To do this, we must support pragmatic partnerships and creative incentives that deter the recruitment of Africa’s marginalized youth and peoples, unemployed, and disenfranchised and invest in developing economic opportunities that help finance their education, health, and on agricultural technologies and other micro-business that augment market growth and investment strategies. Reducing demand for increasingly available illicit drugs is a key part of this puzzle, if we are to give Africa’s youth a fighting chance at stopping the cycle of crime and corruption.
We need to address underlying causes that are contributing to today’s conflicts in Africa: food and water security, poverty, economic integration and development, and other socio-economic areas that empower communities and nurture growth markets, investment frontiers, and resiliency.

With careful, targeted assistance, and smart diplomatic engagement, together we can advance our common objectives and strategic interests.

If we do not act decisively, the region will remain an exporter of terror and a provider of safe havens where terrorists from other conflicts all over the world find refuge, illicit trafficking will continue to expand, arms and weapons will dangerously proliferate, women, men, and children will be trafficked, and drugs and illicit enterprise will corrode the rule of law and the gains of globalization.

The tragic attacks in Abuja, In Amenas, Bamako, Benghazi, Nairobi, and other cities across West Africa, the Sahel, East Africa, and Maghreb are not reasons to retreat. Neither are the greedy and illicit ventures by criminal entrepreneurs that are destroying communities.
An effective response will require more local and regional partners, more cooperation with allies, more resources, and most of all a willingness to accept risk and political courage and commitment to stay the course.

We can only tackle these threats effectively if we work together and synchronize our capabilities and capacities.

If we do this, we can create hope, stability, opportunity, and an enduring peace.
And we must not fail to safeguard all of our security and to protect the blessings for our children to enjoy—a global village that is safer, more secure, prosperous, and at peace.
Thank you.

Thursday, January 23, 2014

3 INDICTED IN CORRUPTION SCHEME INVOLVING MARINE CORPS LOGISTICS BASE

FROM:  JUSTICE DEPARTMENT 
Wednesday, January 22, 2014
Three Georgia Men Charged in Alleged Widespread Corruption Schemes at Local Military Base

Three Georgia men have been charged in a 51-count indictment for their alleged participation in fraud and corruption schemes at the Marine Corps Logistics Base (MCLB) in Albany, Ga., resulting in the loss of millions of dollars to the United States government.

Acting Assistant Attorney General Mythili Raman of the Justice Department’s Criminal Division and U.S. Attorney Michael J. Moore for the Middle District of Georgia made the announcement after the indictment was unsealed in the Middle District of Georgia today.

Christopher Whitman, 48, co-owner of United Industrial of Georgia Inc. (also known as ULOC), an Albany-based trucking company and freight transportation broker , was indicted on 43 counts of money, property and honest services wire fraud, five counts of bribery and one count of theft of government property.  Shawn McCarty, 36, of Albany, a former employee at the MCLB-Albany, was charged with 30 counts of money, property and honest services wire fraud and one count of bribery; and Bradford Newell, 43, of Sylvester, Ga., also a former employee at the MCLB-Albany, was charged with 13 counts of money, property and honest services wire fraud, one count of bribery, and one count of theft of government property.

The three men were arrested earlier today and appeared before U.S. Magistrate Judge Thomas Q. Langstaff.   Judge Langstaff ordered the three men detained pending further hearings next week.

According to the indictment, Whitman paid nearly $1 million in bribes to Mitchell Potts, the former traffic office supervisor for the Defense Logistics Agency (DLA) at MCLB-Albany, Jeff Philpot, the former lead transportation assistant in the traffic office, and Shawn McCarty, another transportation assistant in the traffic office, to obtain commercial trucking business from the DLA.   The indictment alleges that Potts, Philpot and McCarty used their official positions to defraud the government and benefit ULOC by helping ULOC obtain transportation contracts loaded with unnecessary premium-priced requirements – including expedited service; removable gooseneck trailers, which do not require a loading dock and are therefore more expensive than standard trailers; and exclusive use, which requires that freight be shipped separately from other equipment – even if that results in a truck not being filled to capacity.   The indictment alleges that Whitman and ULOC brokered these shipments for service without the premium specifications and on fewer trucks than requisitioned by DLA, but they billed the government at rates approved by the corrupt officials.   These actions are alleged to have resulted in ULOC profits grossing more than $20 million over less than four years.

Whitman is accused of orchestrating a scheme to steal and sell surplus equipment from MCLB-Albany worth more than $1 million.   Whitman allegedly paid approximately $200,000 in total bribes to Shelby Janes, the former inventory control manager of the Distribution Management Center (DMC) at MCLB-Albany, and Newell, an assistant to Janes, who used their official positions to help Whitman steal surplus equipment from the base, including bulldozers, cranes and front-end loaders.   The indictment alleges that Whitman improved and painted the stolen equipment.

An indictment is merely a charge and the defendants are presumed innocent unless and until proven guilty beyond a reasonable doubt in a court of law.

If convicted, the defendants face up to 20 years in prison for each wire fraud count and 15 years in prison for each bribery count.   The theft count carries a maximum prison term of 10 years.   Each charged count carries a maximum fine of $250,000 or twice the gross gain.

Prior to this indictment, one former ULOC employee and three DLA officials pleaded guilty in connection with the fraud and corruption schemes alleged in the indictment.   On Oct. 10, 2013, Kelli Durham, ULOC’s former manager, pleaded guilty to conspiracy to commit wire fraud, admitting to intentionally overbilling the United States for services ULOC did not perform, resulting in losses ranging from $7 million to $20 million, and for receiving $905,685 for her role.   She faces a maximum penalty of five years in prison.   In May 2013, Potts and Philpot pleaded guilty to bribery for collectively accepting more than $700,000 in bribes; and in February 2013, Janes pleaded guilty to bribery for receiving nearly $100,000 in bribes.   The three former officials each face up to 15 years in prison.

The case is being investigated by the Naval Criminal Investigative Service, with assistance from the Dougherty County District Attorney’s Office Economic Crime Unit, Defense Criminal Investigative Service, DLA Office of the Inspector General, and the Department of Labor Office of the Inspector General.   The case is being prosecuted by Trial Attorneys Richard B. Evans and J.P. Cooney of the Criminal Division’s Public Integrity Section and Assistant U.S. Attorney K. Alan Dasher of the Middle District of Georgia.

Wednesday, December 18, 2013

U.S. OFFICIAL,S REMARKS ON INTERNATIONAL LAW ENFORCEMENT CHALLENGES IN PARIS, FRANCE

FROM:  U.S. STATE DEPARTMENT 
Confronting Converging Threats and the Dark Shadows of the Global Economy: Preventing Downward Spirals of Chaos, Insecurity, and Instability
Remarks
David M. Luna
Director for Anticrime Programs, Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs
Conseil Superieur de la Formation et de la Recherche Strategique
Paris, France
December 13, 2013

[As Prepared]

Good afternoon.

I would like to thank Alain Bauer, President of the Conseil Supérieur de la Formation et de la Recherche Stratégique (CSFRS) and the Government of France for their kind invitation to attend the “IVèmes Assises Nationales de la Recherche Stratégique” and share the U.S. perspective on some of the transnational challenges and risks that threaten our common security and interests in many parts of the world today.

It is always a pleasure for me to participate in events at military centers of learning like the École Militaire, where students and scholars can educate one other about the strategic art of confronting complex threats and challenges in a rapidly-changing world.

I can personally attest to the value of higher military education, having studied at the U.S. Army War College. While at the War College, not only did I gain a nuanced understanding of current global threats and pathways to promote and defend our national interests, I learned also that the Defense Department and the State Department are not from different planets, as we used to say in Washington. I came to understand that collaboration—across agencies, across borders—could act as a force multiplier for our own efforts.

So a big “hooah!” all around to military colleges for educating future leaders and fostering a Whole-of-Government, Whole-of-Society approach to global security.

Finally, I would also like to recognize my good friend Dr. Xavier Raufer, Université Paris II MCC, Conseil Scientifique, for his leadership over the years to address global security issues and foster collaboration between the United States and France against transnational crime, terrorism, and corruption.

In the time allotted to me, I would like to outline the converging threats that are increasingly alarming to the United States and our partners; how the United States is responding to these threats; and, finally, how the international community mitigates these threats and builds resiliency through collective action.

Navigating Global Threats and Geo-Security Risks: Human Disasters

Distinguished ladies and gentlemen, we live at a time of great promise and great peril. The theme of this roundtable—“Disorders of the world and crime: structural perspectives”—is timely.

Ever the optimist, I believe that through collaborative platforms, networks, and partnerships, we can create order from chaos and increase our ability to pull humanity back from the brink of disaster, especially where criminal entrepreneurs and illicit networks exploit calamity to erode our collective security and economic stability.

Corruption

Corruption is a particularly destabilizing force to our security, development, and prosperity agenda. Corruption is the lifeblood of transnational organized crime. International criminals have tremendous financial resources, and they spare no expense to corrupt government and law enforcement officials. Not only does corruption undermine security, development, and the rule of law, but it also erodes public trust in institutions, distorts markets, and fuels the spread of organized crime and terror.

Many of the threats we see emerging today are unified in one way or another by one common factor: corruption. Even in the most advanced economies, dark corners exist where a parallel, illicit market thrives. In these dark shadows, corrupt business leaders, government officials, and criminals are working together to influence the economies of many countries. Wherever criminal elements and their corrupt facilitators operate with impunity, our collective efforts to rid the world of ungoverned spaces, promote democracy and the rule of law, and expand legitimate economic opportunities will always be incomplete.

Illicit Trade

Illicit trade—or, as some have called it, “the dark side of globalization”—is another human-caused disaster, and one that I had the opportunity to discuss yesterday at the OECD High-Level Risk Forum as chair of the OECD Task Force on Charting Illicit Trade.

The illegal economy includes narcotics trafficking, wildlife trafficking, human trafficking, illegal logging, counterfeit consumer goods and medications, and other illicit enterprises. It is a network of shadowy markets in which illegal arms brokers and narcotics kingpins act as the new CEOs and venture capitalists.

According to some estimates, the illegal economy accounts for eight to 15 percent of world GDP, and in many parts of the developing world, it may account for several times this estimate. The estimated annual costs and revenues generated by transnational illicit networks and organized crime groups are staggering:

Bribery: Significant portion of $1 trillion
Narcotics Trafficking: $750 billion to $1 trillion
Counterfeited and Pirated Products: $500 billion
Environmental Crime (illegal wildlife trade, logging, trade in CFCs, and toxic waste dumping): $20 to $40 billion
Human Trafficking: 20.9 million victims globally, $32 billion annually
Credit Card Fraud: $10 to 12 billion
Simply put, illicit trade is a barrier to economic growth. It distorts legitimate markets, disrupts global supply chains, and depletes natural resources. It also imperils our collective security. We all experience the effects of illicit trade every day:

When governments cannot afford to provide vital public services and law enforcement because legitimate revenue streams from legitimate commerce are being siphoned away by corrupt officials, smugglers, and criminals;
When businesses suffer loss of revenue because of counterfeiting or black market distribution of their products;
When men, women, and children are trafficked and exploited, leading to the breakdown of families and communities, degradation of human capital, threats to public health, and extortion and subversion of government officials; and
When illicit financial flows and dirty money enter the global financial system, eroding the integrity of legitimate markets while giving false hope to victimized communities that illicit enterprise can replace fair and open markets.
Legitimate commerce loses as the illegal economy expands. We must shut down the illegal economy and create legitimate, transparent markets across the investment frontiers of tomorrow.

Terrorism

We have also come to understand how terrorism can create world disorder, chaos, and insecurity as terrorists engage in cowardly and criminal acts to destabilize peace and security across our communities.

Corruption, crime, and terrorism—the “unholy trinity” as Dr. Louise Shelley, Dr. Raufer, and other distinguished scholars have dubbed it—are the drivers of the global threat environment, the merging and blending of an ever-expanding array of illicit actors and networks.

In an interconnected world, the pipelines linking these threat actors and networks cut across borders, infiltrate and corrupt licit markets, penetrate fragile governments, and undercut the interests and security of our partners across the international community.

The growing illegal economy supports and enables corrupt officials, criminals, terrorists, and insurgents to mingle and conduct business with another. We must build our own networks to fight these illicit networks and break their corruptive influence.

Navigating Global Threats and Geo-Security Risks: Natural Disasters

Let me now say a few words about the cataclysmic events that threaten global security, especially those forces of nature that, when crossed with human disasters, engender an unprecedented level of vulnerability. Catastrophic heat waves, typhoons, earthquakes, flooding, new diseases—any one of these disasters can cause major disruptions to our physical infrastructure, economies, and institutions. When they converge with other geo-security threats, they create the “perfect storm” that can wreak havoc on the stability and security of states and communities. Across the Sahel, climate change, scarcity of resources, and human-caused disasters are contributing to anti-government movements, instability, and the breakdown of social harmony and cohesion.

I cannot emphasize this enough: to manage change and mitigate emerging geo-security risks such as these, we must better understand the adverse effects that corruption, illicit trade, and other global threats can have on economic growth and on achieving millennium development goals, as well as our security. More so now than ever before, it is crucial that we work together to address these international and transnational challenges.

Ladies and gentlemen, corruption and crime exist in every corner of the globe. So do terrorism and climate change. They occur in many of our communities, and on those occasions when they converge, they can bring disorder and instability. In this scenario, shadowy markets, criminal entrepreneurs, and illicit networks could become de facto service providers as governments collapse and chaos and insecurity increase, and in the worst case scenario, prey on the victims of pandemics, storms, and other disasters.

Diplomatic Engagement, Collaborative Platforms, Public-Private Partnerships, and Resiliency

In this ever-changing world, we need to adopt smarter, proactive approaches to market forces, natural disasters, and our own ethical failings. If we do not act, transnational threats will continue to imperil our communities, economies, and ways of life.

We must build a community of responsible governments, businesses, and civil society organizations, working together to build market resiliency, safeguard government integrity, and preserve our common security.

The United States has recently taken steps to make countering the convergence of illicit threats a national security priority. On July 25, 2011, the White House released the Strategy to Combat Transnational Organized Crime: Addressing Converging Threats to National Security, which aims to protect Americans and citizens of partner nations from violence and exploitation at the hands of transnational criminal networks.

While the problem of transnational illicit networks is as ancient as the trade routes that many such networks still employ today, the United States and its partners recognize the importance of net-centric partnerships to confront converging threats and the lethal nexus of organized crime, corruption, and terrorism along global illicit pathways and financial hubs.

Of growing concern are illicit financial hubs and their potentially complicit banks and market-based facilitators and super fixers—such as corrupt lawyers, accountants, black market procurers of commodities and services, and cross-border illicit transport movers.

Illicit financial hubs and sanctuaries help to create the permissive environment that enables illicit funds to enter through vulnerable points in the system and be transferred very rapidly, often with little control or regulation, anywhere in the world. All it takes is a single illicit actor or bank to accept an unsavory client for illicit funds or goods to spread and disguise themselves across the globe, from financial markets in New York and London to Dubai, Hong Kong, and other financial centers.

In support of the Strategy, the U.S. Congress established the Transnational Organized Crime Rewards Program in order to assist efforts to dismantle transnational criminal organizations and bring their leaders and members to justice. The new program complements the Narcotics Rewards Program by offering rewards up to $5 million for information on significant transnational criminal organizations involved in activities beyond drug trafficking, such as human trafficking, money laundering, maritime piracy, and trafficking in arms, counterfeits, and other illicit goods. We anticipate that by rewarding informants who provide leads and tips that help hobble transnational organized criminals, we can protect our citizens and homeland, and target similar threats abroad.

Moving forward, the United States will continue to build collaborative partnerships and knowledge-based platforms with the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), the World Bank, the G8/G20, INTERPOL, the Financial Action Task Force (FATF), World Customs Organization (WCO), the European Union, the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation Forum (APEC), Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), Organization of American States (OAS), African Union (AU), and other regional and sub-regional bodies.

A New Paradigm to Confronting Transnational Threats: Convergence

In closing, at a time when global risks are growing and converging, the international community must come together to better understand the current and future disorders of our world. To confront today’s threats, risk and challenges, we must escape the conventional, inside-the-box mindset, and think more four-dimensionally—we must view today’s converging threats through a more panoramic prism and better understand how threats are increasingly linked and how illicit vectors come together in some of today’s” hot spots” and create a bigger threat altogether.

I would like to share five converging threats that I believe will be among the most critical for the international community to confront in the coming years.

Sustainability and Security: Harming our environment also harms humanity. Environmental security issues will be among the great challenges we face in the coming decades, including the impact that climate change, rapid urbanization, deforestation, natural disasters, and pandemics will have on food supplies, water levels, fisheries, and other critical resources. Given that we are a global community, consuming annually what some estimate is the equivalent of one-and-one half times our planet’s carry capacity, our ecological footprint is detrimental and unsustainable. Moreover, when we couple this with climate change, droughts, scarcity of resources, and humanitarian disasters that will trigger forced migrations. I expect that we will see more conflict and violence across some parts of the world. Global health security threats are likely to increase for many reasons, among them climate change bringing existing diseases to new areas; urbanization packing more people together in unhealthy environments, cheek-by-jowl with domestic animals that harbor cross-species viruses; and even progress in the life sciences that could enable malefactors to create microbial threats even as legitimate scientists develop new tools to defend ourselves against disease. In some of these ungoverned spaces and insecurity hubs, criminal networks and other illicit actors may become increasingly dominant.

Cybercrime and Virtual Currencies: Another emerging threat that many in the international community are concerned about these days is cybercrime. Cyber-based threats will continue to increase daily and as communities around the world lose data, money, and ideas through cyber intrusions and cyber criminals. In recent months, there has also been much reporting on the criminal exploitation of virtual currency systems that further transnational criminal operations, and the opportunities that cyberspace provides to entrepreneurial criminals to engage in illicit activities on-line and to launder their “dirty money” undetected. For example, earlier this year law enforcement shutdown several virtual currency platforms exploited by illicit actors including those involved in the Liberty Reserve $6 billion money laundering operation, which included credit card fraud, identity theft, investment fraud, computer hacking, narcotics trafficking, and child pornography. In another case, the U.S. Department of Justice has alleged that customers of Silk Road, the largest narcotic and contraband marketplace on the Internet to date, were required to pay in bitcoins to enable both the operator of Silk Road and its sellers to evade detection and launder hundreds of millions of dollars. While of growing concern, virtual currencies, have yet to overtake more traditional methods to move funds internationally, whether for legitimate or criminal purposes. Nonetheless, use of virtual currencies will continue to grow, especially among criminals eyeing to launder their illicit proceeds.

Human Trafficking and Enslaved Human Capital: Human trafficking will also continue to be a threat to communities across the world, especially as organized criminal networks target vulnerable men, women, and children. In many countries, victims of human trafficking, also known as trafficking in persons and modern slavery, are exploited, abused and forced to work in sweatshops, brothels, fields, and other trades and settings, some hidden behind dark corners, others in plain view, including as child soldiers. The thriving business that human trafficking constitutes allows criminals to make billions from the labor and exploitation of their victims. In addition to poverty, unemployment, and a lack of opportunities, as discussed earlier, natural disasters, conflict and political instability can also increase the incidence of human trafficking as people become vulnerable due to insecurity and economic distress. As long as some countries continue to turn a blind eye to the extent of human trafficking within and across their borders, governments and communities will not be able to build the new markets and investment frontiers to grow their economy due to the significant loss of their human and social capital.

Megacities, Population Tsunamis, and Dark Slums of Criminality: Megacities as a security issue will demand increasing attention as more and more people gravitate to cities for economic opportunities, escape from conflict zones, forced migration related to climate change, or are trafficked as indentured slaves. Many megacities are taxed and overflowing with newcomers, and yet they only keep increasing in population size. Faced with poverty and resource distribution imbalances, newcomers may be marginalized and resort to the shadowy economy to sustain themselves, leaving insecure pockets, crime ridden communities, and heightened ethnic and religious fault lines. In the coming years, it is reasonable for megacities to experience a convergence of economic security, environment security, sustainable security, and national security coming together to deal with the pressures of urbanization. Unmitigated, social unrest in megacities will have destabilizing impacts that will provide platforms for organized crime and other illicit networks to exploit, including trafficking people or exporting extremist recruits to spawn violence in other parts of the world.

Crime-Terror Convergence/Pipelines: I have been talking a lot about crime-terror pipelines over the past several years. In fact, through a partnership between the Defense and State Departments, the United States has brought together some of the top experts in the world to examine not only the possible crime-terror nexus but also to help us better understand the crime-terror pipelines across the global threat environment so that we can work with the international community to map threat networks, identify interlocking nodes, and to coordinate efforts to disrupt and dismantle transnational illicit bad actors and networks. We need to leverage more non-kinetic methods, especially financial tools and criminal justice responses, to better target corrupt actors and illicit pathways, and follow the money to disrupt and dismantle pipelines, target their facilitators, and eliminate their financial resources. We also need to better coordinate diplomatic efforts to identify and uproot safe havens and exploitable sanctuaries that enable criminals, terrorists, and other illicit actors and networks to corrupt governments, access illegal markets, and stage operations without fear of reprisal from law enforcement. I also believe, as Doug Farah and others have advanced, that there is a greater need to coordinate and expose and prevent conditions for the nesting of illicit forces with criminalized states such as we see, for example, in some parts of the Sahel. Some of the thinking and research which helped to inform our dialogues on combating crime-terror pipelines can be found in a book published in May 2013 by the National Defense University, “Convergence: Illicit Networks and National Security in the Age of Globalization.”

*****

The geo-security threats and risks that the international community confronts each day are very real and growing in complexity. However, our commitment to work through our common challenges will help us navigate the global threat environment. The United States is keen to strengthen cooperation with France and other committed partners to address these cross-border threats, in coordination with the international community and leaders and stewards of global security in both public and private sectors.

In the immortal words of one of the world’s greatest leaders and humanitarians of our lifetime, and someone who has had a tremendous impact on my views on humanity and security, I would like to conclude with a quote from Nelson Mandela, which I hope will end on a positive, inspiring note on the power of resiliency:

I am fundamentally an optimist. Whether that comes from nature or nurture, I cannot say. Part of being optimistic is keeping one’s head pointed toward the sun, one’s feet moving forward. There were many dark moments when my faith in humanity was sorely tested, but I would not and could not give myself up to despair. That way lays defeat and death.

We cannot give ourselves up to despair, we must march forward together to confront today’s global threats and anticipate tomorrow’s challenges recognizing that the real threat centers in their convergence. Thank you.

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